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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines corporate governance in the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) during the period 2008 to 2010. The thesis considers how corporate 
governance should be defined, key theories in corporate governance, development of 
corporate governance in the United Kingdom, factors that explain ownership 
structure and the development of AIM since 1995. The empirical research explores 
three themes. 
First, using hand-collected data, involves the construction of corporate 
governance score covering corporate governance disclosures such as board 
committees, board independence, board power, board transparency, related party 
transactions and remuneration types. The main objective, here, is to evaluate the 
commitment to minimal requirements for good corporate governance. Corporate 
governance score is regressed against performance variables such as Tobin‘s Q (TQ) 
and return on assets (ROA). The regressions show that the corporate governance 
score is positively associated with company performance but that the relationship is 
not statistically significant. 
Second, involves the investigation of the relationship between ownership 
type and company performance. The findings show that levels of ownership and 
performance are negatively associated. The relationship was influenced by company 
variables such as size, cash, debt, and corporate governance variables such as duality 
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman roles and the percentage of 
independent directors. The statistical significance of the relationship varies according 
to ownership type. The results demonstrate the presence of monitoring and 
expropriation effects. 
Third, involves the examination of the determinants of CEO pay. Company 
size consistently shows association with CEO pay. The relationship between CEO 
pay and company performance depends on the proxy used to measure performance: 
TQ gives a positive and statistically significant result, whereas ROA gives a negative 
coefficient and not statistically significant. The impact of institutional shareholdings 
also differs depending on which proxy is used to measure performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1: Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate performance, on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). One of the most widely cited definitions of 
corporate governance is that of (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 737): ‘the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investments’. This definition draws attention to the range of corporate governance 
mechanisms that are likely to be observed in practice, particularly board structure, 
equity ownership and executive remuneration.  
 
The study focuses on investigating the use of corporate governance in the 
AIM companies, characterised as small, growth-oriented companies in the United 
Kingdom, where the approach to corporate governance is flexible and principle-
based. Many studies in the field of corporate governance use the United States of 
America as their main data source. Unlike the UK approach to corporate governance, 
the US approach to corporate governance is mandatory, since the enactment of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX). In the US, corporate governance follows a 
common approach for all the companies listed on US stock exchanges, irrespective 
of the size of the company. The current study extends our knowledge of corporate 
governance by studying AIM companies in the UK, which are subject to less 
rigorous governance regime than larger companies listed on the main market of the 
LSE. 
 
The study of corporate governance issues is important because of the risk that 
conflicts of interest will arise between the owners (shareholders) of a company and 
the company‘s management; these conflicts are often referred to as agency problems 
(see Chapter 3). Research that adopts ‗agency theory‘ has identified a range of 
potential and actual governance mechanisms, which help to mitigate these conflicts 
of interest and thereby enhance corporate performance. Governance mechanisms are 
conceptualised as deterrents to managerial opportunism and self-interest. Corporate 
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governance mechanisms should assure shareholders that managers will strive to 
achieve outcomes that are in the shareholders‘ interests (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
An important feature that distinguishes listed companies in the US and UK 
from those in many other countries is that the UK and the US listed companies are 
more likely to have widely dispersed ownership. Corporations with dispersed 
ownership have no significant dominant owner or single owner holding substantial 
shares to enable that owner to control the corporation (Ishak and Napier 2006), that 
is, have a presence of large number of small shareholders. Although shareholders 
have ultimate residual control rights via their votes, various problems exist in such a 
setting. As each shareholding is relatively small in comparison to the total number of 
issued shares, it is virtually impossible for any individual shareholder, or even 
groups of shareholders, to achieve control over the operations of the company. As a 
consequence, the shareholders cede control to management via the board of directors 
and hence are vulnerable to the self-serving behaviour of executives (Keasey et al. 
2005, 7). Although this may be less of a concern for some AIM companies, where 
founders still own substantial blocks of shares, other AIM companies have reached a 
stage where ownership is widely dispersed. 
 
The various changes in corporate governance since the Cadbury Committee 
on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) have shown the 
importance of specific mechanisms for achieving effective corporate governance 
(McKnight and Weir 2009). The Cadbury Committee recommended several reforms, 
including the formation of three main board committees (audit, remuneration and 
nomination), splitting the functional roles of the Chief Executive Officer and Chair 
of the Board, and increasing the role and appointment of non-executive directors1. 
The introduction of the use of corporate governance communicates to shareholders a 
commitment to both jointly of accountability and transparency, something that the 
Cadbury Committee and its successors have explicitly advocated. Gray (2001, 11) 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, the UK terminology, ‗non-executive‘ or ‗non-executive director‘ (NED) is 
used. This corresponds to the US terminology outside director.  
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defines accountability as ‘identifying what one is responsible for and then providing 
information about that responsibility to those who have rights to that information’. 
Therefore, in terms of corporate governance and accountability, companies are seen 
either as a corporate entity or as represented by directors in a fiduciary role, are 
accountable to their shareholders. A major issue is the rights of other stakeholders 
and clarifying exactly what these rights entail, and this is further discussed in chapter 
three.  
 
Since the Cadbury Report (1992), the UK has seen corporate governance 
evolve in response to financial scandals and crisis, which includes, among others, 
Maxwell and BCCI. Chapter 4 discusses the development of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. The UK Corporate Governance Code consists of principles and 
provisions relating to various aspects of the governance of companies. In the United 
States, certain aspects of corporate governance have become part of the mandatory 
regulation due to the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). In contrast, UK has opted not to 
adopt mandatory corporate governance legislation, instead favours a voluntary 
market driven regime. Hence, UK has opted for a regime under which companies 
can choose the governance practices they wish to adopt but have to make disclosure 
in respect of their choices. The UK Governance Code does not form part of company 
law, so there are no legal obligations to adopt the Code; therefore, companies are not 
required to adopt particular governance practices or mechanisms. However, the stock 
exchange listing rules call for mandatory disclosure, where, companies have to state 
in their annual reports whether they are complying with the Code, and if not, explain 
why. Unlike companies listed on the main market of the LSE, AIM companies are 
not required to follow the Code. Instead, they have to adopt the Quoted Companies 
Alliance approach to corporate governance, which takes guidance from the Code. 
However, there may still be concerns regarding the transparency of AIM companies. 
 
Despite the rapid growth in the number of both UK and International 
companies listing on the AIM, these companies have attracted relatively little 
attention from academic researchers (see Chapter 6 for a literature review). This 
inattention, at least in part, is due to lack of readily available data. For smaller AIM 
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companies, information was often not consistently accessible over several years, thus 
making comparative analysis impossible. Researchers needed to extract information 
for each company manually from the companies‘ annual reports, and this was time-
consuming. However, this is no longer the case since all AIM companies must now 
have a website and upload the company‘s annual reports, which has made data 
gathering easier. Hence, it is likely that research interest in AIM companies will 
grow. 
 
1.2: Motivation for the Study 
AIM is an exchange-regulated market, introduced by the LSE with the 
specific intention of attracting the listings of smaller, growth-orientated companies. 
Companies on the AIM are regulated using a ‗lighter touch‘ than those on the main 
market, and this lighter touch regulation has led to a rapid rise in new initial public 
offerings on the AIM compared to the main market. However, the quality of 
companies on the AIM may be lower than the quality of companies on the main 
market. There is a perception that AIM companies are inherently riskier, and this has 
led to widespread belief that any significant failure of the AIM leading to a negative 
impact on the UK‘s stock market. This implies that the AIM provides an important 
research context for examining corporate governance and quantitatively assessing its 
association with company performance. Hence, this study investigates the link 
between corporate governance and performance for AIM companies. 
 
In much of the literature on corporate governance, only larger publicly listed 
companies are the subject of analysis: a vast amount of empirical research on 
corporate governance and company performance emanate mainly from larger 
companies in both strong developed markets and emerging markets (Zahra 2014, 
77). Only a small number of empirical corporate governance research relate to the 
AIM companies in the UK, and this provides considerable opportunities to contribute 
to the corporate governance literature. So far, empirical work on the AIM has been 
lacking partly due to difficulties in obtaining data. However, by employing a wide 
range of data sources, such research is certainly possible. This study not only studies 
governance of AIM companies empirically, but examines the context in which AIM 
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companies are governed, by investigating the definition of corporate governance, 
reviewing central theories used to understand corporate governance, reviewing the 
development of corporate governance regulation in the UK and elsewhere, and 
investigating specific institutional features of corporate governance on the AIM. 
 
An important aspect of research into the governance and performance of 
AIM companies is being aware of potential differences in how the AIM companies 
are owned and managed, in comparison with the large UK listed companies that are 
commonly studied. A common implicit assumption is that the UK and the US 
publicly listed companies have a unitary board without an influential block holder. 
Hence, these companies exhibit the Berle and Means (1932) stereotype of dispersed 
ownership, which has been a major inspiration for agency theory. This stereotyped 
company is much less likely to exist among the AIM companies, and presence of 
dominant shareholders may be more common. Hence, there is a need for research 
into specific investigation of the ownership structure of AIM companies. It is also 
possible that the management structures and incentives of senior managers are 
different for AIM companies. For example, if there is less separation of ownership 
and control, then Chief Executive Officers may be significant owners of shares in 
their own right, and their compensation structures may systematically differ from 
those observed in larger companies and predicted by agency theory. Hence, there is a 
need to investigate the remuneration of CEOs of AIM companies. 
 
1.3: Objectives of the Study 
Setting this thesis in context involved a comprehensive search of the existing 
literature. In addition, within definitions of corporate governance an understanding 
of corporate governance and the ways in which it has been researched was gained 
from leading corporate governance textbooks, for example, Mallin, Solomon, Monks 
and Minow, and more nuanced insights came from reading corporate governance 
reviews and surveys. Specific literature reviews include, for example, Eisenhardt 
(1989); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Murphy (1999); Core et al. (2003); Young et al. 
(2008) and Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010). Because of the vast amount of 
information available on corporate governance, the thesis structure includes 
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theoretical and empirical chapters. This means that general issues of corporate 
governance theory and practice are addressed in general chapters while literature 
relating directly to the empirical studies is reviewed at the beginning of each of those 
chapters. 
 
The first objective of this study is to review the definitions of corporate 
governance used by different authors, as this provides valuable knowledge in light of 
an upsurge in corporate governance study among both academic researchers and 
regulators. Is there any consensus among these definitions? This will involve 
summing up any common features such as system of regulation, legislation, 
governance structure and focus on shareholder or stakeholders.  
 
The second objective is to understand the different corporate governance 
theories and establish the use of agency theory for this thesis. The systematic 
theoretical literature on corporate governance begins as early as the seminal work of 
Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and control. The 
development of a number of key theoretical frameworks helps to explain and analyse 
corporate governance issues. Chapter 3 will show that there are marked differences 
between the different theoretical frameworks, but there are obvious overlaps between 
them. Corporate governance has evolved differently in different countries according 
to the requirements of their institutional context and the economic development. 
However, in the UK the principal driver of the theory of the governance of listed 
companies is the necessity that managers act as agents of shareholders and thereby 
act in the best interests of the shareholders. Shareholders‘ interests suggest the 
maximisation of the equity return as the corporate objective to which the managers 
are accountable to the control and direction of their corporations. Agency theory is 
undertaken to be the main theoretical form for the thesis and to explain the corporate 
governance issues in AIM companies. 
 
The third objective is to understand the development of corporate governance 
in the UK. Because of corporate failures in the early 1990s, the UK has initiated a 
series of reforms to corporate governance. Achieving this objective involves a brief 
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introduction to the development of the UK‘s corporate governance since the Cadbury 
Report (1992). An important feature of the UK corporate governance regime is based 
on the principle of ‗comply or explain‘ approach, first recommended by the Cadbury 
Report (1992). The importance of the Cadbury report is captured by the London 
Stock Exchange‘s requirement for listed companies to disclose whether the company 
complies with the Code and, if not, to provide a statement justifying non-
compliance. 
 
The fourth objective is to consider the theoretical factors involved in 
determining the structure of equity ownership. Researchers have argued that 
corporate governance systems can be explained in terms of the country‘s legal 
origin, culture and political conditions. For example, according to La Porta et al. 
(2002) countries with common law legal origin have larger capital markets and more 
widely held companies compared to the civil law countries. An inference drawn 
from this is that the ownership patterns are a consequence of the legal protection 
provided to minority shareholders (Porta et al. 1999). An understanding of the 
theoretical literature on corporate ownership is important as ownership variable may 
explain the company performance of AIM companies. 
 
The fifth objective is to examine structural and institutional factors that may 
have contributed to AIM success, which has survived and prospered since 1995, 
during which period some of its competitors have ceased to operate. AIM is an 
important market for UK‘s small and medium enterprises and any prominent 
financial scandal or collapse in this market may destroy investor confidence. 
Therefore, it is necessary for AIM companies to have appropriate corporate 
governance structures and effective checks and balances. This introduces the role of 
the Nominated Advisers, which is a unique feature of AIM and a substantial part of 
its success.  
 
The sixth objective is to determine, for the AIM companies, the relationship 
between independent variables (company performance, size or governance) and 
specific dependent variables (governance, performance). The statistical analysis of 
24 
 
such relationships reflects the possible impact of other factors by including relevant 
control variables. The objective is achieved by developing appropriate hypotheses 
and then by gathering data and using regression analysis to test the hypotheses. 
Overall, the study includes three different areas in corporate governance: the 
relationship between a composite corporate governance index and company 
performance, the relationship between ownership and company performance and the 
determinants of CEO compensation. In each study, the results arise from different 
samples, reflecting the increasing availability of data during the period of the 
research. The empirical work consistently made use of computer software packages, 
such as EVIEWS7 and Excel, for data handling, estimating the statistical models and 
the data presentation.  
1.4: Research Questions 
The objectives set out in the previous section are addressed in different ways. 
The first five theoretical objectives involve a critical examination of both prior 
literature and descriptive material about the AIM. The sixth objective requires the 
statistical analysis of data relating to sample of the AIM companies. 
The thesis aims to answer the following research questions:  
Theoretical Questions: 
To what extent can agency theory, which has been developed mainly in the 
context of large companies with widely dispersed ownership, be extended to smaller 
quoted companies where ownership may be more concentrated?  
Empirical Questions: 
First, does increase in overall corporate governance disclosure, by the AIM 
companies, be associated with higher company performance, that is, results from, or, 
does the individual attributes of corporate governance influence company 
performance? 
Second, what are the determinants of ownership structure for the AIM 
companies? How do different ownership structures affect company performance? 
Third, what are the determinants of Chief Executive Officer‘s pay for 
companies on the AIM? 
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1.5 : The Scope of this Study 
This study focuses on corporate governance for the companies listed on the 
AIM, an important market in the UK with a broad range of sectors. The AIM has 
been successful, in contrast to the Europe‘s ‗new‘ markets for small companies, 
which recruited only the high tech companies, and this much reduced sector base 
may have contributed to its failure (Mendoza 2008). In this thesis, the AIM is the 
primary focus of study, however, throughout the thesis, comparisons with the LSE, 
other emerging stock exchanges and the US stock exchanges are made. 
 
This study uses a quantitative approach for investigation of the relationship 
between corporate governance and company performance. The analysis of the data 
for various samples of AIM companies include for periods from 2008 (2007 if 
lagged data). The selection of this starting period is due to the changes to the ‗AIM 
Rules for Companies‘, regarding acceptable accounting standards for AIM 
companies
2
. AIM 15 requires the mandating of International Accounting Standards 
for accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2007 for AIM companies 
that are incorporated in a European Economic Area member state and those that 
prepare consolidated financial statements. Hence, for this thesis information for 
financial data from annual reports were used from 2007 onwards for the AIM 
companies.  
 
1.6: Research Study Limitations 
Limited Time: This research has limited time from 2008, and hence it may be 
difficult (to the extent that AIM has unique features) to generalise findings to other 
markets. However, there may still be insights as to the application of theoretical 
frameworks for understanding corporate governance. 
 
                                                 
2
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-notices/aim-
notice-22.pdf 
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Limited Sample: The unavailability of data for some AIM companies, 
particularly for earlier years, and the need to hand-collect data from printed or on-
line financial statements, also limited the ability of the researcher to use large 
samples from the over 1,000 companies listed on the AIM. In some cases, lack of 
financial or market data, or the unrepresentative nature of such data, for example, 
some AIM companies have minimal turnover of their securities, thus obtaining 
market capitalisation data was highly problematic, meant that companies had to be 
excluded from the samples. Companies are often traded on AIM for only a few years 
before being taken over or delisted, and this means that company data are often not 
available throughout the period analysed. Hence, samples are inevitably small and 
may not always be representative of the AIM as a whole. However, the research 
provides detailed insights into aspects of corporate governance and performance for 
AIM companies that have hitherto not been available. 
1.7: Organisation of the Thesis 
Figure 1.1 shows a schematic plan for the development of the thesis. The 
thesis is organised into three parts and eleven chapters including the introduction 
chapter: 
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Figure 1.1: Plan of the Thesis 
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THE 
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CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
SCORE AND 
COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE
OWNERSHIP AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE
EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL CHAPTERS
Part 1: General Background and Foundational Material
Part 2: Empirical Material
Part 3: Conclusion
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(8) (9) (10)
(11)
(7)
 
1.8: Main Structure of the Thesis 
The remaining 10 chapters of the thesis consist of three main parts. A brief 
synopsis showed below for parts 1, 2, and 3 and chapters 2 to 11. 
 
Part One: Background on Corporate Governance 
Part 1 consists of chapters 2 to 6, providing an overview of corporate 
governance. These chapters offer an analysis of the various definitions of corporate 
governance over the last two decades, a brief history of corporate governance, 
corporate governance theories and systems, a discussion of corporate governance 
best practices focusing mainly on UK and a review of theoretical factors influencing 
the ownership structure. 
Chapter 2 - considers a range of definitions of corporate governance. The 
review of definitions shows that they differ widely. Overall, most definitions are 
either narrowly defined and express the view of the shareholders or more broadly 
defined to include the wider stakeholder groups. This thesis takes the definition of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 737), that is, specific to the provision of finance; the 
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focus would be on how minority shareholders‘ interests are protected as suppliers of 
finance. For the AIM companies, the minority shareholders are vulnerable due to the 
expropriation by the blockholders. 
 
Chapter 3 - outlines the theoretical framework adopted by researchers in the 
study of corporate governance that help explain different governance mechanisms. It 
sets out the competing theoretical explanations used in corporate governance, 
beginning with the dominant agency theory in the understanding of corporate 
governance. Other theories such as stewardship and stakeholder are further discussed 
in chapter three. Wherever possible the various theories are linked to the AIM 
companies. 
 
Chapter 4 - builds a picture of the corporate governance system in the UK, 
this chapter provides an overview of the development of the corporate governance 
codes in UK from 1992 onwards to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012. 
Keasey et al. (2005) suggest that corporate governance development show a shift 
from a narrow approach of focus on accountability to one that recognises the need 
for governance systems to create appropriate structures for potential growth. 
Interestingly, AIM companies are not expected to follow the recommendations of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code. However, as a minimum requirement AIM 
companies have to follow the governance regulatory specifically designed to meet 
the needs of smaller companies provided by the Quoted Companies Alliance. 
 
Chapter 5 - provides a theoretical perspective of ownership structure. It is 
interesting how both the US and UK listed companies predominantly share the 
fundamental characteristic of dispersed ownership as originally described by Berle 
and Means (1932). However, using mainly the work of La Porta studies, the chapter 
shows that the ownership structure does not generally conform to the separation of 
ownership and control paradigm, (that is, where ownership concentration is 
dispersed) but that ownership in many markets is both more concentrated. In 
addition, comparative reviews suggest that other factors such as culture, legal origin, 
religion and political environment heavily influence  the adoption of appropriate 
29 
 
corporate governance structures, which in turn will affect the performance and 
thereby the valuation. Considering the characteristics of the AIM companies, the 
concentrated ownership structure is more likely to be applicable. 
 
Chapter 6 - provides a background study on the AIM as an exchange-
regulated market owned and operated by the LSE specifically to allow small and fast 
growing companies to have easier access to the financial market. The success of the 
AIM comes from the flexibility endowed to the admission rules, which has proved to 
be attractive for companies wanting to list in the UK. 
 
Part Two: Empirical Research 
Part 2 consists of four chapters: an overview and three empirical studies on 
corporate governance mechanisms using the AIM companies. This section consists 
of chapters 7 to 10, which examine the corporate governance disclosure, 
determinants of ownership structure and determinants of CEO pay for the AIM 
companies. 
 
Chapter 7- outlines the methodologies, sources of data and the 
operationalisation of the variables used in the three empirical chapters 8, 9 and 10, 
for AIM. 
 
Chapter 8 - involves defining and calculating an overall corporate 
governance index, CGSCORE, for a sample of AIM companies, using hand-
collected data for a sample of 56 companies for 2008 and 53 companies for 2009. 
The corporate governance variable is a composite measure of corporate governance 
disclosure practices. Since compliance with the corporate governance code is 
voluntary, the adoption of good corporate governance practices by companies is 
expected to be associated with higher company performance. An ordinary least 
squares  regression results show that the disclosure in annual reports of the corporate 
governance attributes is not explained well by performance measures and other 
company specific control variables such as size, growth, ratio of capital expenditure 
over sales. The t-statistics for company level variables are statistically insignificant 
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in all specifications. Unlike other studies, corporate governance score has no 
statistical significance for company size (see Bruno and Claessens 2010). The major 
contribution of this chapter is to construct a corporate governance index, as a quality 
measure of corporate governance, for companies listed on LSE AIM. 
 
Chapter 9 – looks at the determinants of ownership structure in a sample of 
131 AIM companies for the periods 2008 to 2010. Following from Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), various determinants of ownership structure were examined 
empirically. The ownership data shows that the concentration of equity ownership in 
the AIM companies varies widely. From the literature, different ownership 
concentration measures have been used, for example, the shares held by chief 
executive office, the combined shares held by the board, shares held by the largest 
shareholder and shares held by five of the largest owners. Regressions are run with 
the alternative ownership measures as the dependent variables and company 
performance, as the independent variable, together with control variables. The 
company performance measures are Tobin‘s Q, return on assets and market to book 
value. The results show that different measures of ownership provide different 
results.  
 
With Tobin‘s Q included as an explanatory variable, the coefficient is 
negative for different measures of ownership, but positive for institutional 
ownership. However, the statistical significance is only observed with CEO, director 
and institutional ownership holdings.  
 
The volatility and the square form as the explanatory variables show a non-
linear relationship with CEO ownership holdings, cumulative director ownership and 
institutional ownership holdings. For both CEO and director ownership holdings, 
volatility is negative, volatility square is positive, and both are statistically 
significant. With the institutional shareholdings, the relationship with volatility and 
volatility square shows a positive and negative coefficient, respectively and 
statistically significant. The statistical significant for the above three measures of 
ownership disappear when fixed-effects is included. With the largest ownership 
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holdings, there is no relationship. With the five largest shareholders, the relationship 
is non-linear and the signs reverse from positive to negative when fixed-effects are 
included. However, it is only weakly statistically significant. 
 
With the performance as the dependent variable in a linear relationship, the 
results show a positive relationship between DIR-OWNP and return on assets 
(ROA). This is consistent with and without firm fixed-effects. With Tobin‘s Q as the 
dependent variable, the director ownership has negative coefficient, and statistically 
significant, whereas institutional ownership has a very low, positive coefficient and 
statistically significant. Using fixed-effects, the statistical significance disappears. 
When market to book value is regressed on the ownership measures, the results show 
that no measure of ownership concentration is significant when market to book value 
is the dependent variable. This suggests that the selection of the performance 
measure requires caution, and the choice may be determined by the context and 
particularly the characteristics of the AIM companies. 
 
The research also examines the non-linear relationship between company 
performance and the percentage of equity shares held by the directors. Following 
Short and Keasey (1999), this research tests for a cubic form of the relationship 
between company performance measures and director ownership. The model 
includes three variables to describe director ownership: director ownership, the 
square of director ownership and the cube form of director ownership. The 
coefficients of the director ownership variables allows to determine the turning 
points, unlike other studies such as Morck et al. (1988) who used pre-determined 
levels of ownership at 5% and 25%. 
 
The addition of DIR_OWNP square and cube form does not contribute to the 
hypothesis of non-linear association between corporate performance and the 
proportion of shares owned by board directors, that is, the ability to predict the 
performance of AIM companies. These results differ to those of Morck et al. (1988, 
300) and Short and Keasey (1999, 93), who find a positive-negative-positive 
relationship and statistically significant for the US and UK data, respectively. With 
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the return on assets, as the performance measure, the signs are negative-positive-
negative and are statistically significant with the square and the cube forms of 
director ownership. This suggests that with return on assets alignment occurs at 
higher director ownership levels and then entrenchment at even higher levels of 
ownership.  
 
With the largest shareholder, the research uses a quadratic equation to test for 
non-linear relationship. In the fixed-effects model, the results show s that the sign of 
the coefficient changes from positive to negative and is statistically significant, but 
the coefficients for the largest and largest squared ownership holdings are very low. 
Market to book value shows no relationship with the largest and the largest square 
ownership holdings. 
 
Chapter 10 - provides evidence, for the AIM companies, of the association 
between executive remuneration3, company performance and ownership structure, 
after controlling for company specific determinants for remuneration and 
performance. The sample consists of 197 AIM companies over the period 2008 to 
2010. The results of the hypothesis show that regression of CEO‘s remuneration 
(CEOPAY) on TQ has a positive and significant coefficient (ROA shows no 
association). The return on assets (ROA) as an accounting measure of performance 
shows no relationship with the CEO pay. Company size (measured either as the 
natural logarithm of total assets or market capitalisation) is consistently positively 
associated with different measures of executive pay. The following control variables: 
separate roles of the CEO and Chair and presence of the founder member on the 
board have a positive coefficient and statistically significant with CEOPAY, whereas 
cash holdings, leverage, capital expenditure and board size show no correlation with 
the inclusion of fixed-effects. 
 
                                                 
3 In this thesis, the UK terminology, ‘remuneration’ and the US term, ‘ compensation’ are 
interchangeable with the more generic, ‘pay’.  
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Ownership as a governance mechanism works to align CEO, director and 
shareholder interests through CEO remuneration. The results show that with CEO 
shareholdings and director shareholdings the coefficient is negative and statistical 
significant without fixed-effects. With the inclusion of the fixed-effects, there is no 
association between CEOPAY and CEO ownership, whereas the director ownership 
gives a positive and statistically significant association. Institutional shareholdings 
have no impact on the CEOPAY. Yet, with the inclusion of ROA and fixed-effects, 
the correlation between CEOPAY and the level of institutional shareholding is 
negative and statistically significant.  
 
Part Three: Conclusions  
Chapter 11 - The final chapter sets out the answers to the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1, summarises the main findings of the research, identifies and 
discusses limitations, and suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2  DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
2.1: Introduction 
This chapter‘s objective is to review the definitions with a view to identifying 
which definition to use in the thesis. The main goal of this chapter is to review the 
corporate governance definitions with a view to identifying which definition to use 
in the thesis and to provide an understanding of commonalities and differences in 
definitions. The chapter introduces a range of corporate governance definitions, 
predominantly from an academic perspective, which sets forth the scope of the issues 
for the Alternative Investment Market companies that this thesis discusses. Even 
though corporate governance has generated voluminous literature in the last two 
decades, there is still no universally accepted definition of corporate governance. In 
the governance literature, where the definition of corporate governance does exist, an 
ideal definition is a controversial issue, but the authors focus is on the traditional 
relationship between the managers and the shareholders as a narrow scope or the use 
of other stakeholders as a wide scope definition of corporate governance. One of the 
most widely cited definition of corporate governance is that of Cadbury (1992, s2.5): 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled’. The Cadbury definition 
has proved remarkably enduring, repeatedly cited in the corporate governance 
literature. The Cadbury definition is the one, which is, used by codes of best practice 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012.  
 
Over the last few decades, corporate governance has received a huge amount 
of attention. This is due to corporate scandals and financial crisis and these events 
have challenged conceptions and theories of corporate governance (Conyon et al. 
2011a). Examples include the East Asia economic crisis of 1998, corporate 
governance scandals of Enron and WorldCom in the United States, Parmalat, Ahold 
and Vivendi in Europe and the recent global financial institutions failure of 2008-
2009 leading to systemic failures. The corporate failures have been blamed on the 
presence of poor or bad corporate governance (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013, 2). 
This has led to the development and reforms in corporate governance, globally. 
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These corporate failures have highlighted similar issues relating to the role of boards 
of directors, auditors and external regulation. International institutions such as the 
OECD have helped develop the adoption and reforms in corporate governance 
worldwide. The OECD principles are non-binding, as is the case for the UK 
corporate governance code. However, both are effective due to their status as best 
practices.  
The rest of the chapter structure is as follows: the chapter looks at corporate 
governance beginning by looking at the historical development of the two terms 
corporate and governance in section 2.2. Against this theoretical and conceptual 
background, section 2.3 considers various definitions from academics as well as 
policy makers. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2: What is Corporate Governance?  
The origins of the words ‗corporate governance‘ can be traced first to the 
ancient Greek and Latin. The word ‗corporate‘ comes from the Latin word 
‗corporatus‘ past participle of ‗corporare‘ to form a single body derived from the 
word corpus meaning body. Hence, a corporation represents a body or group of 
people that acts as a single entity. The general concept is ‘governance’, which 
originated from Latinised Greek, ‘gubernatio’, meaning management or government, 
which in turn comes from the ancient Greek, ‘kybernao’, which suggest to steer, to 
drive, to guide , to act as a pilot (Clarke 2007b). The similarities to the above are 
seen in the definition of corporate governance provided by Zingales (1998) who 
describes governance as the exercise of authority, direction, and control.  
 
Kay and Silberston (1995, 86) emphasise a direct comparison of a 
corporation‘s governance system with ‗entrenched political structure‘ and suggest 
that both systems show similarities, for instance, the self-perpetuating nature of the 
managerial/governing elite, and the appointment of new members based on the 
existing elite‘s own criteria. Succession of leaders is internal and orderly, but also 
could be a result of a hostile takeover of a corporation or government. The election 
of directors and re-election of the incumbents using a majority vote ensures 
accountability. Weiss (2000) provides a range of different definitions of 
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‗governance‘ quoting various international institutions such as the World Bank and 
OECD and finds that the definition of governance varies substantially. His article 
suggests a conflict between the practitioners‘ use of ‘governance’ as an illustration 
of a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, and its 
alternative use with ‘government’ or ‘politics’.  
 
According to Krahmann (2003, 325) governance can be categorised in four 
ways: as a generic group synonymous with the political system, reform of public 
administration referring to the local council, policy sectors such as education and 
health and the final group consist of corporate governance. This challenges the 
definition of governance as a generic synonymous with concepts such as the political 
system. As such, the use of corporate governance is seen as a sub-set of the wider 
term governance. One could argue that different components of corporate 
governance can be associated with the general concept of ‘governance’, yet 
corporate governance has grown to create its own discipline. When it comes to 
analysing corporate governance, it can include all organisational types, such as 
limited liability companies (both public and private), profit making or not for profit 
making. However, academic research on corporate governance tends to focus on 
limited liability companies that trade on a stock exchange. Corporate governance is 
used as guidance to ensure that objectives of the manager and the shareholders are 
aligned, but also that they are compliant with all regulatory requirements. Corporate 
governance is manifested by rules from the corporate governance codes or national 
jurisdictions, structures (for example, the board committees), systems (for example, 
the outsider or insider systems), procedures (for example, detailed instructions), and 
practices. 
 
Becht et al. (2003), attribute the first use of the term Corporate Governance 
to Eells (1960, 108) in his book, ‗The Meaning of Modern Business‘, where it 
suggests that corporate governance indicates the structure and functioning of the 
corporate as a political entity. Jensen and Meckling (1976)‘s work on the conflict of 
interest between the management and the shareholders began the discourse on 
corporate governance. Sir Adrian Cadbury in the review on Bob Tricker‘s book on 
corporate governance states that he regards Bob Tricker as the ‗Father of Corporate 
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Governance’ since his 1984 book on corporate governance. Since then, I have 
spoken to several key authors in UK, at a Conference in 2014, who confirm that 
Tricker popularised the term Corporate Governance. 
 
Many academic articles do not define corporate governance. Such authors 
often quote one of the definitions set out in Table 2.1, but some authors do not even 
provide a definition at all. It may be that these authors believe corporate governance 
to be a well-defined concept understood by potential readers. However, this seems to 
be contradicted by the variations within the definitions of corporate governance (see 
Table 2.1). This making it difficult to describe what corporate governance is. This 
makes one believe that the definition of corporate governance is still vague and fluid. 
Although ‗corporate governance‘ a phrase that regularly appears among the 
academics, business groups, media and politicians, it is difficult to generalise what 
corporate governance is. The next section considers several definitions both from an 
academic and institutional perspective. 
 
2.3: Review of Various Definitions of Corporate Governance 
A search using academic textbooks, internet and peer reviewed articles on 
corporate governance show various alternatives for the definition of corporate 
governance as shown in Table 2.1. One view is that the corporate governance 
implies a broad ranging process of rules and practices relating to the corporation‘s 
direction and control. Table 2.1 shows a diverse collection of corporate governance 
definitions and reflects the growing interest in the system that management uses to 
discharge their accountability and to represent the interests of the shareholders. The 
table sorts definitions by date of publication, which suggests the possibility of 
development through time, with later authors reflecting the definitions of earlier 
authors. The merit in using this format would provide a basis for understanding the 
level of generality of the definitions, and how far do they ‗flesh out‘ what the author 
thinks of as good corporate governance. For example, the Cadbury (1992) definition 
is a very general and straightforward with a focus on control. The first sentence of 
the OECD (1999) definition on corporate governance repeats the Cadbury (1992) 
definition, but the second sentence expands on this, hence is more detailed, 
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describing specific functions and the potential to development of hierarchical 
definitions. 
Some definitions provide an identification of relevant parties. However, the 
details, for example, as to who are the stakeholders referred to, which is not always 
stated and left to the interpretation of the reader. The consensus is that the narrow 
view focus is of owners versus managers (mediated by board of directors); in 
contrast, the wider view is of all legitimate stakeholders. 
 
Table 2.1: Examples of Corporate Governance Definitions 
Author Definition Comment 
Cadbury 
(1992, 5) 
A system by which companies are directed and  
controlled. 
Setting the direction in 
which to steer the 
company. Broad/open 
ended.  
Demb and 
Neubauer 
(1992, 9)  
Process by which corporations are made responsive to the 
rights and wishes of stakeholders'. 
Deals with the issue of 
corporate accountability. 
Shleifer and 
Vishny 
(1997, 737) 
The ways to which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
Corporation‘s objective is 
to maximise the returns to 
the shareholders and the 
debt holders; implies 
performance. 
Turnbull 
(1997, 180) 
 
All the influences affecting the institutional processes, 
including those for appointing the controllers and/ or 
regulators, involved in organizing the production and sale 
of goods and services. Described in this way, corporate 
governance includes all types of firms whether or not they 
are incorporated under civil law. 
Description allows the 
inclusion of all types of 
companies under any legal 
regulation.Avoids the 
defining of firm or its 
boundaries. 
Zingales 
(1998, 499)  
A complex set of constraints shaping ex- post bargaining 
over the quasi rents (profits) generated by the firm . 
Relates to both the 
determination of the value 
added by firms and the 
allocation of it among 
stakeholders. Claessens 
(2006, 4) refers to its as a 
set of rules and 
institutions. 
Berglöf and 
Thadden 
(1999, 11)  
A set of mechanisms that translate signals from  
product markets and input markets into firm behaviour. 
Broader than the 
traditional focus on the 
investors and top 
management. 
 OECD 
(1999) 
 
System by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as, the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions 
on corporate affairs.  
Relating to structure for 
setting a company's 
objectives. Definition is 
consistent with that 
provided by Cadbury 
(1992).  
 39 
 
Author Definition Comment 
Wolfensohn 
(1999)
4
 
Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, 
transparency and accountability. 
A well governed 
company should exhibit 
the characteristics 
mentioned  in the 
definition  
byWolfensohn. 
Cadbury 
(2000)  
Holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals. The corporate 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient 
use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and 
society. 
Refers to sustainability 
and organizations within 
a broader socio-
economic system. Focus 
on stewardship.  
Johnson et 
al. (2000, 
142) 
Effectiveness of mechanisms that minimise agency conflicts 
involving managers, with particular emphasis on the legal 
mechanisms that prevent expropriation of minority 
shareholders 
Importamce of the legal 
protection of the 
minority shareholders. 
Denis and 
McConnell 
(2003) 
A set of mechanisms, both institutional and market based, 
that induce the self-interested controllers of a company to 
make decisions that maximise the value of the company to 
its owners, that is, the suppliers of capital. 
Has similarity with that 
of Shleifer and Vishny, 
that is, relates 
specifically to the 
provision of finance. 
Chew and 
Gillan 
(2005)  
Investors are assured by a combination of both corporate 
procedures and financial institutions that professional 
managers will make efficient use of their capital. 
Suggests the difficulties 
that financiers may have 
in assuring that their 
funds are not 
expropriated or wasted. 
Monks and 
Minow 
(2006) 
Risk for investors, whose interests may not be protected by 
ineffective or fraudulent managers and directors, and risk 
for employees, communities, lenders, suppliers and 
customers. They further suggest that corporate governance 
is a structure ,that is, intended to ask the right questions and 
that checks and balances are in place to ensure that the 
answers reflect what is best for the creation of long-term 
sustainable value. 
Relationship between 
stakeholders to 
determine the direction 
and performance of the 
corporations. 
Larcker et 
al. (2007) 
Set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by 
managers when there is separation of ownership and  
control. 
Common relationship 
between principal and 
agent in a firm  run by 
professional managers. 
Walker 
(2009, 
s1.1:19) 
The role of corporate governance is to protect and advance 
the interests of shareholders through setting the strategic 
direction of a company and appointing and monitoring 
capable management to achieve this. 
Narrow definition 
focused on shareholder 
orientation. 
                                                 
4
 quoted in the Financial Times, June 21, 1999, cited in Macey (2008)  
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Author Definition Comment 
Solomon 
(2010) 
System of checks and balances, internal and external, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all 
their stakeholders,  and, act in a socially responsible way in 
all areas of their business activity. 
Suggesting a system of 
checks and balances 
extending the boundary 
to all stakeholders. 
Tricker 
(2012, 4) 
The way power is exercised over corporate entities. It covers 
the activities of the board and its relationships with the 
shareholders or members, and with those managing the 
enterprise, as well as with the external auditors, regulators 
and other legitimate stakeholders 
The governance role is 
not concerned with the 
running of the business 
of the company per se, 
but with giving overall 
direction, with 
overseeing and 
controlling the actions of 
management and with 
satisfying legitimate 
expectations of 
accountability and 
regulation beyond the 
corporate boundaries‘.  
Solomon et al. (2000) cited in Solomon (2010), use a survey questionnaire on 
UK institutional investors to assess the users‘ attitude to the relative importance of 
various definitions. They follow specific themes relates to corporate governance 
functions, which include accountability to stakeholders, corporate success, direction 
and control, financial perspective, regulatory shareholder activism, and shareholder 
orientation. Solomon (2007) view of corporate governance definitions is as aligning 
between two extremes, which they characterise as the narrow and a broad view. The 
former is limited to the relationship between the management and the shareholders, 
whereas the latter is inclusive and extends the boundary between the management 
and the shareholders to include other stakeholders.  
 
The OECD, the World Bank, the European Association of Securities Dealers 
(EASD) and the European Commission, have adopted in spirit a broader definition. 
For example, the EASD states in its principles and recommendation on corporate 
governance that: 
 ‘Governing organs of companies cannot be held accountable to all 
stakeholders in the company – shareholders, staff, clients, suppliers, 
credit providers, as well as the communities and the environment in 
which they operate – lest accountability be fragmented, subjected to 
contradictory aims and thereby diluted. The Committee therefore 
espoused the view that corporate governing organs should be 
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accountable to the shareholders, the more so since they are the 
residual bearers of risk of the company as owners of its equity. 
However, company organs should also be responsible for properly 
addressing the concerns of other legitimate stakeholders. Such 
attention evidently promotes the best interests of the company itself 
in the long term’.5 
The above definition seems to be ambivalent, in that it suggests corporate 
responsibility in relation to legitimate social interests, but denies accountability for 
such responsibility. Therefore, it is unclear whether, in the long run, this should 
benefit all stakeholders, including shareholders. 
 
Indeed, in recognition of the corporate governance definitions stated in the 
preceding sections, raises the question how nuanced are the definitions that the 
authors try to provide. For example, whether the legitimate stakeholder groups are a 
homogenous group, all with the same interests, or are they seen as heterogeneous. 
The examples for the latter would include majority versus minority shareholders, 
block versus dispersed shareholders, executive versus non-executive director and 
salaried managers versus managers with equity stakes. Bebchuk and Weisbach 
(2010) considers the variation between the cash flow and control rights as a common 
governance problem that exists between the inside majority and outside minority 
shareholders. Similarly, as above a more nuanced definition of corporate governance 
would not regard the shareholders, management and board of directors as 
homogenous groups with the same interests. Hence, corporate governance would 
deal with the conflicts of interests between the following groups or individuals: 
management and finance providers; shareholders and other legitimate stakeholders; 
and the large shareholder(s) and the minority shareholders. 
 
The literature on corporate governance suggests various families of 
definitions. I have grouped them into three categories. First, regulation and practice 
type of definition, and financial economics. The former focuses on systems and 
                                                 
5
 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/easd_cg_pr.pdf, p.2, accessed 24 May 2014 
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rules. Regulation can be categorised as both formal and informal rules, which could 
be issued by either public or private bodies. These rules may be binding on the 
corporations‘ management or will help constrain their behaviour without being 
binding. Public regulation includes the softer corporate governance, that is, not a 
legally binding form of regulation and the most common form is the ‗comply or 
explain‘ concept in the UK. This approach to regulation shapes the framework in 
which corporate governance practices are in the UK and other countries that adopt a 
‗comply or explain‘ approach. The rules related to corporate governance may be 
considered as either internal or external. An example of internal rule may relate to 
the division of power between the CEO and the non-executive chair. The company‘s 
articles of association may explicitly state this, or may be tacit, involving 
renegotiation between chair and CEO whenever there is a change of personnel. An 
example of an external rule would be a regulation set by a regulator. As noted above, 
regulations may require or forbid certain practices, or may give rise to a presumption 
of following of the practices, which would permit companies that do not comply to 
provide an explanation for non-compliance. Comparative analysis may be 
problematic, as within a country there may be parallel systems, for example, one 
system for companies trading on the main stock exchange and another for the 
smaller private companies. This is obvious in the Alternative Investment Market, 
with the adoption of the UK Corporate Governance Code by some of the larger AIM 
companies or as a minimum requirement the Quoted Companies Alliance principles. 
 
The financial economics type of definition focuses on aligning management 
decisions with interests of providers of capital. Normally, both the academics and the 
policy makers focus on shareholders‘ interests. Out of the various definitions 
reviewed, one of the common themes arising is that three main groups referred to 
include the shareholders, the executive management and the board of directors. 
Therefore, corporate governance can be a system of rights and responsibilities 
among these groups. Zingales‘ (1998) definition shows a shift from the rights and 
responsibility to a balanced approach, requiring governance systems to produce 
structures and incentives to allow companies to produce profits.  
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Second, common classification of the corporate governance definitions is to 
separate the families into two dichotomous groups, consisting of narrow based 
(shareholder) and the wider based(stakeholder) that contradict each other in the use 
of either the shareholder or the stakeholder as one of the participants. First, in the 
narrow sense, corporate governance focuses on the conflicts of interest and the need 
for greater transparency between the management and the shareholders and refers to 
internal governance structures, which include the executive management, the board 
of directors and the shareholders. This aligns with the Cadbury definition, by which 
companies are ‗directed and controlled‘. The focus is on the legal protection of 
minority shareholders and failing this, the possibility of external regulation and 
legislation for specific internal governance structures. 
 
In a broader sense, corporate governance includes both internal and external 
governance structures. This may include all possible legitimate participants 
(groups/individuals) involved with the corporate entity. The external structures 
include the legal systems, the regulatory system, political, cultural and socio-
economic institutions within which the companies operate. This dimension of 
corporate governance focuses on the legitimating of companies within society. In 
light of this, corporate governance is often about balancing the rights and interests of 
internal and external stakeholders. Therefore, corporate governance can also be a 
structure, which helps resolve the conflicts of interests among stakeholders (see 
figures 3.1 and 3.2). Jensen et al. (2004) suggest that a firm cannot maximise its 
value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders. Perhaps the broader inclusion of all 
stakeholders‘ interests is an ethical issue for these companies; however, the thesis 
does not consider the wider stakeholder group for analysis.  
 
Although corporate governance is now a global concept, interpretations of 
what it means are still ambiguous. The ongoing nature of corporate governance is 
indicated by the definition of the Commission on Global Governance (cited in Clarke 
2007a, 2; Weiss 2000, 797): 
‘A continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interest 
may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It 
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includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and 
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.’  
 
Third, using Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) study, where they categorise the 
definition of corporate governance into a set of behavioural patterns of companies 
who categorise the definition of corporate governance into a set of behavioural 
patterns of companies and a normative framework. Within a set of behavioural 
patterns of companies and measures, include ‘performance, efficiency, growth, 
financial structure and treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders’. The 
definition that concerns with normative framework includes rules, ‘the legal system, 
the judicial system, financial markets and factor (labour) markets’. For studies at 
company level, the behavioural pattern of companies‘ definition seems more 
appropriate. It considers such matters as adoption of the board structure and its 
function, the role of executive compensation in determining company performance, 
and the role of various groups of shareholder ownerships. For comparative studies at 
country level, the second definition is a more logical one. It investigates how 
differences in the normative framework affect the behavioural patterns of companies 
and investors. 
 
 In a comparative review, the question arises how broadly to define a 
framework for corporate governance. Under a narrow definition, the focus would be 
only on the rules in the capital markets governing equity investments in publicly 
listed firms. This would include listing requirements, insider dealing arrangements, 
disclosure and accounting rules and protections of minority shareholder rights. In 
order to clarify the distinction between corporate governance regulation and 
mechanism the next section provides some examples. Examples of corporate 
governance regulation include securities and capital market law, disclosure rules, 
company law, take-over regulation, labour laws such as Germany‘s co-
determination, and international accounting standards. Examples of corporate 
governance mechanisms include the bank or market based financial systems, 
shareholder protection rights and disclosure of information for financial reporting.  
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For the AIM companies, which are the subject of this research, considering 
the nature and characteristics of the companies that they are new and more simply 
structured in comparison with the large listed companies on the LSE main market, 
the narrow definition of the shareholder view is more appropriate. Hence, the 
corporate governance for the AIM companies focus is primarily on the conflicts of 
interest and the need for greater transparency between the management and the 
shareholders and refers to internal governance structures.  
 
Interestingly, the definition of corporate governance used by the Quoted 
Companies Alliance guidelines suggests that ‗corporate governance is a code of 
behaviour expressing how management teams in companies, act and are organised 
(governed) to both create and protect value on behalf of the shareholders’. This 
definition closely relates to that of Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013). 
 
This chapter considers several different definitions of corporate governance 
from policy documents to academic researchers. The use of various definitions 
suggests that there is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance, but 
different definitions analyse specific aspects and each one appropriate in different 
circumstances. It is possible to draw out some common characteristics , which 
include actors, rules, structures, systems, procedures and practices, at least in part, 
which suggest that, although conceptualised in different ways, corporate governance 
may be understood as a general phenomenon. Based on the various definitions 
reviewed in this chapter, suggests that the common themes arising from the 
academic authors are to separate corporate governance into either of the two 
classifications: narrow or broad view. Several authors have criticised the one-
dimensional shareholder based definition, yet interestingly, policy documents such 
as the Cadbury Report (1992) and Walker Report (2009, 23) focus on shareholders‘ 
interests, i.e. the narrow definition.  
 
2.4: Conclusion 
The main ‗goal‘ of this chapter is to review the definitions with a view to 
identifying which definition to use in the thesis. The thesis explores empirically the 
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relationship between corporate governance and company performance at company 
level for the smaller quoted AIM companies. The corporate governance definition 
for this PhD is that of Shleifer and Vishny (1997). It allows for the primary objective 
of the organisation to produce returns for their investors. From a financial 
perspective, this definition focuses on the shareholders and maximisation of the 
shareholders‘ return. It further acknowledges the interdependent interests of the 
different parties involved. 
 
Looking at the ‗families of definition‘ in points above seems that the 
theoretical frameworks adopted, explicitly or implicitly, by the authors heavily 
influence the definitions available. Indeed, the financial economists tend to adopt 
agency theory to explain corporate governance issues, whereas the ‗wider view‘ 
definitions are often grounded in a broader stakeholder theory approach. Cohen et al. 
(2010), from the auditors‘ perspective, suggest that the two theories that assist in 
understanding the role of corporate governance include agency theory and 
institutional theory. Chapter 3 explains the common theories used in explaining 
corporate governance in more depth.  
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CHAPTER 3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THEORIES 
3.1: Introduction 
This chapter‘s objective is to review and provide an understanding of key 
theoretical approaches to corporate governance and to assess the application of 
agency theory for companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). 
Chapter 2 considered the various definitions available for corporate governance. 
According to the conclusion, in Chapter 2, suggest that the theoretical framework 
adopted, heavily influence the definitions available. Researchers, whose interests 
have extended beyond the more commonly cited agency theory have looked at other 
disciplines such as organisational behaviour and sociology (Eisenhardt 1989, 57). 
These theories include, for example, transaction cost economics and institutional 
theory (both of these theories are considered later in this chapter). The study of 
corporate governance and its development in terms of a single theory risks 
overlooking important linkages, parallels and contrasts among the different theories. 
While agency theory seems to be the most popular theory used by researchers in 
explaining corporate governance and firm behaviour, it is important to look at the 
other theories, which shows diversity of corporate governance. The other theories 
discussed in this chapter include stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, institutional 
theory, class hegemony and managerial hegemony. Furthermore, as Turnbull (1997, 
181) suggests that restricting the study of corporate governance to publicly traded 
companies reduces the more efficient institutional arrangements for productive 
activities. Hence, the study of corporate governance and the relevant theories are also 
important in the context of the AIM companies. Table 3.1 gives a summary of these 
theories.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Theories in Corporate Governance 
Theory Focus Governance 
Agency theory Principal-agent relationships Governance mechanisms to protect 
shareholder‘ interest; minimize agency 
costs 
Transactional 
cost economics 
Allocation of governance to distinct 
transactions 
‗Governance structure‘ – minimize 
transaction costs 
Stewardship The long term interests of the principal 
are put above the individual‘s self 
 Corporate governance structure 
enables high authority discretion-
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Theory Focus Governance 
interest (Hernandez 2008) organisational rather than self-serving 
objectives  
Stakeholders Rights and responsibilities to 
stakeholders 
 All inclusive approach to governance 
–How do we prioritise different 
stakeholder groups? 
Legitimacy Society confers legitimacy upon an 
organisation 
 
Institutional Isomorphic pressure forces 
homogeneity among organisations 
Substance is the relations between 
governance groups and the use of game 
play to maintain their form to all 
relevant groups(Cohen et al. 2008) 
Class 
hegemony 
Directors seen as the elite  Interlocking directors 
Managerial 
hegemony 
Management is powerful and weakens 
the influence of the directors 
 Board is under the influence of the 
management and is not acting with the 
shareholders‘ interest in mind (Cohen et 
al. 2008)  
The reasons for the existence of firms, and what a firm is are necessary for 
the understanding of corporate governance. Hence, an understanding of the theory of 
the firm may be able to provide reasons for the organisation of firms, the 
relationships within the firm and that between the firm and the society. The next 
section discusses the theory of the firm. 
 
3.2: Theory of the Firm
 
 
The theory of the firm traces its existence back to Coase‘s (1937) article, 
‗The Nature of the Firm,‘ with its key explanation on the firm‘s existence, 
boundaries and internal organisation that can be explained by integrating the ‗cost of 
using the price mechanism‘ for economic analysis. However, Coase‘s seminal work 
was neglected for over three decades, but, since the 1970s, the theory of the firm 
began to emerge. According to Foss and Klein (2005) the key areas of contribution 
that emerged in the 1970s on the theory of the firm include Williamson‘s transaction 
cost economics, property rights and nexus of contracts (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) 
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Following from the Jensen and 
Meckling‘s paper, this section will focus on property rights and agency to understand 
ownership structure. However, other key theories need to be reviewed. 
 
Literature on property rights assists in understanding the determinants of 
corporate share ownership structure, which emphasises the norms, law and legal 
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systems in structuring the property rights and the governance systems. This suggests 
that share ownership holdings as a property right arrangement through which the 
owner is entitled to the following: owner‘s decision making to deploy corporate 
assets, owner has right to earn income, has cash flow rights, and finally has the right 
to transfer the shares to another group or individual. 
 
Traditional theories focused on the firm as a single unit of decision-making, 
managed by the owner himself. The evolution of the corporate form of business 
organisations has resulted in ownership by a large number of shareholders. A 
consequence of this is the separation of ownership from management. Berle and 
Means (1932) suggest a growing separation between ownership and control within 
large companies in the United States. Berle and Means, which is the most cited 
work
6
 in corporate governance is famous for the phrase, ‘separation of ownership 
and control’. Thus, where the shareholders are the residual claimants, but do not 
benefit from the rights of control, the control rights are granted to the managers. 
Boatright (2006, 113) defines shareholders as any group that are the ‘providers of 
equity capital’ and have the rights to control and to receive the profits of a company. 
Managerial theories of the firm, developed byBaumol (1962); Marris (1963); 
Williamson (1964) suggest that the firm‘s managers want to enhance their own 
utility and consider the implications of this for firm behaviour compared to the 
profit-maximising view. Baumol suggests that managers‘ interests are best served by 
maximising sales after achieving a minimum level of profit to keep the shareholders 
quietly satisfied and happy. Beyond this level, the profit is traded-off to increase the 
utility of the management.  
 
Simon (1979, 502-503) suggests that an alternative to classical theory is the 
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality refers to the ability of stewards to align 
their interests with those of the organisation, as well as limits to the ability of owners 
to evaluate effectively the behaviour of the stewards (Chrisman et al. 2013, 2). 
Managers will accept alternatives, which are not optimal, but those that provide 
                                                 
6
 Cited by 12,224 on Google Scholar accessed 14 September 2013 
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satisfactory choices. Simon calls this ‗satisficing‘, where managers set their own 
objectives and actions, moving away from the maximisation of shareholder value 
concept and instead select an alternative that meets their own ambition. More 
recently, this has led to the rise in ‗principal-agent‘ analysis on problems of 
contracting with asymmetric information. The asymmetric information has become a 
widely acceptable concept among academics that a principal (for example, a 
shareholder) cannot costlessly deduce how an agent (manager) is behaving. It may 
arise because the agent has either greater expertise or knowledge than the principal, 
or because the principal cannot directly observe the agent‘s actions. It is asymmetric 
information, which leads to a problem of moral hazard (described later in s.3.3).  
 
March (1962, 672) provides an alternative to the classical economic theory 
on the behaviour theory of the firm where he suggests that a firm is a ‗political 
coalition‘. A coalition existing between different individuals and groups of 
individuals in the firm and these groups each having different goals and possibly in 
conflict. Each individual/group will have their own goals which will conflict and 
make it difficult to achieve consistent goals (Augier and March 2008, 3). 
 
Penrose (1959) interest in growth of the firm, considers the firm to be an 
administrative entity, with the control over potentially valuable resources. Penrose 
(1960, 3) suggests that the shift from the traditional owner run organisations to the 
professionally managed firms enables managers of the firm to make decisions about 
the firm‘s activities and resources been deployed to allow the firm‘s diversification. 
Penrose discusses the growth of firms measured in terms of fixed assets. This 
measure has its own disadvantages and there is no overwhelming reason for 
choosing this measure rather than another. She suggests that the use of total assets 
may distort the size of the firm, as a productive unit because it includes the purchase 
of investment outside the firm,
7
 which is large simply because the firm is unable to 
expand its productive operations fast enough to make full use of its cash resources. 
                                                 
7
 Joan Robinson 1956, The accumulation of Capital (London) Macmillan, called this ‗placements‘ 
which denote the purchase of titles to debt and shares 
 51 
 
Previous literature on managerial capitalism has been concerned with the 
above issues since Berle and Means argued that while shareholders had legal control 
of the US corporations, it was management, in fact that exercised effective control. 
As holdings in large companies became more and more dispersed, and the individual 
shareholders having claims on very small fraction of the organisation had no 
influence on corporate policy and decision-making. The board is presumed to 
represent the shareholders and has formal control over management, but top 
executives are responsible for appointing the board and may use them as a vehicle to 
legitimise decisions that may not be in the best interests of the owners, that is, 
management dominates the board (see Mace 1971, Herman 1981). In settings where 
managers are not subject to external constraints, managers have discretion to pursue 
own objectives, even when these come into conflict with those of shareholders 
(Williamson 1964; Marris 1964). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) look at the theory of the firm from the relevance 
of agency costs and ownership structure. They begin their explanation from an 
owner-managed firm and extend this to the economic implications of the separation 
of ownership and control. Jensen (1983, 325) argues that in economic literature of 
‗theory of the firm‘ it is not the positive theory of the firm, but to a certain extent a 
theory of the markets in which firms are important actors. From this perspective, the 
firm can be viewed as a black box that responds to input and product markets to 
achieve value or profit maximisation.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an organisation as a legal entity that 
serves as a nexus of contracts both explicit and implicit among disparate individuals 
(p. 310). The nexus of contract meaning is complicated because a contract means an 
agreement, whereas, in law, the term contract means a legally enforceable promise. 
In reality, the nexus of contract does not mean either agreements or legally 
enforceable promises Therefore, a better meaning would be to use ‘nexus of 
reciprocal arrangements’ (Eisenberg 1998, 822).  
 
Conventional economic models explain firms‘ decisions in terms of market 
control: when markets work, the control exchange relationships ensure that the 
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parties act efficiently. However, markets fail to discipline managers in large firms, 
for two reasons. First, the assumptions underlying effective market control for 
managerial behaviour such as, large numbers, accurate information, mobility of 
resources and widely-dispersed power are very stringent and hardly met (Grandori 
1987). Secondly, the control of many of the largest firms is not in the hands of the 
owners, but with managers (see Williamson (1964); Mizruchi (1983)) and these two 
groups have most likely different interests. Owners‘ interest will be in maximising 
firm performance, whereas managers‘ objectives may diverge from the owners, for 
example, increasing the size of the firm. Since, this PhD is about companies quoted 
on the Alternative Investment Market, characterised as small firms, it is likely, that 
the ownership and control in some AIM companies, are in the hands of an individual 
(likely to be founder) or concentrated blockholder. The latter could be an individual 
or an institutional shareholder. Hence, the founder or powerful blockholder is able to 
exercise influence on the way the company pursues its objectives. This contrasts the 
UK and the US large firms listed on their main stock exchanges, where owners are 
widely dispersed, and have little control over the firm‘s activities and hence 
characterised as management controlled. 
  
Morck (2006, 3) suggests that the normative view of a corporation is that it 
should be run to maximise shareholder value, which is derived from economists‘ 
view that firms maximise profits. In neoclassical economic theory, a firm that 
maximises the present value of all its expected future economic profits maximises 
the market value of the shares. This follows from economists‘ perspective that the 
corporation is a nexus of contracts, with the shareholders the residual claimants of 
the firm‘s cash flow (Fama and Jensen 1983b). According to Hart (1995, 680) due to 
transaction costs, comprehensive contracts cannot be written, and hence agency 
problems will be an issue, which suggests that the governance structure has a role. 
The next section discusses the various corporate governance theories that have been 
influential in the development of corporate governance. 
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3.3: Agency Theory 
Agency theory emerged from the seminal papers of Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Academic literature on agency theory spans 
a diverse range of disciplines (see Eisenhardt 1989, 57 for more details). From a 
financial economist's perspective, corporate governance deals with agency problem 
that arises from the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Hart 
1995 cited in Ishak and Napier 2006, 87). Daily et al. (2003) suggest the 
predominance of agency theory in corporate governance literature, is due to the 
simplicity of the theory in using two participants, managers and shareholders, within 
a corporation, and second reason is that the humans are self-interested and unwilling 
to sacrifice own interests for the sake of the interests of the others. 
 
Agency theory explains the relationship in which one party (the principal) 
delegates the work, which another party (the agent) undertakes (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, 308). However, the principal-agent relationship is broad and can 
exist between any two related parties; for example, this principal-agent relationship 
can be between a large shareholder and minority shareholders. The theory argues 
that the agency problems arise under conditions of incomplete information or 
information asymmetries, which characterise most business settings. In the literature, 
two aspects of agency problems discussed are adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection is the pre-contractual problem of information asymmetry under 
which the principal cannot ascertain if the agent‘s selection accurately represents his 
ability to do the work for which he is paid (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. 2012, 540). 
Moral hazard is a post-contractual condition under which the principal cannot be 
sure if the agent has put forth agreed effort or may be shirking (Eisenhardt 1989, 61; 
Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. 2012). Fong and Tosi (2007) explain that due to information 
asymmetry it allows the agent to misrepresent his or her ability to the principal (that 
is, adverse selection) and or shirk (that is, moral hazard). Presence of information 
asymmetry may exacerbate the agency problem. 
 
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are exacerbated, for 
example, when fixed wage contracts are used and; therefore, this is not always the 
optimal way to reduce conflict between the principals and agents (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that fixed wage leads an agent to shirk 
since the agent‘s compensation will be the same anyway, thus ignoring their 
performance or effort level. Alchian and Demsetz (1972, 781-785) suggest where 
there is potential for the agents to shirk, it is more efficient to use remuneration 
based on residual claim (equity) on the profits of the firm or a way to reduce shirking 
would be to put in place someone to act as a monitor. For the AIM companies it is 
more likely, that the management have cash remuneration and very few companies 
will have their salary made up of equity shares. 
 
Within the economics discipline, the principal-agent relationship under 
conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information results in conflict. This 
suggests that the equity shareholders are vulnerable since they are the residual 
claimants, that is, their return depends on after all other contractual claims have been 
satisfied (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Fama and Jensen (1983a, 328) use the term 
‘residual claimants’ for those who bear the residual risk for the rights to net cash 
flows. For the AIM companies, the minority shareholders will be vulnerable for the 
reasons mentioned above. 
 
The separation of management and ownership in an agency contract can lead 
to a situation of control without risk bearing in the large listed firms (Berle and 
Means 1932; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976). This risk 
exacerbates when ownership is dispersed, which make effective coordination 
amongst shareholders difficult and expensive, making the managers the de facto 
policy makers (Marris 1964; Williamson (1964, 1985).  
 
In an ideal situation, one would expect that managers would sign a complete 
contract with the principals specifying all the functions of the managers and 
allocation of profits. Since, future contingencies are difficult to envisage, it is not, 
practical to write complete contracts, and even if it were possible, it would not be 
cost effective. Because of agency problems in designing the contracts, the manager 
and financier have to allocate residual control rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 
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741). Grossman and Hart (1986, 697) suggest that the residual control rights are 
rights to make decisions in circumstances not foreseeable by the contract. 
 
Empirical studies in agency theory have followed two main themes: 
principal-agent relationship and positivist agency theory, which share common 
assumptions, for example, the unit of analysis as a contract between the principal and 
agent. According to Eisenhardt (1989, 59, 68), research that flows from the positivist 
agency theory specifically focus on the relationship between the owners and 
managers of companies (see Figure 3.1). Positivist researchers determine situations 
where the agent and principal have differing interests, and then examine how an 
agent‘s self-serving behaviour can be restricted using governance mechanisms. 
However, the principal-agent researchers are more concerned with the effectiveness 
of contracts within different circumstances of uncertainty and risk. The focus is 
broader and applies not only to owners and managers of companies, but also to other 
relationships such as employer and employee, whereas the positivist literature 
focuses exclusively on the principal-agent relationship between the owners and 
managers (p.59). Given that both the positivist and the principal-agent relationship 
are formed under the same legal form, hence their governance structures would 
present broadly similar structure, but differ in the substance of governance 
structures. The two agency theories are shown schematically in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1: Model of Corporate Governance Between Owners and Managers. 
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Berglöf and Claessens (2004) state that one of the solutions to corporate 
governance problems is to have highly concentrated shareholdings, where large 
block holders can monitor the management. Hart (1995, 678) suggest that agency 
problem, or conflict of interest, involves different members of a company, and this 
will include owners, managers and stakeholders. Figure 3.2 shows diagrammatically 
agency problems that can exist between different groups: first, conflict between the 
firm‘s owners and the managers; second, conflict between owners that have a 
majority or controlling share ownership in the company and the minority 
shareholders; and third, conflict between the firm and other groups besides the 
shareholders, (for example, creditors, employees and customers) 
 
Figure 3.2: WiderPrincipal-Agent Relationship 
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To prevent expropriation by the agent, the shareholders will incur agency 
costs. Agency costs arise with the separation of the ownership and control concept. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308-309), agency costs include monitoring 
costs, bonding costs and residual loss. Monitoring costs are costs that the principal 
suffers to restrict the agent‘s activities. Bonding costs are those costs incurred by the 
agent to ensure that the principal is made aware of their commitment. The last cost is 
when the principal will incur partial loss on her welfare is termed residual loss. 
Therefore, how do we reduce these agency costs? Agency theory specifies 
mechanisms that can reduce agency costs (Eisenhardt 1989). Following are some 
examples of mechanisms to limit agency costs: provision of financial incentive 
schemes to managers for maximising shareholder interests; Grossman and Hart 
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(1982) theorise that higher financial leverage reduces agency costs. They argue that 
management can use debt to self-discipline themselves to avoid threat of liquidation. 
If managers do not maximise profits, the chances of going bankrupt increases, 
together with managers‘ loss of job, reputation and perquisites. It is in the 
shareholders‘ interest for management to issue debt along with equity. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) suggest that institutional shareholders will act as a monitor for the 
managers; Jensen (1986) suggests that the high leverage compels managers to 
generate cash flow for payment of the cost of finance; Morck et al. (1988) suggest 
that increasing insider ownership will reduce agency costs, but maybe reversed at 
very high levels of insider shareholdings. 
 
Agency theory has been criticised as been ineffective, for example, Daily et 
al. (2003); Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003), suggest that the methods for mitigating 
agency problems such as monitoring, pay for performance, corporate control by 
hostile takeover have been found to be ineffective. 
 
Since, this thesis is about the AIM companies, it is important to link agency 
theory within the context of AIM. For the AIM companies, agency theory is 
important for several reasons. AIM companies, are generally new ventures, small 
and have limited resources. One of the contributions from the agency theory is that 
the board of directors are the monitors of executive behaviour and the board should 
align the interests of the shareholders‘ interests to those of the management, and 
hence compensation is more likely to be based on individual characteristics rather 
than company performance measures. Considering the nature of the AIM companies, 
some of these companies have uncertain long-term futures and more prone to higher 
risks in the environment and thereby generating low profits. Such risks arise from 
bankruptcy, changes in technology, new competitors and changes in institutional 
regulations such as the European Union Directives. 
 
Agency theory, conceptualised by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) views the firm as a nexus of contracts, both explicit and 
implicit. Within a principal-agent perspective, the sole residual claimants to income 
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are the shareholders. In this approach, the firm‘s goal is to maximise shareholder 
wealth and the managers have a fiduciary duty as agents for the principals (Klein et 
al. 2012). One of the methods of reducing agency costs is to increase share 
ownership of shareholders. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 empirically investigate the impact 
of different share ownerships on company performance for AIM companies. An 
alternative to agency theory is transactional cost economics, described in the next 
section. 
 
3.4: Transactional Cost Economics  
The general hypothesis of ‘transactional cost economics‘ (TCE) suggests that 
institutions are transaction minimising arrangements that may be attributed to the 
Darwinism principle. Coase (1937) led the way to the development of TCE in his 
article, ‗the Nature of the Firm,‘ in which he argued that market exchange is not 
costless and that transaction costs can explain both the existence of firms and their 
optimal size. Coase (1937) suggests that there are benefits for the firm, if it commits 
to transactions internally rather than externally, where the management directs and 
controls production, thereby lowering the transaction costs. The transaction cost 
approach regards the transaction as the basic ‘unit of analysis’. Coase explains that 
firms emerge to economise on the transaction costs of market exchange and that the 
boundary of a firm or the extent of vertical integration depends on the scale of these 
costs. Vertical integration, or the ‘make-or-buy’ decision, has been described as a 
‘paradigm problem’ of TCE (Williamson 2007). Examples of vertical integration 
include integration from manufacturing into distribution in sectors such as tobacco. 
Coase further emphasises the role of transaction costs in the organisation of firms 
and writing contracts. The latter, of course are more diverse and complex than is 
commonly realised. These costs include those related to opportunistic behaviour and 
bargaining ex-post. Williamson studies state that TCE is an ‗interdisciplinary 
alliance of law, economics and organisation‘. This discipline initiated by Cyert and 
March (1963) concurs with Simon (1979) in describing the key attributes of human 
actors (Williamson 2010), specifically cognition in the study of economic 
organisation is applied to bounded rationality and self-interest as opportunism. 
Bounded rationality suggests that decision-making be constrained within the 
information available. Williamson studies provide justification for the growth of 
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conglomerates, which essentially provide their own capital market. He states that 
using appropriate governance structure, rather than using incentives, will help reduce 
the costs of any misaligned actions. Contracts are unavoidably incomplete because of 
bounded rationality, and ex-ante contracts are not self-enforcing due to managerial 
opportunism. The principal-agent theory assumes that complete contracts are 
expensive to write, (Hart 1995, 680). The governance structure role is emphasised 
where there are incomplete contracts due to high costs related to writing complete 
contracts. Williamson (2002) argues that large corporations will be able to overcome 
the disadvantages due to scale by the choice of governance structure and minimise 
transaction costs, for example, in vertical integration. In contrast, North (1990) 
argues that such alignment may fail to occur, emphasising obstacles presented by the 
political process. 
 
 Williamson (1996) concludes that, except for differences in terminology, 
both agency theory and TCE are similar and describing similar issues. For example, 
both agency and TCE are concerned with managerial behaviour and presume that 
managers are opportunistic. Agency theory considers moral hazard, agency costs and 
managers‘ perquisites, whereas transaction cost economics suggests that managers 
arrange their transactions (Solomon 2007:22-23). 
 
The above provides only a skeleton version of the description of TCE 
literature. To summarise, according to Solomon, TCE explain that the firms have 
grown in size to such an extent that they act as substitutes for the market in 
determining the allocation of resources. The growth of these organisations has seen 
the need for more capital, which has been raised from the capital markets and, or, by 
increasing the company‘s shareholder base. Given that all complex contracts written 
are incomplete, because of bounded rationality, TCE regards the firm as a 
governance structure and the transactions are the basic unit of analysis. 
 
3.5: Stewardship Theory 
An alternative to agency theory is the stewardship theory. Similarly, to the 
agency theory, the stewardship theory focuses on the shared goals and norms 
 60 
 
between the managers (stewards) and the owners (principals) (Davis et al. 1997; 
Tosi et al. 2003). In contrast to the agency theory, there is no conflict of interest 
between the managers and the owners and a successful organisation develops a 
structure that has effective coordination. Therefore, executives as stewards are 
motivated to act in the best interests of the shareholders (Donaldson and Davis 1991; 
cited in Davis et al. 1997, 24).  
 
Davis et al. (1997, 21); Tosi et al. (2003, 2054) suggest that the stewardship 
theory defines situations where managers act as stewards and their interests aligned 
with that of objectives of the principals. Unlike the agency theory, the stewardship 
theory does not assume that a manager exhibits opportunistic behaviour. The 
managers‘ interests align with those of the shareholders and the former aim to 
achieve good corporate performance. Davis et al. (1997) suggest that as managers 
maximise shareholder value, they also serve their own purpose. 
 
The empirical evidence provided by Donaldson and Davis (1991) using the 
roles of the CEO and chair as combined supports the stewardship theory, but fails to 
support agency theory. Stewardship theory rejects the agency assumptions and 
argues that managers perceive that serving shareholders' interests are also in their 
own interests. Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue, in relation to stewardship theory 
and agency theory, that the key issue is not whether one is more valid than the other 
is, for ‗each may be valid for some phenomena but not for others‘ (1991, p. 60).  
 
Stewardship theory focuses on the governance structure as to whether it 
facilitates effective actions by the managers, where managers as stewards are 
provided with appropriate empowering governance structures and mechanisms. This 
suggests that managers should be trusted, given authority and discretion, as control is 
viewed to be opposing managers‘ motivational behaviour (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997, cited in  Clarke 2007b, 121). For example, stewardship theory, as 
shown by Donaldson and Davis, supports the duality of the roles of the CEO and 
chair as held by a single individual, yet this feature of the board structure is 
undesirable under the agency theory. Tosi et al. (2003) suggest that, in contrast to 
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agency theory, which requires monitoring and incentives, these strong control 
mechanisms will inhibit stewards‘ motivation and generate problems or difficulties 
instead of achieving shareholders‘ interest. Organizations that exhibit a stewardship 
orientation are able to direct resources, that would have been spent on monitoring 
and control, toward maximising company performance (Davis et al. 2010). Although 
stewardship theory is not the theoretical framework used in this thesis, research has 
shown that stewardship theory can help explain higher performance in family run 
businesses (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007 cited in Davis et al. 2010, 1094). 
Indeed, some companies on the Alternative Investment Market may be family-run 
and hence stewardship theory may be associated with the governance of these 
companies. 
 
The Madoff ponzi
8
 scheme epitomises all, that is, wrong with modern 
society, such as the pursuit of individual self-interest at the expense of a broader base 
of stakeholders and short termism in which to create and maintain company value. 
Hence, stewardship approach to governance is more appropriate to constrain the self-
interest of the managers. Stewardship theory reflects a continuing commitment to 
others based on the objective to maintain the covenantal affiliation and upholds both 
the principals and the stewards to work towards a common goal, without taking any 
advantage of each other. Hernandez (2012, 174), therefore, defines stewardship as: 
‘the extent to which an individual willingly subjugates his or her personal interests 
to act in protection of others’ long-term welfare’. 
 
As such, stewardship theory rejects self-interested behaviour by the agents, 
holds that managers inherently seek to do the job well and maximising company 
profits and returns to the shareholders. For the AIM companies, as some of them 
may be family owned, stewardship theory might be a useful framework to use for 
examining a context where the owners and managers interests are aligned to those of 
                                                 
8
 For more information on Madoff trial see the article by David Teather in the Guardian, 30 June 
2009, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/29/bernard-madoff-sentence, accessed 1 July 
2012. The term ‗ponzi‘ comes from Carlo Ponzi, one of the most famous for the architect of a 
pyramid scheme, and his name is now used to describe illegal financial schemes. 
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the company. Hence, the interpretation of the empirical results for this thesis should 
bear this in mind. 
 
Other theories have drawn from social and political theory, in particular, the 
stakeholder theory, institutional and legitimacy theory. In recent years, these theories 
have informed the analysis of corporate social responsibilities and voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
3.6: Stakeholder Theory 
Current corporate governance theories centre around two key opposing 
parties, shareholders and stakeholders. The shareholders‘ perspective is far more 
traditional regarding the corporation in question as a manner by which to maximise 
shareholders their returns (see Figure 3.3). Companies agree the need to develop a 
multidimensional perspective to incorporate stakeholder needs into a long-term value 
creation process (Freeman (1984) cited in Bonacchi and Rinaldi 2006, 53). These 
stakeholders include employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the local 
community. They have a legitimate interest in the corporation and as Freeman and 
Phillips (2002) suggest  that an organization‘s success is symbiotic with the health of 
its relationships with key stakeholders. The actual terminology ‘stakeholder’ first 
appeared in the Stanford Research Institute (now SRI International, Inc.). The SRI 
definition of stakeholder is, ‘those groups without whose support the organization 
would cease to exist’ (SRI, 1963; quoted in Freeman, 1984, 31; Clarke, 1998. 186) 
suggests that corporate managers should encourage beneficial contributions from 
their stakeholders. The stakeholder terminology challenges the shareholder group as 
the sole group to which the managers are responsible.  
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Figure 3.3: Shareholder and Stakeholder View  
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Stakeholder involvement may be influential in  preventing  the failure of 
Anglo-American corporate governance system (see, Blair 1995). According to 
Freeman, the management‘s role should include the broader view of responsibility 
towards multiple stakeholders. Rather than been agents of the shareholders, 
managers should take into account the rights and interests of all legitimate 
stakeholder. Whilst managers have a fiduciary duty towards the shareholders‘ 
interests, managers‘ often-myopic views of pursuing personal interests or increasing 
shareholder return necessitate that stakeholders groups are adequately protected by 
use of institutions, organisational norm or law (Parkinson 2003, 495). Parkinson 
(2003) suggests that it be difficult to identify conceptual justifications on which each 
stakeholder group can make a legitimate claim to the firm. Furthermore, it will 
induce practical difficulties in facilitating arrangements such as employee 
representation on the board in the UK. Therefore, participation of relevant 
stakeholder groups would require redesign of governance structure at an institutional 
level.  
 
The stakeholder concept is theoretically simple; however, the complexity of 
this subject arises due to various literature definitions of stakeholder. Table 3.2 
shows some of these definitions. This range of definitions suggests that different 
authors have varying view of what a stakeholder represents and that no consensus as 
to what/who a stakeholder is exists. However, the most widely used definition is that 
by Freeman (2010, prior version 1984) shown below: 
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‘A stakeholder in an organisation is [by definition] any group or 
individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives’ 
 
Table 3.2: Definitions of Stakeholder 
Author Definition of Stakeholder Comment 
The Stanford Research 
Institute (1963. cited in 
Clarke 1998; Mitchell et 
al. (1997) 
‗Those groups without whose 
support the organisation would cease 
to exist‘ 
 
The term stakeholder theory was first 
used 
Jones (1980, 59) The notion that corporations have an 
obligation to constituent groups in 
society other than stockholders and 
beyond that prescribed by law or 
union contract, indicating that a stake 
may go beyond mere ownership 
Used to define corporate social 
responsibility 
Freeman and Reed 
(1983, 91)  
'Those groups on which the 
organisation is dependent for its 
continued survival‘ 
Narrow definition and shows 
similarities with SRI (1983,  cited in 
Freeman 1984) 
Freeman (1984, 46)  Stakeholder-‘any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization's 
objectives‘ 
Widely used, broad; stakeholder 
group can virtually include anybody 
Carroll (1989, 60),   ‗Asserts to have one or more of the 
kinds of stakes in business‘-may be 
affected or affect   
 
Alkhafaji (1989)  
cited in Mitchell et al. 
(1997) 
‗Groups to whom the corporation is 
responsible‘ 
Who receives the resources of the 
firm?Suggesting an inherent conflict 
between the shareholders and the 
other stakeholders 
Thompson et al. (1991, 
209)  
Groups ‗ in relationship with an 
organisation‘ 
 
Clarkson (1995, 106),  Have, or claim, ownership, rights, or 
interests in a corporation and its 
activities‘ 
 
Donaldson and Preston 
(1995, 85)  
Persons or groups with legitimate 
interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of corporate 
activity‘ 
Interests of stakeholders have 
intrinsic worth irrespective of the 
interests of shareholders. Therefore, 
the success of a corporation is seen 
as a driver for advancing the interest 
of stakeholders and not merely 
shareholders 
 
In several countries the maximisation of shareholder value may not be the 
main purpose of the corporation, for example, Japanese companies have focused on 
long-term growth and lower dividend payouts. Germany‘s institutional environment 
strongly embedded within a mandatory legal system permits the two-tier board 
 65 
 
system. In addition, Germany is a good example of the stakeholder theory due to the 
‘Co-determination Act’ ensuring employee representation on the supervisory board 
of the listed companies (Jackson and Moerke 2005, 352). 
Clarke (1998, 187) emphasises that stakeholder role should not be seen solely 
as containing management behaviour via ‗legal and social constraints‘, but also 
enabling (Wieland 2005, 77) managerial behaviour. Several codes, principles and 
guidelines are now available for assisting companies by recommending potential 
corporate governance structures that can accommodate stakeholders‘ interests. For 
example, Porter (1992) recommends that the US policy makers and institutional 
investors should increase the employee involvement by encouraging long-term 
employee ownership, and make board representation of key stakeholders in their 
governance structure if they want companies to remain competitive with those of 
Germany and Japan. Turnbull (1997) describes employees, customers, suppliers and 
local community as ‘strategic stakeholders’, and managers need to consider the 
stakeholders‘ interests.  
 
The OECD (1999; 2004) include in its principles, the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance. The principle states that  
 
‘Corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active cooperation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth and the sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises’. 
 
The Hampel Report (1998, 11.17) emphasises that ideal corporate 
governance includes a company meeting its‘ responsibilities to stakeholders, but 
nevertheless, is accountable to shareholders. However, the Hampel Report 
recognises that companies need to develop and sustain stakeholder relationships 
(s1.18) in order to achieve long-term shareholder value. Hence, the Hampel 
committee emphasise directors‘ responsibilities to be accountable to the 
shareholders. Interestingly, despite the financial crisis and its effect on a wide range 
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of individuals and companies the Walker Report (2009), similarly does not focus on 
stakeholders‘ interest. 
 
To summarise, Gray et al. (1995, 53), suggests that managements‘ goals are 
ultimately concerned with the long-term survival of their corporation. From their 
analysis, stakeholders‘ support is crucial for the longevity of the corporation.  
 
3.7: Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is systems orientated theory where organisations are 
viewed as components of a larger social environment within which they exist 
(Carnegie and Napier 2010, 361). This theory uses a ‘social contract’ to represent 
both implicit and explicit expectations to exist between the organisation and the 
wider community, and not just the organisation and the shareholders. Lindblom 
(1994 cited in Gray et al. 1995, 54) argues that legitimacy is: 
 
‘a condition or status, which exists when an entity’s value system is 
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which 
the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy’  
 
Legitimacy theory assumes that corporations are bound by a social contract 
in which it agrees to perform various socially desired actions in return for approval 
of its objectives, other rewards, and this ultimately guarantees its continued existence 
(Guthrie and Parker 1989, 344). Deegan (2000) suggests that organisations aim to 
operate within the bounds and norms of their respective societies; that is, they 
attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by external groups as legitimate. 
Legitimacy theory provides a theoretical basis for understanding the use of 
externally focussed reports by the management to raise the company‘s reputational 
awareness. This fits in well with corporate governance practices, as the companies 
need to disclose to attain legitimacy. An organisation is deemed legitimate when the 
social values of the company, both explicit and implicit are fitting with the norms of 
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acceptable behaviour within the social system. Legitimacy as defined by Suchman, 
(1995, 574) is  
 
‘‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of any 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’’. 
Mitchell et al. (1997, 866) suggests that the definition of legitimacy by 
Suchman (1995) is imprecise and difficult to operationalise, yet it is representative of 
sociological definitions of legitimacy. 
 
Deegan and Rankin (1996) criticise legitimacy theory, and state that 
companies will only voluntarily disclose positive information. They state that any 
deviations of compliance with societal expectations require the deterrence of legal 
sanctions, restrictions on external finance and labour resources and decline in the 
demand for the company‘s product or service. Over time, the behaviour of the 
companies has changed with substantial growth in the disclosure of corporate 
governance reporting and corporate social reporting. As a result, management may 
use disclosure reports enhancing the company‘s reputation and minimising the risk 
of having its share price lowered. Although legitimacy theory is not the main 
theoretical framework used in this thesis; nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore the 
notion of legitimacy from corporate governance issues. To avoid severely breaching 
social contracts, the majority of the AIM companies show evidence of audit and 
remuneration committees made up of independent non-executive directors. This 
legitimately supports management actions and their values on the use of better 
corporate governance practices and their actions are congruent with the norms of 
acceptable behaviour within the social system. This in turn reduces adverse effects 
upon the company and others on the LSE AIM. Under the legitimacy theory, as 
stated by Deegan (2000, 293) perceive that the survival of an organisation is 
threatened if society sees that the organisation has violated its social contract. This is 
important in the context of the AIM companies. Hence, AIM companies need to 
operate within the bounds and norms of the guidance provided by the AIM Rules, 
the Quoted Companies Alliance Guidelines and to have a nominated adviser 
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(Nomad) at all times to ensure that their activities are perceived by society as 
legitimate. Violation of any of the rules may result in public censure of the company 
and the Nomad by the London Stock Exchange, thus damaging the reputation and 
image of both the company and the Nomad. For example, Minmet – an AIM quoted 
company provides evidence on the breaching of the AIM Rules, the company‘s 
trading was suspended and subsequent restoration of the company‘s shares to trading 
in 2008 show a drop of 63% in the share price from the pre-suspension share price.
9
 
 
In essence, an important observation from the above section is that legitimacy 
and institutionalisation are nearly identical. Legitimacy theory deals with 
organisational structures and as such within this concept, both the legitimacy and 
institutional theories are considered to be similar.  
 
‘From an institutional perspective, legitimacy is not a commodity to 
be possessed or exchanged, but a condition reflecting cultural 
alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or 
laws’ (Scott, 2001: 45).‘ 
 
Hence, companies try to manage their legitimacy because as Deegan and 
Rankin (1996) emphasise that failure to conform with societal expectations may 
adversely affect the company such that they risk sanctions being imposed. As UK‘s 
corporate governance system is legitimately seen as embedded within the principle-
based concept, the competence instilled in the investors has seen an increase in the 
number of new companies listing on the AIM as well as on the main market. If 
legitimacy is of concern, when governance practices are viewed as illegitimate or 
institutional measures are not in place then we are likely to observe a decline in the 
growth of the company‘s share price, companies reluctant to list on to the country‘s 
stock market and in the worst scenario demise of the company. As an extreme case, 
as Carnegie and Napier (2010, 382) suggest that Arthur Andersen, the accounting 
                                                 
9
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-notices/min-met-
public-censure.pdf, accessed 1 October 2014. 
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firm, failure to meet societal expectations as external auditors of Enron in the US 
resulted in the collapse of both Arthur Andersen and Enron. Thus, the death of 
Arthur Andersen de-legitimises the whole of the accounting profession. The 
following definition linking corporate governance and legitimacy is provided by 
Judge et al. (2008, 768) who state that 
 
‘corporate governance legitimacy is defined as the practices and 
structures within a nation that are perceived to result in corporate 
behaviour that is appropriate to meet the needs of society’. 
 
Indeed, corporate governance legitimacy is challenged within the AIM 
companies. For example, the legitimacy of the independence of the members of the 
board committees as an internal governance mechanism orientated to protect 
shareholders‘ interests is questionable. Nevertheless, UK has built a strong 
reputation and legitimacy of its corporate governance practices evidenced by the 
standards and the continuous review of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The 
discussion in this section provides some insights into corporate governance 
legitimacy and how it is influenced by the institutional context. 
  
3.8: Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory emerging from an open systems theory emphasises that 
organizations are also social and cultural systems. As such, institutional theory views 
organizations and organizational actors, not only for competition of resources, but 
ultimately to seek legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Drawing from the works of Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) institutional theory can be 
described as organisational structures and processes that conform towards 
isomorphism with the accepted norms for particular organisations. For example, the 
remuneration committee will structure the pay optimally to align the interests of the 
agents and the principals in an agency theory. However, in an institutional theory 
organisations will copy the organisational structures of others more successful and 
adhere to perceived regulatory processes that are taken-for-granted. 
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Zucker (1987, 444) argues that the institutionalisation phenomenon is a 
process by which social relationships and actions come to be taken-for-granted. 
Despite institutionalisation‘s origin from social phenomena, highly institutionalised 
structures are observed as part of the inter-subjective world consisting of objective 
structures independent of any specific actors or situations (Zucker 1977, 729). 
Second, institutionalisation causes variation in organisational forms, such as roles.  
 
An alternative explanation for  the institutional theory is  provided by Scott 
(2001) who suggests a multi layered diffusion concept, differentiated into three 
hierarchical levels: societal, institutional governance structures and actors (Scott 
1995, 147). The highest level occupied by societal (and global) institutions, where 
models and menus are both formally proposed and informally ratified. These provide 
the institutional context: what is deemed possible, acceptable and legitimate. At the 
next level within Scott‘s model, there are the governance structures, consisting first 
of organisational fields, and organizations themselves. Their organisational fields 
and institutional environments influence the different organisations. Judge et al. 
(2008, 768) explains that an organisational field is where organisations that operate 
in the same area with similar customers served and other organisations that in turn 
influence their survival such as financiers. The final level consists of actors in the 
institutional settings, who may be individuals or groups. 
 
Each of these levels influences and is influenced by the forces of diffusion 
and obligation of institutional norms while adopting change within the institutional 
norms. One of the criticisms of the above model is that organisations conform to 
social expectations and norms even when it is inefficient. Therefore, the assumption 
of institutional theory is that it views organisations as operating within a social 
framework of rules, norms, values and taken-for-granted or routine assumptions 
(Oliver 1997, 699). However, according to Scott (1987, 498), organisations do not 
impulsively conform to institutional pressures because they provide a reality or 
taken-for-granted beliefs, but adapt flexibly to improve their legitimacy. 
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Nevertheless, the above constraints and forces cause isomorphism. 
‗Organisational isomorphism‘, is used to describe the homogenisation of 
organisations, where isomorphism forces one unit within a population to be similar 
to other structures that meet the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, 149).  
 
Davis (2005) argues that the corporate governance research should be 
explained within the ` institutional context, rather than the use of traditional agency 
or transaction cost perspective. In addition, to explain corporate governance practices 
institutional context is favoured over the company or individual level. For example, 
the convergence of corporate governance practices within the European Union can 
be explained mainly due to the institutional convergence (Deeg and Perez 2000). 
 
Institutional theory suggests that firm managers look to industry norms, 
company customs, and management enthusiasm and others to formulate their 
policies, for example, compensation package (Eisenhardt 1988, 489). An alternative 
explanation of institutional theory is provided by Eisenhardt (1988) who suggests 
three mechanisms for institutional isomorphic change to occur: coercive, mimetic 
and normative. Coercive isomorphism originates from political pressures and 
organisations seeking legitimacy as from government mandates. Mimetic 
isomorphism is in response to uncertainty and seeking legitimacy, for example, from 
‗comply or explain‘ concept managers may be inclined to use similar explanations 
used by other companies, rather than provide  more specific and relevant to their 
company for non-compliance with the governance code. This is to avoid rejection of 
their explanation by the investors and having a negative effect on the company‘s 
share price. Normative isomorphism ensures organisations conform in order to be 
perceived as partaking legitimate actions. Normative isomorphism incurs because of 
social obligation to comply, embedded in social necessity or what an organisation or 
individual should be doing. For example, the nominated advisers‘ profession will 
cause the executives in the AIM companies to conform in ways that are consistent 
with normative isomorphism. 
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Isomorphism can explain the similarities in organisational structures; 
coercive can explain that law drives the adoption of particular structures for 
organisations, for example, the presence of a dual board structure and employee 
representation on the supervisory board in the listed companies in Germany. 
Managers build organisational structures as copies of existing efficient structures, 
thus minimising costs for the organisation instead of spending on research to 
experiment for an appropriate structure. Hence, institutional theory within an Anglo-
Saxon context may include more voluntary policies, whereas in other context may be 
shaped by law, customs, and religion. Institutional structures may not be efficiently 
working because of management power and the management will adopt structures, 
which are acceptable within the law, market and industry norm. For example, the use 
of three independent, non-executive directors is norm for the listed companies in the 
UK, but it is possible that the management will recruit individuals who do not have 
appropriate skills for monitoring and challenging the executive directors. Consistent 
with the institutional theory, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) suggest that the 
adoption of governance codes enhances legitimacy and effectiveness of corporate 
governance systems. Legitimacy of the governance systems is consistent with the 
conformity to governance practices, whereas the effectiveness concerns the 
protection of the minority shareholders. Enrione et al. (2006) study 150 different 
codes of governance in 78 countries for the period 1978 to 2004 and use the 
institutional theory to help understand the institutionalisation process of codes of 
governance. They generalise that lawmakers and governance enactors (defined as 
majority and controlling shareholders and executive directors, p.965) initiate the 
issuing of the codes of governance. 
 
3.9: Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Managerial hegemony relates to the concept that although shareholders may 
legally own firms, they no longer effectively control them, since the control is 
assigned to the professional managers. The theoretical perspective suggests that 
senior management selects, from their associates, members of the board who will not 
inhibit managements‘ actions; members are willing to be subservient participants in 
the governance process and dependent on the management for information about the 
company. Although, hegemony approach suggests compliance with the regulatory 
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requirements; however, it has negative consequences for the shareholders, for 
example, minimal independent monitoring, diminishing stewardship function and 
contributory factor to management entrenchment (Core et al. 1999; Cohen et al 
2008, 186). This is in contrast to agency theory where the emphasis is on the board 
function of independent supervisory role. Consequently, from a hegemony 
perspective the board‘s functions are limited to ratifying management‘s actions, 
satisfying regulatory requirements and enhancing executive compensation (Core et 
al. 1999). Simply put, managerial hegemony suggests that the boards are weak and 
low competence in monitoring management and representing the shareholders‘ 
interests. 
 
With respect to the functional role of the board of directors, the implication 
of managerial hegemony is that members of the different board committees may be 
under the influence of the management. This theory also suggests that the board will 
side with the management even when there are obvious conflicts of interests with the 
management and the shareholders. 
 
3.10: Class Hegemony Theory 
The class hegemony theory suggests that executives within a company and 
executives from other companies share a commonality of interests. Therefore, the 
class hegemony extends beyond the boundary of the firm. Here, executives from 
different organisation form bonds due to mutual interests. These bonds form 
relationships, resulting in class hegemony, which in turn form a class across the 
organisations. As a result of the power among these executives will tend to protect 
management‘s interests, for example, setting high executive pay. This theory 
arguably suggests that due to the principal-agent relationship, the agents have 
discretion in setting their own pay (Jensen et al. 2004). 
 
3.11: Conclusion 
This chapter provides an understanding of the theoretical approaches to 
corporate governance and to assess to what extent agency theory can be extended to 
smaller companies listed on the AIM. The theories help to explain managers‘ 
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behaviour. Indeed, some of these theories assent that managers may not act in the 
best interests of the organisation. Employing a single theoretic approach in corporate 
governance research, where agency theory is the main theory, offers an incomplete 
understanding of governance, in particular, to the smaller companies. This study 
advances the agency theory to quoted companies on the AIM and issues of conflict 
between the managers and the shareholders. Increasing the ownership shareholding 
of the executives should reduce agency costs because it naturally aligns the interests 
of the managers and that of the shareholders. However, for the AIM companies, the 
issues of conflict may be exacerbated between the large shareholders and the 
minority shareholders. Chapter 9 empirically considers the ownership in the AIM 
companies. Each of the different theories helps to understand different aspects of 
corporate governance and a single theory is unable to provide a holistic 
understanding of the issues of corporate governance. The inherent complexity 
involved in corporate governance issues is unlikely to enable the use of a single 
theory alone because of the economic, political, culture, legal and social roles. 
Agency is the predominant theory in this thesis to explain corporate governance 
within the AIM companies, both theoretically and empirically, nevertheless, it is 
important to recognise that other theories need to be included, rather than to treat 
each of them as separately. This is well recognised by researchers, for example, 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Cohen et al. (2008, 183). Later, the empirical section (see 
Chapter 9) will extend to the managerial ownership and company performance 
relationship (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck et al. 1988; McConnell and Servaes 
1990; Short and Keasey 1999). Chapter 10 considers the managerial remuneration 
using the two theories commonly associated with remuneration, agency theory and 
the managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). The 
issues of corporate governance using agency theory in large listed have been 
empirically discussed. However, relatively little academic attention has been paid to 
the smaller quoted companies, in particular in the second tier exchanges such as the 
AIM. 
  
 75 
 
CHAPTER 4  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEUNITED KINGDOM  
4.1: Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the authoritative contributions on 
corporate governance that appeared since the Cadbury Report (1992) in the United 
Kingdom. In Chapter 2, the most quoted definition is that of Cadbury (1992), ‘the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled’. Chapter 3 considered some 
of the important theories that help explain corporate governance. This chapter builds 
up a picture of the corporate governance system in the United Kingdom, following 
the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 to the current UK Corporate 
Governance (2012). Hereinafter, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) will be 
the ‗Code 2012‘. The corporate governance problems are not new, for example, the 
problems of stewardship when a principal entrusts an agent to manage the principal‘s 
property, during his/her absence and the ex-post evaluation of stewardship. 
Therefore, agency theory can strongly embed the theoretical framework for the 
governance problems. As Nordberg and McNulty (2013, 356) explain that the UK 
governance codes are based on the agency theory, but its logic arises and evolves 
through a broader concept of accountability. This chapter is useful for this thesis as 
the Codes provide the texts of corporate governance and frames an awareness of the 
roles of the board. The Code‘s objective is to help raise the standards of corporate 
governance and the level of confidence within companies. The Quoted Companies 
Alliance guidelines on Corporate Governance for the smaller quoted company sector 
are the minimum governance recommendation that the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) companies need to adopt. The QCA take their guidance from the UK 
Corporate Governance Code.  
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004, 417) define codes of governance as a set 
of ‘best-practice’ recommendations as regards the behaviour and structure of the 
board of directors of a company, executive remuneration, role of shareholders and 
the role and position of the auditor. In the UK, the Cadbury Report was the first 
comprehensive code of corporate governance, setting the benchmarks, and its 
introduction has been a major step in the development of corporate governance in the 
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UK and worldwide diffusion. The development of the corporate governance code in 
the UK has become an important institutionalisation process. However, Solomon 
(2007, 50) suggests that to control and govern company‘s management there are 
alternatives to the development of national corporate governance codes and reports. 
These include shareholder activism, fiduciary responsibility of the directors imposed 
by company law, the legal requirement for an independent audited annual financial 
report, the overseeing by a regulatory body, the Stock Exchange Model Code on 
directors‘ share dealing and the City Code on takeovers and mergers.  
 
It is interesting to note that the development of the various corporate 
governance reviews have been initiated by external participants in the UK, rather 
than government initiatives, except for the Higg‘s Report (see Chapter 4, s.4.9). The 
UK‘s Cadbury Code (1992) began as principles-based rather than prescriptive rules, 
as in the United States, and the subsequent ‗Code 2012‘, follow the same concept. 
The enforcement of the recommendations within the Code does not rely on the legal 
system, but a mix of regulatory authority, that is, London Stock Exchange, listing 
authorities and on investor attitude. The adoption of the Code‘s recommendations is 
the hub of the ‗comply or explain‘ approach. The ‗comply or explain‘ approach 
means that the companies have a choice of whether to follow the guidance set out in 
the Code, or to explain why they have chosen not to, leaving the final judgement to 
the stock market. In theory, the ‗comply or explain‘ approach allows a company to 
opt out, in effect, from any one or more provisions of the Code. However, and as a 
condition of listing on the LSE, companies have to explain any deviations from the 
governance practices to the investors in the company‘s annual reports. This 
mandatory disclosure obligation underpins the Code and effectively setting the 
compliance with the Code as the default for listed companies (Moore 2009, 86). 
 
The ‗comply or explain‘ approach is not without its criticisms. The 
RiskMetrics (2009) study commissioned by the European Union concludes that on 
analysis of the informative value of statements of non-compliance, the ‗comply or 
explain‘ approach does not appear to have worked effectively. The study finds that 
less than half of explanations given can be qualified as sufficiently informative (cited 
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in FRC, 2011, 5). The problem of low quality governance reports is connected to the 
problem of low shareholder engagement. 
 
In the UK, monitoring of the compliance with the Code takes place in a 
number of ways. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2011) state companies‘ 
monitoring of the adoption of the code by institutions such as the Association of 
British Insurers, and others such as Manifest and Pensions Investment Research 
Consultants, analyse resolutions at general meetings companies listed on the main 
market for compliance with the Code. The number of academic research on the 
analysis of the ‗comply or explain‘ is low. Seidl et al. (2013) uses 257 UK and 
Germany listed companies to develop a taxonomy to identify the extent of using the 
‗explain‘ criteria, and how companies can legitimise their explanations in respect of 
the deviations from compliance. According to Seidl et al. (2013, 808) companies 
maintain their legitimacy by use of compliance statements and the explanations 
provided to be considered as legitimacy devices. A basic form of explanation 
includes a declaration of compliance with a particular code provision. In this manner, 
the company has employed legitimacy tactic by seeking approval by conforming to 
an institution (Suchman 1995; Seidl et al. 2013). The AIM companies apply the 
‗comply or explain‘ concept, but some companies provide an explanation for non-
adoption of the Combined Code or its provision by reference to ‗size‘. However, 
‗size‘ is referred to within the codes. The company‘s disclosure in respect of their 
compliance to the Code suggests that the companies show legitimate conformance to 
the ‗comply or explain‘ approach, but also deviate where a code provision is 
inappropriate within their context. Despite the considerable claims in the code and 
that adoption of the code improves performance, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that it 
has been difficult to substantiate this. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that, 
in the context of systems, which have liquid capital markets such as the UK and US, 
compliance with codes help to cut the cost of raising external capital for companies, 
and enhances investor confidence. 
 
The impact of the failure of companies raises questions in relation to the 
social legitimacy of corporations. Table 4.1 shows a list of fraud examples in the UK 
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during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. These failures were the catalyst for the 
formation of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 
May 1991, a quasi private sector and public policy (Nordberg and McNulty 2013, 
350). The Cadbury Report (1992) addresses the specific scandals that were dominant 
in causing public distress: 
 
‘It is, however, the continuing concern about standards of financial 
reporting and accountability, heightened by BCCI, Maxwell and the 
controversy over directors’ pay, which has kept corporate 
governance in the public eye’ (Cadbury Report, 1992, 9). 
Table 4.1: Examples of Fraud Cases in the UK During the Period 1980-1990 
Name Examples of Fraud 
Barlow Clowes, Lever (1992) Founding CEO stole money from savers 
Brent Walker plc Founding CEO stole money from savers 
Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (1990) 
Auditors did not reveal the going concern nature of the bank 
and collapsed shortly after release of audited accounts- 
Financial statements were signed off by the auditors with no 
qualifications. In addition, business structures played one 
regulator off against others 
County NatWest  Senior executives accused of inflating the success of rights 
issue of Blue Arrow shares by selling shares  in a non arm‘s 
length transactions 
Guinness  Share prices were inflated during a takeover battle for 
Distillers 
Polly Peck International 
(1990) 
Founder CEO siphoned corporate funds to offshore 
companies-  
Robert Maxwell (1991) Used employee pension funds to support his ailing business- 
fraud conducted by people who were both shareholders and 
managers. 
Source: Boyd (1996, 168) 
 
Following from the Cadbury 1992 review, the UK has committed to adopting  
a rigorous approach to deal with issues in corporate governance as problems/crisis 
emerge. The approach begins by initially setting up a committee to deal with issues 
of corporate governance of that time. Jones and Pollitt (2004, 163) refer to four 
major stakeholder groups as ‘influencers’ who may form part of the committee. 
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These include business (for example, corporations, trade unions, profession bodies, 
and institutional investors), authorities (for example, the Bank of England and the 
government), public opinion (for example, media), and exogenous factor (for 
example, financial scandals). All of the reviews focus is on preserving shareholder 
value principle.  
 
4.2: Cadbury Report (1992) 
The Cadbury committee set up by the Financial Reporting Council, London 
Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession in May 1991 in order to assess the 
financial aspects of corporate governance and act to reduce UK‘s poor image in the 
financial markets. This was a result of a series of corporate scandals and the collapse 
of several companies, which had previously received clean audit reports. The 
Cadbury committee was set up, therefore, to address the main concerns of low levels 
of confidence in financial reporting and in the auditors to provide the safeguards 
expected by the users of company‘s reports (Charkham 1994, 249). Therefore, the 
recommendations focus towards the issues in corporate governance of control and 
accountability. The Cadbury Code‘s open definition of corporate governance 
concern is with the whole area of corporate governance (see Chapter 2). This puts an 
emphasis on systems, processes and controls over accountability and decision-
making (Shaw 1997, 23). The Cadbury Report‘s objective is to enhance openness, 
integrity and accountability in the British corporate governance system and is based 
upon two main ideas (Finch 1992). First, that self-regulation is better than statutory 
enforcement for improving the way companies are run. Second, compared to 
regulators, the financial markets are a more efficient system of providing external 
controls over those companies that fail to adopt satisfactory standards of corporate 
governance. Keasey and Wright (1993) suggest that the strong reliance of corporate 
governance framework in the UK on self-regulation and market-based sanctions 
shows weaknesses hence rendering accountability to be problematic. 
 
Cadbury recommended that quoted companies should adopt a governance 
structure that complies with the Code of Best Practice. The Cadbury Report (1992, 
58-89) recommendations include the separation of the roles of the CEO/Chair 
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(duality role), so no one person had unfettered power, independence of non-
executive directors, board sub-committees, a compliance statement, ‗comply or 
explain‘ basis. Thus, embracing appropriate governance structure will provide 
effective monitoring of the board and companies will adopt the shareholder value 
orientated governance practices. Some of these are further explored in Chapter 8. 
Gamble and Kelly (2001, 114) criticise the development of the codes as they offer an 
enlightened shareholder value perspective and obscures the persistence of unchecked 
managerial power. However, Conyon and Mallin (1997) show that, despite the 
voluntary adoption of the Cadbury Report, the UK listed companies have widely 
accepted the recommendations such as CEO/Chairman as separate individuals, 
establishment of the board committees and the number of non-executive directors. 
Weir and Laing (2000) using 200 UK companies in 1992 and 1995 show that the 
returns are higher for companies adopting the Cadbury Report and have established a 
compensation committee. They also show that, since the Cadbury Report, UK 
companies have increased non-executive director representation, reduced CEO 
duality, and increased the presence of board committees Weir et al. (2002, 580). 
Dahya et al. (2002) explored how the adoption of the Cadbury report affected CEO 
turnover. The findings show that CEO turnover increased due to the need for 
separation of the roles of the chairman and the CEO. Literature on country surveys 
shows that even with the voluntary compliance of the corporate governance code 
provisions; listed companies show a positive response to code recommendations as a 
direct response for company transparency and accountability. 
 
Kay and Silberston (1995) state that the corporate governance 
recommendations should recognise a trusteeship model and ensure that managers are 
able to pursue multiple objectives, but should be accountable for their performance. 
The organisational structure and system is flexible to encourage unity within the 
management team, but open to exogenous factors to prevent opportunistic behaviour. 
This basic objective of ‗managerial freedom with accountability‘ is well set out in 
the Cadbury Report section 1.1 p 10. The Cadbury Code as a model of regulation for 
listed companies is imitated by many countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) 
and Iskander and Chamlou (2000)). Authors, however, question its value, for 
example, Finch (1992), Du Plessis et al. (2010) states that the Cadbury Report had a 
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rather narrow view focusing on the financial aspects of the corporate governance and 
that the Cadbury Report assumed that accountability to shareholders as the primary 
objective of corporate governance. However, it is overly optimistic on its reliance on 
self-regulation. Nevertheless, the Code of Best Practice recommended by the 
Cadbury committee have become authoritative since the companies must disclose 
whether they ‗comply or explain‘ with the Code recommendations in order to be 
listed onto the London Stock Exchange. As of July 1993, the Stock Exchange rules 
require companies to adopt the ‗comply or explain‘ approach of the Code and 
provide the reason for any deviations for non-compliance, in their annual reports. Sir 
Adrian Cadbury‘s concerns regarding the adoption of the Code were twofold: first 
that it was up to the shareholders to ensure that the company complied with the 
Code. Second as Cadbury (1992, p12) puts it:  
 
‘We recognise, however that if companies do not back our 
recommendations it is probable that legislation and external 
regulation will be sought to deal with some of the underlying 
problems, which the report identifies. Statutory measures would 
impose minimum standard and there would be a greater risk of 
boards complying with the letter, rather than with the spirit, of their 
requirements’. 
 
Here, Cadbury emphasises the principle-based regulation and challenges that 
the corporations would have to meet the recommendations to make the concept 
work. The implication is that the organisation‘s survival is under threat if society 
perceives any breach of legitimacy with the social contract (see Chapter 3, s.3.7 for 
the discussion on legitimacy theory). The Hampel Report (1998, s1.5, p8) stated in 
respect of the Cadbury Report (1992) the following:  
 
‘struck a chord in many overseas countries, it has provided a 
yardstick against which standards of corporate governance in other 
markets are being measured.’ 
Cadbury echoes the agency problem in the following statutory requirements: 
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‗Given the separation of ownership from management, the directors are required to report on 
their stewardship by means of the annual report and financial statements sent to the 
shareholders‘ (Cadbury Report 1992, s. 5.1). 
Table 4.2 shows the development of the corporate governance codes over the 
last two decades since the launch of the Cadbury Report (1992).  
Table 4.2: Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK 
Year Name of the Report Issuer Comment 
1992 Cadbury Report LSE, FRC, 
accountancy 
profession 
First version of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code looked at Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance; for all listed companies, but 
recommended for small companies to adopt, hence 
includes AIM. 
Post Cadbury and its successors 
1995 Greenbury Report CBI In response to concerns over the compensation 
packages awarded to some directors. 
1998 Hampel Report LSE, CBI, IOD, 
NAPF, CCAB, 
ABI 
 Review and revise the findings of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury report.. 
1998 Combined Code  LSE, FRC, CBI Drawing on the work of the Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Hampel committees, the original Combined 
Code. 
1999 Turnbull Report ICAEW Best practice and principles-based approach to the 
implementation of a sound system of internal 
control and reporting to shareholders on internal 
control. 
2001 Myners Report UK Treasury Institutional Shareholders in UK; focus on UK 
pensions industry. 
Enron and the financial crisis 
 2003 Higgs Report DTI Role and Effectiveness of NEDs; many 
recommendations of the Higgs report were included 
in the Combined Code. 
 2003 Smith Report FRC  Recommendations in relation to the audit 
committee and the role of directors serving on the 
audit committee. 
2003 Tyson Report DTI, LBS Review of the recruitment and development of non-
executive directors. 
 2003 Combined Code  FRC  Revisions to the Code. 
2004/ 
2005 
Review of the 
Impediments to 
Voting UK Shares 
 Report by Paul Myners allows an audit trail of vote 
instructions and transparency between issue and 
beneficial owner. 
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Year Name of the Report Issuer Comment 
2006 Combined Code 
Revised 
FRC . 
2008 Higgs Report 
Revised 
DTI  
2008 Combined Code 
Revised 
FRC  
Banking and the financial crisis 
2009 The Walker Review
10
 HM Treasury Review of corporate governance in UK banks and 
other financial industry entities 
2010 Stewardship Code FRC To improve the quality of engagement between 
asset managers and companies to help improve 
long-term risk adjusted returns to shareholders 
2010 UK Corporate 
Governance Code  
FRC Standards of good practice in relation to board 
leadership and effectiveness, compensation, 
accountability and relations with shareholders. 
 
2011 Davies Report  The review identified barriers preventing women 
reaching the boardroom and made 
recommendations to increase the proportion of 
women on corporate boards. 
2012 UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
FRC The changes to the Governance Code are designed 
to give investors greater insight into what company 
boards and audit committees are doing to promote 
their interests, and to provide them with a better 
basis for engagement‘11. 
 2012 Stewardship Code 
revised 
FRC Changes to 2010 Code relate to the definition of 
stewardship, clarification of the role of asset owner. 
 
 
4.3: Greenbury Report (1995) 
The Cadbury Report was followed in 1995 by the report of the Greenbury 
Committee, in part, a direct response to the growing disagreement over chief 
executive officer pay levels initiated when executives of the privatised electric 
                                                 
10 
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code.aspx 
11 
http://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2012/September/FRC-publishes-updates-
to-UK-Corporate-Governance-C.aspx, comment by FRC Chairman Baroness Hogg, accessed 28 
August 2013 
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utilities exercised share options worth millions of pounds. In January 1995, the group 
was set up on the initiation of the Confederation of the British Industry. The 
Greenbury Report set out recommendations regarding directors‘ pay and share 
options. The Greenbury Report recommended extensive disclosure in annual reports 
on compensation and recommended the formation of a compensation committee 
consisting of non-executive directors. The Greenbury Report reinforced the Cadbury 
approach by extending the role of the compensation committee. Monks and Sykes 
(2002, 29) say that the effect of this report on limiting the growth of executive 
compensation was negligible.  
 
Additionally, the Greenbury committee wanted to show the full costs of 
corporate pension fund contributions to directors‘ compensation, but hitherto hidden, 
and often very high. Some stakeholder groups, particularly from the business sector, 
fearing a ‘fat cat’ repercussion, opposed compensation disclosure, although a 
compromise was reached allowing companies to select full or partial disclosure on 
compensation details. This suggests that there is tension between promoting 
accountability and legitimacy. The credibility of the Greenbury report is underpinned 
by the Stock Exchange‘s action on enforcement via the listing rules. However, 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) state that despite the Greenbury report the pay levels in 
1997 rose by 18%. Although, the CEO pay in the UK has seen substantial growth, it 
has trailed behind the pay levels of the CEOs in the US. Specifically, the year 1997 
is important since it is the first year covered by the UK disclosure requirements for 
compensation data in the company‘s annual report, thus providing a rich source of 
data for empirical research.  
 
In contrast to (Stiles and Taylor 1993) survey of 220 UK companies show 
that the presence of a remuneration committee results in higher pay for the CEO 
recent studies show that empirical research fails to find any evidence that an increase 
in independent non-executive directors in the pay setting process reduces CEO pay. 
Gregory-Smith (2012) find no correlation between CEO pay and the independence 
of the board. The latter is a measured as percentage of insiders on the board and 
percentage of insiders on the remuneration committee. His work is in agreement to 
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that of Conyon et al. (2011b) who find no evidence that stronger governance 
provisions result in lower CEO pay outcomes for European CEOs. 
 
4.4: Hampel Report (1998) 
The Hampel Committee was established to review the extent to which the 
Cadbury Report and the Greenbury Report had been implemented and whether the 
objectives had been met. The Hampel Report (1998) followed external pressures by 
the European Commission to harmonize corporate governance rules in member 
states, for example, two-tier boards making companies responsible to a wider range 
of stakeholders. However, the Hampel committee did not support this proposition 
(Haxhi et al. 2013, 538). In August 1997, the Hampel Committee produced a draft 
setting out principles and code, which embraced the Cadbury Report and the 
Greenbury Report. It concluded, ‘public companies are the most accountable to 
organisations in society’ (Hampel Report, 1998, para 1.1). One of the key 
recommendations was that companies should have regard to the public acceptability 
of their conduct. 
 
The report also emphasises the role of institutional investors, in particular, 
the pension fund trustees, who are the largest group of institutional investors in UK. 
They are encouraged to adopt a more long-term approach. Despite the 
recommendations of the good best practice principles by the above three reports, 
nevertheless, there are concerns as Monks and Sykes (2002, 29) point out the 
problems of effective implementation. 
 
Despite changes in the institutional environment for the directors to discharge 
their duties following the publication of Combined Code (1998), the executive pay in 
UK is still not without problems. According to Perkins and Hendry (2005, 1444) 
there is continuous influence of use of ‗market forces‘, but  the agency theory 
assumes that agents (management) are opportunistic and potentially exploit 
asymmetric information in their contractual relationships. According to the Hampel 
Report (1998), the market will determine the companies‘ executive remuneration. 
But the Greenbury Report (1995, s6.2, s6.3 s6.4) argues that although a market in 
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executive talent exists, however the market remains imperfect for the following 
reasons: management working in the same companies for long period, remuneration 
is determined by the board and the remuneration committee, and influenced by 
consultant surveys and other companies. A potential conflict of interest is pervasive 
in the AIM companies when directors determine their own remuneration, as it may 
be difficult to separate the dominant role of the CEO or a founder member. Hence, 
the presence of a remuneration committee made up of non-executive directors and 
greater disclosure of directors‘ pay is necessary to monitor the management and 
prevent undue exercise of power by the executives. 
 
4.5: Combined Code of Corporate Governance (1998) 
The recommendations of the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report and the 
Hampel Report amalgamated to form a single report, the Combined Code. Based on 
the Hampel report in 1998, the Combined Code was divided into two separate levels: 
the first level consists of seventeen open ended Principles followed by a second level 
comprising of more detailed explanatory Provisions. Since 31 December 1998, the 
Combined Code was appended to the LSE Listing Rule 12.43A. The Code applies to 
all listed companies on the LSE main market with mandatory requirement  for 
companies to provide in their annual report a narrative statement of how they have 
applied the Code principles, state that they have complied with the Code provisions 
or, if not, why not and for what period. Since, the first publication of the Combined 
Code in 1998 it has subsequently undergone several revisions, for example, in the 
years 2003, 2006 and 2008. The Code had no legislative basis for enforcement, but 
failure to meet its requirements would mean delisting from the stock exchange.  
 
By 2000, the responsibility of enforcing the Combined Code underpinning 
the ‘conformance – disclosure obligation’ (see Moore 2009, 89) was transferred 
from the LSE to the FSA. The overall effect of the responsibility for ensuring best 
practice of corporate governance is the migration from a private sector initiative to a 
quasi-public institution. 
  
 87 
 
4.6: Turnbull Report (1999, 2006) 
The Turnbull Committee was established by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) to provide guidance on the Principle 
D.2 of the Combined Code 1998 – for companies to have appropriate internal 
controls. It includes that it is the responsibilities of the Director to ensure the 
efficiency of the internal control. Overall, the Turnbull report provides an explicit 
framework on internal control to which each company could model their own 
system. The ICAEW recognised the gap relating to the risk information within the 
annual reports and issued several discussion topics (1998, 1999, 2002 cited in 
Linsley  and Shrives 2006, 388) encouraging UK listed company directors to report 
upon risks.  
 
Enron and the Financial Crisis 
The UK corporate governance code, mainly initiated by the private sector and 
based on the self-regulatory concept, was to avoid government legislation. However, 
this was not always effective. As the need for broad reforms became evident, 
governments began commissioning enquiries and reports into company law matters, 
especially from around the early 2000s. Senior industry figures appointed by 
government agencies led the government-initiated enquiries. For example, Lord 
Myners (the former chairman of Marks & Spencer), submitted a report in 2001 on 
institutional investors to HM Treasury. In 2003, the Higgs Report into the role of 
non-executive directors and audit committees report was commissioned by the UK 
Government, and in 2003, the Smith Report was also submitted to the UK 
Government after the failures of Arthur Andersen and Enron. 
 
After the global financial crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, 
the government initiated enquiries increased, but still wanted to avoid legislation as a 
reaction for company failures. For example, Sir David Walker 2009 review of the 
duties of directors of banks and financial institutions, strongly urged the adoption of 
non-legislative responses to the failure of directors and institutional shareholders. 
The report focuses on maintaining robust corporate governance standards such as 
‗comply or explain‘ approach  
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4.7: Myners Report (2001) 
The Myners‘ report issued in 2001, by HM Treasury, concentrates on the 
trusteeship aspects of institutional shareholders, in particular, pension and life fund. 
The Myners‘ report recognises that management should be held accountable to the 
shareholders and that the institutional investors must look after the beneficiaries 
despite conflicts of interest. 
 
4.8: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) 
Following Enron‘s and other in the United States, the US Congress put into 
place new legal structures to increase investor protection and formed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX)
 12
  in July 2002. SOX imposes significant corporate governance, 
certification and disclosure requirements for the US and non-US companies listed on 
the national stock exchanges in the US as Brewer et al. (2010) suggest that SOX 
provides for a major regulatory system for accountants, independence, certification 
and attestation requirements. SOX saw the establishment of a ‘quasi-public 
institution’ regulator for the accounting profession called the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (see Srinivasan and Coates 2014). The corporate 
governance requirements include improving disclosure and financial reporting, 
requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of financial and other information 
in the company‘s reports. The SOX further includes mandates regarding the 
composition and functioning of the audit committee, forfeiture of CEO incentive 
compensation upon accounting restatements and prohibition of executive loans and 
non-audit services from auditors (Romano 2009, 232). 
 
4.9: Higgs Report (2003)  
The indirect effect of the scandals in the US and the creation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) has been a catalyst for a host of reforms in Europe. There were 
strong concerns that the US style collapses and scandals did mimic in Europe and the 
UK. In addition, despite the adoption of the Combined Code, corporate failures 
                                                 
12 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm 
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continued in the UK. Further, the UK government was concerned about the 
implications of adoption of the SOX for British companies listed on the NYSE. In 
July 2002, the department of trade and industry and HMTreasury initiated a review 
of the Combined Code following a review of the Company Law. The UK 
government sponsored the Higgs review specifically on the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors. Higgs report made several significant recommendations to 
the Combined Code 1998, in particular, for the boards to consist of a majority of 
independent non-executive directors and to strengthen the roles of the audit and 
nomination committees. Higgs Report has strengthened the requirements of the 
Combined Code. Predominantly, the independence of non-executive directors, 
different individuals should hold the roles of the Chairman and the CEO and the 
directors‘ appointments should be transparent. 
 
Higgs report is not without criticism as the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICEAW) noted that while the Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel 
and Turnbull reports combined produced 14 principles and 45 code points, whereas 
the Higgs review added just 1 principle but 37 code points suggesting that  the code 
was excessively prescriptive (Jones and Pollitt 2004, 165). This arguably has had the 
effect of increasing the narrowness and strictness of the Code at the cost of its 
reputed flexibility. 
 
4.10: Smith Report (2003) 
Sir Robert Smith, Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, published a 
report and proposed guidelines on ‗Audit Committees‘. This was in response to the 
failure of the audit committee in Enron. Both the Higgs and Smith recommendations 
are included in the revised Combined Code 2003. It applies to all listed companies 
on the primary market of the London Stock Exchange for reporting years 
commencing on or after 1 November 2003. The recommendation on the audit 
committee in both the US and UK avoids a loose definition for independence. For 
example, in the US the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 legislated that the 
audit committees should be wholly independent. Similarly, both the Smith and Higgs 
reports stressed the importance of independence of non-executive directors and have 
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emphasised that the audit committees should be comprised of wholly independent 
directors. Smith Report (2003) has expanded the roles of audit committees 
concerning financial reporting and external audit, bringing the UK policy on audit 
committees a step closer to that of the US Turley and Zaman (2004, 306). 
 
In the Combined Code 2003, which followed the publications of the Higgs 
and Smith reports, the compliance task has been complicated with the addition of a 
third layer of norms in the Code‘s regulatory structure. Hence, boards have to adopt 
the regulatory structure at three hierarchical levels: main principles, supporting 
principles and provisions. Moore (2009, 89) states the Code lacks guidance on the 
precise interaction between the three levels; however, it does reiterate the continuing 
listing requirements for the companies. 
 
4.11: The Tyson Report (2003) 
The Tyson Report (2003) seeks to broaden boardroom diversity and 
inclusivity, by encouraging non-executive directors to be drawn from diverse 
backgrounds thus representation of a wider group of external constituencies. This 
represents a shift from a shareholder focused towards a stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance. 
 
4.12: UK Companies Act (2006) 
A new Company Law enacted in the UK in 2006 is the largest single piece of 
legislation and has 1,300 provisions and multiple schedules (Tomasic 2011; Ahern 
2014). UK has been affected by European law reforms due to its membership of the 
EU in areas of EU Company Law Directives and EU corporate governance. 
Although the 2006 Act adoption of new principles allowing simplification of the 
company law and reduction of regulation specifically for the smaller companies but 
there is still uncertainty regarding corporate governance. In respect of general 
corporate governance the Companies Act 2006 are set out in sections 172-174. For 
example, Section 172 specifies the duty to promote the company‘s success. Section 
173 provides that directors to exercise independent judgement at all times. Section 
174 provides that directors must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in 
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everything that they do. One of the striking developments of the Companies Act 
2006 is to foster the longer-term success of the company when making decisions and 
to do so by having regard to various stakeholder considerations. As Tomasic (2011, 
59), states that the stakeholder perspective although symbolic, but an important 
development in company law. 
 
4.13: EU Directive  
The EU Commission amended the Fourth and the Seventh Company Law 
Directives, providing that listed companies should publish a ‘corporate governance 
statement’, either as part of the company‘s annual report or in a separate report13. 
The directors will need to include reference in respect of the mandatory corporate 
governance code; however, company law may allow a reference to a voluntary code. 
The statement should include information about the corporate governance practices 
applied beyond the requirements under national law. In addition, the statement will 
address any deviation from the ‗comply or explain‘ approach to the governance code 
to specific provisions and the code as whole. The Directives also require information 
on the company‘s internal controls and risk management systems, anti-takeover 
protection and shareholders‘ exercise of voting rights. The Directive further calls for 
liability for board members for the corporate governance statement and penalties 
applicable to infringements of the implementing national provisions (Wymeersch 
2006, 135). 
 
The UK implemented the Eighth Directive through Part II of the Companies 
Act 1989. The 1989 Act s27 specifies cases in which a person would be ineligible to 
act as auditor, thus implementing Article 24 of the Directive, which gives scope to 
define lack of independence to the Member States. 
 
                                                 
13
Company law: annual accounts and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies 
(amend. Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC, 91/674/EEC) , http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdo
c=32006L0046, accessed 15 May 2014. 
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The European Union has a significant influence on the corporate governance 
in the UK. The European Commission‘s ‗Corporate Governance and Company Law 
Action Plan (2003) proposed both legislative and regulatory measures which will 
affect all member states on the following issues: disclosure requirements, exercise of 
voting rights, cross-border voting, disclosure by institutional investors, and 
responsibilities of board members.  
 
Banking and the Financial Crisis 
In 2008, the sub-prime mortgage practices and banking crisis raised serious 
doubts about the efficiency and legitimacy of the corporate governance system and 
the integrity and accountability of its actors (Conyon et al. 2011a; Haxhi et al. 2013). 
In 2008 to 2009, the banking crisis resulted in the UK government owning dominant 
stakes in large banks, HBOS/Lloyd‘s, TSB and the Royal Bank of Scotland and the 
nationalization of the assets of a couple of smaller failed banks, Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley (Cheffins 2010). Hence, the following reports may be 
contributory to the reforming of governance factors that will help avert the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 in the future. 
 
4.14: The Walker Review (2009) 
Although UK has strong investor protection rights and good governance, 
however bank governance in the UK is partly to blame for the financial crisis. As a 
result, Sir David Walker chaired a government commissioned report on corporate 
governance of British banks, and published a report in November 2009. 
Interestingly, the Walker report recommends the use of ‗soft law‘ such as corporate 
governance codes to deal with failures on the part of company directors of banks and 
financial institutions, but can apply more generally to all listed companies. The 
‗comply or explain‘ approach to the Combined Code is reaffirmed and considered fit 
for purpose, even though a shift in emphasis to ‗apply and explain‘ is suggested. 
However, the FRC argues that the ‗comply or explain‘ approach is the trademark of 
corporate governance in the UK. 
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4.15: The UK Stewardship Code (2010, 2012) 
The origin of the Stewardship code was initiated by the Institutional 
Shareholders Committee14  report of 2002 entitled, ‗Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents‘. The Walker Report (2009) recommended the FRC‘s remit 
to extend the code of best practice in stewardship to institutional investors and fund 
managers. Walker envisaged that the fund managers should voluntarily commit to a 
stewardship obligation, or explain why they were unwilling to make such a 
commitment. The first UK Stewardship Code (hereinafter Stewardship Code) for 
institutional investors was published in July 2010. FRC includes within their 
definition of institutional investors to include the asset owners and asset managers 
with equity holding in UK listed companies. As with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, the Stewardship Code should be applied on a ‗comply or explain‘ basis. In 
reporting terms, this entails providing a statement on the institution‘s website that 
contains a description of application of the Code, or an explanation for deviations 
from any elements of the Code. Institutional shareholders are required to commit to 
public disclosure of their policies on stewardship responsibilities, active monitoring 
of the investee companies, provision of guidelines for active intervention with the 
investee company, act collectively with other investors and report periodically on 
their stewardship and voting activities. 
 
The new Stewardship code (2012) revised from its previous version in 2010. 
The 2012 Stewardship Code revisions include clarifying the meaning of stewardship, 
and the respective responsibilities of asset owners and asset managers; and asking 
investors to disclose their policy on stock lending and whether they recall lent stock 
for voting purposes
15
. 
 
  
                                                 
14 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-
Code-September-2012.aspx, page 2 
15
 http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/Global/Publication_pdf/Corporate_Governance_Review_2012.pdf 
accessed 13 December 2013 
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4.16: The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, 2012) 
In April 2012 the FRC issued a consultation document and the revisions are 
now included in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012). These revisions 
include, for example, boardroom diversity (gender and ethnicity), and its progression 
report on an annual basis16. In addition, the board to confirm that it has considered 
the annual report and accounts, taken as a whole, to be fair and balanced; audit 
committees to disclose more information about their activities and the FTSE 350 
companies to put the external audit contract out to tender at least every 10 years17 
(UK corporate Governance Code 2012, p.19, s3.7). In May 2013, the Quoted 
Companies Alliance (QCA) issued their own code aimed at the small and mid-sized 
quoted companies, which includes the AIM. 
 
4.17: Davies Report (2011, 2012) 
Lord Davies, on 26 March 2014
18
 published the third annual review of 
women on UK boards. Three years on from the first review in 2011, Lord Davies‘ 
report, women on boards, reviewed the current situation on UK boards (FTSE 350) 
and considered the business case for having gender-diverse boards was now seeing a 
culture change. Since the first report, several follow-up reports published, indicate 
positive improvement in women‘s representation in the boardroom.  
 
Since 2011, a number of recommendations are in place. These include, for 
example, that all Chairman of FTSE 350 companies should set out the percentage of 
women that they aim to have on their boards in 2013 and 2015; and the FTSE 100 
companies should aim for a minimum 25 per cent women in the boardroom by 2015 
although many might achieve a higher figure. Quoted companies should disclose 
annually the proportion of women on the board, women in senior executive 
                                                 
16 Recommended  by Lord Davies in his :Women on Boards‘ report published in February 2011; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-745-women-
on-boards.pdf ; accessed 13 December 2013 
17
 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Feedback-statement-on-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx, accessed 24 January 2014 
18
 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/women-on-boards-reports 
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positions, and female employees in the organisation as a whole. Furthermore, the 
recommendation that the FRC amend the UK Corporate Governance Code to require 
listed companies to establish a policy on boardroom diversity, including measurable 
objectives for implementing the policy, and annually disclose a summary of the 
policy and the progress made towards achieving the objectives. This 
recommendation is now largely complete.  
 
For the AIM companies, it is still rare to have women sitting on the board. It 
is important for the QCA to say that they will not shy away from emphasising the 
importance of diversity for small and mid-sized companies. 
 
4.18: Good Corporate Governance Worldwide 
The development of corporate governance codes in the US began far earlier 
than in the UK. In January 1978, the Business Roundtable issued a report on ‗The 
Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned 
Corporation‘. According to Monks and Minow (1991), this was aimed at criminal 
corporate behaviour and to legislate limiting  hostile takeovers and empire building 
by the management.  
 
In 1989, the Hong Kong Exchange issued its first Code of Best Practice, 
Listing Rules, followed by the Irish Association of Investment Managers who 
drafted a Statement of Best Practice on the Role and Responsibility of Directors of 
Publicly Listed Companies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, 418). Table 4.3 
shows the emergence of governance codes by country. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2004, 434) contra indicative to their hypothesis find that there was more likelihood 
for developed countries with a common law legal status to develop governance codes 
compared to countries with a civil law legal status. The former legal system is 
characterised as having greater protection for minority shareholders and higher 
liability standard for directors and managers. The two legal systems are further 
discussed in Chapter 5, s5.7.  
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Table 4.3: Worldwide Codes of Corporate Governance (CG) Practice or Policy  
Country Year of First 
Governance  
Code 
Legal Origin 
(Claessens and 
Yurtoglu 2013) 
Issuer of last code Influential/ Specific Name Comply or 
Explain
19
 
Board Structure  
Unitary 
Australia 1995 British ASX Corporate Governance Council Bosch Report Yes Yes 
Austria 2002 German Austrian Working Group for Corporate 
Governance 
Austrian Code of CG Yes Two-tier 
Belgium 1995 French Corporate Governance Committee Cardon Report Yes Yes  
Brazil 1997 French Instituto Brasileiro de Governanca 
Corporativa 
Code of Best Practice in CG Yes Two tier 
Canada 1994 British Toronto Stock Exchange Dey Report(1994), Saucier Report (2001) Yes Yes 
China 2002 German China Security Regulatory Commission Code of CG for listed companies in China Yes Two tier 
Denmark 2000 Scandinavian Copenhagen Stock Exchange Committee 
on Corporate Governance 
Norby Commission Yes Two tier 
Finland 1997 Scandinavian HEX Plc, Central Chamber of Commerce 
of Finland Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers of Finland 
Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers 
 Yes Yes 
France 1995 French Association Française des Entreprises 
Privées 
Vienot Report I and II, Bouton Report Yes Unitary/Two tier 
Germany 1998 German Government Commission German 
Corporate Governance Code 
Cromme Code Yes Two tier 
                                                 
19 
The European Commission mandated the use of the comply or explain principle through the 2006/46/EC after having performed a comparative study on corporate gov-
ernance codes in Member States (Gregory 2002),. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-part1_en.pdf. 
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Country Year of First 
Governance  
Code 
Legal Origin 
(Claessens and 
Yurtoglu 2013) 
Issuer of last code Influential/ Specific Name Comply or 
Explain
19
 
Board Structure  
Unitary 
Greece 1999 French Federation of Greek Industries Principles on Corporate Governance in 
Greece 
Yes Yes 
Hong Kong 1989 British Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Code of Best Practice Yes Yes 
India 1998 British Securities and Exchange Board of India Kumar Mangalam Committeee Yes Yes 
Ireland 1999 British Irish Association of Investment Managers Corporate Governance, Share Option and 
Other Incentive Schemes 
Yes Yes 
Italy 1998 French Committee for the Corporate Governance Draghi Reform, Preda Report Yes 
(hybrid) 
Yes 
Japan 1997 German Tokyo Stock Exchange  No Two tier 
Malaysia 2000 British Securities Commission Malaysia Malaysian Code  on CG Yes Yes 
Mexico 1999 French Mexican Stock Exchange Código de Mejores Prácticas Corporativas Yes Yes 
Netherlands 1996 French Corporate Governance Committee Peters Report; Tabaksblat Code Yes Two tier 
Portugal 1999 French Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários 
Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance 
Yes Yes 
Singpore 1998 British Council on Corporate Disclosure and 
Governance 
 Yes Yes 
South Africa 1994 British The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa King Report , I And II Yes Yes 
South Korea 1999 German Committee on Corporate Governance 
Code of Best Practice for CG  
 
Yes Yes 
Spain 1996 French Instituto de Consejeros-Administradores Olivencia Report Yes Yes 
Sweden 1994 Scandinavian The Codes Group  Yes Yes 
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Country Year of First 
Governance  
Code 
Legal Origin 
(Claessens and 
Yurtoglu 2013) 
Issuer of last code Influential/ Specific Name Comply or 
Explain
19
 
Board Structure  
Unitary 
Thailand 1998 British Stock Exchange of Thailand The SET Code of Best Practice for 
Directors of Listed Companies 
Yes Yes 
United Kingdom 1992 British The Financial Reporting Council Cadbury Report; Combined Code Yes Yes 
United States 1978 British New York Stock Exchange Statement on CG Mandatory Yes 
 
Sources: Gregory (2002) ; OECD 2003;Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004, 298); Monks and Minow (2004, 298); Clarke (2007a); Solomon (2007, 188); Solomon (2010); 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009); Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013). http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php accessed 20 March 2014 
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4.19: Success of the UK Corporate Governance  
FTSE -Institutional Shareholder Services‘ Corporate Governance Index 
Report (2005) and Governance Metrics International (2005) using corporate 
governance score show the UK ranking as one of the top countries.Weir and Laing 
(2000); Conyon and Mallin (1997) show that the UK publicly listed companies show 
strong compliance with the Combined Code‘s recommendations, despite the 
voluntary nature of the adoption of the Combined Code‘s recommendations. Weir 
and Laing (2000) using 200 UK companies for the period 1992 to 1995 show that the 
market returns were higher for companies complying with the Cadbury Report and 
establishing a compensation committee. Dahya et al. (2002) show  that the adoption 
of the Cadbury Report in 1992 increases Chief Executive Officer(CEO) turnover in 
the UK. 
 
4.20: Discussion and Analysis 
The UK approach of corporate governance is principle based and this 
approach is in contrast to the US legal rule based. The series of reports produced in 
UK to the current Code (2012) have maintained the ‗comply or explain‘ approach. 
The confidence in the UK codes provide a benchmark against which standards of 
corporate governance recommendations in other markets, such as EU member states 
and other OECD countries have adopted the principle based approach. 
 
Although the compliance with the UK corporate governance code is 
voluntary, however evidence suggests that the majority of the listed companies in the 
UK adopt the Code recommendations. One of the reasons is due to demand by 
market forces to comply with legitimating practices, and, in addition, London Stock 
Exchange listing rules require these companies to comply with all the 
recommendations or justify reasons for non-compliance in their annual reports. This 
quasi-legal rule of ‗comply or explain‘ acts as a prescriptive, mandatory disclosure 
requirement, and its attractiveness extends to the OECD countries and others. 
 
Governance mechanisms can be categorised into two groups: internal and 
external. Internal mechanism includes CEO/Chairman duality, the proportion of non-
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executive directors, debt financing and executive director shareholdings. External 
mechanism is the market for corporate control (Jensen, 1986). Conyon and Mallin 
(1997); Weir et al. (2002) show that the UK companies compliance with the code‘s 
recommendations, in particular, separation of the roles of the CEO and Chairman, 
the percentage of non-executive directors on the unitary board, and the presence of 
board subcommittees such as audit, compensation and nomination committees have 
increased. This suggests that within the UK main market governance places 
emphasis on the internal structural governance mechanisms (Weir et al., 2002:580). 
In another publication by Weir et al. (2005) they find that governance mechanisms 
vary between companies going private and those remaining listed. They find that 
companies going private tend to have higher CEO and institutional share ownership, 
more duality and lower Tobin‘s Q ratio. However, they find that the presence of non-
executive directors and independent directors was statistically insignificant. For the 
AIM companies, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) suggest that internal board dynamics 
such as board size and independent non-executive director exert a greater influence 
on disclosing compliance with Quote  Companies Alliance guidelines than 
ownership related factors.  
 
The corporate governance reforms discussed above contribute to developing 
and formalising structures and norms. Although, the board adopts the UK Corporate 
Governance Code‘s recommendations, however the principle-based criteria suggest 
that the actual practices can be tailored to the needs of the management. For 
example, the use of a single individual for the roles of the CEO and the Chair or 
having only two board committees instead of the recommended three board 
committees. Although this is not recognised as good governance practice, 
nevertheless, for the AIM companies it may be appropriate that the roles of the CEO 
and Chair are combined and discloses two board committees. The UK governance 
codes consistently call for giving priority to shareholders‘ interests while concede to 
the interests of other stakeholders. 
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4.21: Conclusion 
This chapter traces the development of corporate governance codes to the 
current UK Corporate Governance Code (2012). The companies on the LSE‘s main 
market must abide by the UK Corporate Governance Code using the ‗comply or 
explain‘ approach. This is in contrast to the AIM companies, which are not required 
to follow the Code. As a minimum, the AIM companies have to follow the Quoted 
Companies Alliance (QCA) guidelines, which are drawn from the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, thus providing legitimacy. Chapter 6 discusses further the 
application of the QCA guidelines for the AIM companies. The role of the 
independent non-executive directors, a recommendation of the Cadbury Committee 
(1992) and Higgs Report (2003), is captured in the composite corporate governance 
score in Chapter 8 and in Chapter 9 as an explanatory variable for the determinants 
of ownership. Chapter 8 further examines the disclosure and transparency of key 
issues in corporate governance. The review of the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
suggests that even though AIM companies have a lower listing requirement than the 
main market, nevertheless adoption of appropriate governance structures and 
disclosures will benefit the shareholders. Chapter 6 will further discuss the role of 
nominated advisers, who ensure good governance in AIM companies. The 
nominated advisers advise companies prior to the listing on the AIM, and once 
quoted, during the duration of the company on the AIM. Chapter 9 further examines 
the determinants of ownership structure. The agency theory emphasises on 
disclosure, appropriate incentives together with publicly available information to 
mitigate the agency problems. The remuneration package forms an incentive to align 
the interests of the managers with that of the shareholders, yet there are variations in 
the pay and CEOs and executive board members receive high compensation even in 
poorly performing companies. Therefore, Chapter 10 includes the examination of the 
determinants of CEO remuneration in the AIM companies. 
. 
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CHAPTER 5  THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
5.1: Introduction 
This aim of this chapter is to examine two opposite systems of ownership 
structure: dispersed and concentrated ownership. The chapter also aims to explain 
the factors that may be important in suggesting that the presumed diffused ownership 
structure may not be present in the companies listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM). An understanding of the ownership structure is important to an 
appreciation of the role of agency theory and others in the development of the 
corporate governance recommendations, which may be applicable to the companies, 
quoted on the Alternative Investment Market within a specific legal system. 
 
In Chapter 3, the theoretical importance of the owners of a company, the 
shareholders, for understanding corporate governance was established. Chapter 4 
demonstrated the importance of shareholders in corporate governance codes, most of 
which are designed to ensure that managers run the company in the interests of the 
owners. 
 
The discussion of ownership was originally part of the literature review for 
Chapter 9; however, ownership unifies the three empirical studies on AIM 
companies as an important variable. In Chapter 8, the construction of the corporate 
governance variable comes from the governance practices exhibited by the 
companies in the sample, but needs to consider ownership as a governance variable 
and if it can explain the adoption of better corporate governance structure. In Chapter 
9, ownership concentration is the key factor into examining its impact on company 
performance. In Chapter 10, ownership acts as a control variable, since share 
ownership is important when considering the board remuneration as executive 
ownership stakes may determine the level of remuneration. Although, ownership 
concentration is the important and the central issue in Chapter 9, but this created an 
overbalance considering that ownership as the governance mechanism is a factor 
utilised in all three chapters. Ownership, therefore, merits a separate theoretical 
chapter. 
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The focus on corporate ownership is motivated by previous literature 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) and theories that 
regard corporate ownership structures as one of the key determinants of corporate 
governance. The growth in the debate on the ownership structure extends beyond the 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to include 
the emerging markets often characterised with weak legal and regulatory framework, 
and undeveloped illiquid financial market. In the latter setting ownership, ownership 
structure becomes an important corporate governance mechanism. Hence, the 
ownership structure is regarded as a corporate governance variable. Empirical 
studies conducted have looked for a relationship between ownership structure and 
company performance and the reliability of the relationship between the two 
variables. On one hand, various studies have found a non-linear relationship 
suggesting that the ownership matters, but also who owns the shares may be 
influencing the company value. Alternatively, others have argued that the 
relationship is spurious and arises because of misspecification of the empirical tests. 
 
Since this thesis concerns a particular market the national differences are 
covered briefly, except to the extent that literature on national differences prompts 
consideration of issues relevant to the AIM. For example, some AIM companies with 
concentrated ownership, the modified agency problem of ‘expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ may be more significant than the normal agency problem of ‗conflict 
between management and owners‘. Nevertheless, this will matter only to the extent 
that it leads to observable differences in governance structures.  
 
5.2: What Does Ownership Structure Mean? 
Concentrated Versus Dispersed (Narrow versus Wide) Ownership 
Ownership structure is important because it helps to explain the differences 
in national regimes of corporate governance. The primary difference between 
ownership structures of companies in most developed countries tends to fall between 
dispersed and concentrated ownership systems. Interestingly, the majority of 
researchers classify ownership structure as either dispersed or concentrated without 
providing a definition of it. A problem often noted is that within a country, both 
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types of corporate ownership structures may be present among the listed companies, 
and this is becoming especially obvious in the US (Holderness 2009). 
 
Coffee (2001, 3) provides a distinction between the dispersed and 
concentrated ownership structures and links with particular types of financial 
systems as follows: 
 
‘A Dispersed Ownership System, characterised by strong securities 
markets, rigorous disclosure standards and high market 
transparency, in which the market for corporate control constitutes 
the ultimate disciplinary mechanism.’ 
‘A Concentrated Ownership System, characterised by controlling 
block holders, weak securities markets, high private benefits of 
control, and low disclosure and market transparency standards, 
with only a modest role played by the market for corporate control, 
but with a possible substitutionary monitoring role played by large 
banks.’ 
 
5.3: Other Classifications of Corporate Governance Systems 
Claessens et al. (2000, 94)  classifies companies as widely-held corporations, 
(a term that refers to a corporation that has many shareholders and these 
shareholders/owners do not have significant control rights), or non-widely held 
corporations (see Treynor 1981, 68). As per the Berle and Means concept of 
‗separation of ownership and control‘, in the widely held companies it is realistically 
difficult to assume that the interests of the principals (owners) and the agents 
(management) are the same. In particular, some argue, that the management who are 
in control of the company may not share the same financial objectives of the 
principals. 
 
Franks and Mayer (1997, 31) use a different categorisation for the corporate 
governance system. Franks and Mayer (1997) polarise corporate governance system 
loosely into two forms: the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’ models. These two extreme 
groups have now become a generally accepted means of categorising corporate 
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governance systems. An insider corporate governance system is one in which the 
listed companies are owned and controlled by a small number of major shareholders, 
such as founding families. In contrast, the outsider corporate governance system is 
the one where the managers control their companies and the outside shareholders 
own it.  
 
Germany and Japan are examples of ‘insider’ corporate governance system. 
The agency problems can reduce because of the close relationship between owners 
and managers (often they are the same). Another example is the Dutch corporate 
governance system, characterised by large block holdings by institutional investors 
such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds (Bezemer et al. 2011). 
Institutional shareholders help to mitigate agency problems, as they have the 
resources to monitor managers. However, there are other problems related to the 
power exerted by large shareholders, for example, due to information asymmetry 
between the large shareholder(s) and the minority shareholders, or controlling 
shareholder remains passive. Therefore, the most important agency problem with 
insider corporate governance system is the expropriation of outside shareholders by a 
controlling shareholder (Faccio et al. 2001, 55; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
The extent to which the insider/outsider polarisation of corporate governance 
systems may have arisen could be due to differences in ownership structures, culture, 
politics and legal frameworks (Solomon 2010, 182). 
 
5.4: Different Types of Owners 
There are obvious variations in the ownership pattern of corporations across 
countries. In the UK and the US, the ownership structure of large companies is 
widely dispersed among many institutions and individual investors. In the UK, over 
the past 50 years, there has been a gradual shift of ownership from individuals to 
investment institutions. The proportion of institutional shareholdings in UK listed 
companies has grown and they now represent the dominant shareholder group 
(Solomon 2007, 111). In the UK, the four main types of institutional investors are 
pension funds, life insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts. At the end 
of 2012 UK individual owned 10.7% by value, insurance companies held 6.2% of 
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share ownership, pension funds held 4.7%, unit trusts held 9.6% and other financial 
institutions held 6.6%.
20
 
 
In most of continental Europe and other countries, ownership is much more 
concentrated. Large shareholdings tend to be held by different types of owners: 
family, government, management, financial institutions, foreign investors and other 
corporations. 
 
5.5: The Ownership Structure Analysed at Country and Company 
Levels 
Country Level 
At the country level, ownership structure helps to explain differences in 
national regimes of corporate governance, for example, Coffee‘s (see above s. 5.2) 
distinction between dispersed and concentrated ownership structures and links with 
particular types of financial system. The argument is that there are dominant 
common systems of corporate ownership that affect the nationwide (regulatory) 
system of corporate governance. Since, this thesis is based on a specific market; the 
national differences are covered briefly, except to the extent that literature on 
national differences prompts consideration of issues relevant to AIM. For example, 
some AIM companies with concentrated ownership, the modified agency problem of 
‘expropriation of minority shareholders’ may be more significant than the normal 
agency problem of ‘conflict between management and owners’. Nevertheless, this 
will matter only to the extent that it leads to observable differences in governance 
structures.  
 
Prior research on country level studies of corporate ownership has questioned 
the existence of different corporate ownership patterns observed in different 
countries. Durnev and Kim (2005, 1462) consider the importance of country level 
studies in understanding the ‘regulatory environment’, since empirical evidence 
                                                 
20
 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_327674.pdf, accessed 16 August 2014 
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shows extensive within-country differences in corporate governance and disclosure 
practices. They conclude that there is a positive association between corporate 
governance practices and growth opportunities, external finance needs and 
concentration of cash flow rights. In addition, they find that concentrated ownership 
acts as a mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders when investor protection is weak (p.1488). 
 
According to Bebchuk and Roe (1999, 133) both the UK and US are 
characterised as having diffused ownership structures compared to other developed 
economies, in particular continental Europe, which shows concentrated ownership. 
Empirical researchers have compared corporate ownership around the world, and 
find evidence of a high incidence of controlling shareholders, (for example, La Porta 
et al. 1999). For the AIM companies the agency problem is not the separation of 
ownership and control, but rather that between the shareholders and controlling 
shareholders who have nearly significant control over the managers. 
 
Other studies, such as  La Porta et al. (1998); La Porta et al. (1999)explain 
the difference in ownership structures between different countries from a legal 
perspective (see section 5.8 for more details), where they argue that the degree of 
investor protection rights and its enforcement is a determinant of ownership 
structure.  
 
Company Level 
This thesis addresses the question of whether an individual or a group of 
individuals who owns a company‘s shares influences the market value and its 
performance. These groups include managers and board members, shareholder who 
owns a large single block of shares (can be insider or outsider shareholders). The 
outside shareholders may also be institutional shareholders. Another common group 
of shareholders is the family, who also hold significant share holdings or use 
professional managers and are now passive shareholders. It is also possible that a 
founder/family member continues to be an active manager. Regardless of the type of 
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shareholder, for the AIM companies, the question is whether the ownership matters 
and if they increase or decrease company value.  
 
Much of the theoretical work on whether ownership influences the 
company‘s value and performance begins from Berle and Means (1932) work on the 
separation of ownership and control. Thereafter, much of the research work focuses 
on Jensen and Meckling‘s (1976) analysis on whether an optimal fraction of equity 
exists that the owner manager can issue to outside shareholders. 
 
Morck et al. (1988) argue that increasing the proportion of shares owned by 
managers closely aligns the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders. 
However, at substantial higher levels of ownership the managers become entrenched. 
The empirical works that addresses the above circumstance include Morck et al. 
(1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short and Keasey (1999).  
 
5.6: What Does Theory Say About Ownership Structure? 
With ownership structure, it is now common to describe it in terms of the 
classical principal-agent theory at the individual company level, which includes the 
separation of ownership and control, an issue brought to the fore so effectively by 
Berle and Means (1932). Their analysis on ‘modern corporations’ became the 
dominant understanding of dispersed ownership, with ownership divorced 
completely from the control, where management controlled the corporations, often 
without ownership shareholdings, in contrast to the traditional businesses controlled 
by the owners. Consequently, this creates the traditional quandary of principal-agent 
relationship, how to guarantee that agents act on principal‘s behalf and not in their 
own self-interest. 
 
From the time of Berle and Means‘ work and 1970s there was little empirical 
research on ownership, which also may be one of the reasons for the acceptability of 
dispersed ownership. However, in the 1970s there was a revival of the ownership 
research using mainly hand-collected date of the largest corporations. Larner (1966) 
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following the Berle and Means study measure the extent to which ownership control 
actually exists among the 200 large non-financial corporations in 1963. His evidence 
suggests that the corporations have grown to such a size that for the majority of the 
corporations, an individual or a group will be financially constrained to control these 
large corporations. As per Berle and Means (1932) study, many authors analyse the 
control problems that arise when ownership is dispersed, for example, (Manne 1965; 
Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Fama and Jensen 1983b). As more commercially 
available ownership data became available in the late1970s and early 1980s, doubts 
were raised regarding the existence of the diffused ownership structure (Eisenberg 
1976; cited in Holderness 2009, 1402). 
 
The lack of international comparative research before the late 1990s is 
appropriately described by Macey (1999) who suggests that a lack of development of 
generally accepted criteria to measure appropriately alternative systems of corporate 
governance has limited international comparative research check citation. Then with 
a series of La Porta et al. studies and Claessens et al. studies, it has seen the 
development of interest in ownership structure at country level and company level 
and other factors that influence corporate ownership structures. The aim of both 
these sets of studies was to try to understand in a comparative perspective the 
national differences in corporate governance regimes and (though to a lesser extent) 
intra-country variation. One of the key variables they identified to explain national 
variation was the different forms and structures that corporate ownership took in 
different countries. 
 
Classical property rights theory defines ownership as residual rights to 
income, while modern property rights theory equates ownership to residual control 
rights, that is, ‗the rights to make decisions in circumstances not fully foreseen by the 
contract‘ (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 741). Both residual rights to income and 
residual control rights are important in explaining ownership, in particular, when the 
contracts are not complete. Challenges to the classical theory on ownership structure 
to enhance the corporate governance, both theoretical studies, argue that there are 
mechanisms that counteract the agency effects of dispersed ownership, and empirical 
studies show that in practice, dispersed ownership is less common than the literature 
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has suggested even in economies such as the UK and the US. Hence, researchers 
have the challenge to theorise, to test empirically the national diversity in ownership 
structure and to identify key factors explaining these differences. For example, the 
studies by La Porta et al. have questioned the dispersed ownership structure as the 
norm. La Porta et al. (1999, 498) suggest that using a lax measure for definition of 
control for medium sized companies, makes ‘dispersed ownership truly an 
exception’. 
 
Grossman and Hart (1980) show that if a company's ownership is widely 
dispersed, no individual shareholder has sufficient motivation to monitor the 
management personally as benefits for any single shareholder is too small to cover 
the monitoring cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) developed a model to demonstrate 
that some degree of ownership concentration is desirable in order for the market for 
corporate control to work effectively. Presence of large shareholders may mitigate 
agency problems between the management and shareholders because of large equity 
holdings providing the large shareholders with incentives to keep the management 
under observation. Subsequently, large shareholders provide monitoring at levels 
that would be otherwise impossible to reach in diffusely held companies. On the 
other hand, the presence of large shareholders may give rise to conflicts between the 
majority shareholder and the minority shareholders because the former are able to 
exercise control over the company and extract benefits, resulting in ‘expropriation of 
the minority shareholders’ (La Porta et al. 2002, 1163). 
 
5.7: Factors That Can Explain Variations in Ownership Structure 
Legal System 
According to the legal origin claim, an explanation of the variations at 
country level is due to the influence of the presence of either ‗common law‘ or the 
‗civil law‘ systems  (La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Roe 2006). The law 
and finance stress the autonomous role of law and regulation, as been apart from 
political processes (La Porta et al. 1998). In a more narrow sense, autonomy has to 
do with the protection and self-determination of minorities. It focuses the law to 
those that deal explicitly with the organisation of the firm, the securities regulation 
and finance to argue that where minority shareholders protection is provided by the 
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law, the tendency is to find higher propensity for diffused ownership. Therefore, to 
explain the higher level of minority shareholders‘ protection the law considers the 
legal family, that is, common law versus civil law. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
that the law and regulation can help protect shareholders, and this is most likely 
where there is a common law. The common law is the legal system in the US, UK 
and most Commonwealth countries. In contrast, the civil law is the legal system of 
Continental Europe and most of the rest of the world, which is governed by codes of 
law, having their origins in Roman law. The link between legal origins and financial 
markets, according to the La Porta et al. studies, suggest that the degree of investor 
protection of small investors within a country is influenced by the origins of the legal 
system. In terms of legal origin, La Porta et al. focus on the difference between 
countries that have common law and French civil law tradition. They show that the 
common law countries offer greater protection for the minority shareholders‘ rights, 
which benefits the financial market development. Roe (2006) considers that the legal 
protection is important, and the ‗common law via its use of fiduciary duties‘ is 
structurally more appropriate in protecting minority shareholders compared to the 
civil law. In contrast, the French civil law countries are characterised by weak 
minority shareholders‘ rights, and consequently, resulting in a less efficient and 
functional equity market. From the above, based on the level of protection afforded 
to minority shareholders, will determine the pattern of ownership structure, that is, 
diffused or concentrated shareholders. One of the reasons is that if outsiders do not 
buy shares, then a deep stock market does not develop, and the large owners such as 
founding families are locked in (see Roe 2006, 470). However, both legal systems 
can go either way, with the USA‘s Sarbanes Oxley Act being quite directive, while 
Germany is shifting to the more transparent ‗comply or explain‘ approach. 
Therefore, both common law and civil law seems to be converging with detailed 
statues and regulation being the norm. 
 
 While the legal origin provides some answers, it still leaves some 
questionable issues. If civil law is characterised as having higher regulation, then 
why does it not provide higher shareholders‘ rights but promotes more block 
holdings? Despite criticisms of their work, La Porta et al.‘s (1998) work is common 
in corporate governance research as a benchmark for classifying countries into legal 
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systems. La Porta et al. (2000) argue that international differences in financial 
development are distinguishable using the legal system. Based on an efficient 
functioning legal system of either the common law or civil law, effectively facilitates 
both market based and bank based financial systems. This is because finance 
constitutes defined contracts, and its effectiveness stems from the legal rights and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Political System  
Although there are many factors that may affect the structure of ownership, 
(for example, La Porta et al.‘s legal environment) one cannot ignore the political 
system and history. For example, Roe (2002) provides a useful lens through which to 
differentiate national systems and argues that different ownership patterns prevail 
because of the choices in corporate structures and corporate law. Roe (2002) argues 
that the legal origins alone cannot explain variations in ownership structure, in 
different countries. For example, Germany and Scandinavia have strong quality of 
laws but exhibit more concentrated ownership. Roe (2002) suggests that politics may 
be a determinant of corporate governance. 
 
Roe‘s argument for legal institutions as a direct result of politics is that 
countries exhibit diverse preferences in relation to the legitimacy of shareholder 
value and where countries consider shareholder value is legitimate, institutions help 
protect minority shareholders. By contrast, the deficiency of institutional 
arrangements that would protect the rights and promote the interests of minority 
shareholders in some countries reflects the lack of legitimacy. Although Roe‘s work 
does not fully explain whether regulation is inefficient and why it has not changed, 
this raises a further question as to whether political motivation exists to ensure an 
efficient system of corporate law. Roe further argues the relevance of legal 
institutions, which were introduced several hundred years to those that were 
developed more recently. The pervasive argument is how can one assume that codes 
such as that of Austria‘s 1786 Code of Joseph II and complete Civil Code of 1811 or 
France‘s Civil Code (known as the Napoleonic Code) of 1804, shaped by the Roman 
law tradition, as the models of civil law systems. Are these still as relevant in 
influencing the current economy compared to regulations that were introduced over 
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seventy years ago, such as the 1933 US Glass-Steagall Act? The scandals of 
prominent corporations such as Enron (see Bratton 2001), and Parmalat, 
Mannesmann and Vodafone takeover (Kolla 2004) and the public outrage on 
excessive managerial compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) are all examples that 
serve to demonstrate the political implications of corporate governance regulation.  
 
The reduced mandatory requirements for the AIM companies can be seen as 
a direct intervention of the government in the view that this will help economic 
development. However, the use of a particular mode of governance where the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) performs the regulatory role has diverted the 
attention played by the government. AIM provides an interesting context for research 
as it falls under the influence of private rules and regulations, where the ‗Nominated 
Advisers‘ (Nomads) act as the private regulator and ensure individual AIM 
companies adhere to the Quoted Companies Alliance corporate governance 
recommendations. The advantage of the private regulation is in its flexibility and 
enabling smaller companies to list and access capital markets with reduced costs and 
three years clean annual reports compared to a company wanting to list on the main 
market. As such, this flexibility by LSE will provide more companies to have access 
to the stock exchange and time to grow substantially prior to migrating onto the main 
market. As the UK is a member of the European Union (EU), much of the EU 
initiatives have an impact on the UK corporate governance. However, since AIM is 
an exchange regulated market, the European Union Directives on securities and the 
UK Corporate Governance code do not all apply.  
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Financing System  
Thirty years ago, Zysman (1983), cited in  Nobes (1998, 166), has rapidly 
become the work of reference on the political economy of country financial systems, 
classifies the financial system at the country level into three main types: market-
based, bank-based and government-based systems. Interestingly, the market-based 
and bank-based systems have become a major way in which financial systems are 
characterised. Most of the comparative studies have been rather narrow comparing a 
small number of countries, focusing mainly on Germany, Japan, the UK and USA. 
The bank-based financial system (dominated by banks and financial institutions) is 
found in European countries, for example, in Germany. The market-based financial 
system (dominated by securities) found in the US  and the UK (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine 1999), whereas, Japan and France characterised as a government-based 
systems.  
 
Countries with market-based financial systems are more likely to have 
common law origins than countries with bank-based systems. The market based 
outsider systems have all or most of the characteristics of dispersed ownership, with 
an apparent separation of ownership and control, lower leverage and advanced 
financial markets. In this system, there is less incentive for outsiders to participate in 
the control of the corporation (Clarke 2007b, 101), stakeholders‘ interests are not 
formally represented, in contrast to the co-determination in German companies. 
German law provides for a system of ‗co-determination,‘ or worker representation on 
the supervisory boards of large companies. This allows employees to have control 
rights through seats on the corporate board (Bucklew et al. 2013). 
 
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that a relationship based systems, for 
example, a bank based system) ensures a return to the finance providers - similarity 
in the definition of corporate governance by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discussed in 
Chapter 2, this suggests that a return to suppliers of finance may be conducive to 
some form of power over the company. This form of power is when the financier has 
implicit or explicit ownership of the company, thus securing a return on their 
investment. 
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Rajan and Zingales (2001, 477) suggest that in countries with market-based 
systems, that is, in the UK and USA, the importance of venture capitalists as 
financiers with substantial control over the companies they finance has been 
growing. However, this relationship with the venture capitalist and the company is 
seen as a hybrid characterised as a relationship-based financing within a market 
based financial system. In this instance, the venture capitalist, in AIM companies 
acts as a bridge between the company and the market, reducing the illiquidity of the 
company, (often a problem associated in a bank-based system). The next stage for 
the venture capitalist after the initial financing of the company is to prepare for exit. 
They do this by improving and placing appropriate corporate governance structures 
so that the company is in a position suitable for investors to takeover, such as shift 
from a founder dependent run company to a company run by professional managers. 
 
Culture  
`Hofstede‘s (1984) has been influential in aiding identification of structural 
elements of culture and particularly, those which can have significant effects on 
behaviour in business issues. The four cultural dimensions identified were 
individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Although the 
work of Hofstede has been criticised (see, for example, Hofstede 2003), 
nevertheless, culture can explain, in parts, some of the background factors leading to 
corporate governance and ownership structure. Hence, culture can explain certain 
corporate governance compliances, for example, regulation, discharge of 
accountability, and greater disclosure. The societal values of high collectivism, large 
power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance suggest that individuals would tend 
to adhere to rules and regulations and disclose less information voluntarily to the 
public. Furthermore, for financing of the companies, the long-term creditors in 
strong uncertainty avoidance countries may demand more information from their 
borrowers and have higher ownership concentration. Both the UK and US 
characterised by high individualism and low power distance, tend to be more 
transparent and disclose over that, which is required by the mandatory rules. The 
evidence for cultural impact on corporate governance has been observed within 
Asian countries, for example, the voluntary disclosure of corporate information is 
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not readily encouraged. Although researchers are paying more attention to culture 
and empirical evidence suggests that culture, religion, values and ethnicity are 
important determinants of ownership structure and corporate governance, most of the 
evidence is from the East Asian countries. 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) show that religion and ethnic differences in 
Malaysia influence corporate governance practices, specifically to the native Malays 
and Chinese in Malaysia. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) question the suitability of 
importing the Anglo-American style of corporate governance to less developed 
countries such as Bangladesh. They find that the western governance models are in 
conflict with the local cultures and values. They show that families have a dominant 
role in all aspects of corporate governance, for example, the board play a significant 
part in serving the interests of the families rather than those of the minority 
shareholders. Further, the families destabilize the government‘s power in enforcing 
governance regulation. Therefore, to force the implementation of independent 
directors on the board will work in its entirety in the UK, but not in the countries like 
Bangladesh. 
 
Economic (Liquidity of the Stock Market, Inflation) 
Both economic and government policies in the majority of the countries 
suggest that ownership structure is important for economic performance. La Porta et 
al. (2002, 1164) argue that firm valuation levels are low in countries with small 
capital markets, further these show countries low investor protection rights and 
higher concentrated ownership. Hence, companies may find it difficult to raise 
external financing where the capital markets are small.  
 
The differences in corporate governance structures exhibit different 
advantages and disadvantages. The US/UK model supports robust market 
orientation, with strong liquid capital markets. For example, AIM has grown 
considerably with a wide range of sectors that include the following: oil and gas, 
industrial, consumer goods, health care, consumer services, telecommunications, 
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utilities, financial and technology.
21
 Maug (1998, 88) concludes that in stock markets 
with low liquidly there is dominance of small shareholders but the same investor will 
be diversified in more companies. Whereas, where stock markets are liquid, the large 
investors will contribute to more monitoring. On the other hand, if the ownership is 
concentrated among few shareholders the market has poor liquidity since the shares 
are not widely held.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) show insignificant correlation with 
inflation whether a country‘s financial system is bank based or market based, 
although high inflation economies tend to have underdeveloped financial systems. 
Moro Visconti (2011) empirically examines the effect of inflation and its impact on 
operating leverage and cash flow, and subsequently show it affects the relationship 
between different stakeholders within an agency theory framework. 
 
History (Colonial Inheritance) 
The study by Nobes (1998), although published prior to 2000 and related to 
accounting systems, suggests one can extend his idea to corporate governance. 
Hence, that former colony will adopt the systems of the colonial parents, that is, the 
legal systems of the formal colonies are the legal systems of the colonial parents. As 
such, colonial inheritance is probably the major explanatory factor for the 
development of corporate governance system in many countries. Similarly to 
adoption of the financial reporting system adopted by pre-British colonies such as 
Kenya, Gambia, India and or French colonies such as Senegal and Cameroon. These 
countries commonly retain the wider system of law and cultural factors of its 
colonial inheritance. Likewise, Japan‘s structure of stock market and Securities Law 
are both influenced by the USA occupation during World War II. 
 
Impact of Prior Corporate Scandals and Failures  
Major crisis has spurred regulatory intervention by the government. For 
example, the corporate failures of Enron, WorldCom  and TYCO in the US has 
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 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/aim/jan-2013.pdf, p.15 
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criticised the quality of the corporate governance and the ability of the law to protect 
the minority shareholders from insiders‘ scheming (Roe 2006, 494). As such, the 
reactions to this crisis have seen more regulation of corporate governance legislation 
via codification and directive regulation. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 is a good 
example of implementation of corporate governance codes as being mandatory. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new listing requirements have mandatory rules and 
companies listed on the US stock exchanges have to comply with them (MacNeil 
and Li 2006). 
 
The development of corporate governance in the UK began with the Cadbury 
Report 1992, and since has resulted in substantive market and regulatory reform. 
Corporate governance reforms in other countries have lagged, for example, 
Germany‗s first corporate governance code arose in 1998 (see Table 4.3). The 
European Union may tend to foster some convergence among the corporate 
governance systems in Europe, but there are difficulties due to concentrated 
ownership by families as there are vested interests. One of the reasons is that the 
management may use their discretionary control in favour of the owning family and 
simultaneously ignoring the minority shareholders‘ interests. In addition, the block 
holder may oppose the need for higher transparency and disclosure. Disregarding the 
rights of the minority shareholders is a criticism of the governance systems that is 
often cited (see Lindahl and Schadéwitz 2013, 253) . The blockholder issue may be 
prevalent in the AIM companies and may worsen agency conflict due to information 
asymmetry between the blockholder and the minority shareholders in these 
companies. 
 
The above sections have summarised different factors that may be an 
influencing factor on the two alternative forms of ownership structure that may be 
adopted, and this will in turn affect the adoption of best practice for corporate 
governance. The underlying philosophy of using the environmental factors (see 
Figure 5.1) in understanding the alternative forms of ownership structure will assist 
in mitigating agency problems and that managerial run companies will converge or 
adopt structures that within a self-regulated market will prevent any corporate 
governance failures.  
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Figure 5.1: Environmental and Institutional Factors on Ownership Structure 
 
 
Voting Versus Cash Flow Rights 
Voting rights are an important part of corporate governance, however, 
because they identify the extent to which shareholders can wield power over 
corporate activities (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 751). Several studies have examined 
the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. It is important to 
distinguish between ownership of voting rights and ownership of cash flow rights. 
Cash flow rights refer to claim on cash payouts and voting rights refer to, control, for 
example, have the right to influence corporate decisions that require shareholder 
approval such as electing the board of directors). Therefore, in a company with a 
single class of equity shares, cash flow rights and voting rights are equal, and when 
ownership is concentrated the owner will pro rata the shareholder‘s wealth and will 
have cash flow rights on a pro rata basis. In contrast, in several countries variable 
voting rights or dual class equity is a legal mechanism used by controlling 
shareholders. These can take the form of shares with limited voting rights and 
nonvoting shares. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999); Claessens et al. (2000); Faccio et al. (2001, 55) 
suggest that the main agency problem outside the UK and the US is not the manager-
shareholder conflict but rather the risk of expropriation by the controlling 
shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders. An important point to note is 
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that ownership structure data may be misleading if voting rights differ from cash 
flow rights (for example, existence of shares with more votes than usual). Literature 
suggests that outside of the US, due to a higher incidence of the largest shareholder, 
companies on the main stock exchange exhibit higher differences between cash flow 
rights and control rights compared to companies in the US. Complex control and 
ownership arrangements forms provide greater control or voting rights compared to 
their cash flow rights. In general, these arrangements may imply conflicts of interests 
(Belcredi and Caprio 2004, 172)between inside block holders who have higher 
voting and control rights, and typical structures include pyramids or cross 
shareholding structures. 
 
Reasons for managers‘ motivation to hold shares in their company include, 
for example, residual cash flow rights, voting rights or a combination of both (see 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985, 33). In the UK and the US, the main governance 
problem is between managers and outside shareholders, suggesting that the low 
management ownership of cash flow rights may be a source of agency problems. La 
Porta et al. (1999) definition of ownership is based on voting rights rather than cash 
flow rights. Investors have greater protection when companies have one share one 
vote rule as this ensures that dividend rights align to voting rights. 
 
The cash flow rights  
Many European countries have unequal voting rights, as opposed to the one 
share, one vote norm. The former specifically used to protect family control and the 
enaction of one share one vote would dilute the control rights of the family groups. 
Hence, these groups will resist any changes. Some studies on cash flow rights are 
shown below: 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the controlling shareholders with 
substantial cash flow rights are unlikely to expropriate corporate resources and 
consequently maximise minority shareholders value. In contrast, Morck et al. (1988, 
294) suggest that increasing ownership for the management leads to entrenchment, 
where the manager may indulge in non-value maximising behaviour. The 
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entrenchment hypothesis predicts that the value of the company will be less when 
management is free from checks on their control. 
 
Zingales (1994) show that managers issue and own shares with superior 
voting rights to achieve control rights that exceed their cash flow rights in the same 
company. This gives rise to agency problems. The controlling shareholders face 
strong incentives to monitor managers and maximise profits when they retain 
substantial cash flow rights, in addition to control (La, Porta, 1999). Bebchuk et al. 
(2000) describe the means by which pyramids and cross holding structures enable 
one shareholder to maintain complete control of the company while holding less than 
a majority of the cash flow rights. A gap between voting rights and cash flow rights 
can provide incentives for self-dealing, and predicts lower firm value (Claessens et 
al. 2002). Several methods are available where control exceeds cash flow rights such 
as pyramid structures in the East Asian companies, dual class shares with insiders 
retaining voting commons shares and outsiders holding preferred shares (Black et al. 
2012) 
 
Claessens et al. (2002) using eight East Asian countries, find that company 
value increases with the cash flow rights for the largest shareholders and decreases 
when the voting rights exceed cash flow rights. Lins (2003) using over 1,400 
companies from 18 emerging markets finds that the company value is lower when 
voting rights exceed cash flow rights. He finds that higher managerial control in 
excess of the ownership is negatively associated to Tobin‘s Q (TQ) and the range of 
managerial control within 5 to 20 per cent shows a negative relation to TQ. This 
suggests that markets discount companies exhibiting managerial agency problems. 
 
5.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly traced the factors that support corporate governance 
characteristics for ownership concentration and the legal influence on investors‘ 
protection. The common form of influence according to the La Porta studies on the 
legal system of the country. However, Lindahl and Schadéwitz (2013) criticise the 
method and inference of the La Porta et al. (1998) study, nevertheless the La Porta 
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studies have allowed the generation of comparative research involving ownership 
and other factors. Despite the voluminous academic study on the distinction of 
common law and civil law systems, there is strong evidence that the differences 
between these two legal systems in the context of corporate governance are 
diminishing. Hence, countries are converging their governance systems, for example, 
the civil law countries are now accepting common law solutions (López de Silanes 
2008, 327) and vice versa such as adoption of  the ‗comply or explain‘ concept and 
increasing shareholders‘ rights.  
 
The UK provides an excellent context in which to explore the nuances of the 
ownership and control concept (Cheffins et al. 2013, 672), specifically since the 
UK‘s legal system operates within common law framework with a strong protection 
to minority shareholders. However, the nature of the AIM companies, suggests that 
the outsider system will exist in only a minority of the companies and the corporate 
governance system that may dominate is the insider system. It is likely that in some 
AIM companies, the founder member or the controlling shareholder will exercise 
considerable power. Chapter 6 considers descriptively AIM as an exchange-
regulated market, which is unique in the financial markets as one of the few smaller 
stock exchanges that have been successful. Further, Chapter 9 examines empirically 
the determinants of ownership structure and its association with company 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 6  THE ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENT MARKET 
6.1: Introduction  
One of the main purposes for this chapter is to provide an understanding of 
the development of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) since its inception in 
1995. AIM companies are not required to adopt the recommendations of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, this chapter will discuss how the use of a Nominated 
Adviser (Nomad) and the adoption of the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) 
guidelines can provide the governance for the smaller companies quoted on the AIM. 
In Chapter 3, the problems of conflict of interest between the shareholders and the 
management were discussed and it was highlighted that in the AIM companies the 
conflict of interest may arise between the blockholder and the minority shareholders. 
Chapter 4 discussed the institutional arrangement of the Corporate Governance Code 
reviews in the United Kingdom, the Code‘s recommendations and their adoptions 
provide legitimacy to the corporations. Prior to the 1980s, in the UK, companies 
could raise equity finance via the main stock exchange, but the listing onto the main 
market comes with strict entry requirements, high regulation and higher cost. 
Alternatively, companies could gain admission to the ‗Over the Counter‘ (OTC). The 
OTC market was not attractive to all investor groups because of its apparent 
unregulated nature. The difference between an exchange, such as the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), and an OTC is that the former provides a trading venue for assets 
that are by their nature simple and based on measurable parameters such as shares. 
Whereas the OTC offers a deep and liquid trading venue for major banks and 
financial institutions to execute transactions, which are not standardised, but 
individually negotiated. 
 
The ability to raise long-term finance for small companies has been of 
concern in the UK for a long time. Furthermore, there was a decline in small 
companies applying for listing on the LSE. In the UK, to overcome the problems of 
the listing of small companies, a three-tier market covering listed and unlisted 
securities was introduced. The Unlisted Securities Market (USM), created in 
November 1980, formed a bridge between the main exchange and those on the new 
market for subsequent switch to the main market. The creation of USM was 
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motivated in response to small growing companies‘ concerns in respect of the high 
cost and strict regulations of London‘s main market, thereby making it difficult for 
the smaller companies to list. The USM allowed time and experience for the small 
companies to expand until they were substantially large to enter the main market, 
thus providing a direct foundation for the new listings to the main market. 
Companies entering the USM were normally required to be trading for at least three 
years, and provide financial information for five years (or less if period of trading 
was shorter). USM‘s initial attraction was from the formerly traded OTC market and 
new entrants. The USM was initially successful as many new companies went public 
and sought listing of their shares on the USM. 
 
 Hutchinson et al. (1988, 17) found that companies quoted on the USM 
appeared to have low investment in current assets, higher growth rate and leverage. 
However, the recession of the early 1990s resulted in a reduction of the number of 
new listings, severely damaging the attractiveness of the USM. Furthermore, the 
listing requirements of the main market were relaxed, after the amendment of the EC 
Listing Particulars Directive in 1990. Thus the USM now provided little advantage 
for companies to list on the USM. This exacerbated the problems of financial 
liquidity for the small companies. Eventually in December1993, the London Stock 
Exchange announced the closure of the USM; which was completed in1996. 
 
The closure of USM resulted in a gap as to how LSE could best serve the 
small and medium sized companies to gain access to public equity. Hence, the 
development of AIM as part of the LSE, a lower tier market, to provide less costly 
regulatory regime than the main market. A listing on the AIM acts as a stepping-
stone to a listing on the main market in the UK and after 2 years on AIM, a company 
can seek admission to the main listing using a special accelerated procedure. In 
comparison to the LSE, which attracts large companies, AIM draws small and mid-
cap companies. Trading venues such as AIM are classified as ‘exchange regulated 
markets’ Grossman and Hart (1980, 262) and thus avoid the full force of  European 
Union Directives on security market regulations. AIM‘s model exhibits lower listing 
standards and reduced ongoing requirements in comparison with the LSE‘s main 
market. Each company on AIM is overviewed by a Nominated Adviser (Nomad), 
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who coordinates the admission procedure, carries out due diligence to ensure that the 
company is suitable for listing on AIM and provides ongoing oversight. 
 
Companies listed on the main market/Techmark have to provide information 
in English, are required to publish quarterly reports, and to publish financial 
statements based on international accounting standards. However, it is common 
practice for AIM companies to use International Financial Reporting Standards 
(‗IFRS‘)22 for reporting. Issuers on AIM that are incorporated in the European 
Economic Area and that are parent companies are required by AIM Rules to apply 
IFRSs from financial years commencing on or after 1 January 2007. Table 6.1 shows 
the variations in communication to the users between the different exchanges in the 
UK. 
 
Table 6.1: Information Requirements for Listed Companies in the UK 
 Accounting Standards Quarterly 
Reports 
Disclosure of 
significant news 
LSE Main market IFRS, 2005 Yes Yes 
USM, 1980 -1996 National No Yes 
AIM, 1995 US GAAP/ IAS/ IFRS/ 
National 
No Yes 
Techmark, 1999 IFRS, 2005 Yes Yes 
Source: Posner (2005) 
 
Since May 2005, the UK has seen the launch of the following AIM real time 
indices: FTSE AIM UK 50 - the largest 50 eligible UK companies by market 
capitalisation; FTSE AIM UK 100 - the largest 100 eligible companies by full 
market capitalisation and FTSE All-Share - all AIM quoted companies (originally 
called FTSE AIM Index). AIM has a higher spread between the bid-ask prices and 
many stocks do not trade because of the lack of liquidity, poor investment coverage 
and are often not suitable for many investors. In contrast, the main market has larger 
and liquid stock, usually targeted by large asset fund management.  
                                                 
22
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/publications/documents/a-
guide-to-aim.pdf, accessed 24 January 2014 
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AIM began operations in June 1995, with the listing of ten companies, having 
an aggregate market capitalisation of £82 million. The number of companies on the 
AIM has grown to over 1,100 companies with a market capitalisation of £78.3 
billion by June 2014.Table 6.2 clearly shows growth both in terms of the number of 
companies and the money raised on AIM since 1995. AIM is attractive to both UK 
based and overseas companies. The number of international companies reached a 
high of 347 companies in 2007, but there has been a decline since then to 222 
international companies by June 2014. 
 
Since, the launch of AIM in 1995, by the LSE has developed into a 
significant global asset class within the UK financial sector, both in terms of the 
number and diversity of the companies admitted to the market. The majority of the 
companies are predominantly small, growing and UK originated companies. 
However, it has become popular with foreign companies (see Table 6.2). By June 
2012, there were 1,096 companies quoted on the AIM from 38 sectors, and AIM 
companies have generated over £80.8 billion since the stock market started. The 
importance of AIM as part of the London Stock Market is that it has become a 
valuable pool of international capital, attracting a diverse range of companies from 
different business sectors. The AIM market, as a classic city institution with its 
principle-based regulation and easier access by companies, has been highly 
criticised, and described as a gambling unit by Roel Campos
23
, of the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
24.
 The SEC Commissioner‘s remark 
came as the number of new admissions on the AIM had outstripped the new listings 
in the United States e exchanges and amongst concerns that the US capital market 
was losing its leading position for IPOs. AIM has been an attractive market, in 
particular for international companies who now have an alternative listing compared 
to a listing on the US stock exchange. Graffignini (2009, 262) provides examples of 
American companies such as Catalytic Solutions and Solar Integrated Technologies 
                                                 
23
 http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-03-31/aim-chief-responds-to-report-on-lack-of-
regulation-new-economic-foundation-ne
 
24 
The Financial Times, 9 March 2007 
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listed on the AIM, that have benefited due to the reduction on compliance costs 
related to adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; companies can avoid filing 
quarterly and annual reports and instead submit reports twice a year, and the period 
to list successfully is substantially reduced. Graffignini further says that the 
regulation on the AIM is commonly characterised as light-touch regulation. The 
light-touch regulation means that companies coming onto the AIM are not 
scrutinised to the same extent as those listing on the main market (Mallin and Ow-
Yong 2010, cited in; Cressy et al. 2012, 108) leading to a competitive advantage 
over the new listings for the AIM. LSE has differentiated the application of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (previously Combined Code) such as AIM listed 
companies do not need to abide by it, whereas the companies on the main market 
have to ‗comply or explain‘ basis. Therefore, the AIM companies are subject to 
lighter governance requirements (OECD, 2009). 
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Table 6.2: AIM Statistics Since its Launch in 1995 
 
No. of companies- 
Country of Incorporation 
 
No. of  
admissions 
Money raised  
£m 
(new and 
further) 
 UK International Total Total Total 
19/06/1995 10 0 10   
1995 118 3 121 123 96.5 
1996 235 17 252 145 823.6 
1997 286 22 308 107 691.7 
1998 291 21 312 75 585.2 
1999 325 22 347 102 933.9 
2000 493 31 524 277 3,092.4 
2001 587 42 629 177 1,128.4 
2002 654 50 704 160 975.8 
2003 694 60 754 162 2,095.2 
2004 905 116 1021 355 4,656.1 
2005 1,179 220 1,399 519 8,942.4 
2006 1,330 304 1,634 462 15,678.1 
2007 1,347 347 1,694 284 16,183.9 
2008 1,233 317 1,550 114 4,322.3 
2009 1,052 241 1,293 36 5,601.6 
2010 967 228 1,195 102 6,957.6 
2011 918 225 1,143 90 4,269.1 
2012 870 226 1,096 71 3,168.8 
2013  861 226 1087 99 3915.4 
June 2014 882 222 1104 64 3706.5 
Total launch to date   3,524 87,771.4 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
The above sections suggest that the higher number of listings on the AIM 
was due to the attractiveness of the flexible regulation on the AIM compared to the 
more rigid and rule based Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX)
25 
. However, prior to 
enaction of the SOX 2002, the AIM was well established. The QCA Guidelines to 
date recommend that the AIM companies should use the ‗comply and explain‘ 
concept for adoption of the corporate governance practices. The action of the SOX 
was due to corporate mismanagement and accounting scandals from companies such 
as Enron and WorldCom, and the downfall of accounting firm Arthur Andersen. The 
                                                 
25 
London Stock Exchange, Aim: Growth Market of the World 15 
(2008),www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/3B5EDCF9-1E01-4B7C-A31A-
95B717067SB9/0/LSEAIMBROCHUREWEB.pdf (last visited May 7, 2008). As of April 2008, there 
were 1,683 companies trading on AIM, 481 of those companies were international  
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preamble to SOX states that its purpose is to protect investors by improvements in 
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
26.
 Roe (2006) states for a stock 
market exchange to succeed a country‘s legal provision for protection of the 
shareholders‘ interests and property rights is necessary. Peristiani (2007, 4) suggests 
several reasons for the growing concerns that the US capital markets are seeing a 
drop in the number of new international IPOs. First, the European and Asian 
exchanges are able to meet the capital needs of large companies locally and thus 
increase their national market share. Second, the non-US issuers are concerned about 
implementing the stringent SOX Section 404
27 
and third, the higher cost of listing in 
the US
28
. 
 
The laws and regulations imposed on the US financial market and its 
regulatory structure has decreased the US competitive position with respect to other 
countries and in particular the UK. Emphasis has been due to the stringent regulation 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) raising the listing costs in the US. Doidge et 
al. (2009, 254) supports that SOX makes a US listing more difficult for companies 
because of the costs on both the companies and their managers, especially due to the 
compliance requirements of Section 404.To prevent the dominance of US stock 
market from receding,  special research committees such as Committee on Capital 
Market Regulation propose several solutions. The committee proposes, for example, 
elimination or revising sections of the SOX, curbing securities litigation and 
reformation of the enforcement guidelines
29
.The evidence comes from three main 
areas of concern. First, the US declining share of global IPO volume; second, US 
equity market loss of distinction as the first choice for IPOs by foreign companies 
and third, decrease in cross listing ratios, which suggest that the share of foreign 
companies listed in the US has been stagnant since 2000. 
                                                 
26
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006). cited in (Hill 2009, 
130). 
27 McKinsey & Company, Sustaining New York‘s and the U.S. Global Financial Services Leadership¸ 
January, (2007), pg 12 
28
 Stavros Peristani, Evaluating the Relative Strength of the U.S. Capital Markets, Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Volume 13. No. 6 July (2007) 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/2007.html accessed 20 March 2014 
29 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-128.pdf, accessed 16 August 2014 
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However, in 2013 the New York Stock Exchange raised $44.4 billion from 
111 new IPOs, whereas the LSE raised $18.7 billion from 33 listings. The LSE was 
followed by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which raised $18.5billion through 455 
IPOs. NASDAQ ranked fourth and raised $16.6 billion in new IPOs.
30
 
 
AIM is an important part of the London Stock Exchange. The advantages are 
that they share the same trading systems (SETSmm, SEAQ and SEATS Plus) and 
the same website (Board et al. 2006, 199). One of the reasons for the popularity for 
the admission of the companies on the UK stock market is the self-regulatory nature 
of corporate governance in the UK economy (Dignam 2007). This is in direct 
contrast to the US stock market, which has much higher costs of listing, compulsory 
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 irrespective of the size of the company. 
Moreover, the former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman, Arthur Levitt, 
advocates implementation of even stronger measures in the US
31
. 
 
The rest of the chapter follows as: section 6.2 considers the AIM‘s 
competitors; section 6.3 examines the role of nominated advisers. Sections 6.4 and 
6.5 consider the regulation for nominated advisers and regulation in UK. Sections 
6.6 and 6.7 look at corporate governance and its application to the AIM companies. 
Section 6.8 considers the role of the Quoted Companies Alliance. Section 6.9 looks 
at some examples of previous studies on AIM and section 6.10 concludes. 
 
AIM Characteristics 
Board et al. (2005)
32
  provide AIM companies‘ characteristics from their 
report on the perception that the AIM market is riskier than the London‘s main 
market. Some of the characteristics are shown next. AIM companies are smaller than 
those listed on the LSE main market. The AIM companies are less diversified than 
                                                 
30
 Anna Irrera, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2014-01-13/londond-stock-exchange-second-
biggest-for-ipos-in-2013?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622, accessed 19 September 2014 
31
 Neil Weinberg (2007) Levitt Loves Sarb-Ox Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/2007/02/07/levitt-
sec-sarbox-biz-cz_nw_0207levitt.html 
32
 Board A false perception. Relative riskiness accessed 4 October 2014 
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large companies on the main market. Companies listed on AIM are younger than 
those quoted on the LSE. Majority of the companies listed on AIM tend to be from 
industrial sector such as mining and oil and gas. It is generally agreed that companies 
on the AIM have lower liquidity than those on the main market, with less frequent 
trading and this may result in fewer but larger price movements. They have smaller 
free float than the companies do on the main market. Since the ratio of the tradable 
shares to total shares is much lower and thus any news in respect of an AIM 
company will have a higher price impact. Venture capitalistic tend to be more 
involved in AIM companies, and have a shorter investment policy, and when they 
exit huge price volatility may incur.  
 
6.2: AIM’s Competitors 
Posner (2005, 2) states that between 1995 and 2005, 12 European countries 
created at least twenty ‗new‘ stock markets specifically designed for entrepreneurial 
companies to enable them to access different sources of finance. It is interesting to 
note that most of these ‗new‘ markets modelled on the US, the National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). The rationale for a second 
tier market acts as a potential feeder to the country‘s main market. Examples of these 
include the Second Marché of the Paris Bourse, the Geregelter Markt of Deutsche
33
 
and the Mercato Risretto of Borsa Italia
34 
(Vismara et al. 2012). Another group was 
created for the high tech companies, and these formed the basis for the pan European 
network called ‗Euro.NM‘ (NM stands for new stock markets). The members of 
Euro.NM included the Nouveau Marche (France), Neuer Markt (Germany), Nieuwe 
Markt (Holland) and Nuovo Mercato (Italy) and Euro.NM Brussels and smaller 
company market in Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. Euro.NM had a short 
duration since it opened in 1997and closed down its operations in December 2000, 
but its member exchanges carry on operating separately (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002, 
232). 
 
                                                 
33
 http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/basics+overview/market+segments/regulated+market 
34 
http://bankpedia.org/index.php/it/115-italian/m/21079-mercato-ristretto 
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An observed success of AIM is evident because the LSE and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) published a framework for a new Tokyo based market for smaller 
growth companies. This new market structure emulates the LSE‘s AIM market, 
which is underpinned by a regulatory framework, which is, accommodating to the 
needs of growth companies plus the unique role played by the Nominated Advisers 
(Nomads) in aiding issuers to meet their obligations as public companies. The 
operation of these markets focus is to address the external financial needs faced by 
growing companies and provide new opportunities for local and international 
professional investors.  
Atsushi Saito, President and CEO of the TSE, said:  
‘We are delighted to be able to publish the rulebook for our new 
joint venture market, as well as to announce its official name: 
TOKYO AIM. Our strong partnership with the London Stock 
Exchange has enabled us to make steady progress towards the 
launch of TOKYO AIM.’35 
 
Other major countries have emulated similar models, for example, in France, 
Italy, Japan, and Canada (Revest and Sapio 2013). However, AIM Tokyo and AIM 
Italia have been the only two using the AIM-Nomad model. There are several 
smaller stock exchanges similar to AIM, some have terminated and others renamed. 
Table 6.3 shows a list of the smaller exchanges. Further evidence of the success of 
AIM model as it has been imitated by Italy and Japan with the use of a Nomad as a 
key similarity between these exchanges (Mallin and Ow-Yong 2012, 108). The AIM, 
TSX Ventures in Tokyo and Korea‘s KOSDAQ of all the small exchanges have a 
separate exchange market
36
, while others are a separate board within the exchange 
and operate in parallel to the main board. AIM is the largest by market 
capitalisations and has the highest number of international companies. Most of these 
markets adopt a ‘junior market’ strategy in which the listed companies graduate to 
the main market.  
                                                 
35
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-
releases/2009/tokyostockexchangeandlondonstockexchangepublishrulebookforpubliccommentnamene
wgrowthmarkettokyoaim.htm; downloaded 6 November 2011 
36
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEXPCOMNET/Resources/FIAS_Note_315.pdf 
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Table 6.3: Worldwide Smaller Exchanges  
Country First 
Launched 
Name Regulator/Advisor 
London June 19, 
1995 
Alternative Investment Market(AIM) NOMAD 
Germany June 21, 
2005 
Freiverkehr Markt  
 
 
Euronext May 17, 
2005 
Alternext  Trust intermediary 
Spain April 10, 
2000 
Nuevo Mercado   
Italy May 8, 2009 Mercato Alternativo dei Capitali July 18, 
2007: Merger with LSE, formed AIM Italia  
NOMAD 
Ireland  Enterprise Securities Market ESM Adviser 
Canada  TSX Venture Exchange  
Hong Kong  Growth Enterprise Sponsors and Compliance 
Advisers 
Korea January 
1997 
KOSDAQ Korean Stock Dealers 
Association - based on 
NASDAQ 
Singapore  SESDAQ/renamed  Catalyst Sponsor 
Japan April 2009 Mothers, Tokyo AIM
37
 NOMAD 
United 
States 
 OTCQX Designated Advisory for 
Disclosure (DAD) 
China  Shenzhen ChiNext   
The ICAEW report shows support for the lighter-touch disclosure and 
financial reporting requirements as compared to the full Prospectus Directives 
Regulations
38
. Roel Campos
39.
has highly criticised AIM‘s so-called lighter touch 
regulation and compared it to a casino. He further felt that the lax regulation of AIM 
                                                 
37
 LSE withdrew from the joint venture, and Tokyo Stock Exchnge took over 100% of Tokyo-AIM. 
http://www.eurotechnology.com/2014/02/24/tokyo-aim-to-tokyo-pro-market/ accessed 19 August 
2014. 
38 
London Stock Exchange AIM Notice 24 AIM Rules for Companies, AIM Rules for Nominated 
Advisers and AIM Disciplinary Procedures and Appeals Handbook ICAEW Rep 66/06. 
39 
Roel Clark Campos served as Securities and Exchange Commissioner from 2002 to 2007. see The 
Times March 9, 2007. 
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would indirectly affect the credibility of the LSE
40
. However, his comments are in 
sharp contrast to those made by Bob Greifeld, Chief Executive of NASDAQ, who 
felt that the US should relax the stricter Sarbanes-Oxley regulation as non-US 
companies were avoiding to list on the US stock exchanges (Piotroski and Srinivasan 
2008, 385). The decline in the US market hegemony, for new international IPOs, has 
seen the development of OTCQX, a listing platform, which resembles the more 
lightly, regulated AIM. 
 
6.3: Regulation: EU and UK  
The attractiveness of the companies listing on the AIM is due to the less 
demanding requirements than the main market, for example, there are no thresholds 
on company size, trading records or proportion of shares in the public hands. These 
differences in the admission criteria are summarised in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Differences in the admission requirement  
Main market  AIM 
Minimum market capitalisation of £700,000 for equity   None 
Production of a prospectus for approval by the UKLA  None 
Minimum 25% shares to the public  None 
3 year trading record required & clean audit report  No trading record required 
Prior shareholder approval required for substantial  
approval of acquisitions and disposals 
 Not required 
Sponsors needed for certain transactions  Nominated adviser required at all 
times 
Pre-vetting of prospectus by the UKLA  Admission documents not pre-vetted 
by the Exchange or by the UKLA in 
most circumstances. The UKLA will 
only vet an AIM admission document 
where it is also a Prospectus under the 
Prospectus Directive 
Source: London Stock Exchange, A guide to AIM (2010)  
Currently, in the UK, in the absence of an application for admission to 
official listing and/or trading, a prospectus does not need approval by the competent 
                                                 
40
Matthew Lynn, Investment Week 16 July 2007. 
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authority. In order to prevent costs increases for issuers intending to float on AIM, 
the LSE announced on 18 May 2004, that, with effect from 12 October 2004, AIM 
would cease to be a regulated market, thus bringing it outside the scope of the EU 
Directive41. The main attraction of AIM has been its flexibility resulting from its 
lighter regulatory regime. Therefore, the advent of the EU Prospectus Directive in 
July 2005 was seen to have a negative impact on the AIM because of the additional 
level of regulatory requirements (Brooks 2006, 8).  
 
A ‘regulated market’ includes the main listing on the LSE, but excludes the 
AIM. Since AIM has changed its status to ‘exchange regulated’, since October 2004, 
which would protect the AIM companies from having to adhere to several European 
directives on financial regulation. The main motivation is to reduce compliance 
overheads that would result from both the European Prospectus Directive and the 
Market Abuse Directive. With the implementation of the EC‘s financial services 
action plan, AIM‘s object to seeking a change in status will protect the structure that 
allows flexibility, which has been the foundation of the market‘s success. To avoid 
the implications of the Prospective Directive, the LSE proactively changed the AIM 
to an exchange-regulated market rather than a pure regulated one. The advantage of 
this is that although the public offering on AIM requires a prospectus, but making an 
application for the admission does not. The exemptions from the requirement to 
publish a prospectus in the UK in relation to the AIM initial public offerings, fund 
raisings and takeovers include the total consideration payable for securities is less 
than £1.71 million (Brooks, 2006) and offers made solely to qualified investors. As 
of February 2007, the LSE introduced new rules, including AIM Rule 26
42
, for 
companies whose shares trade on the AIM following a consultation period at the end 
of 2006. AIM companies are now required to have in place corporate websites 
detailing financial and governance information in the interests of disclosure and 
transparency. 
 
                                                 
41 
LSE Annual Report 2005, p10 
42 
AIM Rules for companies, July 2005, August 2006, February 2010, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/rules/aim-rules-for-
companies.pdf 
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AIM has rivalled its competitors
43
 since the listing of new companies on AIM 
is far higher than in other stock exchanges. One of the key successes of AIM‘s 
performance is the internationalisation of the companies listing on AIM. This is 
evident from the market capitalisation of the 452 international companies, which is 
much higher at £31.8 billion compared to the market capitalisation of £29.4 billion 
from the 644 UK companies (see Table 6.5). Doidge et al. (2009, 258) find that the 
Australian, Canadian, Irish and US companies dominate the new listings on the AIM 
and represent almost 61% of the total foreign listings for the period 1995 to 2005. 
However, at December 2012 this figure for the same countries as Doidge et al. is 
reduced to 20%. Australia, China and the US dominate the AIM sample of foreign 
listings. 
  
                                                 
43 
LSE Annual Report 2005, p7 
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Table 6.5: Listing of the foreign countries companies on AIM  
Country of Operation 
Number of companies as per 
country of operation 
Total market capitalisation  
as at Dec 2012 
£million 
Africa 61 4,428 
Australia 28 648 
Canada 16 1,614 
Central & Eastern Europe 18 1,220 
Channel Islands 11 979 
China 46 2,826 
India & Bangladesh 25 3,873 
Isle Of Man 8 229 
Israel 8 112 
Japan 1 105 
Latin America 23 1,664 
Middle East 10 1,802 
Other Offshore 10 270 
Russia & CIS
44
 39 1,968 
South East Asia 39 3,777 
US 47 2,998 
Western Europe 62 3,307 
Total: International companies *452 31,819 
Total: UK companies 644 29,352 
Total 1,096 61,171 
*Total figures are different from Table 6.2, because Table 6.2uses country of incorporation whereas 
Table 6.5 uses the country of operation. 
Source: AIM statistics London Stock Exchange Dec 2012: AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers
  
 
6.4: Nominated Advisers 
A central and unique structural feature of AIM's regulatory system is the 
important role played by the Nominated Advisers (Nomads) (Mallin and Ow-Yong 
1998, 232). Nomads are private regulators that oversee individual AIM companies 
and they make an opinion as to whether a particular company can list on to the AIM. 
This system of private regulation reduces regulatory barriers and attracted many 
companies (Stringham and Chen 2012). The growth in the AIM companies has 
resulted in a change, in the regulatory regime and reorganisation of the AIM Rules. 
                                                 
44
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991. At present, the CIS 
unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.  
 
 138 
 
There are now two rulebooks: AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers and AIM Rules 
for Companies. The design of the AIM regulatory structure is to balance the need to 
protect companies to control costs associated with admission to a public market
45
.  
 
The AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers (2014
46
) provides four criteria for an 
entity to gain approval to act as a Nomad by the LSE. These criteria state that the 
entity must be a firm or company, have practiced corporate finance for at least the 
last two years, have acted on at least three relevant transactions during the two year 
period and employ at least four Qualified Executives. Mendoza (2008) suggests that 
Nomads play multiple roles as gatekeepers, advisers and regulators of the AIM. The 
more stringent listing, regulatory and disclosure requirements for the main market 
are not required for companies listing on the AIM. The LSE began regulatory 
reviews of Nomad, which started in 2007 after the publication of the AIM Rules for 
Nominated Advisers
47
 . The objective of the reviews is to assess the compliance of 
Nomads with the AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers. These rules cover both the 
obligations at admissions of an AIM company and its continuous obligation. Since 
April 2010, the LSE have introduced a broad risk based reviews for the Nomad.
48
  
 
The LSE delegates important regulatory responsibilities to Nomads, for 
example, assessing the appropriateness of companies prior to admission. Nomads 
provide advice and guidance to AIM companies post admission. The Nomads‘ 
responsibility continues to ensure ongoing compliance with the AIM Rules and the 
corporate governance for the company for the duration of its listing on the AIM. 
Hence, the Nomads have unrestricted authority to decide whether the company no 
                                                 
45
LSE available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-
notices/ad8-disciplinary-notice.pdf ; Pinsent Masons, Nomad Censure increases regulatory burden, 
June 2009, available at http://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/AIMMarketUpdate.pdf.  Pinsent Masons 
is a legal adviser to AIM companies and Nomads. 
46
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-
notices/aimrulesnomadsmay14.pdf 
47 
AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers, February 2007 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/publications/aim-rules-for-
nominated-advisers.pdf 
48
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/inside-aim-
newsletter/inside-aim-issue2.pdf 
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longer fits the AIM listing (Mendoza 2008, 317). However, if a company quoted on 
the AIM dismisses its Nomad, or if a Nomad decides to severe its relationship with 
an AIM company, the company has 30 days in which to appoint another Nomad 
otherwise the AIM company‘s shares are suspended and eventually removed from 
the AIM. Nomads are LSE (previously FSA) authorised and regulated, and must 
have adequate systems and controls in place to prevent bribery and comply with the 
UK Bribery Act 2010. 
 
Appendix 1 shows a list of the names of the Nomads on LSE at April 2013. 
Nomads are mainly from the following sectors: accountancy firms, corporate 
finance, investment banks, and lawyers. Currently active Nomads, include highly 
regarded firms like Grant Thornton UK, HSBC Bank, J.P. Morgan and Merrill 
Lynch. Currently, over 50 Nomads advise companies seeking to list on the AIM. The 
primary function of the Nomad is to decide whether a company is suitable for AIM. 
Once listed, the company must have an appointed Nomad at all times, as without one 
they would be unregulated. A Nomad is required to be a member of the LSE. 
Nomads are responsible for advising issuers of their obligations to the LSE under the 
AIM Rules for Companies. Due to the lighter regulation of the AIM, if the Nomads 
do not carry out their work efficiently, may enable some companies that lack sound 
corporate governance structures to enter AIM. LSE takes its supervision of AIM 
seriously, and levies fines on both the Nomad and the issuer for breach of the rules. 
The first Nomad to be censured publicly was Durlacher. Durlacher did not make 
public material information about profit warnings and whilst its client, an AIM listed 
financial services raised money in placing of convertible loan stock. Campbell and 
Tabner (2014) cite the following censures for breaches of the AIM Rules for 
Nominated Advisers. The censure disclosed in October 2007 when the Nomad 
Nabaro Wells was fined £250,000. Astaire Securities PLC, formerly Blue Oar 
Securities PLC is an example of the failure of compliance with the AIM rules. The 
AIM Disciplinary Committee found the company in Breach of Rule 39 of the AIM 
Rules for Companies and Rules 16, 18 and 19 of the AIM Rules for Nominated 
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Advisers
49 
and fined £225,000
50
. The next case was disclosed in 2011, when the 
disciplinary committee of AIM publicly censured the Nomad Seymour Pierce and 
imposed a fine of £400,000 for breaches of four Nomad rules in relation to two client 
firms in 2011
51
. 
 
Many Nomads have largely relied upon voluntary disclosure by, and 
discussion with, the company‘s directors rather than examining the entire relevant 
underlying document themselves. The disadvantage of this is that the Nomads may 
fail to assess adequately whether the company is appropriate for admission to AIM; 
carry out due diligence and advice the company properly regarding disclosures at 
admission and post admission to ensure compliance by the company with the AIM 
rules.  
 
The AIM Disciplinary and Procedures Handbook forms part of the AIM 
Rules and sets out the procedures to be followed when the LSE considers that a 
Nomad or an AIM company has breached its responsibilities under the AIM Rules. If 
the LSE wants to commence disciplinary action against an AIM company or a 
Nomad, LSE shall refer the matter to either the AIM Disciplinary Committee or the 
AIM Executive Panel. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the LSE will decide 
what action is necessary in each case. As a minimal disciplinary process, the LSE 
will instruct the party to take remedial action, or alternatively may issue a warning 
notice.  
 
The Stock Exchange AIM Disciplinary Notice publishes details of their 
disciplinary action on an anonymous basis, as deterrents and emphasizing to AIM 
companies and their Nomads the expected standards of conduct on the AIM. 
                                                 
49 
See Public Censure and Fine – Astaire Securities Plc, February 2007 at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-notices/ad8-
disciplinary-notice.pdf, accessed 16 August 2014. 
50 
London Stock  Exchange, Stock Exchange AIM  Disciplinary Notice,  22 June 2009  
51
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-notices/aim-
notice-ad11.pdf, accessed 16 August 2014. 
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Disciplinary or corrective action is in the following circumstances: first, the use of 
over optimistic language when updating the market on its future prospects and giving 
no explanation as to their assumptions of their expectations and associated risks. 
Second, prior to verification of the accuracy of results, company prematurely 
announces price sensitive information on positive results. Third, postponement of 
disclosure of negative trading update, in the belief they may be able to announce 
positive news within a short term. Fourth, failure to update the market on the 
progress of a pre-announced refinancing deal once the deadline had passed. Fifth, 
material facts omitted from a company‘s admission document. 
 
6.5: AIM and Corporate Governance 
Companies listed on the UK‘s main market are required, as part of the Listing 
Agreement, to adopt the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
2012 (previously discussed in Chapter 4). Companies quoted on the AIM are not 
technically ‗listed‘, and hence the terms of the Listing Agreement are not a binding 
requirement for these companies. However, the various corporate governance reports 
recommend that ‗smaller companies outside the FTSE350‘ should follow the same 
corporate governance standards as those applying to larger listed companies, and the 
UK Corporate Governance Code supports this view. Although this recommendation 
applies to smaller listed companies, the spirit of the recommendation would apply to 
AIM companies
52
, as well, shown by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, 5) 
 
‘Smaller listed companies, in particular those new to the listing, 
may judge that some of the provisions are disproportionate or less 
relevant in their case. Some of the provisions do not apply to 
companies below the FTSE350. Such companies may nonetheless 
consider that it would be appropriate to adopt the approach in the 
Code and they are encouraged to do so‘. 
  
                                                 
52
See A Guide to AIM 2010, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisers/aim/publications/documents/a-guide-to-aim.pdf, pg 20 
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6.6: Application of Principles 
From the beginning of the development of the corporate governance reform 
in the UK, a voluntary approach of ‗comply or explain‘ has been a key focus. A 
‗comply or explain‘ approach facilitates companies to choose what balance is most 
fitting for them and to tailor their response accordingly. Applying this to the general 
issue of compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code (previously Combined 
Code), we would expect some AIM companies to explain why they do not comply 
(or comply fully) with the Code. Most of the companies seek to comply with the 
provisions and principles of good corporate governance and code of best practice 
(the ‗Combined Code‘) as far as it is practicable for a group of its size and structure. 
The following section follows a few examples of corporate governance compliance 
statement: 
 
‘The rules relating to securities traded on the London Stock 
Exchange’s AIM market (AIM) do not require AIM companies to 
report in accordance with the Combined Code. However, the Board 
believes in the principles of good corporate governance and is 
committed to applying the highest principles commensurate with its 
size‘ (Character Group Plc Annual Report 2012, 11). 
 
‘The Company is listed on the Alternative Investment Market and is 
not required to comply with the provisions set out in Section 1 of the 
2008 FRC Combined Code. However, the Directors support the 
principles contained in these requirements and apply these where 
they consider they are appropriate to Mulberry Group plc‘ 
(Mulberry Group plc, Annual Report 2011, 7). 
 
‘The Board of the Company is committed to achieving the highest 
standard of Corporate Governance. Although not formally required 
to do so, the directors have sought to embrace the principal 
governance rules applying to UK companies fully listed on the 
London Stock Exchange in formulating and applying the Company’s 
corporate governance policies. The principal governance rules are 
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contained in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance adopted 
by the Financial Reporting Council in June 2008 (‘Combined 
Code’). The Company’s policies are monitored to ensure that they 
are appropriate to the Company’s circumstances and comply as far 
as possible with the provisions of the Combined Code given the size 
of the Company’ (ASOS Annual Report, March 2011, 40). 
 
The significant growth in the number of companies admitted to AIM, and its 
attractiveness for larger companies, suggests that institutional investors are likely to 
be showing greater interest in the AIM companies. The National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF) has published, in March 2007, a Corporate Governance 
Policy and Voting Guidelines for AIM listed companies. The NAPF Guidelines are 
consistent with the guidelines of the QCA. Despite the exemption from the adoption 
of Combined Code recommendations, the NAPF guidelines suggest that the boards 
of AIM companies should be familiar with the main principles of the Combined 
Code and should seek to apply them as appropriately to their circumstances. The 
policy document states that the companies at the top end of the AIM market, by 
market capitalisation, should comply with the provisions of the Combined Code or 
explain non-compliance. The importance provided to corporate governance 
disclosures by institutional shareholder and regulation in Table 6.6 shown below. 
The differences are minimal between the three different institutional requirements, 
which are NAPF, QCA and the Combined Code requirements.  
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Table 6.6: Comparative Disclosure Requirements 
Disclosure National  
Association of Pension 
Funds  
March 2007
53
 
UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
(Combined Code) 
 
Quoted  
Companies  
Alliance  
Guidelines 
Corporate governance 
policies 
- Statement on 
Corporate 
Governance required 
Yes Yes Yes 
Biographical details 
of directors and board 
Required Required Required – in the 
annual report or the 
website 
Separation of the 
roles of Chairman 
and CEO 
Support for the 
separation of the roles – 
requires disclosure in 
the annual reports if 
combined 
Yes Yes 
CEO becoming 
Chairman 
As per Combined Code 
principle 
CEO should not go on 
to be a Chairman of the 
same company 
Not addressed 
Senior Independent 
Director 
As per Combined Code 
principle 
A senior independent 
NED, other than the 
board Chairman 
Not addressed 
Balance of the Board Smaller company 
should have at least two 
independent NEDs 
Smaller company 
should have at least two 
independent NEDs 
Two independent 
NEDs  
Board committees As per Combined Code 
principle 
Audit, 
Remuneration and 
Nomination 
Remuneration 
Committee Guidefor 
Smaller Quoted 
Companies (Feb 2012) 
Audit Committee 
Guide Guidefor 
Smaller Quoted 
Companies (Feb 2009)   
Non Compliance Detailed Explanation Detailed Explanation  
Remuneration 
arrangements 
Companies to put their 
remuneration report to a 
vote at the AGM 
Companies to put their 
remuneration report to a 
vote at the AGM 
Companies to put their 
remuneration report to 
a vote at the AGM 
Source: London Stock Exchange; Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008; 2012), National Association of 
Pension Funds March 2007 
 
                                                 
53
 
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/~/media/Policy/Documents/0023_Corpo
rate_governance%20policy_and_voting_guidelines_for_Aim_companies_Mar_2007_0307.ashx; 
accessed 28 august 2013 
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There is consensus that AIM companies should not have a lesser standard of 
disclosure, for example, the directors‘ compensation is one of the major areas of 
conflict and hence appropriate disclosure is fundamental to the relationship between 
shareholders and management (UKSA, 2002)54. Literature on country studies show 
that individual companies can select governance arrangements in excess of what is 
required by law and regulation, and these has a deep impact on valuation. Black 
(2001), for example, finds that Russian companies with good corporate governance 
ratings are a hundred times more valuable compared to their peers with poor 
corporate governance ratings. Using a governance index for US companies, Gompers 
et al. (2003) find that better governed companies perform better on the stock market. 
Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2005) shows a positive relationship between company 
governance and valuation is systematic across a large set of companies and 
countries.  
 
6.7: The Role of the Quoted Companies Alliance 
A group of smaller quoted company advisers formed the City Group for 
Smaller Quoted Companies (CISCO) to lobby the London Stock Exchange to 
introduce a junior market that could be used for entrepreneurial companies to raise 
equity funding, without having to endure the costly and time-consuming 
requirements of a listing on the main market. CISCO, the association representing 
smaller quoted companies (outside the FTSE 350) in the UK has changed its name to 
the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) (Corporate Governance Update  2001). 
 
The QCA is a not for profit organisation that represents the interests of the 
smaller quoted companies on the main market (outside the FTSE 350), AIM and the 
PLUS markets. The characteristics of these companies are that they have a lower 
level of management and financial resources, narrow shareholder base and low 
investor profile. The objectives of the QCA are to benefit the small and mid cap 
sector in reducing the burden of regulation, improving investor liquidity and 
facilitate knowledge sharing between its members. The QCA has over 200 members: 
                                                 
54 The United Kingdom Shareholders Association (UKSA), Response to ‗ Company Law- Directors 
Remuneration – A Consultative Document‘, 2002:3 
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60% of these are smaller quoted companies and 40% from professional advisory 
companies. 
 
The QCA is governed by an elected executive committee and undertakes its 
work through a number of focused committees and working groups of members. 
Members of the QCA will have the advantages of obtaining information on 
regulation changes, networking events, technical guidance and promotion 
opportunities. The areas that have been concentrated on are taxation; legislation; 
corporate governance; share schemes for employees; trading, settlement and custody 
of shares; regulation of stock markets; political liaison; accounting standards and 
company law reform. 
 
The QCA supports the principles of corporate governance contained in the 
UK corporate governance code (previously the Combined Code) and requires that all 
quoted companies,  in so far as is practical for their size, should adopt the principles. 
The QCA advises smaller companies to comply with the Combined Code and where 
they are unable to comply fully, then the company should explain giving details why 
they are unable to comply(Mallin and Ow-Yong 2008). The QCA corporate 
governance guidelines for AIM companies were initially published in 2005 (Mallin 
and Ow-Yong 2008, 8). The QCA guidelines are minimal in comparison to the 
Combined Code, which is applicable to companies listed on the main market. 
 
In May 2013, the QCA released Corporate Governance Guidelines for 
Smaller Quoted Companies (the ‗QCA Code‘)55. The QCA Code now replaces the 
previous Corporate Governance Guidelines for AIM companies published in 
2005and 2010. The introduction of this material reflects the continued reverberation 
of the aftershocks of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The QCA Code derives its 
guidelines from the UK Corporate Governance Code, and both have similarities, but 
the former is less prescriptive. For example, the QCA code specifies inclusion of 
corporate governance statement in the annual reports; board committees such as 
                                                 
55
 http://www.theqca.com/shop/guides/86557/corporate-governance-code-for-small-and-midsize-
quoted-companies-2013-downloadable-pdf.thtml 
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audit, compensation and nomination; identifying the roles and responsibilities of the 
directors; separate roles of the chairman and the chief executive officer and 
independent directors with a minimum of two independent directors. To date the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and the QCA code adopt the ‗comply or explain‘ 
concept. The larger companies on the AIM generally comply with the QCA 
guidelines, and it is anticipated that even the smaller companies will follow with 
good governance principles. The QCA Code advises companies to make public an 
annual corporate governance statement in their annual report and accounts or on their 
website. The QCA provides 12 Guidelines, together with examples of governance 
structures and minimum disclosures. Table 6.7 summarises the QCA guidelines. 
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Table 6.7: Quoted Companies Alliance Guidelines  
QCA Guidelines Examples of Governance 
Structure 
Comment 
Structure and Process Corporate governance 
framework 
Chairman to report on the application of the QCA 
guidelines; Number of board meetings and of the 
committees and directors‘ attendance 
 
Responsibility and 
accountability 
 
 
 
Senior management Role and responsibility of board, Chief executive 
and Chairman; where the  roles of chairman and 
the chief executive are not separate; role of  
senior independent director 
Board balance and  
size 
At least two independent 
non-executive directors 
Identity of all directors; terms and conditions of 
appoint and specifically for independent directors  
 
Board skills and  
capabilities 
Executive and non-
executive directors 
Effective audit, compensation and nomination 
committees 
 
Performance and 
development 
 
 Regular reviews of the board‘s performance 
Information and  
support 
 Board to be in receipt of up to date and accurate 
information 
 
Cost effective and 
 value added 
Key performance 
indicators; non-executive 
director meetings with 
shareholders  
Summary of risk management and internal 
control system; compensation policies and 
corporate social responsibilities‘ activities  
 
Vision and strategy Executive management Communicated to shareholders and externally 
 
Risk management 
 and internal control 
 
 
Annual review of 
effectiveness of internal 
control system 
Responsibility of the board and communicated to 
shareholders 
 
Communication of 
shareholders‘ needs  
and objectives 
 
Meetings with the 
shareholders 
Focused on votes at general meeting and proxy 
voting 
 
Investor relations  
and communication 
Investor relationship Communication channel needs to be put between 
the board and the shareholders, for example, 
Annual reports 
 
Stakeholder and 
social responsibilities 
A proactive CSR policy Implement a corporate social responsibility policy 
 
Source: QCA Corporate Governance Guidelines for Smaller Quoted Companies, September 2010, 
Sec 3, pg 8-10 
The LSE regards the UK Corporate Governance Code as the benchmark for 
all public companies, but it also supports the QCA guidelines for AIM (LSE 
September 2012, 54). Walmsley (2012, 5) in the forward note to publication on‘ 
Corporate Governance for main market and AIM Companies by LSE stated the 
following supporting the above: 
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‘Although companies on the London Stock Exchange’s long-
established growth market, AIM, are not mandated under the AIM 
Rules to adhere to the provisions of the Code, they are encouraged 
to develop strong governance procedures and are advised to aspire 
to achieve the key elements set out in the Code as they grow. As a 
minimum, all AIM companies are encouraged to adhere to the 
Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) Guidelines, which are based on 
the Code but specifically tailored to the needs of growth companies 
and their investors’. 
 
The obligation to ‗comply or explain‘ under  Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules (DTR) 7.2, LR 9.8.6R (5) and (6) and LR 9.8.7 do not apply to AIM as it is 
not a regulated market, Instead, the AIM regulatory framework relies on the ‗Nomad 
system‘ to assist companies with the application of corporate governance guidance 
 
‘The AIM Rules for Companies do not require adherence to a 
particular set of corporate governance rules. The London Stock 
Exchange believes that a blanket requirement to ‘comply or 
explain’ by reference to a particular code would not be appropriate 
for the predominantly smaller, growth-stage companies that make 
up AIM’s constituent members. The London Stock Exchange’s 
‘Inside AIM’ newsletter (issue 2, July 2010) stated: ‘Such a step 
may simply be seen as ‘more regulation’ rather than as a beneficial 
set of practices to improve the running of a company and the 
interaction between board and shareholders.’ For many AIM 
companies, according to :‘A Guide to AIM’, the costs of full 
compliance with the Code would outweigh the benefits to the 
average shareholder‘ (see Cronin and Murphy 2012, 21).
56
 
 
The AIM companies compliance is mixed with some having full compliance 
with the UK Corporate Governance Code, and others adopting the QCA guidelines 
as a minimum. The three primary sources of corporate governance guidelines and 
                                                 
56
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and 
advisers/aim/publications/documents/corpgov.pdf, accessed 24 January 2014. 
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rules, applicable to AIM companies include the AIM Rules
57
, the QCA guidelines 
and the Corporate Governance and Voting Guidelines for AIM companies, published 
by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). Under the AIM Rules, 
companies on the AIM have no mandatory obligation to adhere to the provisions of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code; nevertheless, they are encouraged to develop 
strong governance structures and advised to adopt the key elements set out in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code as they grow. However, the QCA guidelines on 
corporate governance are the minimum requirement for all AIM companies to adopt. 
The QCA uses the UK Corporate Governance Code as a basis of their guidelines but 
these are less prescriptive. The QCA strongly supports the comply or explain 
approach, and this differentiated approach for smaller quoted companies, such as on 
the AIM would benefit since these companies are at different stages of development. 
Thus, the smaller quoted companies can tailor the recommendations to their 
advantage at the same time allowing companies to adopt principles of corporate 
governance. In the absence of mandatory rules, the key consideration is that the AIM 
companies should follow as a minimum the ‗Corporate Governance Guidelines for 
the Smaller Quoted Companies‘ published by the QCA. In addition, the role of the 
Nomads is to encourage compliance. 
 
Germany‘s Deutsches Atkieninstitut, France‘s MiddleNext and the UK‘s 
QCA58 have produced a principle-based common set of corporate governance 
guidelines known as the European Corporate Governance. This association 
emphasises the need for appropriate corporate governance among the small and 
medium sized quoted companies in Europe
59
. A common set of guidelines overlap 
considerably with the QCA guidelines, and the document invites companies ‘to use 
                                                 
57 
The AIM Rules for Companies have been updated by the LSE with effect from 14 May 2014, 
except for the the amended Rule 26 on company information to be adopted by companies from 11 
august 2014. Available at C:\Users\123\Downloads\Need to Know - AIM Rules.pdf, downloaded 16 
September 2014; AIM Rules for Companies – May 2014 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-
notices/aimrulescompaniesmay2014.pdf 
58 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework/registered-
organisations/qca_en.pdf,pg. 2,   accessed 20 March 2014 
59
http://www.theqca.com/article_assets/articledir_88/44421/EuropeanCorpGovGuidelines_May2011_
Final.pdf 
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these guidelines as they apply their own national code~’,(which, for AIM 
companies, will normally be the QCA guidelines). In short, this complements the 
need to enhance monitoring towards increasing transparency, mitigating systemic 
risk and protecting the shareholders against managerial behaviour. 
 
6.8: Literature Review  
Until recently the academic literature on the AIM was very sparse, as most of 
the work in the UK has focused on the larger companies listed on the main market. 
The most work on AIM that offer insights into AIM is from Mallin and Ow-Yong 
who have published several papers specifically on AIM (for example, Mallin and 
Ow-Yong 1998; 2008; 2010; 2012). While studies on the AIM companies differ 
considerably, they can be differentiated into four areas: cross-country and switching, 
performance, governance and others.  
 
Cross-Country and Switching 
In the cross-country and switching group, for the AIM companies are 
expected to switch to the main market, if the company is successful, or some 
companies listed on the main market move to the AIM.  
Board et al. (2006) in a study commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize 
Securities Legislation in Canada evaluated stock trading activity in the AIM and 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) or Toronto Stock Exchange Venture Exchange 
(TSXV) for cross-listed Canadian shares. They also analyse the switch of UK 
companies from the AIM to the main market or vice versa and at stocks that have 
switched from the Canadian Stock Exchange. The analysis of the switching of 
companies form the LSE‘ main market to AIM showed no significant improvement 
in performance following the switch, and for those AIM companies switching to the 
main market displayed marginally poor performance following the switch. The study 
showed that there was no reduction in the trading activity on the TSX (or TSXV) 
after the companies listed on the AIM. In fact, listing on the AIM seemed to have 
motivated awareness in the Canadian market and onTSX (or TSXV) trading volume 
increased after cross listing. Doidge et al. (2009) find that despite the low number of 
listings on AIM, it has grown considerably since 2001. However, the characteristics 
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of the companies that list on AIM are small, and unlikely to cross list on the US 
exchanges. Doidge et al. examine whether the small size of the typical firm listed on 
AIM can list on NASDAQ. They find that 21 out of 80 non-US firms and only one 
of eight US firms meet the criteria of NASDAQ‘s listing rules. They conclude that 
AIM does not compete with NASDAQ. They find evidence supporting the non-
competition between AIM and NASDAQ since only three companies joined AIM of 
the 95 US foreign delisting. In contrast, five out of the 105 LSE main market 
delisting joined AIM (p 263). In addition, they find that the companies that list on 
the AIM have a much higher Tobin‘s Q in the listing year compared to the 
companies listing on the main market. 
 
Vismara et al. (2012) differentiate the evolution of the second-tier market in 
Continental Europe into three models: sequential, sectorial and demand led. In the 
sequential model, small successful companies move to the main market. The 
sectorial model applies to New Markets created in 1996-1999, with admission 
allowed to companies in high tech sectors. In the UK, there was no development of 
an independent new market, but instead a new market segment (techmark) which 
includes the high tech industries companies listed on the LSE. The third group is 
demand side model, typically associated with the LSE AIM. Since the launch of 
AIM in 1995 to 2009, 90 companies transferred from AIM to the LSE main market 
compared to 282 firms from the main market to AIM. Hence, a higher number of 
companies switch to AIM, when both the markets are in the same jurisdiction. 
Vismara et al. (2012, 377) using the official document when companies transfer 
between markets suggest that the reasons for transferring, for example, are lower 
costs, mergers and acquisitions, growth, shareholders‘ interest, flexibility, less 
regulation, fiscal benefits. Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2010) use press releases to 
analyse the companies transferring from AIM to the main market and vice versa. A 
common reason for the transfer to the AIM was the burden imposed by the 
obligations of the listing rules imposed by the LSE. Their study shows that 
companies transferring from the AIM to the main market have a positive 
announcement effect on the company‘s stock price, compared to the companies 
switching from the main market to the AIM where they have a negative 
announcement effects on the company‘s stock price. Despite the initial negative 
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effect for those companies that switched to AIM, over time the trading on the AIM 
for these companies is associated with positive average returns. The movement from 
the main market to AIM announcement results in an immediate negative return of 
4% (p, 26); whereas they report a positive 6% return on the announcement of 
companies moving from AIM to the main market. This raises questions that the two-
tier governance regimes in UK may be allowing companies from the main market to 
AIM, where the companies can avoid stringent governance standards. 
 
Mizuno and Tabner (2008) compare the AIM with junior stock exchanges in 
East Asia, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) Mothers market, Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange Growth Enterprise Market and the Singapore Exchange Catalist markets. 
Since, then TSE has set up a new market similar to the AIM model, Tokyo AIM in 
2009. 
 
Nielsson (2013) find that companies that list on AIM show similar 
characteristics as other companies that list in the US or in Continental Europe. In 
addition, the market valuation of the companies and the proportion of company 
failures are comparatively similar to that of other exchanges. Neilsson (2013) uses 
monthly AIM reports and suggests four reasons for companies that delist from AIM: 
transfer to the LSE main market, mergers and acquisitions, voluntary delist and 
involuntary reasons. The reasons for involuntary delisting are that a company may 
not be able to raise capital, failure to keep a Nomad at all times and fail to comply 
with the AIM rules. 
 
Performance 
The second group identified in AIM research falls under the category of 
performance. The first of this is Colombelli (2010) who examines the effects of 
entrepreneurial orientation on company market performance for IPO sample of 
companies listed on the AIM in the period 1995 to 2006.The Colombelli study 
shows a positive impact of risk taking, innovation and proactivity on investors‘ 
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valuation. He concludes that second tier markets, such as AIM, are core for ensuring 
the financial needs of smaller companies are met.  
 
Gerakos et al. (2013) provide evidence on the post-listing performance for 
AIM companies. They benchmark the AIM companies to companies listing on the 
―Pink Sheets‖ market in the US. The characteristics of the Pink Sheets‘ companies 
are that they are not required to be SEC registered, limited in both permitted capital 
raising and share ownership. They find AIM companies perform poorer than Pink 
Sheets companies, which again suggest that the AIM registration process provides 
limited supervision. In comparison of their results on venture capital and private 
equity, they find that AIM companies significantly show poor performance. On their 
analysis of changes in AIM regulation, they conclude that the cash shells 
performance improved following the stricter regulation in 2005 and that the overall 
performance of AIM IPOs improved following the tighter regulation of Nomads in 
2007. 
 
Revest and Sapio (2013) empirical results suggest that companies listing on 
AIM tend to have higher than average growth in operating revenues and total assets, 
and in addition the AIM companies grow faster than comparable private companies 
in terms of employees. However, the growth in employees is not matched by a 
comparable growth in added value, thereby concluding that AIM companies tend to 
underperform in productivity. They further consider that Nomads build on indicators 
of success in promoting companies. However, once the companies are on AIM, their 
focus shifts from real performance to short-term financial results, which may be 
detrimental to the shareholders wealth in the long term. The above fits well due to 
the financial manipulation on AIM with high incidents of reverse takeovers, cash 
shell operations, and reduced regulations. However, these financial manoeuvrings 
will not be conducive to developing a sustainable market for the small or medium 
enterprises. Instead, one interpretation for the increasing growth in AIM is due to 
excessive financialisation and therefore, it is not surprising to see the high number of 
reverse takeovers. Epstein (2005) cited in Dore (2008, 1097) provides a definition of 
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‗financialisation‘ as  the increasing role of finance in terms of motives, markets, 
actors, and institutions in the operation of the financial economies. 
 
Governance 
The third group is governance, and draws upon the work of Mallin and Ow-
Yong beginning from 1998. 
 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (1998) paper consider AIM companies as split into two 
groups: first, the internal corporate governance structure of the company organised 
by the directors and second, an external corporate governance function carried out by 
the Nomads in their capacity as monitors. Using the admission documents the 
authors analyse the corporate governance structure of fifty companies and found 
variations depending on the type of Nomads as advisor (i.e. Nomads who are brokers 
and Nomads who do not act as brokers) and whether these companies raised new 
capital on admission or not. The observed differences were in areas of board sub-
committees, such as the presence of audit and remuneration committees and the 
inclusion of a statement of corporate governance policies in the admission 
documents. Hence, the findings of this article suggest that the Nomad as a broker are 
more concerned with their reputational risk and hence support the use of the Cadbury 
Code recommendations for the AIM companies.  
 
A decade later, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2008) analyse annual reports of 300 
AIM companies for the period 2005 to 2006, prior to the Rule 26 on AIM companies 
to maintain corporate websites providing information on financial and governance 
matters, which came into effect on 20th August 2007. They find high instances of 
disclosure by AIM companies for corporate governance practices such as inclusion 
of corporate governance statement, presence of board sub-committees, list of the 
directors and their responsibilities, splitting the roles of the CEO and chairman. 
Despite, the recommendation by the QCA Guidelines (2005) in respect of 
independent directors and a minimum of two independent non-executive directors on 
board, the adoption of these practices were not observed in majority companies on 
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AIM. In addition, disclosure on directors‘ performance and attendance at board was 
very low. Overall, they find that AIM companies disclosed lower governance 
practices then recommended by the QCA Guidelines (2005). Accordingly, it is 
hardly surprising that Baker Tilly and Faegre & Benson report of 2009 (cited in 
Mallin and Ow-Yong 2010, 228) in their survey of 116 AIM companies and 55 AIM 
investors show that 58% of institutional investors say that the corporate governance 
standards in AIM companies were not satisfactory. Fewer than 40% of institutional 
investors consider them acceptable. 
 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2010) conduct face-to-face interviews with various 
participants that include AIM company directors, institutional investor who invest in 
the AIM companies, and Nomads relating to the role of the Nomad. One concern that 
is the quality of companies sometimes admitted on the AIM, in particular, for some 
overseas companies whose home country has weaker corporate governance 
regulation. Additional concerns were that these companies often operate in 
environment, which have poor business ethics.  
 
In another study by Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) on corporate governance 
disclosures, they examine factors that may influence the disclosure of compliance 
with QCA best practice on corporate governance for a sample of 300 companies 
quoted on the AIM for period before June 2006. They use a non-weighted score to 
develop a disclosure index for 23 attributes from the QCA guidelines 2005. They 
find that the regression of the disclosure index on the explanatory variables such as 
increase in the percentage of non-executive directors, board size and company size 
show a positive and highly significant coefficient. The gearing ratio coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that equity shareholders expect AIM 
companies to have good corporate governance structures. Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2012) find that company size, board size and the proportion of independent non-
executive directors have greater influence for companies to comply with QCA 
guidelines than ownership factors. In addition, they find that companies that have 
switched from the main market to AIM tend to have higher disclosure scores, thus 
maintaining the corporate governance structures that they had adopted whilst on the 
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main market. Their findings do not support that an AIM company will disclose more 
corporate governance compliance if their Nomad also acts as a broker does.  
 
The next article co-authored by Mallin on governance in AIM companies is 
that of Farag et al. (2014) where they use a sample of 271 companies, for the period 
2000 to 2007, to investigate the impact of ownership (specifically venture capital 
funds) on corporate governance characteristics using a manually constructed index, 
CGAIM50 index. They investigate the ownership type and its effect on the 
company‘s governance structure. They also estimate the inter-relationship between 
corporate governance, ownership and financial performance. They find a positive 
and significant relationship between CGAIM50 index and the venture capital 
ownership, a causal relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance. 
 
Others 
Parsa and Kouhy (2008) analyse the disclosures of social information by 90 
AIM companies. They state that despite the limited resources the AIM companies in 
their sample have embraced social reporting to establish and maintain corporate 
reputation. 
 
 Cassia et al. (2009) analyse the influence of universities on firm growth 
focusing on the companies listed on the AIM and the UK main market for the 
period1995 to 2006. Their sample consists of 200 companies listed on the AIM and 
200 companies listed on the UK main market. There results show that both 
university input and output are important determinants of firm growth for AIM 
companies, but has no influence on the main market companies. Their paper adds to 
the AIM literature, but also to the knowledge spillovers literature.  
 
Based on the review of published research it is clear that AIM has been 
successful, and provides an interesting regulatory environment to research. 
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6.9: Conclusion 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010:1), the purpose of 
corporate governance is to facilitate effective management that will enable long-term 
survival of the company. Improved corporate governance has the potential to 
enhance economic development. Although the UK Corporate Governance Code 
adoption refers mainly to the officially listed companies on the main market, if the 
smaller companies refrain from benchmarking against the provisions provided in the 
Code, it may have negative implications in the long- run, and a potential source of 
future problems. AIM is a lightly regulated marked, LSE acts as regulator as well as 
exchange owner. It works through the Nomads to enforce appropriate standards for 
the AIM companies. The support of the QCA and its development of the minimum 
requirement of corporate governance facilitate a link between the main market and 
the AIM. This will enable those companies wanting to enter the main market from 
the AIM to have had time to implement the requirements of the LSE. However, not 
all of these companies fully or to the same degree will have implemented the 
requirements of listing on the main market. AIM provides a good example of the use 
of liberal corporation laws that allow the smaller companies to economise on the 
costs of political and legal control of the managers, without much interference for the 
effective operation of market controls. For managers seeking to list, AIM allows 
companies to adopt the full UK Corporate Governance Code or elements of it and 
the market will reward the optimal mix that the managers adopt. 
 
In addition, legislation in the UK on ownership suggests that any 
shareholding greater than 3% should be disclosed in the annual reports or websites of 
the company, and this gives a rich source of information and transparency to 
investors. Economically, there is strong evidence of the importance of growth 
companies to the UK economy. The AIM acts as an initial platform for companies to 
move its listing to the main market of the LSE. In particular, the number of IPOs on 
the AIM is higher than in Europe and in the period 2004-2006 the IPOs were more 
than ten times those on the LSE main market (Meoli et al. 2008, s.3.1). 
 
Since the launch of AIM in 1995, corporate governance has been 
continuously evolving. However, there is paucity of research on AIM companies and 
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corporate governance, which demonstrates the need and potential for further research 
into AIM companies. The justification returns once again to the opening theme of 
this chapter, namely that the AIM model being mimicked by other stock exchanges 
and AIM is attractive to listing from both UK and international companies. The 
second part of this thesis contains empirical studies that extend research into 
governance of AIM companies. 
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CHAPTER 7  OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
7.1: Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research design for the three empirical Chapters (8, 
9 and 10) within the context of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The next 
three chapters address whether company level variation in corporate governance 
practices affects the company‘s performance. Despite the large number of academic 
studies, the link between corporate governance and company‘s performance is not 
clearly established. Most of the literature focuses on large companies in developed 
countries and emerging markets. First, this chapter attempts to provide a 
comprehensive description of the data and research methodology used in this study 
to ensure that the work is replicable. Second, this chapter attempts to explain the 
rationale for the various data and methodological choices made in this study. 
 
7.2: Methodology 
Prior empirical research on corporate governance uses a wide array of 
methods, from content analysis, surveys, questionnaires, interviews and econometric 
methods. The econometric methods include the general ordinary least squares 
regressions. However, other more sophisticated econometric methods use the 
simultaneous equations, two and three stage least squares methods and Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM). 
 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the individual company and the list of 
AIM companies by London Stock Exchange forms the basis for the selection of the 
sample companies. For this study, the sample comes from a population size of over 
1,000 companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (see Appendix, 
Tables 2 to 4 for the company names for each of the three chapters). In the final 
sample, the number of companies for each chapter is as follows: Chapter 8 – 56 
companies, Chapter 9 – 133 companies and Chapter 10 – 197 companies. 
 
For each of the three chapters, the results of univariate and multivariate 
regressions are analysed. The ordinary least squares regressions include a set of 
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variables representing proxies for corporate governance, such as corporate 
governance index ‘CGScore’, ownership and executive compensation. 
In line with prior studies that examine the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and company performance, the following regression 
specifications are used: 
Corporate Governance index  = f (company performance variables, control variables) 
Ownership     = f (company performance variables, control variables) 
Performance    = f (corporate governance variables, control variables) 
 
The sections 7.7 to 7.9 describe the specifications of the common variables, 
and those variables specific to each of the Chapters 8, 9 and 10 are described in their 
respective chapters.  
 
7.3: Panel Data Analysis  
For the ordinary least squares  regression, the data set containing values of 
one or more variables of interest are collected for several companies, at the same 
point in time , (for example, Tobin‘s Q for 50 companies for a specific year). Time 
series data set contains observations on a single phenomenon observed over multiple 
time-periods, (for example, earnings per share for several quarters or years). As the 
number of time-periods involved is not very large, the data set is not quite suited to 
the econometric techniques appropriate to time series data.  
 
In this thesis, panel data, also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-
series data, is used. A panel data set consists of both time series and cross section 
data. Panel data analysis assumes that one is observing the same cross sectional 
relationship, for example, observing the same companies(n) at different points in 
time(t), that is, n times t observations (Wooldridge 2002, 143). This increases the 
efficiency of the estimators due to the increase in the number of observations. Panel 
data sets moderate the problem of multicollinearity as the explanatory variables vary 
in two dimensions. Panel data can be either balanced or unbalanced: a balanced 
panel data set contains an observation for every unit of observation in the time series 
and the unbalanced data set has missing observations. The most important 
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methodological advantage of using panel data analysis is that it relates to the 
concerns of bias resulting from omitted variables. In contrast to the cross-sectional or 
time series, panel data analysis allows controlling for unit fixed-effects. Most 
researchers believe that inclusion of fixed-effects in panel data analysis captures the 
systematic influences from omitted variables. Panel data typically take the form of a 
set of observations for different periods for the same set of subjects, for example, 
measures of performance for a group of companies for each year in the time-period 
observed. Treating the data as panel data allows controlling for variables that 
otherwise are difficult to observe or measure easily, for example, cultural factors, 
difference in governance practices across companies, and variables that change over 
time but not across entities, for example, national policies, international agreements. 
That is, it accounts for individual heterogeneity. The panel data facilitates 
minimising inherent problems in statistical inferences arising from endogeneity (see 
Larcker and Rusticus 2007, 208). 
 
7.4: Fixed-effects Explained 
The variation of the corporate governance data in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 
perhaps generates from intercompany variation in corporate governance from one 
company to another company or the intra-company, that is, variation within each 
company over time. Therefore, a single cross-section of data would offer only 
intercompany variation. The fixed effect coefficients absorb all the across company 
variants. The remaining is the within group variants, which is what is required, 
simultaneously waning the risk of omitted variable bias.  
 
Since fixed effect models rely on within company variables, repeated set of 
observations for each company is needed. A significant amount of variation of the 
explanatory variables within each company is used to analyse longitudinal data with 
repeated measures on both independent and dependent variables. The fixed effect 
models have the attractive feature of controlling for all stable characteristics of the 
companies, whether measured or not. This is accomplished by using only within 
company variation to estimate the regression coefficients. In general, there would be 
many unobserved company specific factors that influence the governance variables 
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in a company that are difficult to satisfactorily measure, such as managerial style and 
corporate strategy (Conyon 1997, 497). The use of the fixed-effects model will 
capture the differences that exist about the companies, or the management. 
Wooldridge explains that a fixed-effects model can be constructed using dummy 
variables. The fixed-effect coefficient absorb all the across group actions, and the 
remaining is the within group action, which is what is required and thereby reduce 
any threat of omitted variable bias. With fixed-effects, the R-squared will always 
increase as we are adding more variables (see, for example, Table 9.7). The major 
disadvantage of using fixed-effects is that we need to watch out for degrees of 
freedom as the higher number of variables will reduce the degrees of freedom and 
therefore may ‗mess up‘ the results because of a couple of reasons. First, the fixed 
effect will absorb so much of the variation in the data that the variable you want to 
investigate that there is not much of the variable left to explain. Second, sometimes 
the number of observations is not sufficient without eating up all the degrees of 
freedom. Therefore, there needs to be a trade-off on doing the right thing between 
what one considers the best way to model the data, and what the model can support, 
based on the number of observations available. Consequently, the result will be that 
the variables are not statistically significant.  
 
Since the sample is a cross-section of companies of varying sizes and from 
different industrial sectors, so there are likely to be time invariant unobserved 
differences between companies. This may account for some of the variation in 
corporate governance variables such as pay and ownership. The example provided 
by Gormley and Matsa (2013, 31) suggest that, in the analysis of executive 
compensation  there may be a concern about unobserved heterogeneity across 
managers‘ skills, risk appetite or personality (see Bertrand and Schoar 2003). 
Additionally, Gormley and Matsa (2013) also suggest that the unobserved 
heterogeneity across companies, such as culture, may correlate with the independent 
variables, for example, size, profitability and CEO age. Since the unobserved effects 
are likely to correlate with the explanatory variables and to allow for the unobserved 
heterogeneity, a fixed-effects regression is preferred over a random effects model. 
Many past studies use ‗first difference‘ approach to remove the fixed company 
effects (this method was not a preferred choice, as this would result in lost data). The 
 164 
 
inclusion of fixed-effects approach removes the unobserved heterogeneity across 
companies, and so concentrates on those variables that change over time. With the 
fixed-effects methodology, observations are transformed by subtracting the group 
mean and running the OLS on these transformed variables. One of the limitations is 
that the regressions may omit an important explanatory variable, which is, driving 
the results, and may be correlated with the governance or the company specific 
variables. I consider that fixed-effects regressions are important because the sample 
covers a range of different industries, which should be controlled for. However, 
using industry dummies will require either a large number of additional variables, 
thus reducing the power of the regression analysis, or only a small number of general 
industry categories. In either case, using fixed-effects regression is an effective way 
of controlling for industry characteristics. It is difficult to include all the relevant 
control variables in the regressions and hence estimating the ordinary least squares 
model may be fraught with unobservable factors that are correlated with the 
variables included in the regression. As Gormley and Matsa (2013) conclude, there is 
need to address unobserved heterogeneity in order to infer causal relations from the 
data analysed. They find that of the various methodologies available to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, the fixed-effects approach yields consistent estimates. 
These unobservable variables may be time invariant and, therefore, the regressions in 
Chapter 9 and 10 include fixed-effects. 
 
7.5: Endogeneity 
A further problem of using the regression method is that of endogeneity or 
reverse causality between the corporate governance and performance measures. Not 
only can corporate governance affect performance, but company performance can 
also cause the company to change its governance structures (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1988). Demsetz (1983, 384) argues that the ownership structure of a company that 
materialises is an endogenous effect of economical choice in which various costs are 
balanced to arrive at an equilibrium system in the firm. 
 
Some early researchers in finding a relationship between ownership and 
performance have ignored the endogeneity, however, others have explicitly allowed 
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for endogeneity in the quantitative studies on ownership structure and company 
performance, for example, (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Himmelberg et al. 1999; 
Weir et al. 2002; Bhagat and Jefferis 2005, 16). Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) treat ownership structure as exogenous. However, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) argue that the ownership structure is endogenously determined. In 
addition, Kole (1994) provides evidence of a reversed causality in the ownership and 
corporate value relationship. This suggests that the corporate value could be a 
determinant of the ownership structure rather than being determined by ownership 
structure. The empirical research has focused on determining the causal effect, if any 
of company characteristics on ownership and measure of company value, as 
dependent variables. If there is any causal relationship, that is, by coincidence, for 
example, the cause of higher performance is because companies have higher 
ownership by management. However, many studies have not controlled for 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables due to unobserved company heterogeneity. 
 
A source of endogeneity could arise because of differences in unobserved 
growth opportunities, where companies may need to raise external finance for 
expansion and, therefore, find it optimal to improve their governance mechanism. 
Therefore, if company performance is higher for companies with good opportunities, 
this in turn could be the cause of endogeneity of governance in the regressions 
(Klapper and Love 2004, 712). Theory shows as a governance mechanism that 
institutional ownership reduces agency costs, such as shirking by management. This 
becomes a problem if ownership is dependent on the performance and the 
institutional owners invest in companies with higher performance. This is causation 
in one direction. However, why should the institutional owners invest more in one 
company over the other if they have similar performance? If this is so then we have 
reverse causation. 
 
The use of instrumental variables is becoming increasingly common method 
for researchers to deal with econometric problems related to endogeneity that 
confound the interpretation of coefficient estimates in corporate governance 
research. I found that the studies that used instrumental variables were not clear as to 
the reasons for using these exogenous variables, that is, uncorrelated with the error 
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term in the models (Gompers et al. 2003; Durnev and Kim 2005). Black et al. (2006, 
369) criticise Durnev and Kim (2005)‘s use of instrumental variables as suspect. 
Hence, Black et al. (2006, 368) use an exogenous variation using Korean legal rules 
for asset size as a reliable instrument for governance to address causality issues, but 
this unusual local rule does not apply to the UK. Himmelberg et al. (1999, 379) 
suggest the use of company size and stock price volatility as instruments. 
 
Garay and González (2008) use a single equation model with lagged 
dependent variables as instruments to deal with the complexity of endogeneity. Other 
researchers, for example, Ozkan (2011, 271) minimise the potential endogeneity 
problems in executive compensation regression models by using lagged explanatory 
variables . The argument is that although current values of performance 
measurements might be endogenous to the ownership structure, it is unlikely that 
past values of performance are subject to the same problem. 
 
The above section shows that different researchers adopt different techniques 
to solve the problem of endogeneity; for example, simultaneous equations, two-stage 
least squares (2SLS), instrumental variable or lagged endogenous variables. Other 
researchers use the ‘differences-in-difference methodology’ to account for 
endogeneity issues (Bereskin and Cicero 2013, 481). In addition, using lagged values 
for the explanatory variables could reduce the potential endogeneity issues. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the contemporaneous data for both the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable were preferred over the lagged data for two reasons. 
First, using lagged values will cause a reduction in the number of observations. 
Second, in this study due to the nature of the AIM companies, finding continuous 
data for many companies for more than 3 years was difficult and therefore, using of 
contemporaneous dependent and independent variables is appropriate for this study. 
Luo and Jackson (2012) make the same assumption for a sample of Chinese 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 2001 
to 2009.  
 
Endogeneity, principally omitted variable bias, is a major concern. In this 
study, endogeneity is addressed by using panel data with fixed-effects, in Chapters 9 
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and 10. Sensitivity to specification is important and, therefore, addresses this by 
using different proxies for the dependent variable. 
 
7.6: Problems with Outliers 
The two common methods available to deal with outliers are ‗trimming‘ and 
‗winsorising‘. The trimming method means that we cut off a certain number of 
values at each end of the variable, whereby we simply omit the extreme 
observations. Due to the small sample size, it was felt that winsorising was more 
appropriate. In a winsorised sample, the extreme observations are replaced with the 
highest (and lowest) value. Therefore, to deal with extreme values in the variables 
for corporate governance, financial performance and in the control variables were 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels, (for example, Coles et al. 2006, 440). For 
example, in a sample, size of 1,000 company years values the top and bottom 10 
values for each variable were replaced with the 11th and 989th values, respectively. 
Specifically, in Chapter 10 variables are winsorised for the top and bottom 1% 
values using the EVIEWS7. Hence, in these two chapters the discussion of the 
results will be after winsorisation of the variables. 
 
7.7: Heteroskedasticity 
The empirical study consists of a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. The fixed-effects are included to control for differences across the 
companies in both observable and unobservable predictor and thereby reduce the 
effects of potential omitted variable bias. As the sample includes multi-year 
observations, there is likely to be induced heteroskedasticity. In view of the potential 
existence of heteroskedasticity, the OLS regressions use the correction techniques 
for unknown heteroskedasticity and the standard errors are constructed using White 
(1980)‘s adjustment for standard errors. Hence, the t-statistics computed from 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are heteroskedasticity –robust t-statistics. 
The method of adjusting for the standard errors and test statistics is now an accepted 
method even when heteroskedasticity is suspect. This method is now popular in 
estimating the coefficients using OLS (Wooldridge 2002, 56). As EVIEWS7 
provides the WHITE option in the regression programs, this will be used. Chapter 8 
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compares the output of the OLS with and without the WHITE option to check for 
any problems associated with heteroskedasticity for the set of data collected. 
The variables fall under three main groups: corporate governance, 
performance variables and control variables. The next section describes the variables 
for the analysis. 
 
7.8: Corporate Governance Variables 
A number of corporate governance measures are used to gauge the severity of 
the company‘s agency costs. These include a manually constructed index of 
corporate governance attributes, ownership concentration (insider and institutional), 
remuneration of the top management and board structure (such as size and 
independence). 
 
Ownership 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Cui and Mak (2002, 320) use average 
managerial ownership measured as the ratio of total managerial ownership to the 
number of these shareholders. As in some studies, I do not analyse the separate 
effects of cash flows and voting rights, since in UK equity ownership is a suitable 
variable to proxy control because of its strong association with voting rights. Hence, 
in a listed UK company, ownership of ordinary shares and voting control can be 
regarded as been equal (Cheffins et al. 2013). The source for all ownership data is 
S&P Capital IQ for the years 2008 to 2010. Managerial ownership is a measure of 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the directors. This definition of managerial 
ownership is similar to that used by Morck et al. (1988); Short and Keasey (1999) 
and they define managerial ownership as ownership by members of the board of 
directors. However, McConnell and Servaes (1990) define managerial ownership to 
include corporate officers and members of the board of directors. The definition by 
McConnell and Servaes is not applicable to the UK due to disclosure regulations for 
ownership data for managers is only available for members on the board.  
 
The ownership data was obtained from S&P Capital IQ for the end of each 
calendar year. The ownership data available was for executive directors, institutional 
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shareholders and significant non board members. The substantial non board 
members were not used in the study, as only a small number of companies were 
available with this information. Extant studies have typically used the aggregated 
shares held by several largest investors, commonly the largest shareholder, top five , 
ten or twenty shareholders or the Herfindahl index (see Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
 
For the AIM samples, in the regression equations, the various ownership data 
includes that of the CEO shareholdings, managerial shareholdings, the institutional 
shareholdings, the shares owned by the largest shareholder and the cumulative shares 
of the top five shareholders. Studies such as Gillan and Starks (2007); Erkens et al. 
(2012) suggest that institutional shareholders and the largest shareholders provide 
important disciplining and monitoring roles.  
 
Listage 
For the AIM, a company‘s age (listage) is a measure of the number of years 
since its initial public offering. Listage as a determinant of ownership shareholdings 
suggests that ownership concentration declines over the maturation of the company. 
Evidence suggests that listage is negatively correlated with ownership concentration 
for US companies (Holderness et al. 1999; Helwege et al. 2007; Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz 2009) and for UK companies (Franks et al. 2009). The company listage 
measure used is natural logarithm of number of years the company has listed on the 
AIM. The reasons for decrease in ownership holdings over time is because founders 
sell their shareholding over time to cash out of the business, issuing more equity for 
further finance or acquisition and hence diluting ownership of existing shareholders. 
 
Duality (DUMMYCEO) 
The UK‘s framework regards duality in the combined roles of the CEO and 
the Chair held by a single individual as undesirable because it could give one person 
too much power over board decisions. Guided by the UK Corporate Governance, the 
recommendation is to have separate individual head up the roles of the CEO and 
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chairman, to avoid too much power in a single person, therefore, if the roles are held 
by separate individual the code is one otherwise zero. 
 
  
 171 
 
7.9: Company Performance Variables 
Tobin’s Q  
Tobin‘s Q (TQ) is a standard variable used as a measure of company 
performance in corporate governance mechanisms studies, often used as the 
dependent variable. Other things equal, if governance affects company‘s market 
value, this should be reflected in TQ, (for example, Morck et al. 1988; Mehran 1995; 
Anderson and Reeb 2003; Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2011; Ozkan 2011). 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981, cited in Chung and Pruitt, 1994), calculate TQ 
using a complex formula (see Equation 7.1) as follows: 
 
NETCAP  BKCAP - TOTALASST
ADJ  STEDEBT LTDEBT VCOMS  PREFST
  TQ(LR)
+
++++
=    (7.1) 
 
PREFST refers to the liquidating value of the company‘s preferred stock. 
VCOMS refers to the price of the company‘s common stock multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding at December 31. LTDEBT is the value of long-term 
debt adjusted for its age structure. STDEBT is the book value of non-current 
liabilities. ADJ is value of the net short-term assets. TOTALASST is the book value 
of the total assets. BKCAP is the book value of the firm‘s net capital stock and 
NETCAP is the inflation adjusted net capital stock. 
 
According to Chung and Pruitt (1994, 70), (CP),the calculation for TQ, as 
provided by Lindenberg and Ross (1981, 10-16) is computationally complex and the 
data costly to obtain. The Lindenberg and Ross measure requires separate calculation 
for the market value and replacement costs
60
. Chung and Pruitt (1994, 71) define TQ 
as the follows:  
TA
DEBT)/TA+PS+(MKCAP
=TQ        (7.2) 
                                                 
60 
Lindenberg and Ross define replacement cost is the dollar outlay needed to purchase the current 
‗productive capacity of the firm at minimum cost and with the most modern technologies available. 
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CP define MKCAP as the product of share price and number of shares 
outstanding; PS as the liquidating value of the preferred stock; DEBT as the sum of 
book value of short and long term debt and TA as the book value of the total assets. 
The definition of TQ by CP differs from LR, in assuming that the replacement value 
of company‘s plant, equipment and inventories are equal to the book value.  
 
The definition of TQ used in the three empirical chapters is the sum of the 
market value of equity (product of closing stock price and common shares 
outstanding) and the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
divided by the book value of total assets. This definition approximates TQ, as the 
replacement value of assets is difficult to obtain for the AIM companies.  
 
As is commonly shown in corporate governance studies, the TQ significantly 
skews to the right with some companies having extremely high values, which could 
significantly influence the interpretation of the results. Hence, the outliers were 
removed with TQ greater than 13. One of the reasons is that some AIM companies 
had extremely high values, which would significantly influence results for empirical 
analysis without representing the common patterns. This follows other studies such 
as Klapper and Love (2004, 708) who exclude companies with TQ greater than ten. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990, p.600) use a tighter definition for outliers and delete 
companies with TQ greater than six. To maintain consistency with the other 
variables, TQ was further winsorised at 1% and 99% (see section 7.6). 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
In contrast to TQ, ROA is a historical measure, therefore, backward looking 
and does not reflect the future impact of management decision making. ROA 
measure also suffers due to manipulation, because of creative accounting by the 
managers. In addition, the managers may follow short- termism behaviour, which 
may adversely affect the long-term shareholder value. But ROA (or other accounting 
indicators such as EPS, EBIT) has an advantage over share price indicators in that 
they are not subject to the unexpected shocks of the stock market performance. Share 
price is a noisy variable and therefore, subject to greater variability due to the 
unexpected events in the stock market. 
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Comparing Tobin’s Q and ROA 
The majority of the studies on corporate governance have used TQ rather 
than accounting profit measures. ROA (ROE is used in some studies instead of or as 
well as ROA) measures profitability and efficiency, while TQ captures market 
expectations about future earnings. The two performance ratios, TQ and ROA, differ 
in their time orientation since the accounting profit ratios are backward looking, that 
is, using historical data compared to the TQ, which is considered as forward-looking. 
The accounting profit ratios are a measure of what management has accomplished, 
whereas TQ is an estimate of what management will accomplish. The advantage of 
using TQ is that it is a forward-looking measure and considers what the investors 
anticipate of the future and therefore does not reflect what the managers have 
currently achieved, but takes the view of what is likely to be achievable in the future. 
It considers that financial markets are efficient and that the company‘s market value 
is an unprejudiced estimate of the present value of its cash flows (Lang and Stulz 
1994, 1253) . TQ and ROA may be strongly correlated, but both measure different 
aspects of performance; TQ as a measure of market valuation of the company and 
ROA as a measure of operating performance (Klapper and Love 2004). 
 
Because agency theory does not categorise the precise procedures for 
measuring the relevant accounting and market performance variables, hence 
according to the extant literature the performance measures selected are TQ and 
ROA. Furthermore, TQ, ROA and stock return as measures for company 
performance are highly correlated (Landsman and Shapiro 1995) and ,therefore, this 
should not affect the empirical results. The denominator in the definitions of both 
ROA and TQ includes the book value of total assets and not the replacement costs as 
per the theoretical definition of TQ. This suggests that ROA and TQ will have a 
strong correlation. This is not an issue as both TQ and ROA, as performance 
variables, are used in separate equations. Since stock return is not used, this will 
avoid the complications of high price volatility and low liquidity as described as 
present in thin markets and it could be argued in this sample of study that the share 
price does not always reflect the true market value of each company. 
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Other measures of performance 
The Market-to-Book (MBV) ratio definition is the market value of a 
company's equity divided by the book value of equity. Short and Keasey (1999, 89) 
call this ‗valuation ratio‘ and substitute this ratio for TQ as measure of company 
performance. Wintoki et al. (2007) define TQ as market to book ratio. They suggest 
that TQ is a proxy for growth and there is strong theoretical basis to assume that 
growth opportunities are a cause, rather than a consequence, of governance 
structures. Therefore, they use market to book ratio as a control variable. Due to the 
skewness of the TQ and MBV, some authors use the log form of these variables. 
 
The other common measure used is stock return as a measure of company 
performance (Jensen  and Murphy 1990b). Other measures of company performance 
used in prior studies on corporate governance are net income, earnings per share, 
return on equity and return on assets as accounting measures of performance. 
Fogelberg and Griffith (2000) use economic value added for a sample of bank 
holding companies and find a curvilinear relationship between management 
ownership and company performance. 
 
7.10: Control Variables 
Company Size 
The literature shows various measures for company size. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) suggest that ownership is a function of company size, and hence they use the 
average market value of common equity (p.1164). An equity-based measure 
suggests, that for a large company, reflects higher investment by the owner, for a 
given proportion of equity. Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990) use 
the logarithm of replacement cost of assets as their measure of company size. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999, p.364) uses logarithm of company sales and its square as a 
measure of size. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Drakos and Bekiris (2010) use the 
natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of the company. Durnev and 
Kim (2005) prefer to use sales, as sales have a low influence from earnings 
manipulation and accounting rules. Farag et al. (2014, 7) use the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization as a proxy for firm size. Gabaix et al. (2014) use different 
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proxies for firm size, namely total firm value, earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT), sales and equity value. 
 
For this study, the natural logarithm of total assets, LOG (TA), is preferred 
over the absolute value to avoid heteroskedasticity and spurious correlation. The 
company size, LOG (TA), is expected to produce a positive indication with corporate 
governance variable or company performance as dependent variables. The weakness 
of using an accounting measure of company size is that it omits unrecognised assets 
such as many intangibles – such assets may be particularly important for some AIM 
companies. 
 
Leverage (Debt)  
 Leverage (DEBT) is defined as the total liability (sum of current and non-
current liability) over total assets (Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Farag et al. 2014). Debt 
is defined to include short-term debt and long-term debt, since it is observed that 
some of the companies do not have long-term debt but all have short-term debt. Due 
to high financial risk associated with high debt ratio, the CEO ought to receive 
higher pay to take on additional risk. Literature suggests that debt can act as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism by minimising the managerial agency 
costs of free cash flow. Other researchers have used debt as a ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets (Bebchuk et al. 2011), but this study uses the sum of current and non-
current liability to calculate debt as due to the size of the companies, there were 
companies with nil non-current liability. Debt was included in order to monitor the 
likelihood that debt holders strongly influence the management of companies (Short 
and Keasey 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). Debt is included to control for a 
number of factors. First, high levels of debt can help increase the size of the 
company, thus help to overcome owners‘ wealth constraints (Stulz 1988). Second, 
high debt levels could constrain the managerial discretion due to the obligation to 
pay out future cash flows (Grossman and Hart 1982) and reduce the possibility of 
extracting perquisites by managers in control, thus reducing conflict between 
managers and shareholders.  
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Market capitalisation (MKVAL) 
Market capitalisation (MKVAL) is a measure of the product of the number of 
outstanding shares and the market price as a variable is used as a measure of 
company size. The logarithm of market capitalisation is used as an alternative 
measure for company size (see Farag et al. 2014). 
 
Volatility (VOL) 
The exogenous variable for standard deviation, VOL, has been used by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Loderer and Martin (1997); Holderness (2009). VOL 
satisfies the intuition that higher volatility creates stronger incentives for outsiders to 
take over managerial responsibilities. Therefore, managerial ownership should be 
positively related to volatility. The volatility is measured as the standard deviation of 
monthly return on a company‘s stock for each year. The variables VOL and its 
variance, VOL, squared have been used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Loderer and 
Martin (1997) as control variables. According to Demsetz and Lehn, the two 
variables are proxies for ‗control potential‘ and higher share price volatility makes it 
harder for small shareholders to monitor managers. Therefore, unmonitored 
managers may be unrestrained and exhibit self-serving behaviour, thereby cause a 
decrease in the share prices. The lower share prices will be attractive for outsiders to 
purchase shares in the company. If the outside investors have accumulated sufficient 
shares, they are able to monitor managers, and prevent expropriation by the 
managers. This suggests that the higher the volatility, the larger the holding of 
outside ownerships. Demsetz and Lehn contend that this relationship is concave. As 
a result, managerial ownership (even outside block holdings) should be positive for 
volatility. If the relationship is concave, the variance should be negative. 
 
Capital expenditure (PPE/S) 
I control for capital expenditure in the regressions. This is measured as 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. As long as investments in 
fixed assets are observable and, therefore, more easily monitored, companies with 
higher investment in fixed assets will have a lower level of managerial ownership. 
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Cash Holdings (CASH/TA) 
According to Jensen (1986), the higher the company‘s free cash flow, the 
higher is the desired level of managerial ownership. Free cash flow measured as 
operating cash flow less capital expenditure is an important measure that represents 
the amount of cash required for the company to expand and pursue its objective to 
enhance shareholder. Due to the variability between both operating cash flow and 
capital expenditure for the AIM companies, the use of cash and cash equivalent can 
be a proxy for cash. For this study, the variable cash is a measure of the cash and 
cash equivalent divided by total assets. The cash holdings, CASH/TA, (see Bigelli 
and Sánchez-Vidal 2012, 29), is considered as the liquidity necessary to support the 
working capital needs of the company. The cash and cash equivalents is easily 
available from the cash flow statement. 
 
7.11: Data and Sources 
The corporate annual report and their websites are the main medium of 
disclosing corporate governance in UK. There are several advantages of using annual 
reports for information on the corporate governance disclosure and financial data as 
the reports are publicly available on a regular basis, required by legislation and 
produced by all companies, thus making comparisons quite easy. In addition, other 
authors have relied on the annual reports because of the greater credibility associated 
with information disclosure and stakeholders use the reports as a source of 
information (Deegan and Rankin 1997). The corporate governance report is 
generally available after the Directors‘ report. Its content varies, but it includes an 
introduction, comment on the board of directors, board committees, internal control, 
going concern, shareholder relations and directors‘ compensation report. In this 
study, the data can be categorised into two main areas: governance measures and 
financial data. The sample in each chapter is drawn from companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) Alternative Investment Market (AIM), comprising of 
non-financial companies. The official list of all the companies listed on the AIM is 
available from the LSE website. Similarly to other researchers, the companies in the 
sample exclude financial companies, real estate and investment trusts (see Farmer et 
al. 2013, 91). The source of company specific data includes the annual reports, 
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DataStream and S&P Capital IQ. The annual reports were downloadable in 
electronic formats from the company‘s website, Google or Northcote. 
 
The sample data sets for each of the three chapters are separate, and this 
reflects the different research question(s) for each chapter (see Chapter 1), and the 
difficulty in obtaining the data and hence the small sample size compared to other 
governance studies.  
 
Specific to Chapters 9 and 10, the data for ownership, compensation and 
company financial information are obtained from S&P Capital IQ and a sample 
manually checked using the company‘s annual reports. Prior to rejecting any 
company from the sample, the annual reports are checked for any missing data. Data 
relating to a sample of companies were manually checked, using the companies‘ 
annual reports to crosscheck the figures from the S&P Capital IQ. The annual reports 
were searched using the key words relevant to each chapter. To maximise the sample 
size, where the data was missing from S&P IQ Capital, the annual reports were used 
to supply the missing data. Despite the change in the rules for the AIM companies to 
maintain a corporate website (s26 AIM Rules for Companies, 2014)
61
  there were 
some companies that did not have an electronic copy of their annual reports and 
hence were not included in the sample. On hindsight, this would have made 
interesting information to analyse as to the number of companies that did not 
maintain their corporate websites with appropriate information as a transparency 
measure. However, the researcher did not maintain a detailed log of the number of 
companies that did not have annual reports on their websites. 
 
7.12: Financial Crisis 
This section provides some evidence as to why corporate governance is 
related to company performance during the financial crisis, since the selection of the 
                                                 
61
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisers/aim/advisers/aim-
notices/aimrulescompaniesmay2014.pdf. This is the latest AIM RULES, prior version were in 2007, 
2010 
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sample falls within the 2008-2009 financial crisis. While corporate governance may 
not be root cause of the economic crisis, but it is not blameless(Conyon et al. 2011a). 
As per Erkens et al. (2012), the beginning of the financial crisis period is 2007. For 
this thesis, the studies on AIM coincide with the financial crisis period of 2007-2008 
and assume that all financial and non-financial companies are affected. 
 
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) using paired US financial firms find  that 
board tenure is negatively related to subprime lending adding that younger boards 
may be too inexperienced to be effective. Busy boards may form ineffective boards 
for overseeing risky strategic initiatives and that board gender diversity negatively 
influences the decision to focus on subprime lending. Grove et al. (2011) examine 
236 US banks prior to and during the crisis. They use 11 different firm level 
governance factors and find only a few were significant and in the predicted 
direction. For example, they find a positive association between the level of block 
ownership and ROA, a negative association between CEO duality i.e. combination of 
the role of the CEO and the Chairman, and performance. Consistent with agency 
theory, their findings confirm that CEO duality indicates a weakness. They challenge 
that single corporate governance attributes may be found significantly associated 
with performance but, when studied as elements of a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance attributes, they are marginally significant. In agency theory framework, 
some insider-related mechanisms such as insider representation, CEO duality and 
affiliated committees may be ineffective at mitigating agency conflicts for banks. 
This can be explained using Donaldson and Davis (1994) explanation on stewardship 
theory as the roles of the insider representation and CEO duality may not be 
monitoring but seen as empowering governance structures. 
 
7.13: Corporate Governance Disclosure and Company 
Performance 
The research in Chapter 8 uses corporate governance mechanism themes, as 
key elements of good corporate governance, such as board committees, board 
independence, board transparency, board power and remuneration  disclosures, to 
construct a ‗Corporate Governance Score‘ (‗CGScore‘)and to examine its 
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relationship with company performance and other company characteristics. The 
extant literature does not provide a systemic way of establishing the relative 
importance of various governance mechanisms and hence how to select a meaningful 
set of weights. In addition, the number of items selected may be very large and, 
therefore, time consuming to create an index manually. Hence, a simple yes or no 
allows the construction of the CGScore. All variables have a binary coding where I 
use one if the answer is ‗yes‘ or zero if the answer is ‗no‘. The final sample of 
companies‘ selection was on the basis if they had publicly available information. The 
study uses a small sample size of over 50 companies listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market for the two-year period 2008 and 2009. As the construction of 
corporate governance index required the use of manually extracted information from 
companies‘ annual reports, only a small sample set was feasible.  
 
The CGScore index is a measure of disclosure, as it is not possible to infer, 
from the presence or absence of a particular corporate governance practice, that 
governance in a given company is or is not effective. The study of disclosure is 
important as companies listing on the stock market besides having access to the 
finance have an incentive to disclose all available information to obtain higher prices 
as non disclosure may cause investors to assume the worst.  
 
For the financial years 2007 to 2009, financial data were collected from the 
companies‘ annual reports. The first year, 2007, was necessary in order to collect 
data for lagged variables. All financial data are reported in sterling pound, and any 
reports using a non-UK currency were converted to the sterling pound using 
conversion rates available at the date of the company‘s year-end. The final sample 
consists of 56 companies in 2008 and 53 companies in 2009. 
 
7.14: Managerial ownership and Company Performance  
The research in Chapter 9 examines the relationship between ownership and 
company performance in AIM companies using two themes. First, focus on the 
determinants of ownership structure and following the theme that governance issues 
arise from the separation of ownership and control, the managerial ownership of 
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equity shareholdings is a mechanism that aligns the interests of the principal with 
those of the agents. The empirical discussion is as follows: first, for the determinants 
of ownership structure, the general hypothesis examined here is that there is a linear 
relationship between the equity ownership and company performance. Different 
measures of ownership concentration are regressed on identical sets of explanatory 
variables. Second, as per Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the profit potential from owning 
shares is correlated with the instability in the company‘s environment and the 
relationship is non-linear. In accordance with Demsetz and Lehn, volatility is used as 
a measure of instability, and the square term of volatility is used to allow for non-
linear relationship between the ownership and volatility.  
 
The second major focus of Chapter 9 is to examine whether the company 
performance has linear or non-linear relationship to the director ownership 
shareholdings. The analysis follows the Short and Keasey (1999, 86) and tests for 
linear and cubic relationship between the company performance and managerial 
ownership. Three different forms of managerial ownership are used in the regression 
analysis. These are percentage of shares owned by directors, its square form and the 
cubic form. This avoids using arbitrary levels of ownership as per prior literature 
such as (Morck et al. 1988). The other ownership variable used is the institutional 
ownership holdings, largest shareholder and the largest five.  
 
This chapter includes a test for a non-linear relationship with the largest 
shareholder ownership and the largest shareholder ownership squared. Ordinary least 
squares regressions estimates on three alternative measures of company 
performance, TQ, ROA and MBV. In all the regressions, control variables include 
company size, debt, cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets,  property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets, dummyceo, listage of the company on 
the AIM and director independence. 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) use pooled observations for their sample companies across several periods. 
This assumes that the impact of management shareholdings is stable over time. 
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However, this is unlikely in practice, and hence using panel data analysis should 
allow for observing any changes over time. Using panel data also makes it easier to 
control for unobservable intercompany-differences hence may be more appropriate 
for the study of the relationship between ownership and company performance. 
 
The final sample consists of 133 companies for the period 2008 to 2010. The 
sample selection includes a maximum of three largest companies by the market 
capitalisation from each industrial sector. In some sectors due to missing data, one or 
two companies were possible to be included. The resulting sample consists of a 
broad cross section of companies of different sizes. This sample should enable to 
determine the extent to which ownership has an impact on company performance for 
a broad range of industries, unlike other studies on large companies, which have 
focused on specific industries. 
 
7.15: Remuneration and Company Performance  
The research question in Chapter 10 is to examine the relationship between 
the link between managerial remuneration and company performance. As discussed 
above the ordinary least squares with company fixed-effects are the preferred 
method for the empirical research. The dependent variable, executive remuneration, 
is measured as CEO pay, highest paid director, total remuneration of the board and 
the ratio of CEO pay to total directors‘ remuneration including that of the CEO. As 
before, the measures of the company performance are included from prior literature 
as TQ, ROA and market to book value (MBV). In all the regressions, it is necessary 
to control for other factors that may affect company performance and remuneration. 
These control variables include company size; debt; property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets; DUMMYCEO; board size; and a founder receiving 
remuneration who is a member of the board. 
 
Criteria for sample selection 
The inclusion of an AIM company within the sample were subject to a few 
criteria such as availability of published annual reports for the period 2008 to 2010 
(and 2007 for lagged TQ and ROA), the corresponding financial information must be 
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available for all the three years. All monetary data to be in Great British pound 
(GBP), and any foreign currencies converted to GBP using the year-end conversion 
rates provided by S&P IQ Capital. A balanced panel data for analysis is preferred to 
for analysis spanning several consecutive years of data, (for an explanation of the use 
of balanced data see section 7.3), however some data were lost and hence a balanced 
data set was not possible. 
 
The requirement of a minimum of three consecutive years of data on each 
AIM company potentially may introduce a survivorship bias in the sample selection 
because poorly performing companies are more likely to cease to exist or are 
acquired by other companies. Due to the potential bias, the results may lean towards 
finding a positive relation between corporate governance variable and company 
performance. This study uses panel dataset in both Chapters 9 and 10 over a three-
year period, as this would make it possible to ascertain whether the observed cross 
sectional and time series properties of the corporate governance variables and its 
association with company performance also hold over time. 
 
The objective of Chapter 10 is to analyse the relationship between 
management remuneration, company performance and ownership shareholdings. 
This study offers a significant contribution to the existing literature in the following 
ways: first, it focuses on publicly held smaller growth companies. Most of the prior 
research has focused on CEO remuneration based on larger listed organisations. 
Comparing previous research with the results from this research, will ascertain if 
studies on larger companies can be generalised to smaller organisations. Second, the 
data uses different forms of remuneration such as salary, bonuses, directors‘ fees, 
other remuneration and options. Third, since the companies are young, the presence 
of the founder may have a positive impact on the level of the remuneration. Fourth, 
the regressions assess the influence of company specific characteristics as well as 
governance characteristics. 
 
The focus of the chapter is on the relationship between the performance of 
the company and CEO remuneration. However, the executive remuneration in the 
form of highest paid director (HPD), total pay of all the directors on board (PAYT) 
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and the ratio of CEO remuneration over total directors‘ remuneration are also tested. 
Two proxies used for company performance are Tobin‘s Q (TQ) and return on asset 
(ROA). For robustness, the market to book value is tested. While other studies have 
used average or lagged values, to reduce endogeneity issues. TQ and ROA may be 
considered to be substitutes for each other, due to the same denominator used in 
calculating both variables, however, both measures represent a different type of 
performance as discussed in section 7.5. 
 
In addition to the performance, other company specific factors that could 
affect CEO remuneration are tested. These are company size, cash and cash 
equivalent over total assets, property plant and equipment scaled by total assets, 
leverage. Share ownership by CEO, director ownership and institutional ownership 
may influence CEO remuneration. Other governance variables used were board size, 
CEO/Chair duality and founder. Other studies have used characteristics specific to a 
CEO such as age, education, gender and ethnicity. Due to lack of consistency in 
obtaining the data and poor disclosure in the annual reports, the CEO attributes were 
not used in the analysis. 
 
In this chapter, a sample of 197 AIM companies over the period 2008-2010 is 
used. As a starting point, the sample is constructed by determining the ownership 
data available for the period 2006 to 2010 - from a list of 627 companies provided to 
S&P Capital IQ, who then provided remuneration data for 615 companies. From this 
list, a large number of companies were deleted for the following reasons: lack of data 
on CEO remuneration and director remuneration over the period 2008 to 2010; lack 
of data for the computation of TQ value, debt, cash and cash equivalent; property, 
plant and equipment and negative shareholders‘ equity. 
 
The main reason for limiting the selection of companies on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) to the period post 1 January 2007 is that they are required 
to produce year-end consolidated and interim financial statements in accordance with 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). IFRS was rolled out in 
January 2007 for those companies listed on the AIM. The decision not to go back 
 185 
 
beyond these years is to ensure that the AIM companies are all reporting using the 
same International Financial Reporting Standards and, therefore, obtain consistency 
in the reporting of financial data . In this study, a sample of LSE AIM 
companies existing over the period 2008-2010 is used. The data source for 
compilation of sample is the LSE list of AIM companies. S&P CAPITAL IQ and 
annual reports of the companies is used to obtain the details related to remuneration, 
ownership and financial data. 
 
7.16: Conclusion 
The discussion presented in this chapter provides a guide to the methodology, 
reasons for using panel data, fixed-effects, problems with outliers, and endogeneity 
issue. It then discusses the variables used for corporate governance, company 
performance and control variables. It gives a brief discussion of the data and sample 
and a synopsis of each of the three empirical chapters. The final part of the thesis 
involves three empirical investigations of corporate governance measure and its 
impact on company performance. A review of the related literature is contained 
within each empirical chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SCORE 
8.1: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to increase the understanding of corporate 
governance characteristics such as board structure, director independence, 
transparency and remuneration on the variation of the voluntary disclosure regarding 
corporate governance practices for the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
companies. This chapter examines the relationship between the quality of a 
company‘s corporate governance practices, measured as an overall corporate 
governance score (CGScore), company performance and ownership holdings of a 
sample of the AIM companies in 2008 and 2009. The sample contains 56companies 
randomly selected from all AIM companies. However, 53 of these companies are 
included in 2009. The annual reports for these three companies were not available as 
these companies delisted from AIM in the second year. The information available in 
the annual reports of the companies in the sample enables the construction of the 
corporate governance score.  
 
The chapter first provides evidence on the extent and nature of disclosure in 
AIM companies‘ annual reports, in respect of information on board committees, 
board independence, board transparency, board power and executives remuneration 
to develop an overall governance index. Second, more substantial objective of the 
study is to test the hypothesis about the key determinants that influence the corporate 
governance score, that is, does overall corporate governance disclosure result from 
higher company performance or, is it that the individual attributes that have an 
impact on company performance. 
 
This chapter involves a manual construction of corporate governance 
disclosure index using some of the key recommendations from the Combined Code 
2008 (revised UK‘s Corporate Governance Code 2012, see Chapter 4). The 
regression results of this chapter, using a sample of 56 companies, first shows that 
although there is a positive relationship between corporate governance attributes 
measured by the corporate governance score (CGScore) and company performance, 
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but is not statistically significant. Secondly, there is a non-linear relationship 
between CGScore and director ownership and the largest shareholder. However, the 
non-linearity is not shown when using institutional share ownership and the 
relationship is not significant. Intuitively, it could be argued that institutional share 
ownership could lead to higher corporate governance practices. Thirdly, using 
company performance as the dependent variable the coefficient is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. 
 
This chapter contributes to other studies that use company level corporate 
governance indices to examine the relationship between overall corporate 
governance and company performance, specifically where a second tier stock 
exchange is available. The quality of a company‘s governance is dependent on 
several factors such as board structure, remuneration structure and ownership 
structure. A common practice in prior research is the use of a corporate governance 
index as there is evidence that a broad measure of company level corporate 
governance predicts higher share prices  (Black 2001; Klapper and Love 2004; 
Garay and González 2008).  
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: sections 8.2 to 8.4 describe 
disclosure of voluntary information and the ‗content analysis‘ as a research method. 
Then section 8.5 reviews the literature on the relationship, at the company level, 
between corporate governance and performance. Sections 8.6 to 8.8 describe the 
sample, variables, the construction of the corporate governance score and the 
hypothesis. Section 8.9 discusses the OLS results. Section 8.10 discusses the 
robustness. Section 8.11 concludes. The rest of the chapter include the research 
limitations and further research. 
 
8.2: What is Disclosure? 
Disclosure can be either mandatory or voluntary. For example, disclosure of 
useful information by managers to users is by means of the mandatory interim and 
the annual reports of the company. In addition, companies also provide additional or 
voluntary disclosure, and this includes management‘s forecasts, presentations and 
press releases of material issues (Healy and Palepu 2001, 406). Why do users need 
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disclosure of both financial and non-financial information? There is consensus that 
where there is the separation of control and ownership (Berle and Means 1932) 
shareholders require timely information. Since, the shareholders delegate the task of 
running the companies to managers, and the former are reluctant to participate 
actively in the companies where they hold shares. The managers who are self 
interested will create agency costs by acquiring perquisites, pay exorbitant 
remuneration to themselves and engage in empire building by making decisions on 
activities that may be harmful to the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
two main concepts that introduce agency costs are information asymmetry and the 
inherent conflicts between the managers and the shareholders. 
 
The corporate governance mechanisms that have been extensively studied 
include internal to the company are the board and the equity ownership structure (see 
Denis and McConnell 2003). The board‘s responsibility is to monitor and discipline 
the management. The external mechanism, the market for corporate control, 
including the threat of hostile takeovers and proxy contests will mitigate agency 
problems.  
 
8.3: To Voluntarily Disclose Information or Not 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest voluntary disclosure as the additional 
information released to the market, directly as a result of the managements‘ insider 
knowledge of the company, but often not required for publication in the regulated 
reports. Gray et al. (2001, 351) refer to voluntary disclosure, as been both 
disclosures in mandatory and non- mandatory areas. The former includes that 
required by law or codes of best practice, and the latter refers to disclosure beyond 
what is legally required. 
 
The use of narratives within annual reports provides the opportunity to 
explore corporate governance reporting. Why would the companies report if there 
were no legal requirements to do so? Voluntary disclosure is a device that has 
moderating effect due to information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. 
One of the reasons to determine the level of governance information is because it 
brings benefits to the company in terms of the bottom line and reduces uncertainty 
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relating to the board. In particular, for the AIM companies, higher disclosure of 
governance information enables companies legitimately to exhibit greater 
transparency and credibility with the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Consequently, may reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour and information 
asymmetry. Adoption of internal control mechanisms such as; board committees, 
non-executive directors, separation of the roles of the chair and the chief executive 
officer, may enhance monitoring quality in strategic decision-making activities. 
Further, companies may disclose corporate governance recommendations to appear 
legitimate for both social issues and to avoid incurring costs of non-legitimacy 
Skinner (1994). In addition, companies may also accommodate key stakeholders‘ 
demands for their long-term survival. 
 
8.4: Content Analysis 
A brief description of the method commonly used in disclosure analysis of 
content analysis follows in this section, as it helps to construct the governance 
disclosure index for the AIM companies. Davison (2011, 258) suggest that 
accounting research often use narratives for analysis. However, the use of narratives 
is profusely extended to corporate governance and corporate social reporting 
research. Beattie et al. (2004, 208) suggest that researchers using the narrative 
analysis of annual reports can use the financial analysts‘ view. However, the 
financial analysts‘ view as a source of disclosure is subjective and restrictive. 
Nevertheless it is a popular source, for example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) use the 
voluntary disclosure, as measured by disclosure scores, provided by the Financial 
Analysts Federation, also known as Association of Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR). However, AIMR discontinued its disclosure rankings in 1997, 
and the UK does not have similar rankings. Lang and Lundholm (1993) assume that 
the ratings measure disclosure ‗informativeness‘; however, there are concerns due to 
information bias towards the analysts‘ perceptive.  
 
The second approach is the semi-objective, (see figure 8.1) in which content 
analysis is the main method. This semi-objective method is broken into two types of 
narrative disclosure: disclosure index studies or textual analysis. According to 
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Beattie et al. (2004), studies using disclosure index use the concept of content 
analysis (or thematic). 
Figure 8.1: Different Approaches to the Analysis of Narratives  
 
 
Source: (Jones and Shoemaker 1994; Sydserff and Weetman 1999; Sydserff and Weetman 2002; 
Beattie et al. 2004, 209). 
 
8.5: Literature Review 
Measures of Corporate Governance Indexes 
A major task involved in the creation of the index is the appropriate selection 
of items, for example, words, phrases and numbers reported in the annual reports. 
The number of items selected has ranged from a low of 17 (Barrett 1976) to a high of 
224 items Cooke (1989, 115). The availability of commercial company level 
information has seen a surge in the development of corporate governance index and 
its use in the empirical research. Some of the commonly used specialist companies 
include Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Governance Metrics International 
and The Corporate Library (see Table 8.1). ISS includes corporate governance 
information of 5,300 US companies and 2,400 non-US companies such as Canada, 
Europe, East Asia and Pacific. The non-US companies are large and belong to the 
main stock exchange of their respective country stock markets. In 2010, RiskMetrics 
acquired ISS. In 2010, Governance Metrics International merged with The Corporate 
Library. The Corporate Library uses a proprietary weighting scheme to include over 
a hundred variables on board characteristics, management remuneration policy and 
anti-takeover measures. In addition to the above, similar governance rankings were 
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produced by Deutsche Bank for Latin American countries, Deminor Rating for 
Western European countries, and S&P 500 is producing rankings for both developed 
and emerging markets (Klapper and Love 2004). 
 
Cerf (1961)‘s study was the first to use a disclosure index, using the financial 
reports of 527 companies for the period 1956-1957 and empirically examines 
voluntary disclosure. The disclosure index consists of 31-weighted items, and the 
index is positive with asset size, number of shareholders and profitability. Singhvi 
and Desai (1971) follow a similar research method and find that companies 
disclosing poor information tend to be small, free from listing requirements, audited 
by small accounting firms, less profitable and have more volatile stock prices. 
Although these studies use accounting information for the disclosure index, but the 
adoption of this is equally valid for constructing a corporate governance index. 
 
Using an index as a composite measure of corporate governance variable is 
widely used and has a broad geographical coverage. For example, Gompers et al. 
(2003); Brown and Caylor (2004); Bebchuk et al. (2009) use US data, Drobetz et al. 
(2004) use data from Germany, Toudas and Karathanassis (2007) use data from 
Greece, Cheung et al. (2007) use Hong Kong data, Black et al. (2006), uses Korean 
data Beiner et al. (2004) uses Swiss data and Hodgson et al. (2011) uses data from 
Thailand. Table 8.1 distinguishes between two types of empirical research in respect 
of the identification between corporate governance, measured as an index, and 
company performance. These studies use an index based on researchers‘ personal 
method or studies that have purchased a commercial corporate governance ratings.  
.  
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Table 8.1:A Summary of Research Using a Corporate Governance Index 
Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
Panel A: Questionnaire survey or hand collected data from publicly available information 
 Beiner et al. 
(2004) 
Swiss Stock 
Exchange 
109 
companies 
Questionnaire 
survey 
38 governance 
attributes: CG 
commitment; 
shareholders' rights; 
transparency; 
management and 
supervisory board 
matters and auditing 
TQ; ROA Beta; growth; log 
(assets);  
log (age); 
leverage;dummy 
industry; endogenous 
variables:  
OLS; 
Simultaneous equations 
Corporate governance 
index (CGI ), board size; 
shareholding of 
management have a 
significant influence on 
firm valuation.  
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
Germany 
91 companies 
2002 
Questionnaire 
survey 
‗principal portfolio‘ 
firms with the  
highest governance 
quality corporate 
governance rating 
(CGR)>21; ‗agent 
portfolio‘: firms with 
the weakest governance 
quality CGR<18 
TQ; 
market to book 
ratio 
 
Beta; growth; 
log(assets);  
log (age); 
 leverage; 
 dummy industry 
Three-factor model 
Fama and French 
(1993) 
Significantly positive 
correlation between 
CGR and measures of 
return and firm value; 
firms with better 
governance practices 
were large firms 
contrasts the finding of 
Gompers; Ishii & 
Metrick (2003). 
Black et al. 
(2006) 
Korean Stock 
Exchange 
515 
companies 
Survey of  
corporate 
governance 
practices in 
2001 
Index based on  
38 variables  
TQ;  market to 
book ratio; market 
to sales ratio 
Ln(assets); Ln(years 
listed); debt/equity; 
sales growth; 
R&D/sales; PPE/Sales; 
Capex/Sales; market 
share; share turnover; 
ownership; dummy 
variables for ADR; 
bank and industry  
OLS; 
2SLS;  
3SLS 
A causal link between 
corporate governance 
and the market value. 
Better corporate 
governance does not 
appear to predict higher 
firm profitability. 
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Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
Cheung et al. 
(2007) 
Hong Kong 
168 
companies  
Publicly 
available 
information 
Weighted corporate 
governance score 
Market to Book 
ratio 
Size; ROA; leverage; 
current ratio; board 
characteristics; 
shareholdings of top 5; 
CEO duality; audit 
/compensation 
committee; ADR; 
MSCI 
 Significant and positive 
relationship between 
CGI and Market to book 
ratio. 
Garay and 
González 
(2008) 
Venezuela Authors fill up 
the 
questionnaire 
using publicly 
available data;  
 CGI based on 17 
questions 
Market to book 
ratio; dividend 
payout and TQ 
ROA; leverage; size OLS Reduce the cost of 
capital and enhance 
market valuation when 
firms improve corporate 
governance practices. 
Black et al. 
(2010) 
Sample of 66 
Brazilian 
companies 
2005 and 2006 
Survey 
questionnaire 
with 88 
responses 
41 firm attributes TQ Firm characteristics OLS with firm random 
effects; Pooled OLs 
Statistically significant 
relationship between 
BCGI index and firm 
market value. 
Black et al. 
(2012) 
Brazil 
66 private; 
nonfinancial 
Brazilian 
private 
companies; 
which 
responded to 
the Brazil CG 
Survey 2005- 
comparison of 
BRIC 
countries 
Hand 
collected 
CG Survey 
2005 
 
Overall index results 
derive mostly from 
subindices for 
ownership; 
board procedure; and 
minority shareholder 
rights. Others include 
disclosure and related 
party transactions 
Natural logarithm 
of TQ 
Ln(assets); firm age; 
leverage;sales growth; 
net income/assets; 
EBIT/sale; 
PPE/Sales;share 
turnover; largest 
shareholderownership; 
industry dummies; and 
ADR dummy 
OLS An overall index predicts 
Tobin‘s Q in all 
fourBRIC countries. 
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Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
Mallin and 
Ow-Yong 
(2012) 
UK  
300 AIM  
companies 
prior to June 
2006 
Hand 
collected from 
companies‘ 
annual reports  
23 Attributes of the 
QCA guidelines 2005 
none Percentage 
shareholdings of 
institutional investors 
and directors; board 
size; proportion of 
NEDs; log(assets); 
gearing; dummy 
variables for Broker 
Nomad; ex-main 
market; if company has 
gross turnover 
OLS Coefficients of board 
size and proportion of 
NEDS are positive and 
highly significant. 
Gearing is negative and 
significant. 
Farag et al. 
(2014)    
UK  
271 AIM  
companies in  
2000 to 2007 
Hand 
collected from 
companies‘ 
annual reports 
and websites 
CGAIM50 index; 
consists of 50 items  
based on AIM 
regulation 
ROA; TQ Venture capital (VC) 
ownership; ln(mkcap); 
debt/ta; R&D/sales; VC 
reputation; age; 
foreign; CEO/founder; 
lockup; active 
CEO/Director  
GMM; 2SLS; 
 3SLS 
High levels of VC 
ownership and its 
reputation has a better 
corporate governance; 
Positive relationship 
between corporate 
governance 
characteristics and 
performance. 
Panel B: commercial corporate governance index provided by specialised companies 
 
Gillan et al. 
(2003) 
 
S&P 1;500 
companies; 
and other 
large; 
publicly-
traded 
corporations; 
1997 to 2000 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research 
Centre 
Sub indices: board of 
directors; corporate 
charter provisions; state 
of incorporation and 
ownership  
TQ Capital expenditure; 
total assets ; leverage; 
total pay; firm age; 
firm volatility  
OLS Industry does affect 
governance; test a 
reverse causation model 
in which TQ predicts 
governance for USfirms. 
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Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
Gompers et al. 
(2003) 
US 
1990-1999 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research 
Centre 
Index Performance 
measure 
calculated using 
RMRF; SMB; 
HML; 
Momentum; and a 
constant 
 Four-factor regressions 
model of Carhart 
[1997];  
Fama-MacBeth Return 
Regressions 
Index is negatively 
correlated with firm 
value; as measured by 
TQ and shareholders‘ 
return.  
Brown and 
Caylor (2004) 
US  
2;327 
companies   
at February 1; 
2003 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
Services  
52 firm CG 
characteristics and 
provisions to assign 
 a score to each firm 
ROE; profit 
margin and sales 
growth; TQ; 
Dividend yield; 
Stock Repurchase 
Log(Assets); log (Age); 
dummy S&P dummy 
Delaware 
 
 
High score associated 
with better governance 
have higher operating 
performance; higher 
valuations; and pay out 
more cash to their 
shareholders; negative 
relationship between 
governance index and 
sales growth. 
Klapper and 
Love (2004) 
374 
companies 
14emerging 
markets 
Credit 
Lyonnais 
Securities 
Asia 
Composite of 57 
qualitative; binary 
questions 
TQ; ROA Log(Sales); Growth; 
Legal System; ADRs; 
Industry dummies; 
fixed capital/sales 
OLS Better corporate 
governance is highly 
correlated with firm 
performance and market 
value. 
Durnev and 
Kim (2005) 
 
494 
companies 
 24 countries 
 2000 
Credit 
Lyonnais 
Securities 
Asia; Standard 
and Poor‘s 
disclosure 
data 
Corporate  
Governance scores 
Firm valuation  - 
TQ 
Investment 
opportunities; external 
finance; ownership 
concentration; legal 
environment; control 
for industry and 
company 
characteristics 
Cross section random 
effects regression; 
3SLS 
Companies with higher 
quality corporate 
governance are valued 
higher. Conclude that 
companies with better 
investment opportunities 
and higher needs for 
external finance practice 
better governance and 
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Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
disclosure. 
Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) 
USA;  
1990-2002 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research 
Centre 
Uses a 6 provision 
index- to create an 
‗entrenchment index‘ 
four provisions that 
limit shareholder rights 
and two that make 
potential hostile 
takeovers difficult. 
TQ Log(Assets); 
Log(Age); Delaware 
incorporation; Insider 
Ownership; ROA; 
CAPEX; Leverage; 
R&D year & firm 
fixed-effects 
Pooled; 
OLS  
High Score is associated 
with weak shareholders‘ 
right; lower TQ and 
lower abnormal return; 
and a low score is 
associated with strong 
shareholder rights. 
Ertugrul and 
Hegde (2009) 
 
 The Corporate 
Library 
(TCL); 
Institutional 
shareholder 
services and 
Governance 
Metrics 
International 
Corporate  
governance rating 
Operating income 
after depreciation 
scaled by total 
assets 
Natural log (size);  
industry and year   
dummies 
Fama and French 
(1995) three factors; 
momentum factor of  
Carhart (1997) 
Commercial governance 
ratings perform poorly in 
predicting operating 
performance; stock 
returns; several TCL 
sub-ratings exhibit 
significantly predictive 
power with respect to 
company performance. 
Carter et al. 
(2010) 
USA 
S&P 500  
1998 to2002 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research 
Centre  
Includes minority  
and gender board 
characteristics 
TQ; ROA Log(assets); firm fixed-
effects; year fixed-
effects 
OLS; 3SLS No evidence of causation 
going from board 
diversity to financial 
performance; some 
evidence of positive 
relationship with board 
diversity and financial 
performance in the fixed 
effect regression.  
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Authors Country Source of  
Data 
Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
Performance 
Variables 
Other Controls 
Variables 
Method Comment 
Renders et al. 
(2010) 
14 European 
countries for 
the period 
1999-2003 
Deminor 
Rating 
The ratings based on 
over 300 criteria 
ROA; ROE TQ 
market to sales 
market to book 
ratio 
Log(market value of 
equity)  
log (age);growth; 
Leverage; ownership; 
fixed asset ratio; 
indicator of negative 
net income; IAS; 
shareholder protection 
OLS;  
3SLS 
Corporate-governance 
ratings and performance 
has become weaker over 
time. 
Vintila and 
Gherghina 
(2012) 
USA  
126 
companies 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
 Services 
Corporate governance 
sub-indices provided 
by ISS; construct own 
score for corporate 
governance 
Return on asset; 
return on equity; 
Tobin'sQ; price 
earnings ratio; 
market to book 
ratio 
Log(assets); leverage OLS Negative relationship 
between CGI and firm 
performance measured 
through TQ; price to 
book value; and price-
earnings ratio. With 
ROA have not identified 
any relationship between 
CGI and ROA. 
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Gompers et al. (2003) uses a broad index based on twenty four provisions, 
find that the corporate governance index for a large sample of US companies 
negatively correlates to Tobin‘s Q. Durnev and Kim (2005) confirm the existence of 
a relationship between company-level governance attributes and firm value in a 
cross-section of countries. Doidge et al. (2007) show that the country characteristics 
account for a large part of the variation in company level governance across 
countries because it is costly for companies to adhere to stricter governance 
standards than those imposed by the country. While the results of these papers do not 
necessarily contradict each other, they do raise the question: is it mostly company 
level or country level characteristics that determine governance? 
 
Brown and Caylor (2004) create a more extensive governance index 
compared to that of Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). Their data 
consists of 2,327 US companies with 51 equally weighted factors across eight 
subcategories based on data provided by the ISS. Their findings show that 
companies with high governance score have higher operating profit, higher 
valuations and pay more cash to their shareholders compared to companies with low 
governance score. While Black et al. (2006), using corporate governance index for 
Korean public companies find that corporate governance is an important factor in 
explaining the market value. Black et al. (2006) use a unique Korean governance 
rule that apply to firms with assets of at least 2 trillion won as an instrumental 
variable for their corporate governance index. This study and others, support 
company level corporate governance, in particular for countries with weak legal 
protection rights for investors (discussed in Chapter 5). Indeed, Black (2001) argues 
that higher governance practices on company  performance are likely to be found in 
developing countries because these countries have weaker rules and large variations 
between companies in corporate governance practices. 
 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) built an ‗entrenchment index‘ based on the six 
provisions of Gompers et al. (2003). Examining the relationship between the 
entrenchment index and company performance, measured as Tobin‘s Q and stock 
return, Bebchuk et al. (2009) support the positive correlation between governance 
and performance found in Gompers et al. (2003)‘s study. 
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The development of the commercially available governance index has been 
the stimulus for academic governance indices. However, according to Baker and 
Anderson (2010) the academic literature have not been able to establish a causal 
relationship between governance and performance. In contrast to the works of 
Gompers et al. (2003), Brown and Caylor (2004) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
described above, which show a positive relationship between the governance index 
and performance, the correlations are out of equilibrium as shown in Figure 8.2. In 
addition, studies such as Cremers and Nair (2005) question whether a positive 
association even exists. 
 
Figure 8.2: Equilibrium and Out of Equilibrium Determinants of Governance 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, 8) 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) state that empirical research on boards of 
directors is challenging because of the endogeneity and equilibrium nature of the 
variables (see Figure 8.2), for example, the company performance is both a function 
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of the previous directors‘ actions as well as that of the subsequent directors‘ choices. 
Studies that are more recent no longer ignore the endogeneity issue, but the 
complexity involved makes it difficult to judge the appropriateness of the results. 
The association between the numbers of board committees with company 
profitability has a negative association. The ‗out of equilibrium‘ scenario ‗suggests 
that restriction on the numbers of board committees should be encouraged or even 
mandated. The equilibrium interpretation suggests that there are other factors 
associated with board committees and company profitability, and hence strict 
regulation would be considered to be irrelevant and perhaps a hindrance to company 
development. Figure 8.2 illustrates both of the above two interpretations. Black et al. 
(2006, 371) study long-term relationship between governance and firm market value 
and are indifferent to equilibrium or out of equilibrium relationships. 
 
Work by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Core et al. (2006), questions whether 
a positive association exists. For example, Daines et al. (2010) find no relationship 
between the commercial ratings and the company performance measures. Prior 
literature, besides using a composite measure of the corporate governance index, also 
considers individual board characteristics as important determinants of corporate 
governance. The studies that have a focus on a single measure of corporate 
governance include board independence (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003), share 
ownership and the duality of the CEO and Chairman roles (see Desender et al. 
2013). An important question arises as to whether a single board characteristic can 
be as effective a measure of corporate governance compared to an index that has 
multiple characteristics associated with corporate governance, as cited in Bebchuk et 
al. (2009). 
 
 The principal differences between this chapter and the research discussed 
above are as follows: first, the thesis exploits a unique second-tier stock market in 
the UK, where the governance in the UK is characterised as having strong investor 
protection rights and applies a principle based concept. In contrast, most of the 
research consists of large public firms. Secondly, the CGScore is comprised of six 
subindices, for board committees, board independence, board power, board 
transparency and two indices for remuneration. Thirdly, over time AIM companies‘ 
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data has been more readily available and thus allowing to employ more control 
variables.  
 
This study uses a sample set from the AIM companies and is similar to the 
two studies by Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012); Farag et al. (2014) who also derive 
their sample from the AIM. This study uses the Combined Code to develop the 
disclosure index, whereas the studies by Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012); Farag et al. 
(2014), both use the Quoted Companies Alliance Guideline to develop the corporate 
governance disclosure score. There are several differences between this study and 
the Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) study. For example, this study explores the 
relationship between corporate governance disclosure index and company 
performance, including company and ownership shareholdings, whereas the Mallin 
and OW-Yong study examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
company and ownership characteristics. In addition, this study uses a sample set of 
56 AIM companies for the period 2008 to 2009, whereas the Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2012) study uses 300 companies quoted on the AIM prior to June 2006. This study 
is different to that by Farag et al. (2014) in their research design as they consider the 
relationship between corporate governance, venture capital ownership and company 
performance for the period 2000-2007 (see Table 8.1). In addition, they use the 
Generalised Methods of Moments and 3SLS to address causality issues. 
 
8.6: Sample Selection  
The total number of companies listed on the AIM at the end of December 
2008 was 1,681. Of this list, 436 companies that had listed on the AIM after the 1 
January 2007 were deleted; 92 companies with zero market value were deleted, 
leaving a sampling frame of 1,153 companies. From the 1,153 companies, I select 
one of the first 10 companies in alphabetical order; I then further select every 10
th
 
company until a random sample of 82 companies was obtained. At this point, no 
sector or minimum size of the company is deleted, and, therefore, the final sample 
may include financial companies as well as some of the smallest companies by 
market capitalisation on the AIM. A further 17 companies were deleted for the 
following reasons: access to either the company‘s annual report or corporate 
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governance information is unavailable on the company‘s website or internet; 
delisting of the company from AIM; cancellation of the shares of the companies; the 
company was a cash shell or had no sales revenue. A further nine companies were 
removed as TQ was greater than 13. As previously explained in Chapter 7, one of the 
reasons is that some AIM companies in the sample had extremely high values, which 
would significantly influence results for empirical analysis without representing the 
general patterns. In the final sample, 56 companies remained in 2008 and 3 further 
companies dropped out in 2009 owing to missing data, leaving 53 companies in 
2009. The three companies for which CGScore was not available are Genetix Group 
(proposed cancellation of shares)
62
, Thirdforce (request of the company the shares 
were cancelled) 
63
and Touch Group (annual report for 2009 not available; company 
delisted from the AIM in December 2011). The above sample selection ensured a 
spread of the full range of market values of the companies and, therefore, size bias 
was minimised. Although not used in the regressions, two companies were dual 
listed, and only one company had a female on the board of directors. 
 
8.7: Variables 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Construction of the Corporate Governance Index (CGScore) 
Corporate Governance Index (CGScore) is a composite measure using five 
thematic groups consisting of board committees, board independence, board power, 
board transparency and board remuneration. For details on the construction of the 
CGScore, see Table 8.2. The corporate governance data used in this study is for a 
two-year period 2008 to 2009. This chapter uses the content analysis approach to 
identify the corporate governance provisions identified on companies‘ annual 
reports, and or websites. The rationale for using this approach is for two reasons. 
First, it allows searching directly from the company‘s annual report or websites for 
adoption of the corporate governance recommendations communicated to 
                                                 
62
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ag09Eqn.uwU0, accessed 19 
September 2014 
63
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4ZnzFmlX6nw, accessed 19 
September 2014 
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stakeholders. Second, it allows coverage of a larger sample of companies, which 
would be difficult by using other methods such as interviews. The study in this 
chapter has considered prior literature, in particular,Haniffa and Cooke (2002); 
Bruno and Claessens (2007); Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012); Farag et al. (2014). In 
addition, taking into account the practicalities of the AIM and the Combined Code 
(2008) as a benchmark, as this was corporate governance code available for the two-
year periods of analysis. The researcher use of Combined Code for the construction 
of the CGScore is for two reasons: first, Cadbury Report (1992) in section 3.15 
suggests that full compliance will bring benefits to the boards of small companies; 
second as QCA guidelines are adopted from the UK Corporate Governance Code as  
 
‘The QCA Code adopts key elements of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, current policy initiatives and other relevant 
guidance and then applies these to the needs and particular 
circumstances of small and mid-size quoted companies on a public 
market’.64  
The literature articles allowed the development of a list of governance items 
as a thematic disclosure index, across five major areas, to examine the extent to 
which AIM companies report corporate governance information.  
 
Following from Wiseman (1982), corporate governance attributes were 
dichotomous, but there were some attributes where a degree of specificity was 
necessary. For example, remuneration of the directors needs to be broken down into 
a number of sub-elements, which were base salary, bonus, long-term share options, 
share options, pension and other items. For each item of remuneration disclosed a 
score of one was given, resulting in a total score of five, to reflect the different types 
of remunerations. There were difficulties as to when only aggregate figures for all 
directors are available.  
 
                                                 
64
 http://www.theqca.com/shop/guides/86557/corporate-governance-code-for-small-and-midsize-
quoted-companies-2013-downloadable-pdf.thtml 
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The approach to scoring items is mainly binary in that an item in the research 
theme scores one if disclosed and zero if it is not. The calculation of the disclosure 
scores is as follows: first, I allocate a score of ‗1‘ to the company if the annual report 
or website contains a specific recommendation or information, or ‗0‘ if not. Second, 
individual scores for each thematic group are then aggregated into a total index, and 
finally a summative score for each company was noted, therefore, summarising the 
overall governance into a single number (see Table 8.2). The final list of corporate 
governance disclosure items contains an unweighted score. The CGScore calculation 
using the number of governance attributes disclosed by the company ranges from a 
minimum of zero to a maximum of twenty. Table 8.2 shows the details for the 
construction of the corporate governance score. 
 
To ensure that the information to construct the CGScore had no errors as the 
data is manually collected by the author, therefore, the following crosschecks for the 
disclosure scores were used. The company‘s annual reports/websites were visited on 
the following dates: March 2010, August 2010 and September 2010.The resulting 
corporate governance disclosure scores for each company from the first and second 
checks coincided exactly with those calculated.
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Table 8.2: Construction of the Corporate Governance Score 
Variable Description Source of information Attributes Binar
y 
Maximu
m 
score 
Board 
Committee  
Index  
(BODC1) 
Section A.1.2 of the Combined Code (1998) stresses the importance 
of the committees as a corporate governance best practice. The main 
committees are audit, remuneration and nomination. I assign one 
point per committees and one point for any additional committee(s). 
QCA Guidelines (s5) 
Corporate governance section of the 
annual reports  
Company‘s website 
Audit 1, 0 
4 
Remuneration 1, 0 
Nomination 1, 0 
Other 1, 0 
      
Board 
Independence 
(BODI2) 
The Combined Code also advocates for independence of the 
committee members. In line with the Combined Code, the second 
index BODI 2 suggests if there is the presence of strict independence 
in each of the three main committees.  
QCA Guidelines Appendix A- at least two non-executive plus 
chairmans are independent 
Corporate governance‘s report or 
biography on the board of directors. 
Assumed that if the annual report states 
non-executive director‘ as a committee 
member then this  suggests 
independence 
Audit 1, 0 
3 
Remuneration 1, 0 
Nomination 1, 0 
      
Board  
Power  
(BODP3) 
One of Cadbury‘s repeated arguments for the separation of Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is to ensure that the board runs 
properly and power is not concentrated in one individual, positing 
that agency problems are higher when the same person holds both 
positions. 
QCA Guidelines: Best practice is that the chairman is not also the 
CEO 
Corporate governance section 
Information on the board of directors 
Chairman and Chief 
Executive Office 
roles are held by two 
individuals 
1, 0 
2 
Chairman is non-
executive 
1, 0 
      
Board 
Transparency 
(BODT4) 
Consists of three separate areas: auditor‘s remuneration, related 
 party transaction and member of the board with financial 
knowledge. The emphasis originated from the Smith guidance to 
non-audit services: 
 ‗The audit committee should develop and recommend to the board 
the company‘s policy in relation to the provision of non-audit 
services by the auditor. The audit committee‘s objective should be to 
ensure that the provision of such services does not impair the 
external auditor‘s independence or objectivity.‘ 
Audit fees information:  
Corporate governance report under 
audit committee 
Notes to the financial statements 
Audit fees greater 
than non-audit fees 
1, 0 
4 
Notes to the financial statements Disclosure of non-
audit fees as zero 
1, 0 
The directors‘ report  
Notes to the financial statements 
If any director had  
no related party 
transactions 
1, 0 
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Variable Description Source of information Attributes Binar
y 
Maximu
m 
score 
QCA guidelines: audit committee responsibility for agreeing scope 
of the audit, non audit service policy and the fees charged by the 
auditor; no informationation on related party transaction; and  
requires one member of the committee to have recent and relevant 
financial experience 
Directors‘ information:  
The company‘s website  
Annual reports 
member of board 
with financial 
knowledge 
1, 0 
      
Directors‘ 
remuneration 
structure  
(REM1) 
Remuneration of executive directors - components of the 
remuneration package commonly contain base salary, bonus,  
long term share based incentives, pension and other benefit.  
The disclosure of each component is given a score of one, and non-
disclosure a score of zero. Where breakdown of the individual 
remuneration package was not given and only aggregate figures 
shown a score of zero was given, as it lacks transparency 
QCA guidelines: comments on remuneration policy but not in detail 
Remuneration report within the annual 
report 
Aggregate figures were available in the 
notes to the financial statements. 
 
Base salary  1, 0 
5 
Bonus  1, 0 
Long term share 
based incentives  
1, 0 
Pension  1, 0 
Other benefits 1, 0 
      
Directors‘ 
remuneration 
 as options 
 (REM2)  
 
Are options available to the directors and the  
non-executive directors? 
 
Remuneration report within the  
annual report 
Aggregate figures available in  
the notes to the financial statements. 
Options outstanding 
for directors 
1, 0 
2 
NEDs have options 1, 0 
      
Maximum 
available 
score 
    
20 
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Company Performance Variables 
The performance measures based on prior literature are Tobin‘s Q (TQ). For 
robustness checks, return on assets (ROA), and market to book value (MBV) are 
used (for a description of the variables see Chapter 7). The prediction is a positive 
relationship between corporate governance measure and company performance. 
 
Ownership Variables 
The ownership shareholdings are measured using director ownership, 
institutional ownership and the largest shareholdings. For a description of the 
variables, see Chapter 7. 
Control Variables 
The control variables are sales growth; company size (measured as logarithm 
of total assets), and capital expenditure over sales. The expectation is that larger 
companies will adopt better corporate governance and disclose more information. 
Higher growth firms have greater information asymmetry and agency costs and 
hence growth companies will have poorer corporate governance disclosures. Higher 
capital expenditure will need higher finance, from either financial intermediaries or 
equity shareholders. In such cases, managers will commit to providing more 
voluntary information and improve the company‘s governance structure. 
 
In previous research, company size has been found to be positively correlated 
with disclosure level in a number of studies and statistically significant. This 
suggests that larger companies disclose more information, either mandatory or 
voluntary, than smaller companies do (Meek et al. 1995; Camfferman and Cooke 
2002; Mallin and Ow-Yong 2012; Allegrini and Greco 2013). 
 
Listing on another stock exchange status is also used as a control variable in 
studies using corporate governance index (Allegrini and Greco 2013). Two 
companies in the sample were dual listed; the number was too small to justify the use 
of this variable in this thesis. Table 8.3 reports the definitions and measurement of all 
variables in this chapter.  
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Table 8.3: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Measurement 
CGScore Corporate Governance 
Score 
See Table 8.2 for building the CGSCORE 
TQ Tobin's Q The sum of the market capitalisation less 
shareholders' equity plus total assets divided by book 
value of the total assets 
TQ_1 Lagged Tobin's Q For the previous year - TQ 
ROA Accounting 
profitability 
Earnings before interest and taxation divided by total 
assets 
ROA_1 Lagged Accounting 
profitability 
For the previous year - ROA 
MBV Market to book value  Market capitalisation divided by the book value of the 
shareholders' equity 
LOG(SALES) Company size Natural logarithm of sales 
SALES,   £Million 
TA   Book value of total assets, £Million 
LOG(TA) Company size Natural logarithm of total assets 
GROWTH Sales growth  Difference between the current and previous year 
sales divided by the previous year sales 
PPE/S Capital expenditure Property, plant and equipment divided by sales 
DUMMYCEO Duality roles of 
CEO/Chair 
Binary number: 1 if the roles are separate,  
otherwise 0 
DIR_OWNP Director Ownership 
 
Percentage of shares owned by the 
managers/directors on the board 
INST_OWNP Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares owned by the institutions 
LA Largest Shareholder  
 
Percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder 
 
8.8: Hypothesis 
This section examines the impact of the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance practices, the company performance and the 
ownership shareholdings. This chapter uses a composite measure of governance 
index, rather than a single variable, to measure the overall quality of corporate 
governance. Table 8.1 shows that this is a common method of choice in the corporate 
governance literature. The index is constructed using the Bruno and Claessens 
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(2007) paper. The details of the corporate governance index (CGScore) are available 
in Table 8.2. CGScore is designed to estimate the amount and details of voluntary 
information that improves corporate governance information for the investors and 
comply with the QCA recommendations of good practice. The following sections 
discuss the development of the hypotheses relating to the CGScore as the governance 
variable and explanatory variables for performance and ownership. The higher 
instances of voluntary disclosure and adoption of corporate governance best 
practices by the company suggests a higher quality of corporate governance practices 
of that company. Thus, for investors to purchase shares in the company and hold 
them would require high quality of corporate governance practices and 
correspondingly higher company performance. 
 
Although the prior literature shows mixed results for association between the 
corporate governance and profitability, however, following Klapper and Love (2003) 
who find that companies with better corporate governance have higher operating 
performance. Therefore, to find out how corporate governance behaves in relation to 
corporate performance, the expectation is that higher corporate governance adoption 
will increase with corporate performance. Hence, the expectation is that a positive 
relationship between the two variables. 
 
H1: Companies with higher corporate governance index are more likely to have 
higher corporate performance. 
Director ownership is the percentage of shares held by members of the board. 
With low director ownership holdings, the potential of an agency problem increases. 
Therefore, the shareholders will increase monitoring of managers‘ behaviour to 
mitigate the agency problem. Since monitoring increases costs, better corporate 
governance practices would reduce such costs: hence, the prediction is that we 
expect an association with higher corporate governance score with lower share 
ownership. Managers will tend to adopt better governance practices to avoid 
monitoring by outside shareholder. Here adoption of better corporate governance can 
be a substitute for higher monitoring which can add costs for the company. With 
respect to AIM companies, large shareholders (institutional or individuals) can 
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address the agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control. 
Even controlling or larger shareholders, however, may rely on boards of directors, to 
monitor and discipline management. The regression includes ownership 
concentration, and ownership concentration squared to account for possible non-
linearity between corporate governance and ownership concentration. For 
robustness, institutional shareholdings and the largest shareholding are also 
explanatory factors.  
 
H2: Companies with higher corporate governance index are more likely to have 
lower percentage of director share ownership.  
In the hypothesis 1, corporate governance is the dependent variable and 
corporate performance is the independent variable. Are the two variables causally 
related; that is, whether corporate performance the cause and corporate governance 
the effect? According to Gujarati and Porter (2010, 8) using regression analysis 
cannot establish causation. However, the analysis needs to consider reverse 
causality. In addition, following other researchers who use company performance as 
the dependent variable and corporate governance index, for example, (Klein et al. 
2005), the third hypothesis predicts that the performance is positively associated with 
the corporate governance index. 
 
H3: Companies with higher company performance, are more likely to have a 
higher quality of corporate governance disclosures, i.e. have a higher corporate 
governance score 
 
8.9: Results and Analysis 
The analysis involves the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine 
the relationship between CGScore and the explanatory variables. The primary 
interest is the relationship between corporate governance index and the company 
performance. Hence, TQ is regressed on the corporate governance index and other 
control variables. Following Black et al. (2003); Klein et al. (2005), this study 
includes as control measures company size, sales growth, capital expenditure and the 
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DUMMYCEO. The variables were described in Chapter 7, section 8.7 and the 
definitions are available in Table 8.3. 
 
This chapter uses the following regression equations: 
Equation 8.1 
ε+DUMMYCEOβ+PPE/Sβ+GROWTHβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+
0
α=CGSCORE 54321           (1) 
Equation 8.2 
εDUMMYCEOβS/PPEβGROWTHβ
)TA(LOGβOWNP_DIRβOWNP_DIRβαCGSCORE
654
3
2
210
++++
++++=                                      (2) 
Equation 8.3 
εDUMMYCEOβS/PPEβGROWTHβ)TA(LOGβCGSCOREβαTQ 543210 ++++++=         (3) 
The histograms in Figure 8.3 illustrate that both ROA and TQ are skewed but 
in opposite directions. CGScore suggests that there is variation in the adoption and 
disclosure of the corporate governance components of the index constructed. As for 
TQ, large number of companies has TQ less than 1. 
Figure 8.3: Histogram of CGScore and Company Performance  
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Table 8.3 shows the descriptive statistics of each of the governance items and 
the percentage of incidence. For the BODC1 (see Table 8.3) indicator, it shows that 
for companies in 2009 have an audit committee 91% (93%) and remuneration 
committee 89% (91%) and Nomination committee is only observed by 28.3% 
(28.6%) of companies (figures in bracket relates to 2008). The incidence of ‗other 
committees‘ is low increasing from 11% to 19%. The difference over the two years 
is very little in each of the three main committees. Bruno and Claessens (2007) find 
the adopted practice for the presence of an audit committee is 83%, remuneration 
committee is 58% and a nomination committee is 52%.  
 
Table 8.4 shows that independence characteristics, BODI2, of the three main 
board committees was slightly higher in 2008 compared to 2009. The audit and 
nomination committees have a majority of independent board members.  
 
Table 8.4 also shows that board power, BODP3, 86% of the companies have 
two individuals for the roles of the CEO and Chairman in 2008, and this figure drops 
to 79% for the year 2009. The reduction over the two year may due to several 
reasons, for example, companies‘ preference for an internal chairman, this maybe a 
transition period, or the company genuinely believes that the same individual may do 
a better job. However, the incidence of the chairman as a non-executive director is 
57.1% in 2008 and increases to 62.3% in 2009. 
 
Table 8.4 shows that for all the three attributes used to characterise 
transparency, BODT4, is higher in 2009, that is, more companies are disclosing and 
adopting greater transparency. The range of corporate disclosure score varies from 
company to company but remains similar over the two years 
 
Table 8.4 shows the remuneration package, and in 2008, 70% of the 
companies have a base salary, which increases to 74% in 2009.Bonuses and long-
term share based incentives (LTSB) have dropped slightly from 2008 to 2009. 
However, the pensions and other benefits have increased. Table 8.4 also shows that 
71.4% of the executive directors have share options in 2008, which increased to 
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77.4% in 2009. Non-executive options increase from 25% to 30% over the two-year 
period. 
Table 8.4: Attributes in Developing the Corporate Governance Score 
 
2008 – 56 Companies 2009 – 53 Companies 
Attributes Number Average Maximum Number Average  Maximum  
 
 Score  Score 
Board Committees (BODC1) 
       
Audit  52 0.93 1 48 0.91 1 
Remuneration  51 0.91 1 47 0.89 1 
Nomination 16 0.29 1 15 0.28 1 
Other  6 0.11 1 10 0.19 1 
  2.24 4  2.27 4 
Board Committee Independence (BODI2) 
       
Audit  40 0.71 1 37 0.70 1 
Remuneration  39 0.70 1 36 0.68 1 
Nomination 10 0.18 1 9 0.17 1 
  1.59 3  1.55 3 
Board Power (BODP3) 
CEO/Chairman roles are 
separate 
48 0.86 1 42 0.79 1 
Non-executive chairman 32 0.57 1 33 0.62 1 
  1.23 2  1.41 2 
Board Transparency (BODT4) 
       
Audit Fees vs non-audit 
fees 
43 0.77 1 48 0.91 1 
Related Party 
Transactions 
23 0.41 1 26 0.49 1 
Director with Finance 
Knowledge 
35 0.63 1 43 0.81 1 
  1.81 4  2.21 4 
Directors’ remuneration (REM1) 
       
Base Salary 39 0.70 1 39 0.74 1 
Bonus 25 0.45 1 23 0.43 1 
LTBS 27 0.48 1 25 0.47 1 
Pensions 29 0.52 1 30 0.57 1 
Other Benefits 28 0.50 1 30 0.57 1 
  2.65 5  2.78 5 
Directors’ Options (REM2) 
Executive Options 40 0.71 1 41 0.77 1 
NEDs Options 14 0.25 1 16 0.30 1 
  
0.96 2  1.07 2 
Maximum Score 
     20 
Source: companies’ annual reports and websites 
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Table 8.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in Chapter 
8. The corporate disclosure score varies from a high of 18 to low of 2 and is widely 
distributed (see Table 8.5).TQ is skewed with a mean of 1.41 and a maximum of 
9.16 (see Table 8.5). 
 
Table 8.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
CGScore  10.96  12.00  18.00  2.00  3.71  109 
TQ  1.41  0.98  9.16  0.18  1.27  112 
TQ_1  2.06  1.22  23.11  0.13  3.04  112 
ROA -0.81  0.04  3.30 -55.89  5.60  112 
ROA_1 -3.63  0.04  3.88 -350.27  33.30  112 
MBV  1.48  0.89  22.60 -25.88  4.30  112 
LOG(SALES)  2.82  2.71  6.09 -1.97  1.66  111 
SALES  53.98  15.08  439.30  0.14  90.41  111 
TA  125.45  23.85  2178.09  1.62  346.78  112 
LOG(TA)  3.44  3.17  7.69  0.48  1.48  112 
GROWTH  0.15  0.06  10.48 -15.27  1.98  109 
PPE/S  1.07  0.09  22.45  0.00  3.24  109 
DUMMYCEO 0.83  1  1.00  0.00  0.38  109 
DIR_OWNP  24.69  20.00  72.78  3.23  18.58  64 
INST_OWNP 33.25 28.62  96.02  4.05  22.54 79 
LARGEST(LA) 24.66 17.79 76.08 4.28 18.71 83 
 
Table 8.6 presents the correlation between the variables. Table 8.6 shows a 
positive correlation between CGScore and TQ, ROA, MBV and DUMMYCEO. 
Table 8.6 shows a negative correlation between CGScore and LOG (TA), growth, 
and capital expenditure. CGScore shows a positive correlation with dir_ownp, 
inst_ownp and the largest shareholder. The univariate analysis supports the 
hypothesis, H1, that CGScore has a positive association with company performance. 
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Table 8.6: Correlation Analysis  
Sample size 112 observation for the period 2008 to 2009 
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CGScore  1.00                
TQ  0.13 1.00               
TQ_1  0.03 0.42 1.00              
ROA  0.16 -0.07 0.05 1.00             
ROA_1  0.07 -0.46 -0.65 0.06 1.00            
MBV  0.14 0.24 -0.03 -0.00 0.21 1.00           
LOG(SALES)  -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.12 -0.01 1.00          
SALES  0.08 -0.12 0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.06 0.75 1.00         
TA  -0.13 -0.13 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.38 0.53 1.00        
LOG(TA)  -0.03 -0.22 -0.15 0.18 0.21 -0.05 0.55 0.59 0.70 1.00       
GROWTH  -0.09 0.08 -0.19 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.15 -0.34 -0.30 -0.14 1.00      
PPE/S  -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.12 -0.01 0.15 0.02 1.00     
DUMMYCEO  0.41 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.20 0.01 -0.06 -0.16 -0.30 -0.26 -0.09 -0.29 1.00    
DIR_OWNP  0.28 0.02 -0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.16 -0.16 0.02 -0.11 0.29 1.00   
INST_OWNP  0.22 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.35 -0.19 -0.16 -0.28 0.10 0.05 0.09 -0.44 1.00  
LARGEST (LA) 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 -0.21 -0.30 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.72 0.42 1.00 
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Table 8.7:Expected Signs 
Hypothesis Variables (expected sign) 
H1 – corporate governance score and company 
performance 
TQ (+), ROA (-), MBV (+); Size (+);  
Growth (-), PPE/S (+); DUMMYCEO (+) 
H2 – corporate governance score and ownership 
concentration 
DIR_OWNP (-), INST_OWNP (+), LA(-) 
H3 – company performance (TQ) and corporate 
governance score 
CGScore (+); Size (+); Growth (+); PPE/S (+); 
DUMMYCEO (+) 
 
CGScore as the dependent variable - analysis of Equation 8.1 
Table 8.8 reports the results of Equation 8.1, using ordinary least squares 
regression. A qualitative chart, Figure 8.4 shows a scatter plot plus a fitted regression 
line from a regression of CGScore and TQ plus a constant term. The graph still 
shows some outliers, although the sample includes companies with TQ less than 13. 
The positive association is not statistically significant as t = 1.36 (see Table 8.7). 
 
Figure 8.4: Corporate Governance Score and Tobin’s Q 
 
The next section shows the analysis of the regressions of CGScore against 
TQ. A small set of control variables, are added showing the selected results with a 
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Tobin’s Q 
In Table 8.8, Model 1, CGScore is regressed on TQ as a sole explanatory 
variable. An increase of one point in the TQ causes an increase of 0.38points in the 
CGScore. Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 include one additional control variable in the 
estimation. Model 5 includes all variables considered together. In each of the five 
models the positive sign of the coefficient remains, however, any association is 
statistically insignificant. All control variables, except DUMMYCEO, are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
In Table 8.8, Panel B shows the regression of CGScore on the ROA, and the 
control variables. Model 1 includes the ROA as the sole explanatory variable. An 
increase of one point on ROA results in an increase of 0.38 points in CGScore, 
however, the result is statistically insignificant. Models, 2, 3, 4 and 5 include one 
additional control variable. In each of these models, ROA maintains the same 
positive sign and is statistically insignificant. All control variables, except 
DUMMYCEO are statistically insignificant. 
 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 
In Table 8.8, Panel C shows the regression of CGScore on the MBV, and the 
control variables. An increase of one point on MBV results in an increase of 0.12 
points in CGScore. The results are similar to that of the TQ and ROA performance 
variables that is there is no statistical significance and the R-squared values are very 
low. These results contradict Farag et al. (2014) who find that using the governance 
equation, gives a positive and significant relationship (p < .01) between the 
CGAIM5065 index and financial performance measured by TQ, ROE and ROA. 
 
Control variables 
In Table 8.8, the variables LOG (TA), GROWTH, PPE/S the direction of the 
coefficients remain the same irrespective of the performance measure, but are not 
                                                 
65 Farag et al. (2014) construct the CGAIM50 index to measure corporate governance characteristics 
consisting of 50 items. This index is equally weighted and each item has a binary code. 
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statistically significant. In contrast to the study by Farag et al. (2014), this study does 
not find any association between the CGScore and company size. With 
DUMMYCEO, the coefficient is positive (as predicted), statistically significant and 
increases the explanatory power. The positive coefficient for the DUMMYCEO is in 
keeping with the agency theory, which suggests that the two roles of CEO and Chair 
should be separate and, hence, therefore, influences higher governance disclosure. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find that the there is no association between DummyCEO 
and Tobin‘s Q, but do find relationship when using ROA is the performance 
variable.  
 
This study uses a small number of control variables, which raises the 
potential for omitted variables bias. It is possible that unobserved company 
heterogeneity will predict both governance and company performance, and leading 
to a spurious correlation between the two variables. Figure 8.4 shows that there are 
outliers and could consider dropping them from the sample. However, this would 
reduce the sample size and, therefore, not considered. Black et al. (2006, 479) drop 
the outliers for TQ, remaining with a revised sample of 495 companies from a 
sample of 515 companies, but do not find any difference in the results that include 
outliers. Company level financial characteristics as determinants of corporate 
governance practices do not explain well the deviations from better or poor adoption 
of corporate governance attributes (attributes shown in Table 8.2). 
 
The amount of variability explained by the company characteristic varies 
from a low of 2% to a high of 19% suggesting that there are missing variables. The 
missing variables, for example, may be related to behaviour of the management, type 
of Nominated Adviser as a broker or non-broker, auditor from large or small firms. 
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Table 8.8: OLS Results for CGScore on Performance 
  DUMMYCEOPPESGROWTHTALOGTQ 543210 )(CGSCORE       Equation 8.1 
AIM Companies 
 Panel A: TQ Panel B: ROA Panel C: MBV 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
C  10.43  10.44  11.36  11.41  6.64  11.03  11.56  12.39  12.36  7.86  10.79  10.98  11.83  11.82  7.28 
 [19.85]** [9.70]** [10.03]** [10.07]** [4.31]** [31.17]** [12.55]** [12.74]** [12.74]** [5.59]** [28.91]** [11.95]** [12.06]** [12.06]** [5.12]** 
TQ  0.38  0.38  0.33  0.30  0.38           
 [1.36] [1.32] [1.17] [1.05] [1.42]           
LOG(TA) -0.00 -0.20 -0.7  0.15  -0.15 -0.34 -0.30  0.00  -0.05 -0.25 -0.20  0.10 
  [-0.00] [-0.78] [-0.64] [0.61]  [-0.62] [-1.36] [-1.16] [0.01]  [-0.23] [-0.98] [-0.79] [0.41] 
GROWTH  -0.20 -0.20 -0.10   -0.20 -0.20 -0.10   -0.20 -0.19 -0.10 
   [-1.13] [-1.08] [-0.59]   [-1.14] [-1.09] [-0.59]   [-1.12] [-1.07] [-0.58] 
PPE/S   -0.12 -0.00    -0.13 -0.02    -0.13 -0.01 
    [-1.06] [-0.01]    [-1.19] [-0.18]    [-1.14] [-0.13] 
DummyCEO     4.08      3.99      4.00 
     [4.21]**     [4.17]**     [4.14]** 
ROA      0.37  0.39  0.38  0.38  0.38      
      [1.73] [1.81] [1.73] [1.74] [1.89]      
MBV           0.12  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.10 
           [1.42] [1.40] [1.20] [1.15] [1.31] 
Observations: 109 109 106 106 106 109 109 106 106 106 109 109 106 106 106 
R-squared: 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.18 
F-statistic: 1.86 0.92 1.13 1.13 4.60 2.98 1.68 1.69 1.62 4.98 2.02 1.03 1.15 1.19 4.53 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
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Corporate Governance Score and Ownership: Non Linear Relationship - 
analysis of Equation 8.2 
In this section, Table 8.9 shows the results of the regression of the CGScore 
on ownership. The ownership variables include shareholdings of the director, the 
institutional investors and the largest shareholder (may be individual or an 
institutional). The square value of ownership enables to test for non-linearity. Table 
8.9 shows three different models as robustness for Equation 8.2. Model 1 includes 
the control variables LOG (TA) and DUMMYCEO; Model 2 uses all the control 
variables as per Equation 8.2 and Model 3 uses DIR_OWNP as the explanatory, and 
LOG (TA) and DUMMYCEO as the explanatory variables. 
 
As per Durnev and Kim (2005); Bruno and Claessens (2010) the regressions 
do not use in the same equation the variables for performance and ownership. In 
Panel A (Model 1) the results show a weak association with CGScore, the 
coefficients on the variables DIR_OWNP and DIR_OWNP
2
 are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign, that is, the coefficients on the variables 
DIR_OWNP and DIR_OWNP
2
 are positive and negative respectively. The reversal 
of signs suggests that the corporate governance practices improve with an increase in 
director ownership but at a decreasing rate. Inclusion of the control variables 
GROWTH and PPE/S shows that the variable DIR_OWNP is weakly significant, but 
DIR_OWNP squared is not (Panel A, Model 2).  
 
However, in Panel B, in Models 1 and 2, the institutional shareholder 
ownership gives a positive coefficient for both INST_OWNP and INST_OWNP
2
 and 
is statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with that found by Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) who do not find any association between disclosure score and the 
institutional ownership holdings.  
 
In Panel C (Model 1), the variables LA and LA
2
 give a stronger positive –
negative association, however, for the squared term the coefficients are statistically 
significant but close to zero. The positive-negative association with the largest 
shareholder ownership is similar to the findings of Durnev and Kim (2005, 1478). 
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Nevertheless, contrasts the results of Black et al. (2006, 403) where they use the 
largest shareholder for Korean companies and find that it is statistically insignificant. 
The results in Panel A and C are consistent with the debate that the higher ownership 
concentration may align the interest of the directors with those of the minority 
shareholders, but may result in higher managerial entrenchment.  
 
Model 3 does not include the squared form of the ownership variable on the 
right hand side of the equation. The results of Model 3 show that DIR_OWNP and 
the LA ownership holdings remain positive but statistically insignificant and the 
coefficients are closer to zero. However, with the INST_OWNP the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant but weak.  
 
For the control variables, there is no statistical significant relationship 
between CGScore and LOG (TA), GROWTH or PPE/S. As in Equation 8.1 (see 
Table 8.8), the control variable DUMMYCEO is positive and statistically significant. 
Unlike, other studies, although company size has a positive coefficient, but is not 
statistically significant to higher CGScore (see Eng and Mak 2008, 340; Farag et al. 
2014). 
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Table 8.9: CGScore and Ownership Shareholding Non-Linear Relationship 
εS/PEPβROWTHGβ DUMMYCEOβLOG(TA)βDIR_OWNPβDIR_OWNPβαCGSCORE 6543210
2 +++++++=
   Equation 8.2 
Dep. Var: CGSCORE  PANEL A: DIR_OWNP PANEL B: INST_OWNP PANEL C: LARGEST 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
C   2.94  7.35  4.47  4.63  9.50  4.38  3.20  7.29  4.98 
  [1.91] [4.18]** [3.11]** [2.58]* [5.35]** [2.70]** [1.97] [4.39]** [3.26]** 
DIR_OWNP   0.20  0.24  0.03       
  [2.61]* [2.55]* [1.45]       
DIR_OWNP
2
  -0.00 -0.00        
  [-2.27]* [-1.68]        
LOG(TA)   0.32 -0.04  0.34  0.41  0.06  0.39  0.29 -0.09  0.35 
  [1.25] [-0.14] [1.30] [1.49] [0.20] [1.46] [1.17] [-0.32] [1.36] 
DUMMYCEO   4.31   4.70  4.57   4.57  4.29   4.80 
  [3.96]**  [4.23]** [4.72]**  [4.75]** [4.61]**  [5.08]** 
GROWTH   -0.26   -0.24   -0.24  
   [-1.24]   [-1.27]   [-1.33]  
PPE/S   -0.43   -0.14   -0.18  
   [-1.14]   [-1.17]   [-1.66]  
INST_OWNP      0.02  0.03  0.04    
     [0.26] [0.40] [2.16]*    
INST_OWNP
2
      0.00  0.00     
     [0.34] [0.17]     
LARGEST(LA)         0.23  0.31  0.03 
        [2.92]** [3.59]** [1.32] 
LARGEST^2(LA
2
)        -0.00  0.00  
        [-2.65]** [-3.21]**  
Observations:  63 60 63 79  79 79 82  79 82 
R-squared:  0.37 0.26 0.31 0.27  0.09 0.27 0.32  0.19 0.26 
F-statistic:  8.34 3.73 8.77 6.90  1.40 9.28 9.24  3.46 9.26 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
 223 
 
Company Performance as the dependent variable – analysis of Equation 8.3 
Table 8.10, shows the results of the regression of performance variables on 
CGScore and control variables.  
 
In Table 8.10, Model 1, TQ is regressed on CGScore as a sole explanatory 
variable. An increase of one point in the CGScore causes an increase of 5% in TQ. 
The regression estimations for Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 include one additional 
control variable. Model 5 includes all variables considered together. The regression 
is repeated with ROA and MBV as dependent variables. 
 
In all five models, the regression of TQ on CGScore gives a positive 
coefficient, though the result is statistically insignificant. Adding control variables 
has relatively no effect on the CGScore coefficient. LOG (TA) has a negative 
coefficient and is statistically significant in Models two to five. The direction of the 
coefficient and statistical significance for the company size is consistent with other 
research (see, for example, Black et al. 2006). GROWTH has a positive sign but is 
not statistically significant. PPE/S has the predicted negative sign but is not 
significant. DUMMYCEO has the opposite sign to that predicted but is not 
significant.  
 
In Table 8.10, Panel B shows the regression of ROA on the CGScore, and the 
control variables. An increase of one point on CGScore results in an increase of 7% 
in ROA. In each of the Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 CGScore maintains the same positive 
sign and is statistically insignificant. LOG (TA) has the predicted positive sign (see 
Table 8.4) and is weakly significant in Model 2 only. GROWTH, PPE/S and 
DUMMYCEO have no association with company performance measured as ROA.  
 
In Table 8.10, Panel C shows the regression of MBVon the CGScore, and the 
control variables. An increase of one point on CGScore results in an increase of 16% 
in MBV, however, the result is statistically insignificant. The control variables, LOG 
(TA), GROWTH, PPE/S and DUMMYCEO have no association with MBV, as they 
are statistically insignificant. 
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Table 8.10: OLS Regressions - Performance as Dependent Variable 
  DUMMYCEOPPESGROWTHTALOGCGSCORE 5431210 )(TQ          Equation 8.3 
Dep. Var: PANEL A: TQ PANEL B: ROA PANEL C: MBV 
Models 1 2 3 4  5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
                
                C  0.91  1.55  1.63  1.67  1.99 -0.98 -1.74 -1.78 -1.79 -1.52 -0.28  0.16  0.67  0.71  1.32 
 [2.37]* [3.26]** [3.08]** [3.14]** [3.34]** [-1.98] [-2.84]** [-2.62]* [-2.61]* [-1.97] [-0.21] [0.10] [0.37] [0.38] [0.64] 
                
CGSCORE  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.14  0.17 
 [1.36] [1.32] [1.17] [1.05] [1.42] [1.73] [1.81] [1.73] [1.74] [1.89] [1.42] [1.40] [1.20] [1.15] [1.31] 
                
LOG(TA) -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.21   0.21  0.22  0.22  0.19  -0.12 -0.19 -0.18 -0.24 
  [-2.20]* [-2.16]* [-2.00]* [-2.25]*  [2.04]* [1.97] [1.92] [1.62]  [-0.43] [-0.64] [-0.59] [-0.75] 
                
GROWTH   0.04  0.04  0.03    0.04  0.04  0.03    0.10  0.10  0.09 
   [0.60] [0.63] [0.50]   [0.49] [0.48] [0.39]   [0.45] [0.46] [0.39] 
                
PPES   -0.04 -0.05     0.01 -0.00    -0.04 -0.06 
    [-0.99] [-1.23]    [0.18] [-0.00]    [-0.28] [-0.42] 
                
DUMMYCEO    -0.46     -0.39     -0.88 
     [-1.18]     [-0.76]     [-0.65] 
                
                Observations: 109 109 106 106 106 109 109 106 106 106 109 109 106 106 106 
R-squared: 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
F-statistic: 1.86 3.39 2.44 2.07 1.94 2.98 3.61 2.09 1.56 1.36 2.02 1.10 0.74 0.57 0.54 
                
                t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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8.10: Robustness Test: 
Lagged performance variables  
Table 8.11 shows the results of using lagged performance variables, Using 
CGScore as the dependent variable, in Panel A, the regressions of the CGScore and 
performance has a positive coefficient, but statistically insignificant. For control 
variables, only the DUMMYCEO is positive and statistically significant.  
 
In Panel B, the regression of performance as the dependent variable and 
CGScore is positive irrespective of the measure of the performance variable, but 
statistically insignificant. With MBV, lagged one year shows that the control 
variable, GROWTH, has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. None 
of the other control variables is statistically significant. 
Table 8.11: Using Lagged Performance Variables  
 
PANEL A: Dep. Var. CGScore 
PANEL B: Dep. Var.Lagged 
performance 
  TQ(-1) ROA(-1) MBV(-1) 
       
C  7.10  7.65  7.57  1.85 -2.79 -0.38 
 [4.76]** [5.48]** [5.44]** [3.03]** [-1.09] [-0.19] 
       
TQ(-1)  0.23      
 [0.87]      
       
LOG(TA)  0.09  0.08  0.05 -0.13 -0.53  0.24 
 [0.36] [0.33] [0.22] [-1.41] [-1.35] [0.78] 
       
GROWTH -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.12  0.16 -0.81 
 [-0.37] [-0.57] [-0.41] [-1.88] [0.59] [-3.91]** 
       
PPES  0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03  0.10 -0.01 
 [0.04] [-0.07] [-0.03] [-0.85] [0.59] [-0.05] 
       
DUMMYCEO  4.13  3.94  4.07 -0.32  3.31  1.05 
 [4.33]** [4.02]** [4.23]** [-0.81] [1.98] [0.81] 
       
ROA(-1)  0.04     
  [0.62]     
       
MBV(-1)   0.02    
   [0.25]    
       
CGSCORE    0.03  0.10  0.03 
    [0.87] [0.62] [0.25] 
Observations: 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared: 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.16 
F-statistic: 4.64 4.55 4.47 1.32 2.24 3.86 
       
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively  
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Huber/White/Sandwich Estimator of Variance 
This robustness check conducted consists in re-estimating all the regression 
coefficients, with using the White (1980) estimation of heteroskedasticity. Using the 
White cross section for the covariance suggests that the data are contemporaneously 
correlated, or put differently those clustered by period. The White variance –
covariance matrix of the coefficients, the calculation of the standard errors using the 
White correction for heteroskedasticity, is appropriate when the residuals of the 
estimated equation are heteroscedasticity, but serially uncorrelated (Brooks 2014, 
201). Severe heteroskedasticity can sometimes be a problem. This process generates 
larger standard errors and, therefore, the estimated t-results can be much lower than 
those found using the traditional OLS estimates. Fortunately, unless 
heteroskedasticity is ‗marked‘, significance tests are virtually unaffected, and; 
therefore, there are no concerns of serious distortion in the OLS estimations. The 
results in Table 8.13 show that the inclusion of White‘s estimation has no effect on 
the coefficients value and direction, and the adjusted R-square. 
 
The results are similar with any of the three performance measures used (see 
Table 8.10), that is, coefficients and the signs remain unchanged with the 
introduction of White (1980) heteroskedasticity test. However, with White 
measurement of heteroskedasticity ROA is now statistically significant. 
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Table 8.12: OLS Regression of CGScore and Performance for White 
Heteroskedaticity 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively 
 
Regression of individual corporate governance attributes  
Table 8.13 shows the association of the each of the six sub-indices and 
performance. Each subindex is regressed on performance while controlling for 
company size, GROWTH, PPE/S and DUMMYCEO. TQ has a positive coefficient 
with board committee, board independence, board power and the two remuneration 
subindexes. With board transparency, the coefficient is negative. None of the results 
is statistically significant. It is not certain whether adopting the individual corporate 
governance practices as measured by the separate indicators contributes to higher 
performance. For the AIM sample, one explanation for the absence of a significant 
relationship between the corporate governance variables and company performance 
is that the corporate governance may only matter for certain board actions. The 
results of Table 8.13 contrasts Bruno and Claessens (2007); (2010) studies, who find 
that at company level, the regression of TQ on corporate governance indicators has a 
positive coefficient and statistically significant relationship with board committee, 
Dependent Variable: CGScore   
 PANEL A: no White heteroskedasticity PANEL B: no White heteroskedasticity 
       
C  6.64  7.86  7.28  6.64  6.64  7.28 
 [4.31]** [5.59]** [5.12]** [3.91]** [3.91]** [5.03]** 
TQ  0.38    0.38  0.38  
 [1.42]   [1.13] [1.13]  
LOG(TA)  0.15  0.00  0.10  0.15  0.15  0.10 
 [0.61] [0.01] [0.41] [0.54] [0.54] [0.37] 
GROWTH -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
 [-0.59] [-0.59] [-0.58] [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.65] 
PPES -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 [-0.01] [-0.18] [-0.13] [-0.01] [-0.01] [-0.18] 
DUMMYCEO  4.08  3.99  4.00  4.08  4.08  4.00 
 [4.21]** [4.17]** [4.14]** [3.93]** [3.93]** [3.90]** 
ROA   0.38     
  [1.89]     
MBV    0.10    0.10 
   [1.31]   [1.15] 
       
Observations: 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared: 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 
F-statistic: 4.60 4.98 4.53 4.60 4.60 4.53 
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board independence and board transparency66. Non-executive directors may possess 
characteristic of being independent, and although the evidence relating to 
independence characteristics tends to support the positive relationship, but is 
insignificant. This result questions the pressure to increase the number of 
independent non-executive directors.  
 
With ROA, in Panel B, as the performance variable, results are similar, 
except that REM1 has a positive coefficient and is weakly significant. The positive 
coefficient between the variables REM1and ROA suggests that the remuneration of 
executive directors is dependent on the accounting profit rate. 
 
All the above variables have low explanatory power for the changes in 
company performance and suggest that there are omitted variables or other factors, 
for example, CEO characteristics may be affecting the results. Stronger board power 
(that is, CEO) is associated with lower return on assets, lower capital expenditure 
and higher structure of remuneration package. Interestingly, in Panel A and Panel B, 
BOD3P, shows that the variability of the explanatory variables is 58% and 59% for 
TQ and ROA as performance measures, respectively. 
                                                 
66 
Bruno and Claessens use TQ as the dependent variable, when I used TQ and ROA as the dependent 
variable the direction of the coefficients for board committee, board independence, board power and 
board transparency did not change and were statistically insignificant. 
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Table 8.13: Regression of Individual Corporate Governance Attributes 
 
 Panel A – TQ as the explanatory variable Panel B– ROA as the explanatory variable 
Dep. Var 
Subindices 
BOD1C BOD2I BOD3P BOD4T REM1 REM2 BOD1C BOD2I BOD3P BOD4T REM1 REM2 
             C 1.56 0.70 -0.18 1.98 1.57 1.00 1.74 1.09 -0.13 1.83 2.09 1.20 
 [4.06]** [1.48] [-0.84] [4.60]** [1.90] [3.20]** [4.92]** [2.51]* [-0.67] [4.62]** [2.82]** [4.13]** 
             
TQ 0.07 0.13 0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.08       
 [1.06] [1.65] [0.34] [-0.81] [0.94] [1.57]       
             
LOG(TA) 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.00 -0.12 
 [0.46] [0.26] [2.73]** [0.64] [0.56] [-2.05]* [0.17] [-0.32] [2.56]* [0.83] [-0.01] [-2.39]* 
             
GROWTH -0.08 -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
 [-1.88] [-0.01] [1.21] [0.28] [-0.26] [-1.10] [-1.84] [0.02] [1.20] [0.25] [-0.29] [-1.02] 
             
PPE/S 0.03 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 
 [1.14] [1.41] [-0.02] [-0.54] [-1.33] [0.72] [1.01] [1.21] [-0.06] [-0.44] [-1.48] [0.52] 
             
DUMMYCEO 0.64 0.72 1.50 -0.05 0.97 0.29 0.62 0.69 1.50 -0.04 0.94 0.27 
 [2.66]** [2.44]* [11.36]** [-0.20] [1.88] [1.49] [2.58]* [2.33]* [11.39]** [-0.14] [1.87] [1.37] 
             
ROA      0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.00 0.25 0.00 
       [0.42] [1.43] [0.78] [-0.07] [2.34]* [0.07] 
             
Observations: 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared: 0.11 0.08 0.58 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.59 0.01 0.12 0.10 
             t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Endogeneity 
Using 1 year lagged values for TQ and ROA, and the set of control variables 
with two stage least squares regressions find that the sign and value of the 
coefficients did not change to the one obtained using an OLS regression indicating 
no evidence of endogeneity. Hence, endogeneity is not a problem in this particular 
study. 
 
8.11: Conclusion 
The study in this chapter demonstrates the effect of the determinants of 
corporate governance, using manually constructed CGScore. In general, the 
companies in the AIM companies sample have adopted good corporate governance 
practices for the two years 2008 and 2009. Specifically, the study finds that 90% of 
the companies have audit and remuneration committee, whereas only 28% of the 
companies had a nomination committee, and the reason suggested in the annual 
reports relates to the size of the company. The data shows that the Cadbury‘s 
recommendations are widely followed by the AIM companies as to the presence and 
reporting of board subcommittees, in particular the audit and remuneration 
committees. In addition, number of non-executive director representation on the 
board has increased. With the audit and remuneration committees, 70% of the 
companies consist of independent non-executive directors, whereas with the 
nomination committee the percentage was much lower at 17%. The high percentage 
of audit and remuneration committees suggest that AIM companies are steering 
towards greater emphasis on the internal structural governance mechanisms, and this 
may be due to the guidance of the NOMADS.  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that if there is an increase in the corporate governance 
index, as a measure of quality of corporate governance disclosure, and then the 
company‘s performance will increase. However, the results do not show any 
significant relationship with any measure of company performance and hence the 
hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that increase in the corporate governance index, will 
result in lower ownership shareholdings. The results show that the relationship 
between CGScore and director ownership is concave giving a positive-negative 
relationship with DIR_OWNP and DIROWNP
2
, respectively and statistically 
significant at 10% level. Intuitively, this suggests that when the level of CGScore is 
high the need for higher ownership levels is not necessary to align the interests of the 
shareholders, since the direction of the coefficient is positive at lower levels of 
CGScore, and turns negative at higher levels of CGScore. Using institutional 
ownership holdings does not give any association. With the largest shareholder and 
its square form, the relationship is positive-negative and statistically significant at 
5% level. Therefore, the hypothesis 2 is supported by the presence of the largest 
shareholder.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that if company performance increases, would result 
in an increase in the CGScore. However, the results do not support the hypothesis 3. 
In this chapter, H1 and H3 are rejected and H2 is supported only as regards the 
largest shareholder. 
  
The results suggest that the CGScore and company performance are 
independent of each other. One reason for the lack of significance can be explained 
due to the small sample size of the AIM compared to other research in emerging 
markets or Anglo-Saxon countries. Further, most of the research conducted in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and emerging markets have used large companies listed on 
the stock market. For the above reasons, comparisons between prior works are more 
difficult to interpret. Another explanation is that the data were for the period, which 
includes the severe global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The financial crisis may 
have contributed to the evidence that there is no significance between the CGScore 
and company performance, or vice versa, using performance measures based on 
either market measures, TQ and MBV, or the accounting profitability, ROA.  
 
Cadbury Report (paragraph 2.1), suggests that the economic downturn, weak 
internal control may be the key causative factors. The results show that an overall 
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corporate governance score is not a causal factor in explaining the company 
performance, or vice versa, in the case of AIM companies. Black et al. (2006), posit 
an interesting question as to whether better corporate governance practices of firms 
within a single country affects the firms‘ market value. They find for Korean 
companies a causal relationship between corporate governance index and higher 
share prices, and hence higher market value. The result of using this sample of AIM 
companies in this chapter does not provide the same evidence as that of Black et al. 
(2006). 
 
The results of this study contradict Klapper and Love (2004) and Gompers et 
al. (2003) who show high correlation between  the presence of good corporate 
governance practices and firm market valuation. According to Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), a significant concern on corporate governance studies is due to potential 
endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory variables. For example, it is 
possible that companies with higher market values may adopt good governance 
practices, in order to improve company performance and, therefore, the share prices 
are higher. Black et al. (2006), alternatively explain that companies may adopt good 
corporate governance practices as a signal for appropriate behaviour and thereby 
increase share prices. The results suggest that the endogeneity of the reverse 
causation did not matter. The study in this chapter was motivated, in part, by the 
claims of researchers that a corporate governance index is directly related to the 
profit measure and the company size, yet there was little systematic evidence to this 
effect, in particular for small companies within the context of UK. However, the 
composite corporate governance index and its sub-indices do not show any 
relationship between any measure of corporate governance and the company 
characteristics. The study shows that DIR_OWNP and the LARGEST shareholder 
have a non-linear association with CGScore, and institutional ownership shows no 
association with the square form of the institutional ownership variable. Hence, this 
specific study rejects the monitoring effect by the institutional shareholders in the 
case of the AIM companies. For the sort of companies on AIM, the average 
corporate governance mechanisms that are mandated by the codes do not matter, but 
what matters is ownership. Thus, Chapter 9 considers further the determinants of 
ownership concentration as a governance variable. 
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8.12: Limitations to the Study 
There may be some problems of judgemental error in the manual 
construction of the corporate governance score. The major problem with the manual 
construction of the index is that it is very labour intensive and hence only feasible for 
small samples. 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that the sample size and the number of 
different corporate governance items are much smaller, compared to other research, 
which may restrict generalisation and meaningful interpretation. For example, 
Gompers et al. (2003) use 24 different corporate governance provisions for an 
average of 1,500 companies per year from 1990 to 1999. Although the exercise of 
formatting disclosure index is simple, there are a number of limitations such as the 
uncertainty of the exact number of governance recommendations and its usefulness 
will be highly dependent on the items selected in the formation of the index. In a 
smaller sample size there might have been a relationship, but need a bigger 
relationship for statistical significance, hence the small sample size of 50 companies 
has restricted the statistical significance. With a bigger sample size, even a small 
relationship can be shown to be statistically significant. 
 
Another problem encountered is to whether to use a weighted index score, 
partial scores or a ranked score. Marston and Shrives (1991, 396) comment that there 
is not a favoured index with researchers and most researchers adapt and tailor 
existing indices to meet their own requirements. 
 
 Another problem that arises is that certain items of disclosure may not be 
applicable to specific companies, for example, not all companies provide share 
options to their directors. Hence, companies should not be penalised for non-
disclosure in this case. Cooke (1989) noted that in cases of non-disclosure of an item 
is not always clear whether an item is relevant or not. For example, non-disclosure of 
non-audit fees may be either that there is none, or that the company is declining to 
disclose them. This, therefore, involves reading the whole of the annual report to 
judge an item either irrelevant or not disclosed by the company.  
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Another limitation of the study pertains to the fact that there is no agreement 
in the literature as to the optimum method of measuring voluntary disclosure 
(Urquiza et al. 2009). Hence, the results and the analysis will depend on the two 
common methods available for developing the index: either construct own index or 
purchase from commercially available sources. The index used here is constructed 
by the researcher based on Bruno and Claessens (2007). Although, Mallin and Ow-
Yong (2012); Farag et al. (2014) construct their own disclosure of governance index, 
using the data from the AIM, the results are different to that found in this chapter. 
The difference can be attributed to the period and the attributes they use to develop 
the corporate governance index. 
 
8.13: Future Research 
Future study can use a larger sample over a longer period to show if there is a 
causal relationship between an overall governance score and company value. In 
addition, future analysis can consider whether an industry affects adoption of good 
corporate governance structures. Therefore, by using more data the companies can 
be split into industry types to see if specific sectors can explain the governance 
disclosure.  
 
Future study could do a comparison of corporate governance index 
measurement over a different time period and using the minimum disclosures 
required by the Quoted Companies Corporate Governance Guidelines for Smaller 
Quoted Companies, for example before and after the financial crisis period of 2008 
to 2009. 
 
Furthermore, to create portfolios of companies by ranking, using size and the 
three risk factor model of Fama and French (1993), to examine the effect of 
corporate governance to equity performances. Puksamatanan and Nittayagasetwat 
(2012) adopt this method for the determinants of corporate governance, using 
corporate governance characteristics on the equity returns of companies listed in 
Thailand. 
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It is possible that other corporate governance mechanisms are influencing the 
corporate governance practices and company performance such as ownership. 
Researchers have shown that ownership structures can matter as well, but the 
empirical results are mixed, for example, companies with greater concentration of 
ownership may invest more (Durnev and Kim 2005) or less (Doidge et al. 2007) in 
improving governance practices. The ownership structure is explored further in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9  OWNERSHIP AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE 
9.1: Introduction 
This chapter considers a single corporate governance variable, ownership, 
compared to Chapter 8, which uses an overall corporate governance index to 
determine the relationship with company performance. This chapter builds a panel 
data set for 131 companies from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) covering 
all the industrial sectors for the period 2008 -2010. This chapter considers first the 
determinants of ownership and secondly, that the performance of companies is non-
linearly related to the percentage of equity shares held by directors. The ordinary 
least square regressions show that the regression of CEO and cumulative director 
shareholdings give a negative and statistically significant association with TQ. 
Whereas institutional shareholdings is positive and statistically significant suggesting 
that the institutional shareholdings results are complementary to that of the director 
or CEO ownership. The omission of fixed-effects in the regression of corporate 
performance and director ownership shows an association with both TQ and ROA 
and director ownership. Whereas the inclusion of fixed-effects, TQ shows no 
association, but ROA coefficient remains positive and is statistically significant. 
 
One of the recommendations for overseeing of managers and shareholders‘ 
conflict of interest in a publicly traded company, where the interests of the managers 
and shareholders are misaligned, is to provide equity shares to the managers. 
However, the question to ask is, why does one observe that the managers of some 
companies possess large ownership shareholdings, whereas the managers of others 
do not? If there is an optimal level of the managerial ownership, most appropriate to 
maximise return to shareholders, why do the managers not try to adjust their 
ownership to an optimal level? If an optimal level of managerial ownership exists, 
what would it look like? It may be that, in practice, the optimal level of managerial 
ownership varies from one company to another. For example, when the manager 
owns 100 per cent of shares, that is, when the manager and owner are the same, and 
the problems associated with the principal-agent relationship (see Figure 3.1) do not 
occur. However, when the managerial ownership is less than 100 percent and the 
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owners and managers are separate, is there a threshold level below which managers 
and shareholders‘ interests do not align? It may be that, in practice, the optimal level 
of managerial ownership varies from one company to another. The main interest in 
this chapter is whether a relationship exists between managerial ownership and 
company performance. How does managerial ownership affect company 
performance? To what extent is company performance a factor determining 
managerial ownership, and what other determinants are there? 
 
The factors that are considered to influence managerial ownership examined 
empirically are size, leverage, cash and cash equivalents, capital expenditure, 
volatility, duality of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman, and board 
independence. Prior literature has examined most of these factors, but to date most of 
the studies between managerial ownership and company performance has been 
primarily for the largest listed companies in any country. For this study, the 
empirical analysis extends to a sample of Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
companies for the three-year period 2008 to 2010. 
 
Managerial theorists argue that the separation of ownership from control 
allows managers to pursue their own objectives, but this may be detrimental to the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. Agency costs arise because of direct 
expropriation of funds by managers, excessive perquisites, for example, the case of 
Conrad Black in Hollinger International, discussed by Kolla (2004, 837), shirking 
and entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Managerial theory explains how 
managers use their effective control rights to pursue projects that benefit the 
managers, but that may be detrimental to the shareholders (Baumol 1959; Marris 
1964; Williamson 1964; Jensen 1986). 
 
Academics argue that the concentrated ownership as a governance 
mechanism can reduce one of the major principal-agent problems, that is, the conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers. Here, the institutional shareholders, 
who have the resources, access to managers and the power to monitor, are perhaps 
best suited to ensure that the managers act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
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This monitoring role is associated with higher valuation (Ferreira and Matos 2008, 
521). Despite the institutional shareholders holding more shares in companies, there 
have been recent examples of governance failures. For example, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, where managers expanded their 
company by adopting high-risk strategies, both of which have received considerable 
press coverage viewed through the lens of a shareholder model. 
 
Why is the Study Important? 
Should managers hold stock? Company managers regularly own a significant 
proportion of the shares of their companies. For an individual director, these 
holdings of their company‘s shares may make up the main part of his/her personal 
wealth. Owning large portions of shares in a single company involves costs in terms 
of foregone diversification. Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) conclude that a 
significant minority of CEOs hold a large proportion of their own companies and has 
a positive effect on stock market returns. However, in the context of the AIM where 
the owners may be same as the managers and, therefore, expect the managers to own 
large shareholdings of their own companies as ultimately it is in their own interest as 
a long-term investment. The expectation is that due to the nature of the AIM 
companies they will exhibit more concentrated ownership structures rather than the 
diffused ownership structure. The characteristics of AIM companies are that they are 
younger, and the intangible assets (Colombelli 2009)are important in shaping the 
performance of firms listed on the AIM. The AIM companies have higher 
intangibles and, therefore, require equity finance, as their asset base has little or no 
value on forced sale of the assets. According to Cassia et al. (2009, 212) ‘these firms 
are in the entrepreneurial phase, characterised by high innovativeness and 
entrepreneurial creativity’. The problem with this is that the company‘s value will 
relate mainly to future growth opportunities, and this will be less attractive for banks 
to provide finance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 765). Shleifer and Vishny ‘observe 
greater use of equity finance for young, growing companies’ and for those in fast 
growing economies whereas there is greater reliance on bank finance for mature 
companies (p. 765). 
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9.2: UK Regulation 
The UK adoption of the practice of disclosure regulations for substantial 
shareholdings in companies dates back to the Cohen Report 1945
67 
that 
recommended the disclosure of beneficial ownership of shares should apply to all 
UK public companies listed or non-listed, unlike the EU Transparency Directive 
(TD). The Cohen Committee addressed the concerns in respect of the dispersion of 
capital among small shareholders. The Cohen Committee‘s recommendations 
formed part of the Companies Act 1948, which includes the following: voting by 
proxy, provisions to induce an extraordinary general meeting with 10% for the 
voting rights and resolutions to oust the directors. Interestingly, it was by statute 
rather than the use of the common law that brought about these changes and 
improves investor protection. The UK company law also stipulates a threshold of 
three percent for the disclosure of beneficial share ownership compared to ten 
percent as per the TD. The disclosure rules are important as it allows existing and 
potential shareholders to know whether there are in existence substantial 
shareholdings of shares, which might enable an individual, a corporation or group to 
control the activities of the company. Moreover, if such a situation arises, it allows 
the identification of a significant shareholder(s). For the period 1985 to 1989, the 
disclosure threshold was five percent proposed by the Conservative Companies Bill, 
1973/74. The EU Transparency Directive (TD) brings in a new rule for periodic 
financial reporting and the disclosure of significant shareholdings. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has implemented the TD in the UK; subsequently the LSE 
Listing Rules have adopted the Disclosure Rules, which are combined into the 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR). Whilst the UK has retained the 3% 
threshold for substantial shareholder ownership disclosure, the TD only requires 
notification when the proportion of voting rights exceed or falls below the threshold 
percentages of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 and 75. On 1 April 2013, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) replaced 
the FSA. With the new regulators, compared to the FSA, in particular the FCA, there 
                                                 
67 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/other_resources/Cohen_Committee.aspx, section 
82 accessed 18/07/2013 
 240 
 
is a shift from a light touch regulation (specifically for the financial services) to a 
stronger judgement based regulation. 
 
Both the UK and US exhibit a high level of protection provided to minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997). UK has a common law setting and provides 
minority shareholder protection derived from court rulings. In Foss v Harbottle, 1843 
(cited in Franks et al. (2009, 4010), the conclusion was that the majority of the 
shareholders take decisions within a company (that is, rule of majority supremacy) 
and that individual shareholders under normal circumstances cannot appeal against 
such decisions. However, in Menier v Hooper s Telegraph Works Ltd, 1974, the 
courts found an exception to the majority rule, where the intention of the majority of 
shareholders is to profit and disadvantage the minority shareholders. This is an 
important agency theory problem described as the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 741), when financiers provide 
funds, they expect to retain the residual control rights. In practice, this is not possible 
due to the financiers‘ lack of information to make appropriate decisions. 
Consequently, the managers receive residual control rights and discretion to decision 
making. In return, the financiers receive certain rights in relation to the assets of the 
company due to the explicit contract. Unlike other creditors, shareholders do not 
receive regular interest payment, however, may receive dividends at the discretion of 
the managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997:764). 
 
The organisation of the remaining part of this chapter is as follows: section 
9.3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 9.4 describes the variables, section 9.5 
describes the data set and section 9.6 discusses the issues of endogeneity. Section 9.7 
discusses the development of the hypothesis for the determinants of ownership at 
company level corporate governance and determinants of company performance. 
Section 9.8 presents and discusses the empirical results for ownership shareholdings, 
performance and control variables at the company level. Section 9.9 considers the 
robustness tests. Section 9.10 concludes. 
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9.3: Literature Review 
Prior empirical studies show a mixed relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Some studies find a positive and significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and company performance include, for 
example, Mehran (1995); Core and Larcker (2002). McConnell et al. (2008, 93) 
interpret the empirical relationship to mean that ownership ‘matters’ and that a 
change in share ownership by managers will subsequently change corporate value.  
 
Empirical studies that have found no relationship between managerial 
ownership and company performance include (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Loderer 
and Martin 1997; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). 
 
Non Linear Relation between ownership and firm value 
The research by Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
non-linear  relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Both 
studies use TQ and percentage of shares owned by the board of directors as a 
measure of firm performance and ownership, respectively. Morck et al. use a 
piecewise linear regression method and calculate the coefficients on the ownership 
variables at 5% and 25% ownership levels. They find that the slope is positive over 
the range of 0% to 5% of managerial ownership, negative over the range 5% to 25% 
of managerial ownership and positive above the 25% managerial ownership, 
although more slowly (p. 311). Morck et al. interpret the results as follows: the 
positive slope between 0% and 5% is reflecting the ‗convergence of interests‘ and 
the negative relationship between 5% and 25% suggests that the ‗entrenchment‘ 
effect is dominating. Morck et al. (1988) results are similar to different measures of 
performance, for example, using a profitability rate measured as the firm‘s net cash 
flow less adjusted depreciation divided by the replacement costs of its tangible 
assets. Morck et al. propose an alternative view where increased ownership by the 
management leads to entrenchment, where the manager will indulge in non-value 
maximizing behaviour. The entrenchment hypothesis predicts that the value of the 
firm will be less when management is free from checks on their control, and suggests 
that firm performance decline as management ownership increases. 
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) use a large sample of 1,100 companies from 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 
find a non-linear relationship between TQ and insider ownership for the two years 
1976 and 1986. McConnell and Servaes estimate a quadratic equation, which 
includes the percentage of shares owned by directors, and its square form. 
McConnell and Servaes results are similar to that of Morck et al. (1988) between the 
ranges 0% to 5% and find a positive and significant relationship between TQ and 
insider ownership. However, McConnell and Servaes find the slope over the range 
from 5% to 25% is positive and insignificant, which contrasts the findings of Morck 
et al. (1988).  
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use a piecewise linear regression for 142 
companies on NYSE. They use a panel data for five years, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 
and 1983 and find a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and TQ. 
However, their results show a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and TQ in the 0% to 1% and beyond the 1%, increase in managerial ownership the 
relationship with TQ is negative. They explain that the incentive alignment 
dominates over the range 0% to 1% and the entrenchment effect dominates over the 
1% ownership. As shown above their results differ from that of Morck et al. (1988) 
and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
 
Short and Keasey (1999) show a cubic relationship with managerial 
ownership for large UK companies and report that director ownership affects firm 
value as measured by TQ positively when members own below 12.99% or above 
41.99%. Between these two values, they find that performance declines suggesting 
managerial entrenchment. 
 
Mura (2007) conclude that there is a relationship between directors‘ 
ownership and firm performance and that the direction of causality runs from 
ownership to performance. Results also confirm the cubic relation predicted by the 
alignment - entrenchment hypothesis. Mura finds that there is convergence when 
managers own up to 15.06% of the shareholdings, and thereafter between 15.06% 
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and 45.43%, entrenchment dominates. When board ownership exceeds 45.43%, there 
is a positive relationship between ownership and TQ.  
 
No Relation between ownership and company value 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no significant relationship between profit rate 
and ownership concentration. Demsetz and Lehn‘s  study varies compared to that of 
Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990) discussed above in that Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) use the fraction of shares owned by the largest five and largest 
twenty shareholders (p.1163), and these may not necessarily be the management. In 
addition, they do not test for a non-linear relationship. They argue that ownership 
concentration is endogenously determined by both company and industry specific 
factors, such as, risk and capital requirements. 
 
Karathanassis and Drakos (2004) use 59 companies listed on the Athens 
Stock Exchange for the period 1996 to1998 using time series and cross section data 
with fixed and random effects. They find no relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, but find a positive relationship between 
institutional shareholders ownership and corporate value suggesting that this support 
the efficient monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Simultaneous equation studies 
Majority of the current research applies the simultaneous equation method to 
deal with the endogeneity problem of managerial ownership. Loderer and Martin 
(1997) use simultaneous equations estimation methodology by setting managerial 
ownership and firm performance as endogenous variables in a two-equation system. 
Using a sample of 867 corporations, which participate in buy-outs, they conclude 
that the high performance leads to lower levels of managerial ownership. One 
explanation for the negative effect of corporate performance on managerial 
ownership is that TQ measures growth opportunities, and the share price will adjust 
accordingly. Therefore, there is no plausible reason for managers to hold stocks of 
companies with high corporate value.  
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Cho (1998) examines the relationship between ownership structure, 
investment, and the company‘s value with respect to the potential role of the 
ownership structure as a determining factor on investment. Using a sample of 326 
companies from Fortune 500, Cho finds different results depending on the 
econometric method applied. Using OLS method, ownership structure affects the 
value of the firm while using the simultaneous equations shows that investments 
affect firm performance, which in turn affects ownership status, but not vice versa. 
Cho constructs a three-equation model where performance, ownership and corporate 
investment are endogenous variables. He finds that performance is a positive 
predictor of ownership but not vice versa. 
 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that both managerial ownership and firm 
performance may be endogenously determined by exogenous or other factors within 
the firm. With fixed effect panel data and controlling for heterogeneity, they find no 
statistically significant correlation between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance. However, using instrumental variables for endogeneity of ownership 
they find that a quadratic specification describes the effect of ownership on firm 
performance. Himmelberg et al. (1999) conclude that previous works were unable to 
examine the non-observable heterogeneity of the business and hence any relationship 
detected might result from spurious correlations. 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine the issue of ownership structure and 
corporate performance arguing that ownership structure should not be considered as 
an endogenous variable, but rather as a synthesis of many shareholders with different 
interests. Using a sample of 223 companies from Fortune 500 for the period 1976-
1980, they empirically test using OLS and 2SLS methods. They conclude that 
ownership structure, whether defined as high concentration or diffused does not 
appear to have a significant impact on firm performance. 
 
Davies et al. (2005) propose an alternative structure to the association 
between managerial ownership and corporate value. Their model captures non-
linearity at higher levels of managerial ownership and report a quintic specification. 
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They use 752 UK listed industrial companies for the year 1995, the authors conclude 
that even if one accounts for the endogenous relationship between managerial 
ownership and corporate value misspecification in the model will give spurious 
conclusions concerning the direction of causality. They provide evidence that the 
managerial ownership and the firm value relationship are co-deterministic; 
suggesting that the correct form for ownership and company value relationship is a 
double humped curve. 
 
Amongst the empirical studies that do not consider endogeneity on the 
relationship between company value and ownership structure are Morck et al. 
(1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Short and Keasey (1999). However, other 
authors have considered that endogeneity is an important issue in the study of the 
relationship between company value and ownership structure because of the 
causality of ownership on company value. The inclusion of endogeneity as criteria 
has become possible due to the availability of techniques such as the simultaneous 
equations, two stage least square, three stage least square and generalised method of 
moments, which facilitate the testing of endogeneity between variables such as firm 
ownership and firm performance.  
 
Industry level factors 
Richter and Weiss (2013) use a sample of 900 companies from nine countries 
find that the variation due to industry level factors in ownership concentration is low 
at 2% of the total variance in ownership concentration. At the industry level, they use 
the Standard Industrial Classification code of the industry that the company belongs 
to, and a dummy variable for financial services and utilities as one, and all other 
industries as zero. In addition, none of the industry level factors proved to be 
statistically significant. They find the following company specific factors as 
determinants of ownership concentration: company size, company specific risks are 
only able to explain a small proportion of the company level variation in ownership 
concentration. 
 
 246 
 
One of the reasons for the differences in the ownership and performance 
relationship may be attributable to the variation in the company size within the 
sample used by different researchers (Kole 1995 cited in Short and Keasey 1999, 
81). Considering the above literature that the relationship between ownership and 
company performance is mixed on the shape of the relationship and the causality not 
only in UK but also in the US studies, justifies further study of the AIM companies. 
 
9.4: Variables 
This section discusses the ownership structure variables, company 
performance variables, and control variables (for additional details see Chapter 7 and 
Table 9.1).  
 
Ownership Variables 
The ownership variable for AIM companies in this chapter include the 
percentage of share holding of the CEO, cumulative board directors, institutional 
shareholders, largest shareholder and the cumulative largest 5 shareholders. Short 
and Keasey (1999) use the percentage of shares owned by directors, institutional 
shareholders owning more than 5% and shares held by other external ownership 
interest. In contrast to Short and Keasey, this chapter uses institutional share 
ownership at 3% level. 
 
In this study, an assumption made is that ownership structure data relate to 
the percentage of equity shares, which conform to the one vote for each ordinary 
share, held. The ownership data from S&P Capital IQ were checked using the 
company‘s annual reports, but there were some differences. These variations arose 
due to the difference in timing of the company‘s annual reports year-end, which did 
not coincide with the end of the year data available for the ownership shareholdings. 
 
Performance Variables 
This chapter uses Tobin‘s Q (TQ), Return on Assets (ROA) and market to 
book value (MBV) as the measures of performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use 
accounting profit rate to measure performance. TQ, a forward looking measure, has 
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been used to analyse most relation between ownership structure and performance 
(for example, Morck et al. 1988; Lang and Stulz 1994; Himmelberg et al. 1999; 
Coles et al. 2003; Gompers et al. 2003; Drakos and Bekiris 2010). 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables used in this chapter have been selected by reference to 
those employed in previous empirical studies, in particular (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; 
Loderer and Martin 1997; Short and Keasey 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001; 
Drakos and Bekiris 2010).These are company size, leverage, capital expenditure, 
volatility, that is, market risk, cash holdings (cash and cash equivalent to total 
assets), property plant and equipment over total assets and company age since listing 
on the AIM. The directors‘ independence and CEO duality are used as determinants 
of managerial ownership factors. The control variables are described in Table 9.1. 
Other studies have also included industrial dummies; however, industrial dummies 
were not used in this analysis as increasing the number of dummy variables would 
have imposed severe restrictions on the degree of freedom in the regression. Table 
9.2 shows the expected signs. 
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Table 9.1: Definition of the Variables  
Variables Definition Source 
Company Performance Variables 
TQ Tobin's Q approximation = sum of the total market  
value plus book value of  total assets minus shareholders 
equity divided by the book value of total assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
ROA Return on Assets: profit before interest and tax  
divided by total assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
MBV Market capitalisation divided by book value of  
total assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
Ownership Variables 
CEO_OWNP CEO Ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO S&P Capital IQ 
DIR_OWNP Director Ownership: percentage of shares owned 
 by the managers/directors on the board  
S&P Capital IQ 
INST_OWNP Institutional Ownership percentage of shares owned by the 
institutions 
S&P Capital IQ 
LA Largest Shareholder: percentage of shares owned  
by the largest shareholder 
S&P Capital IQ 
LA5 Largest five Shareholders: aggregate  percentage of shares 
owned by the largest five shareholders 
S&P Capital IQ 
Control Variables 
Log(TA) Natural logarithm of total assets S&P Capital IQ 
VOL Standard deviation of company‘s monthly stock price  
over the previous 12 months 
S&P Capital IQ 
VOL^2 Standard deviation of company‘s monthly stock price  
over the previous 12 months squared 
S&P Capital IQ 
Debt Total liabilities(current and noncurrent) 
 over total assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
PPETA Property. plant and equipment divided by  
total assets 
S&P Capital IQ 
DUMMYCEO Duality of CEO and Chairman: If CEO and  
Chairman are separate assign 1, otherwise 0 
Annual Reports 
INDEP Independence: percentage of the number of non-executive 
directors over total board number 
Annual reports 
CASH/TA Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets S&P Capital IQ 
Log(LISTAGE) Natural logarithm Number of years company is 
 listed on the AIM 
LSE statistics 
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Table 9.2: Expected Signs 
Dep. Var. Director Ownership Company Performance 
Company Performance TQ (+); ROA (+) MBV(+)  
Ownership Variables 
 CEO_OWNP   + 
DIR_OWNP  + 
INST_OWNP  +/- 
LARGEST(LA)  +/- 
LARGEST5(LA5)   +/- 
Control Variables 
 
Log (TA) - + 
VOL + - 
VOL^2 - + 
CASH/TA + + 
PPE/TA + - 
DEBT + + 
DUMMYCEO + +/- 
INDEP + + 
Log(LISTAGE) + + 
 
9.5: Data and Sources 
The data consists of a sample selected from the total number of companies 
listed on the LSE AIM market for the period 2008 to 2010. Companies with the 
market capitalisation of less than £1 million are removed from the analysis. This was 
done to keep the data set manageable (see Lang and Stulz (1994, 1256).who exclude 
firms that have less than $100 million of assets from their data set for similar 
reason). From the resulting list, a maximum of three companies with the highest 
market capitalisation from each non-financial sub-sector in 2010 are selected. The 
selection of the companies across different industrial sectors ensures that the sample 
is a broad representation of the companies from across all the industrial 
classification. Specifically, given that a large part of AIM constitutes mining and oil 
companies, this selection procedure ensures that the results do not stem solely from 
these sectors. The resulting sample size further decreased for non-availability of data 
to calculate TQ, ownership higher than 100% and TQ greater than 13 (for reasons 
see page 167). The sample of companies was further subject to the following criteria: 
the companies must have complete one-year accounts for 2008; each company must 
exist in the three-year period from 2008 to 2010, therefore, excluding companies that 
were delisted or acquired during the sample period. The choice of length of the three 
year sample period is similar to that of Himmelberg et al. (1999, 360) who also use a 
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three year period. Other authors have included within their sample companies that 
were present in the first three years of their sample period, (for example,Himmelberg 
et al. 1999; Benson and Davidson III 2009). 
 
Previous UK studies use annual reports to extract ownership data of their 
sample companies or hand-collect from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register 
(December issues for each year). The Companies Act, post 1990 legislation, require 
companies to disclose, in their annual reports, the details of significant shareholders, 
who own 3% or more of the issued share capital. For this thesis, the yearly data on 
ownership percentage of shares held by three different groups that include the 
directors, institutional shareholders and other significant owners who are not on the 
board, and the financial data are obtained from S&P Capital IQ. The S&P Capital IQ 
collect ownership data for directors and institutional shareholders from 
announcements and, therefore, I was able to obtain information for ownership 
holdings that were less than the mandatory requirement of 3%. This allows data for 
more companies was available, in particular in relation to CEO ownership with less 
than 3% shareholdings. One of the problems with ownership data from this source 
was that there was double counting of shares under different ownerships and 
companies. Other authors using ownership data have found similar problems, for 
example, Bhagat and Jefferis (2005, 51) adjust the beneficial ownership data of 
directors and officers as a group, for double counting in the proxy statements. 
Dlugosz et al. (2006) using compact disclosure data provide examples of where 
errors can occur, for example, SEC requires in the proxy statements a list of all 
beneficial owners of more than 5% of the equity shareholdings. This caused shares to 
be double or triple counted under different individuals/groups. In addition, they 
found that the percentage shareholdings shown may not have correctly been 
separated between the percentage shareholdings of the equity shareholders and the 
preferred shareholders.  
 
There is greater preference for vendor supplied data, for example, Kole 
(1995, 418) states that the advantages include the time saved compared to the time 
required to manually extracted ownership data from the original documents, low cost 
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of access and details of shareholder as low as 0.2 percent of the company‘s equity 
holding as at the year-end. 
The data collection directly from annual reports has greater credibility than 
from third party databases. The major advantage of using data from S&P Capital IQ 
is time saving from manual collection of ownership data from the annual reports. 
Thus, despite the data been available for year-end and not the financial year-end, it 
was decided to use S&P Capital IQ data due to the extensive availability of details 
for different ownership groups. However, I used the annual reports of some of the 
companies to verify the significant ownership shareholdings, specifically names of 
the shareholders and to check for duplications.  
 
Problems with the third party disclosure  
As noted above the ownership data obtained from S&P Capital IQ available 
at the end of the year. There were overlaps where two or more block holders are 
listed in the ownership table with the same shareholdings. The data also separated 
the ownership of directors from that of other large shareholders; however, there were 
no notes to suggest that shares of one individual be owned indirectly through a 
company, family or a trust. This may suggest that a higher number of shares are 
owned when a lower figure is the correct for the block holder. The lack of 
standardised source of data on large block holders is an impediment to this work and 
the reason as to why researchers have manually collected their data from annual 
reports or proxy statements. Dlugosz et al. (2006, 599) exemplify several problems 
for US companies ownership data obtained from Compact Disclosure (CD) database 
of Standard and Poor, for example, double or triple counting of shares under 
different people or entities. 
 
9.6: Endogeneity of Ownership 
The empirical research on the relationship between ownership structure and 
company performance show conflicting results. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) support 
the endogeneity of a firm‘s ownership structure, which was originally argued for by   
Demsetz (1983). Himmelberg et al. (1999) use a fixed effect panel data set and 
instrumental variables to control for any unobserved heterogeneity. Using 
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instrumental variables to control for endogeneity their results show a quadratic form 
of the effect of ownership on performance. Holderness et al. (1999) confirm the 
endogeneity of ownership, and their results suggest that the determinants of 
ownership are company size, performance volatility, the square form of volatility, 
regulation and leverage. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that ignoring the 
endogeneity issues in a single equation model to estimate the ownership on 
performance incurs bias. Morck et al. (1988), Short and Keasey (1999) ignore the 
endogeneity issue altogether. 
 
9.7: Hypothesis Development 
The theoretical research on managerial ownership and performance do not 
provide a consensus but explain the development of two theories. The first relates to 
‘convergence of interest’ and assumes a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and company performance. The ‗convergence of interest‘ hypothesis 
suggests that the company‘s valuation augments as managers‘ shareholdings rise in 
the companies they manage.  
 
In contrast, the ‘entrenchment hypothesis’ predicts a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and company performance. Thus, when managerial 
equity holding is low the external market discipline will contain the managers‘ 
opportunistic behaviour in favour of maximisation of profits. However, higher levels 
of managerial shareholdings could lead to ‘entrenchment’, which will adversely 
affect company performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) explains managerial 
entrenchment as when managers use their power to further their own interest rather 
than the interests of the shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 123) provide 
examples of entrenchment when managers make specific investments (reducing 
manager replacement), extract higher wages and larger perquisites from the 
shareholders. Short and Keasey (1999, 79) give it a very short definition as ‗pursuing 
self-interest‘. The entrenchment hypothesis suggests that as management increase 
their ownership shareholdings and external market discipline may be ineffective 
against large managerial ownership shareholdings.  
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Determinants of Ownership 
Of the possible explanatory variables affecting ownership structure, using 
prior research, the three variables that need investigation in this thesis are company 
performance, company size and volatility. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985, 1174) argue that the disadvantage of diffused 
ownership is that ownership structure has the potential to allow managers to benefit 
by serving their own self-interests. Therefore, increasing the managerial ownership 
ought to align the interests of the managers and the shareholders and hence improve 
performance. Therefore, there should be a positive relationship between the increase 
in managerial ownership and company performance, thereby increasing shareholder 
value. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If director equity shareholdings are increased, it has a positive 
influence on company performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Holderness (2009, 1391) provide two reasons for volatility affecting 
ownership concentration. First, due to managerial risk aversion and as (Himmelberg 
et al. 1999) suggests that the diversification by a large shareholder be poor if they 
concentrate all their shareholdings in a single block. Hence, this would result in 
lower levels of ownership as volatility increases. Secondly, in contrast to 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the managerial 
performance is difficult to monitor when companies operate in a noisy environment 
and, therefore, require higher payoffs to owners in maintaining tighter control. 
Hence, with noisier environments one would see more concentrated ownership 
structures. In addition to linearly estimating ownership concentration as a function of 
volatility, hypothesis 2 also estimates this relationship as a non-linear form by 
including the squared value of the volatility variable. Following Core and Larcker 
(2002, 327) in using the standard deviation of stock return volatility as a proxy for 
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noise. The concave relationship is captured by using the squared value of the 
volatility. Hence, at higher values of the volatility variable the increase in the 
concentration of ownership with given increase in volatility will weaken. The 
prediction is a positive-negative relationship with VOL and VOL
2
, respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between equity ownership shareholdings and 
company volatility is non-linear. 
 
Determinants of Performance 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis predicts that there is a linear relationship between 
company performance and director ownership. Most of the early studies on the 
relationship between performance and ownership were linear in form (see, for 
example, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Loderer and Martin, 1997, 235).  
 
Hypothesis 3: If company performance increases, then it has a positive 
influence on the director ownership shareholdings. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis examined here is that the performance of companies is 
non-linearly associated with the percentage of shareholdings held by directors. 
Following the results of Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Kole 
(1995); Short and Keasey (1999), Morck et al. (1988, 299) study uses pre-
determined ownership levels at 5% and 25%. The 5% because of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission‘s mandatory disclosure requirement for the US listed 
companies. The 25% cut off motivated by Weston (1979, cited in Morck et al. 1988) 
who suggests that beyond 20-30% ownership holdings it is less likely for a hostile 
bid to be successful. Others, for example, Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) 
use 5%, 10% and 20% of all outstanding shares owned by the management as fixed 
cut-offs, but their study is different as they use these ownership shareholdings to 
develop portfolios to test for abnormal returns. Since, there is no theoretical evidence 
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for using the specific ownership percentages, this thesis follows that of Short and 
Keasey (1999) and uses the square and cubic forms of managerial ownership 
holdings to determine the turning points. 
 
Therefore, as Short and Keasey suggest the variables DIR _OWNP and its 
cubic form, DIR _OWNP
3
, is expected to be positive in line with the convergence of 
interest with a positive effect on the company performance at both lower and higher 
levels of managerial ownership. The coefficient for the DIR _OWNP
2
 is expected to 
be negative indicating entrenchment. Therefore, company value should increase with 
low ownership concentration levels at low and high levels (due to the alignment-of-
interest effect) and decrease with insider ownership at in-between levels (because of 
the managerial entrenchment). Hypothesis 4 implies that DIR_OWNP is a maximum 
and DIR-OWNP- squared is a minimum (see Figure 9.1). Hypothesis 4 tests for the 
AIM companies the relationship between the performance of companies and director 
ownership is cubic in form. 
 
Figure 9.1: Company Value and Director Ownership Shareholdings 
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Hypothesis 4: Company performance increases with director ownership at low 
and high levels, due to the convergence of interest, and decreases with director 
ownership at intermediate levels, due to the managerial entrenchment.  
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Hypothesis 5 
Increasing ownership will result in positive performance, which is consistent 
with the monitoring hypothesis (De Miguel et al. 2004). However, concentrated 
ownership by the largest shareholder may result in poor performance, due to 
expropriation by the largest shareholder. The two competing theories suggest that 
company performance is a quadratic function of the largest shareholder‘s ownership. 
The coefficients of LA and LA
2 
will be positive and negative, respectively. The 
quadratic relation proposed in hypothesis 5 presents a single turning point and 
implies that ownership concentration is at a maximum (see Figure 9.2) and the 
coefficients for LA and LA
2
 will have opposite signs – a positive with lower levels 
of ownership concentration and negative with higher levels, respectively. The LA 
may or may not include directors.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Company performance increases with largest ownership 
shareholdings at low levels, due to monitoring effect, and decreases with higher 
levels of largest ownership shareholdings, due to expropriation effect. 
Figure 9.2: Company Value With Increasing Ownership Concentration 
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9.8: Empirical Results  
The descriptive statistics from Table 9.3, Panel A, depicts that the mean, 
medium and the maximum for largest five shareholders (LA5) are similar to the 
cumulative shareholdings of the institutional ownership. This suggests that the 
dominant or the major shareholders are the institutional investors. Further, the 
maximum percentage of shares held by the CEO, cumulative board director 
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ownership, the largest shareholder stands at 83%, and one conclusion is that the 
majority shareholders are board members. Table 9.3 Panel B, shows the comparison 
of aggregated director ownership over the three years. The results show that there is 
very little variation in the mean value of the director ownership holdings; however, 
the maximum has dropped from 83% to 74.8% in 2009 and to 74.4% in 2010. 
Table 9.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Variables used for the LSE AIM for the period 2008 to 2010 
 
       
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Observations 
Company Performance Variables 
TQ 1.73 1.18 10.72 0.32 1.40 391 
ROA -3.02 3.38 75.06 -390.02 30.29 391 
MBV 2.24 1.34 153.82 -81.96 9.27 389 
Ownership Variables 
CEO_OWNP 7.37 1.11 83.10 0.00 14.68 379 
DIR_OWNP 15.69 9.83 83.10 0.00 17.87 385 
INST_OWNP 43.45 44.85 93.46 0.00 22.66 391 
LARGEST(LA) 21.86 15.38 83.10 0.00 16.78 391 
LARGEST5(LA5) 45.74 43.49 89.16 0.00 18.81 391 
Control Variables 
TA 129.25 62.93 1,248.47 3.08 179.21 391 
VOL 0.16 0.13 3.69 0.02 0.21 390 
VOL^2 0.07 0.02 13.58 0.00 0.70 390 
CASH/TA 0.21 0.14 0.96 0.00 0.22 391 
PPE/TA 0.23 0.16 0.96 0.00 0.25 388 
DEBT 0.40 0.37 1.58 0.00 0.24 391 
DUMMYCEO 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 388 
INDEP 51.98 50.00 100.00 0.00 16.16 385 
LISTAGE 6.05 5.00 16.00 2.00 2.91 391 
 
Panel B Descriptive variables for Dir_ownp for each of the 3 years 
 
 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Observations 
2008 16.17 9.91 83.10 0.00 18.53 130 
2009 15.76 10.65 73.77 0.00 17.61 129 
2010 15.11 7.94 73.44 0.00 17.56 126 
 
Table 9.4 shows a comparison of the levels of managerial ownership reported 
by previous researchers. Comparisons of managerial ownership levels in previous 
studies show a wide range across the mean and median values depending on the 
country and the stock market used. For example, the director ownership mean for 
AIM is 15.8%, and median is 9.8% compared to Short et al. (1999) who use UK data 
for the year 1992 find that both the mean and median are lower at 11.5% and 4.1%, 
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respectively. Morck et al. (1988) use a 1980 sample for US companies report much 
lower figures for the mean and median, 10.6% and 3.4%, respectively. However, in 
comparison to Drakos and Bekiris (2010) who use a sample of companies listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange report much higher mean and median figures, 38.7% and 
41.6%, respectively. 
 
Table 9.4: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics for Managerial Ownership 
 This study Short and 
Keasey 
(1999) 
Morck et al. 
(1988) 
Drakos and 
Bekiris 
(2010)) 
Period/Year 2008-2010 1992 1980 2000-2004 
Country/Mar
ket 
UK (AIM) UK 
(Main 
market) 
USA 
(Fortune 500) 
Athens Stock 
Exchange 
Mean 15.79 11.50 10.60 38.70 
Median 9.77 4.10 3.40 41.60 
Maximum 83.10 75.30  92.70 
Minimum 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Std. Dev. 17.79 15.50  27.84 
 
Table 9.5 shows the correlation between the variables and supports the claim 
that the regressions are not affected by multi-collinearity. However, in Table 9.5, 
correlation greater than 0.7 is between LA and LA5 but these variables do not appear 
in the same regression, so the strong correlation does not matter. Table 9.5 shows 
that CEO_OWNP and DIR_OWNP correlate negatively with INST_OWNP (0.35 
and 0.52, respectively). This is as expected since one would expect that inside 
owners will sell their shares for various reasons and mainly the institutional 
shareholders will purchase these shares. The CEO_OWNP and DIR_OWNP 
correlate positively with the LARGEST and the LARGEST5 shareholders, but not so 
much to qualify that these measures may be redundant if the other is used. Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001, 215) find that the correlation between the five largest 
shareholders and the management is positive, but has a moderate correlation. Hence, 
they suggest, with all else equal, a study that uses both measures together would 
provide a more accurate picture of the ownership-performance relationship.
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Table 9.5: Correlation Matrix  
Three-year period 2008 to 2010 for AIM sample of companies. Included observations: 391 after adjustments. Pairwise samples 
 
 
 
C
E
O
_
O
W
N
P
 
D
IR
_
O
W
N
P
 
IN
S
T
_
O
W
N
P
 
L
A
R
G
E
S
T
 
L
A
R
G
E
S
T
5
 
T
Q
 
R
O
A
 
M
B
V
 
L
O
G
(T
A
) 
V
O
L
 
V
O
L
^
2
 
D
E
B
T
 
P
P
E
/T
A
 
D
U
M
M
Y
C
E
O
 
IN
D
E
P
 
C
A
S
H
/T
A
 
L
O
G
(L
IS
T
A
G
E
) 
CEO_OWNP  1                 
DIR_OWNP  0.62 1                
INST_OWNP  -0.35 -0.52 1               
LARGEST (LA) 0.46 0.44 0.17 1              
LARGEST5(LA5) 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.83 1             
TQ  -0.06 -0.12 0.13 -0.06 -0.03 1            
ROA  -0.04 0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.09 -0.13 1           
MBV  -0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.04 1          
LOG(TA)  0.01 -0.05 0.1 0.09 0.05 -0.32 0.27 -0.04 1         
VOL  -0.05 -0.1 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 0.21 -0.21 0.04 -0.11 1        
VOL^2  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.19 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.91 1       
DEBT  0.04 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.05 -0.19 -0.06 0.01 0.34 -0.08 -0.08 1      
PPE/TA  0.12 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.18 0.09 -0.04 0.26 -0.09 -0.06 0.16 1     
DUMMYCEO  -0.38 -0.17 0.02 -0.22 -0.19 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.08 0 0.01 0.02 -0.15 1    
INDEP  -0.13 -0.24 0.14 0 0 0.02 -0.21 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.1 1   
CASH/TA  0.01 0.1 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.46 -0.24 0.05 -0.34 0.14 0.1 -0.37 -0.39 -0.02 0.08 1  
LOG(LISTAGE)  0 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.1 0.1 0.03 -0.1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.1 -0.08 -0.11 1 
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This section focuses to explain the level of ownership shareholdings and 
relationship with company performance and company specific control variables. 
Table 9.2 shows the definition of each variable used in this chapter. To summarise, 
Equations 9.1 and 9.2 allows studying ownership determinants for the AIM 
companies. The models use the following forms: 
Equation 9.1 
=  OWNERSHIP  
ε+(LISTAGE)LOG β+INDEPβ+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+
+VOLβ+DEBTβ+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α
9876
543210
 
(1) 
Equation 9.2 
=  OWNERSHIP  
ε+(LISTAGE)LOG β+INDEPβ+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+
VOLβ+VOLβ+DEBTβ+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+ TQβ+α
10987
2
6543210
 
(2) 
Equation 9.3 
=  EPERFORMANC
  
+ε(LISTAGE)LOGINDEP+βDUMMYCEO+β+β
CASH/TA+VOL+βDEBT+βPPE/TA+β+β
LOG(TA)+ βINST_OWNP+DIR_OWNP+β+βα
1098
7654
3210
 
(3) 
Equation 9.4 
=  EPERFORMANC
 
ε+(LISTAGE)LOG β
+INDEPβ+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+
+VOLβ+DEBTβ+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+INST_OWNPβ+
+DIR_OWNPβ+DIR_OWNPβ+DIR_OWNPβ+α
12
11109
87654
3
3
2
210
+
 
(4) 
Equation 9.5 
=  EPERFORMANC
 
ε+(LISTAGE)LOGβ+INDEPβ +
+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+VOLβ+DEBTβ+
+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+LAβ+LAβ+α
109
8765
43
2
210
 
(5) 
 
Ownership shareholdings regression on TQ  
Table 9.6 reports the results of the determinants of director ownership 
shareholdings defined by Equation 9.1. For robustness, the dependent variable 
includes different measures of ownership shareholdings of CEO_OWNP, 
INST_OWNP, LA and LA5. Each of the specification includes the same control 
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variables as per Equation 9.1. Panel A shows the regression results without company 
fixed-effects and Panel B shows the regression results with company fixed effect. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985); (Himmelberg et al. 1999) control for industries, but this 
study does not control specifically for industries as the sample includes companies 
from all non-financial sectors on the AIM. 
 
Table 9.6 Panel A, without fixed-effects shows a negative association 
between the CEO_OWNP and the variables TQ, VOL, DUMMYCEO and INDEP 
and statistically significant at 5%. CEO_OWNP has a positive association with 
PPE/TA and CASH/TA and statistically significant at 5%.There is no association 
with LOG (TA), DEBT and LOG (LISTAGE). 
 
Panel A, without fixed-effects shows a negative association between 
DIR_OWNP and the variables TQ, LOG (TA), DUMMYCEO, INDEP and LOG 
(LISTAGE) and statistically significant at 5%. DIR_OWNP has a positive 
association with PPE/TA, DEBT and CASH/TA and statistically significant at 5%. 
The association between the variables DIR_OWNP and VOL is weak at the 10% 
significance level. 
 
Panel A, without fixed-effects shows a negative association between the 
INST_OWNP and the variables DEBT and CASH/TA and statistically significant at 
5%. INST_OWNP shows a positive association with TQ, LOG (TA) and INDEP and 
significant at 5%. With VOL, it is weakly associated at 10% significance level. The 
positive TQ results show that INST_OWNP are complementary to that of 
DIR_OWNP. 
 
Panel A, without fixed-effects shows a negative association between the 
dependent variable LA is and DUMMYCEO and INDEP and statistically significant 
at 5%. LA has a positive association with LOG (TA), PPE/TA, DEBT, CASH/TA 
and INDEP and significant at 5%. With VOL, it is weakly associated at 10% 
significance level. LA only explains 8% of the variance. 
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Panel A, without fixed-effects shows a negative association between the LA5 
dependent variable and DUMMYCEO and statistically significant at 5%. LA5 has a 
positive association with PPE/TA and CASH/TA and statistically significant at 5%. 
LA5 only explains 8% of the variance.  
 
The expectation was that company performance would increase with the 
increase in equity ownership; however, the results suggest that with the increase in 
the equity ownership is associated with a decrease in TQ for all the dependent 
variables except the INST_OWNP. This evidence contradicts the interpretation of 
agency theory that higher managerial ownership increases shareholder wealth and 
aligns the interests of the principal and the agents. The positive association between 
INST_OWNP and TQ suggests that institutional investors are investing in companies 
with high returns or influencing the management to make better decisions. The 
positive association between INST_OWNP and log (TA) suggests that the former 
have higher investment in larger companies and owners are selling their stake to 
realise their investment, or they need the finance to expand. 
 
Table 9.6 Panel B, inclusion of fixed-effects, shows an association between 
the CEO_OWNP and TQ, but DIR_OWNP and INST_OWNP drop out. Controlling 
for firm fixed-effects the results show that increasing managerial ownership may 
affect performance. Short and Keasey (1999, 94) find that institutional and large 
shareholders do not support an independent effect on the performance of the 
companies. So find that both variables have a positive coefficient but statistically 
insignificant. In this analysis, institutional and the largest shareholder have a 
negative and positive coefficients, respectively and statistically insignificant. The 
findings that institutional ownership have no effect on company performance is 
contrary to that of the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990) who report a 
positive coefficient and statistically significant. Although there is no statistical 
significance with the institutional shareholder, but the direction of the coefficient is 
as expected, due to complementariness. 
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Panel B, inclusion of fixed-effects, there is no association between 
CEO_OWNP and LOG (TA).There are several reasons to explain this. First, the 
CEOs are new and recruited externally and, therefore, have little or no 
shareholdings. Second, the CEOs may have sold their shares to outsiders to realise 
their cash. With the DIR_OWNP, LA and LA5 ownerships, the shareholdings 
decrease with an increase in company size. Hence, as the company size increases, 
and the companies need to expand, the shares are sold to outsiders, may be to the 
institutional shareholder, and hence the institutional shareholding increase with an 
increase in company size. There is a good association between ownership and 
PPE/TA; however, the coefficients for institutional, LA and LA5 are negative. 
Increasing investment in PPE/TA suggests that the CEO and directors are unwilling 
to reduce their shareholdings because increasing the investment in the capital 
expenditure suggests that the company is growing, and there is potential for higher 
value of the share price in the future. Ownership variables and DEBT has a negative 
coefficient but is not statistically significant. LA5 show a weak positive association 
with VOL. LA5 and CASH/TA shows a positive coefficient and statistically 
significant at 5%.  
 
The governance variable, DUMMYCEO, has a negative coefficient and 
statistically significant with CEO ownership holdings. A score of zero does not 
matter since the coefficient is negative. It is predicting that if CEO and chairman 
roles are combined there should be higher ownership (i.e. coefficient should be 
positive). The results for director and the largest shareholder ownership are similar 
since CEO is part of director ownership and in these companies where the CEO and 
chairman are the same individual and therefore likely that the largest shareholder is 
the same person. 
 
INDEP is only statistically significant with director ownership holdings. A 
key factor to notice is that the association of DUMMYCEO with ownership. Since 
the coefficient is negative, it suggests that the score of zero, that is, when the same 
individual holds the CEO and chairman roles, does not matter. Comparing the 
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duality role of the CEO and chairman suggests that the separation of the roles results 
in a drop, in the ownership. 
 
Finally, ownership shows relationship with LOG (LISTAGE). However, the 
direction varies depending on the measure of ownership.  
 
The regression in Equation 9.1 was re-run using ROA as the firm 
performance. The following results show: DIR_OWNP, LA and LA5 the coefficients 
were positive and statistically significant, whereas CEO_OWNP and INST_OWNP 
showed no significant association with ROA.  
.
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Table 9.6: Ownership Shareholdings Regression on TQ  
ε)LISTAGE(LOGβINDEPβDUMMYCEOβTA/CASHβVOLβDEBTβTA/PPEβ)TA(LOGβTQβαOWNERSHIP 9876543210 ++++++++++=
  
Equation 9.1  
White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected); Method: Ordinary least squares  
 Panel A: no Fixed -Effects Panel B : With Fixed -Effects 
Dep. Var: CEO_ 
OWNP 
DIR_ 
OWNP 
INST_ 
OWNP 
LA LA5 CEO_ 
OWNP 
DIR_ 
OWNP 
INST_ 
OWNP 
LA LA5 
           C  30.84  45.17  18.03  26.85  55.57  24.00  35.52  29.16  37.06  64.82 
 [20.89]** [30.13]** [3.52]** [11.76]** [7.57]** [9.01]** [39.14]** [4.24]** [5.96]** [7.23]** 
TQ -1.24 -2.87  3.79 -0.89 -0.98 -0.22 -0.15 -0.09  0.12 -0.52 
 [-4.54]** [-6.74]** [14.30]** [-1.52] [-1.55] [-3.25]** [-1.84] [-0.38] [0.62] [-2.37]* 
LOG(TA) -0.64 -1.17  3.25  0.81  0.83  0.08 -2.58  1.56 -2.43 -5.71 
 [-1.59] [-5.99]** [8.70]** [2.86]** [1.82] [0.21] [-8.42]** [1.98]* [-2.78]** [-14.59]** 
PPE/TA  6.87  10.62 -6.35  3.72  5.67  2.70  6.33 -12.49 -6.50 -15.40 
 [29.01]** [4.62]** [-1.72] [4.68]** [63.10]** [3.80]** [7.19]** [-9.21]** [-2.42]* [-33.38]** 
DEBT  4.52  4.98 -3.24  5.32  2.69 -4.29 -1.17 -4.07 -2.19 -0.72 
 [1.59] [5.34]** [-2.67]** [5.54]** [1.28] [-1.70] [-1.68] [-1.32] [-0.85] [-0.51] 
VOL -2.13 -6.12 -4.90 -2.73 -5.01  0.11 -0.45 -1.22 -0.60  1.47 
 [-85.39]** [-1.99]* [-2.14]* [-1.76] [-2.45]* [0.64] [-0.58] [-1.69] [-0.68] [2.38]* 
CASH/TA  9.14  23.19 -16.69  5.26  10.49 -2.76 -0.20  1.41 -0.80 -6.10 
 [4.99]** [6.34]** [-4.66]** [3.04]** [15.21]** [-1.27] [-0.29] [0.22] [-0.32] [-3.48]** 
DUMMYCEO -16.12 -9.66  2.79 -10.71 -11.28 -9.11 -2.87 -7.99 -7.78 -8.62 
 [-26.21]** [-11.92]** [1.68] [-7.91]** [-6.46]** [-81.95]** [-3.88]** [-1.35] [-8.24]** [-1.95] 
INDEP -0.18 -0.33  0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02  0.05 
 [-16.80]** [-12.32]** [5.23]** [-3.10]** [-1.30] [-0.97] [-2.65]** [-0.33] [-0.45] [0.82] 
LOG(LISTAGE) -0.42 -1.52  0.02  0.09 -1.47 -3.56 -1.03  12.48  3.04  9.05 
 [-0.98] [-4.92]** [0.01] [0.16] [-0.82] [-10.09]** [-11.80]** [20.39]** [8.70]** [7.45]** 
           
Observations: 366 372 378 378 378 366 372 378 378 378 
R-squared: 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.94 0.97 0.86 0.92 0.83 
           t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
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Ownership and company volatility 
Table 9.7 shows results for Equation 9.2. The regression of CEO and director 
ownership on volatility, in Panel A, shows a non-linear relationship, negative – 
positive, for VOL and VOL squared, respectively. Both the coefficients are 
statistically significant, at 10% for CEO_OWNP and 5% for DIR_OWNP. In 
comparison to Table 9.6, the difference in variance is almost negligible. With the 
inclusion of fixed -effects, the statistical significance disappears.  
 
With the institutional shareholders as the dependent variable, Table 9.7, in 
Panel A the coefficients for VOL and VOL square are positive and negative, 
respectively, and statistically significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
However,   with the inclusion of fixed-effects the significance disappears, in Panel B. 
The direction of the coefficients is as expected due to complementariness between 
the director ownership and institutional ownership. For example, in older companies 
it is less likely that the founders are still holding large amounts of shareholdings and 
institutional owners replace the director or CEO shareholdings. Table 9.7, Panel A 
shows no association with VOL and VOL-squared for the LA and LA5. However, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use LA5 as the dependent variable, find that the linear 
estimation of the ownership concentration as a function of volatility gives a positive 
coefficient, and a negative coefficient with the square form. In both cases, they are 
statistically significant. Therefore, at higher levels of volatility variable has a 
diminishing effect on the ownership concentration. Although Demsetz and Lehn do 
not use the fixed-effects, they do control for three industrial sectors. These results are 
similar to Himmelberg et al. (1999, 372). Holderness (2009, 1391) suggests that 
large shareholders may be under-diversified, and the optimal level of block 
ownership should decline as volatility increases. 
 
 With the inclusion of fixed-effects, the CEO_OWNP, DIR_OWNP and 
INST_OWNP and their square forms are no longer significant. However, only LA5 
shows a weak association with VOL and VOL square and the direction of the 
coefficient changing form positive to negative. The fixed-effects can be explained by 
taking each company‘s observations and doing the regression of just those 
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observations for each individual company, where the regression is correcting for 
differences in each company from period to period. Hence, the heterogeneity of each 
company is different and some variables show variations in the ownership structure 
not explained by the different companies. That is, unobserved heterogeneity can 
explain the large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in the ownership. For 
example, it is questionable as to why CEO _OWNP with the fixed-effects has a 
lower ownership in comparison to the coefficient in Panel A that excludes fixed-
effects. 
 
The regressions have been run without fixed effects and with inclusion of 
fixed effects correcting for heterogeneity across the companies in the sample. The 
ownership variable is likely to be stable for each company in different periods, 
whereas across the companies is going to be different. A likely explanation for 
heterogeneity of ownership for this sample is that some variations are still providing 
as a prediction part, but it is possible that there will be collinearity between the 
variables.
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Table 9.7: Ownership Shareholdings Regression on Company Volatility 
ε+E)LOG(LISTAGβ+INDEPβ+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+
VOLβ+VOLβ+DEBTβ+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α=OWNERSHIP
10987
2
6543210
         Equation 9.2 
 Panel A: Without Fixed-Effects Panel B: With Fixed-Effects 
Dep. Var: CEO_OWNP DIR_OWNP INST_OWNP LA LA5 CEO_OWNP DIR_OWNP INST_OWNP LA LA5 
C 32.07 48.04 15.11 27.11 55.40 24.57 37.22 26.45 36.46 60.25 
 [14.91]** [30.33]** [3.27]** [10.98]** [8.56]** [6.74]** [20.57]** [2.52]* [5.08]** [7.87]** 
TQ -1.25 -2.88 3.81 -0.89 -0.98 -0.22 -0.15 -0.09 0.12 -0.52 
 [-4.30]** [-6.34]** [14.41]** [-1.51] [-1.56] [-3.13]** [-1.62] [-0.32] [0.61] [-1.91] 
LOG(TA) -0.67 -1.25 3.34 0.80 0.83 0.03 -2.70 1.75 -2.38 -5.39 
 [-1.61] [-6.28]** [9.05]** [3.18]** [1.97]* [0.07] [-7.75]** [1.73] [-2.45]* [-8.77]** 
PPE/TA 6.71 10.26 -5.98 3.69 5.69 2.54 5.87 -11.65 -6.31 -13.98 
 [33.60]** [4.90]** [-1.73] [4.06]** [60.21]** [5.67]** [8.64]** [-5.17]** [-2.67]** [-18.42]** 
DEBT 4.65 5.35 -3.58 5.35 2.67 -4.21 -0.92 -4.46 -2.28 -1.38 
 [1.70] [7.94]** [-4.05]** [5.16]** [1.19] [-1.69] [-1.07] [-1.23] [-0.89] [-1.26] 
VOL -9.89 -25.41 14.23 -4.41 -3.87 -1.04 -4.25 4.72 0.72 11.46 
 [-2.23]* [-3.89]** [2.22]* [-0.58] [-0.45] [-0.38] [-0.96] [0.48] [0.23] [2.16]* 
VOL^2 2.54 6.34 -6.29 0.55 -0.37 0.36 1.18 -1.84 -0.41 -3.10 
 [2.12]* [3.52]** [-3.58]** [0.28] [-0.17] [0.45] [0.99] [-0.64] [-0.60] [-2.37]* 
CASH/TA 9.29 23.52 -17.00 5.29 10.47 -2.89 -0.61 2.06 -0.65 -5.01 
 [4.96]** [6.38]** [-4.91]** [2.96]** [15.97]** [-1.43] [-1.14] [0.37] [-0.29] [-3.29]** 
DUMMYCEO -16.22 -9.86 3.00 -10.72 -11.26 -9.22 -3.15 -7.57 -7.69 -7.91 
 [-33.19]** [-9.45]** [1.98]* [-7.72]** [-6.68]** [-26.15]** [-3.06]** [-1.13] [-6.92]** [-1.79] 
INDEP -0.18 -0.32 0.19 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 
 [-15.44]** [-14.00]** [4.25]** [-2.76]** [-1.23] [-0.94] [-2.53]* [-0.30] [-0.43] [0.85] 
LOG(LISTAGE) -0.47 -1.65 0.16 0.08 -1.46 -3.61 -1.17 12.73 3.09 9.47 
 [-1.34] [-3.72]** [0.08] [0.13] [-0.82] [-11.10]** [-5.33]** [21.33]** [8.33]** [10.98]** 
Observations: 366 372 378 378 378 366 372 378 378 378 
R-squared: 0.21 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.94 0.97 0.86 0.92 0.83 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Linear relationship between company performance and director ownership 
Table 9.8, presents the results of equation 9.3 where performance is the 
dependent variable and the key independent variable are director ownership. Panel 
A, without firm fixed-effect, shows that for every 1% increase in director ownership 
there is a drop in TQ ratio by 0.0073 points, but is moderately significant. The 
negative relationship between performance and director ownership is in contrast to 
what the theory suggests, as the expectation was to have a positive coefficient to 
reflect the increase in company value from savings by reducing the monitoring costs 
by outside shareholders. With institutional investors, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. The LOG (TA), DEBT, VOL, CASH/TA and DUMMYCEO 
control variables are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
Panel A, shows that the regression of ROA on DIR_OWNP gives a positive 
coefficient and statistically significant. The positive relation between the accounting 
measure of profit and director ownership suggests that managers increase their 
shareholdings in companies that are profitable. With ROA and institutional investor, 
the coefficient is positive but not significant. These results are similar to those of 
Short and Keasey (1999) that coefficients on the variable INST_OWNP is positive 
but statistically insignificant. The finding that company performance has no 
association with institutional ownership contrasts with that of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) who find a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
the two variables.  
 
Table 9.8, Panel B, shows the results with firm-fixed-effects. The relationship 
with TQ and DIR_OWNP is negative and statistically insignificant. ROA has a 
positive coefficient and significant. ROA shows a linear relationship with director 
ownership. With institutional investors, the coefficient is negative and statistically 
insignificant. 
 
An explanation of the contrasting results with different performance variable 
is due to the difference measures that each variable is measuring, TQ measures 
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growth opportunities and directors may be holding onto shares for the long-term 
gain. 
In general, the estimated regressions explain 32% to 26% of the variation in 
the dependent variables, TQ and ROA, respectively. However, the R-squared with 
MBV is very low at 1%, and I feel that the MBV measure in this chapter is a suspect. 
 
Table 9.8:Performance Regression On Ownership Shareholdings- Linear Model 
ε+E)LOG(LISTAGβ+INDEPβ+DUMMYCEOβ+CASH/TAβ+
+VOLβ+DEBTβ+PPE/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+INST_OWNPβ+DIR_OWNPβ+α=ERFORMANCEP
10987
6543210
 
Equation 9.3  
White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected). Method:Ordinary least squares  
 
Panel A: no Fixed-Effects 
 
Panel B: with Fixed-Effects 
 
Dep. Var: TQ ROA MBV TQ ROA MBV 
C  1.45 -22.61 -1.32 -0.50 -38.45 -13.43 
 [4.17]** [-3.56]** [-0.60] [-0.57] [-3.41]** [-5.58]** 
DIR_OWNP -0.01  0.29 -0.01 -0.01  0.99 -0.04 
 [-46.51]** [10.48]** [-0.53] [-1.27] [5.89]** [-0.75] 
INST_OWNP  0.01  0.03  0.03 -0.00 -0.06  0.02 
 [3.97]** [0.81] [1.73] [-0.72] [-0.46] [1.60] 
LOG(TA) -0.23  8.91 -0.20  0.13  22.49  0.88 
 [-18.16]** [4.28]** [-0.31] [0.49] [5.77]** [1.11] 
PPE/TA  0.30 -2.31 -0.64 -0.29 -12.68  1.73 
 [1.08] [-0.97] [-0.41] [-0.64] [-1.21] [0.96] 
DEBT  0.29 -35.13  1.61  1.23 -91.79 -0.86 
 [3.85]** [-1.48] [0.24] [3.21]** [-8.66]** [-0.18] 
VOL  0.89 -19.13  1.53  1.08  1.62  2.95 
 [3.92]** [-2.37]* [3.30]** [6.75]** [0.32] [3.14]** 
CASH/TA  2.91 -29.96  2.31  3.23  18.44  7.34 
 [11.58]** [-2.09]* [6.88]** [12.04]** [1.35] [2.78]** 
DUMMYCEO -0.28  10.45  0.24 -0.20 -4.38  0.19 
 [-3.16]** [4.27]** [1.59] [-1.50] [-1.20] [0.61] 
INDEP -0.01 -0.32  0.01 -0.02 -0.19  0.07 
 [-5.79]** [-6.64]** [0.69] [-3.21]** [-2.13]* [1.56] 
LOG(LISTAGE)  0.38  5.06  0.79  0.91 -13.64  3.51 
 [2.54]* [3.29]** [0.64] [57.69]** [-3.15]** [1.05] 
       
Observations: 372 372 370 372 372 370 
R-squared: 0.32 0.26 0.01 0.75 0.87 0.10 
F-statistic: 16.73 12.95 0.46 5.23 11.84 0.20 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively 
 
Cubic relationship between company performance and director ownership   
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Table 9.9, Panel A (without company fixed-effects), presents the results of 
the hypothesis that the relationship between the company performance and 
managerial ownership is cubic (Equation 9.4). In terms of the TQ, the OLS 
regression results provide the positive – negative – positive signs as expected. Both 
DIR_OWNP and its cubic form give a positive coefficient, but are statistically 
insignificant (similar to Morck et al. (1988) who find that at higher levels of 
managerial ownership the coefficient is positive but insignificant). The coefficient 
for the square form of DIR_OWNP is negative and as per the other two managerial 
is not statistically significant. The predicted signs are consistent with that found by 
Short and Keasey (1999), but Short and Keasey‘s study find the coefficients on the 
three ownership variables to be statistically significant. The OLS results for the three 
managerial ownership variables may not support hypothesis 4. The institutional 
shareholder ownership holdings shows a positive coefficient for all three-
performance variables, but is statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence 
for TQ only, in Table 9.9 Panel A, but insignificant for ROA and MBV.  
 
For ROA, the three ownership variables show the opposite signs to the 
expected one. The direction of the coefficient of DIR_OWNP squared is positive, 
DIR_OWNP cubed is negative, and both are statistically significant, whereas the 
DIR_OWNP is negative and statistically insignificant. The signs are opposite to that 
for TQ. The coefficient for institutional shareholder is positive but not statistically 
significant. The following variables are statistically significant: LOG (TA), 
DUMMYCEO, INDEP and LOG (LISTAGE) at 5% significance. VOL and 
CASH/TA variables are significant at 10% level. Interestingly, debt is not significant 
for ROA. This contrasts the results obtained by (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Short 
and Keasey 1999). 
 
Finally, for MBV the three ownership variables show the opposite signs to 
the expected one (similar to ROA). Both the DIR_OWNP and DIR_OWNP cubed 
are negative and statistically insignificant, whereas the DIR_OWNP squared is 
positive and statistically insignificant. With MBV as the dependent variable, VOL 
and CASH/TA are statistically significant. However, with or without fixed-effects 
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the adjusted R squared is very low and negative. I believe that the measurement of 
MBV is suspect. 
 
Using the company fixed-effects, Panel B, consistency of the signs between 
TQ and DIR_OWNP, DIR_OWNP squared and DIR_OWNP cubed from the results 
without fixed-effects is not consistent. With TQ, the results do not show the 
predicted signs for the cubic relationship, that is, the results are negative – negative – 
positive.  
 
With ROA, the direction of the coefficient is positive - positive - negative. 
DIR_OWNP squared, and DIR_OWNP cubes are statistically significant at 5% level. 
In the cross-sectional with company fixed-effects, the adjusted R- square increases to 
75% and 87% for TQ and ROA, respectively. However, there was no significant 
change when using MBV as dependent variables. The results suggest that the 
independent variables as determinants of MBV cannot explain the variations. For 
MBV, the adjusted R-squared with or without the fixed-effect has very low 
explanatory power and hence is dropped from further analysis.
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Table 9.9: Performance and Director Ownership - Cubic Relationship 






)(12
1110/987/6
)(5_4
3_3
2_2_10
LISTAGELOG
INDEPDUMMYCEOTACASHVOLDEBTTAPPE
TALOGOW NPINSTOW NPDIROW NPDIROW NPDIREPERFORMANC
 Equation 9.4  
OLS regression with company performance as the dependent variable using panel data 
White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected)  
 Panel A: no Fixed-Effects 
 
Panel B: with Fixed-Effects 
 
Dep. Var: TQ ROA MBV TQ ROA MBV 
       
C  1.27 -18.42 -0.70 -0.50 -34.33 -10.95 
 [2.33]* [-2.44]* [-0.22] [-0.66] [-2.38]* [-4.31]** 
       
DIR_OWNP  0.02 -0.38 -0.08 -0.00  0.01 -0.64 
 [0.67] [-1.43] [-0.57] [-0.11] [0.08] [-1.63] 
       
(DIR_OWNP)^2 -0.00  0.03  0.00 -0.00  0.03  0.02 
 [-1.31] [3.26]** [0.42] [-0.14] [3.18]** [1.65] 
       
(DIR_OWNP)^3  0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 [1.52] [-3.79]** [-0.27] [0.18] [-3.11]** [-1.66] 
       
INST_OWNP  0.01  0.02  0.03 -0.00 -0.04  0.03 
 [3.19]** [0.60] [1.82] [-0.92] [-0.35] [6.33]** 
       
LOG(TA) -0.23  8.87 -0.24  0.13  22.61  0.98 
 [-12.31]** [4.22]** [-0.35] [0.48] [5.52]** [1.42] 
       
PPE/TA  0.30 -2.40 -0.69 -0.29 -13.30  1.40 
 [1.11] [-1.10] [-0.43] [-0.67] [-1.29] [0.82] 
       
DEBT  0.31 -35.44  1.71  1.22 -91.14 -0.41 
 [4.82]** [-1.49] [0.25] [3.11]** [-8.61]** [-0.08] 
       
VOL  0.89 -19.38  1.40  1.08  1.39  2.83 
 [3.58]** [-2.33]* [2.33]* [6.49]** [0.28] [3.72]** 
       
CASH/TA  2.95 -30.47  2.45  3.22  18.46  7.37 
 [11.99]** [-2.08]* [11.06]** [12.08]** [1.37] [2.60]** 
       
DUMMYCEO -0.27  10.26  0.29 -0.20 -4.12  0.33 
 [-3.04]** [4.33]** [1.81] [-1.58] [-1.02] [0.64] 
       
INDEP -0.00 -0.33  0.01 -0.02 -0.19  0.06 
 [-3.19]** [-6.38]** [0.68] [-3.21]** [-2.01]* [1.39] 
       
LOG(LISTAGE)  0.41  4.66  0.84  0.91 -14.23  3.06 
 [2.57]* [3.67]** [0.68] [27.52]** [-3.46]** [0.93] 
       
       Observations: 372 372 370 372 372 370 
R-squared: 0.33 0.27 0.01 0.75 0.87 0.11 
F-statistic: 14.45 11.11 0.43 5.12 11.70 0.21 
       
       
       t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Equation 9.4 is repeated, but in a hierarchical form. Table 9.10, Panel A, 
Model 1 refers to when only director ownership variable is used as one of the 
predictors in Model 1. Model 2 refers to the inclusion of the square of the 
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DIROWNP is added to the first model. Model 3 refers to when DIROWNP cube 
form is added to Model 2. All three models include the same control variables. 
Model 1 accounts for 32% of the variation in the TQ, The results show that 
DIR_OWNP is negative, not in line with the alignment hypothesis, it is found to be 
statistically significant. Addition of DIR_OWNP
2
, there is no change in the R-
squared and found not to be statistically significant. Addition of DIR_OWNP
3 
the R-
squared increases to 33%, but shows no statistical significance. The addition of 
DIR_OWNP square and cube form does not contribute to the hypothesis of non-
linear association between corporate performance and the proportion of shares 
owned by board directors, ability to predict the performance of AIM companies. 
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Table 9.10: Tobin‘s Q on stepwise inclusion of ownership variable 
Dep. Var. TQ Panel A: Without Fixed-Effects Panel B: With Fixed-Effects 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C  1.45  1.52  1.27 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 
 [4.17]** [3.81]** [2.33]* [-0.57] [-0.63] [-0.66] 
       
DIR_OWNP -0.01 -0.02  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 [-46.51]** [-2.89]** [0.67] [-1.27] [-0.43] [-0.11] 
       
(DIR_OWNP)^2  0.00  0.00   0.00  0.00 
  [1.26] [-1.31]  [0.02] [-0.14] 
       
(DIR_OWNP)^3   0.00    0.00 
   [1.52]   [0.18] 
       
INST_OWNP  0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 [3.97]** [3.70]** [3.19]** [-0.72] [-0.80] [-0.92] 
       
LOG(TA) -0.23 -0.24 -0.23  0.13  0.13  0.13 
 [-18.16]** [-15.19]** [-12.31]** [0.49] [0.50] [0.48] 
       
PPE/TA  0.30  0.29  0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 
 [1.08] [1.07] [1.11] [-0.64] [-0.67] [-0.67] 
       
DEBT  0.29  0.30  0.31  1.23  1.23  1.22 
 [3.85]** [3.93]** [4.82]** [3.21]** [3.22]** [3.11]** 
       
VOL  0.89  0.87  0.89  1.08  1.08  1.08 
 [3.92]** [3.66]** [3.58]** [6.75]** [6.62]** [6.49]** 
       
CASH/TA  2.91  2.93  2.95  3.23  3.23  3.22 
 [11.58]** [12.50]** [11.99]** [12.04]** [11.60]** [12.08]** 
       
DUMMYCEO -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
 [-3.16]** [-2.91]** [-3.04]** [-1.50] [-1.59] [-1.58] 
       
INDEP -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-5.79]** [-4.33]** [-3.19]** [-3.21]** [-3.20]** [-3.21]** 
       
LOG(LISTAGE)  0.38  0.39  0.41  0.91  0.91  0.91 
 [2.54]* [2.70]** [2.57]* [57.69]** [70.52]** [27.52]** 
       
Observations: 372 372 372 372 372 372 
R-squared: 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.75 0.75 0.75 
F-statistic: 16.73 15.25 14.45 5.23 5.17 5.12 
       
       t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 9.11 Panel A and Panel B, reports the results of Hypothesis 5 without 
fixed-effects and with fixed-effects, respectively. The analysis shows that the 
inclusion of the largest (LA) shareholder ownership and its square allows testing for 
the monitoring and expropriation effects. The quadratic relation proposed here 
presents only one turning point. A graph of performance as a function of largest 
shareholder's holding - performance will be rising to begin with as LA increases (the 
motivation effect), will reach a maximum (the turning point or breakpoint De Miguel 
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et al. (2004), and then decrease as LA increases further (the entrenchment effect – 
see Figure 9.1). The slope or gradient of the line is given by the first derivative (or 
first differential) of the performance function. Since, the performance function has 
variables other than LA and LA
2
 in it, one need to calculate the partial derivative 
relative to LA to work out the slope relative to LA. In a partial differentiation, the 
performance depends on several variables, not just on LA. Using partially 
differentiate with respect to LA all the other variables are held constant, and the first 
derivative of a constant is zero, so all these other terms drop out and do not feature in 
the first partial derivative. The slope of ‘an increasing function’ is positive and of a 
falling function is negative, so at the turning point where the function switches from 
increasing to decreasing, the slope must be zero. If the performance function is, for 
example, TQ = α + β1LA + β2LA
2
 + [other terms], then the first derivative relative to 
LA is β1 + 2β2LA, and at the turning point this equals zero. Therefore, rearranging 
the terms gives -β1 = 2β2LA, or LA = - β1/2 β2. As expected one of these coefficients 
(β2) to be negative and the other (β1) to be positive, this suggests that the turning 
point will be a positive value of LA. Assuming partial derivative equals zero, this 
turning point for the largest shareholding = - β1LA /2β2LA
2
. Since the estimated 
values for β1 and β2 are respectively 0.0288, and -0.0004 gives 36%. This estimation 
does not hold without fixed-effects, as the signs for LA and LA
2
 are negative and 
positive, but statistically significant. 
 
The results of the regression using ROA as the dependent variable, in Table 
9.11 the expected signs of the coefficients on the variables LA and LA
2
 are as 
predicted in Hypothesis 5, that is, β1 and β1 is positive and negative, respectively. 
This positive-negative direction of the two coefficients confirms the quadratic 
relationship between ROA and the largest shareholder ownership holdings. These 
results suggest that the AIM companies‘ performance rises with increase in the 
largest shareholder concentration. This is in line with the monitoring effect provided 
by the concentrated shareholding of the largest shareholder. However, beyond this 
turning point, the performance is negatively affected by the largest shareholder 
ownership concentration. This suggests that at very high levels of blockholder there 
is potential of expropriation of minority shareholders in the AIM companies. 
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The coefficient value using MBV, as the dependent performance the 
coefficients of LA and LA
2
 are not statistically significant and do not show the 
monitoring and the expropriation effects. The reason for this may be the financial 
crisis for the years 2008 and 2009 resulting in showing that the relationship is not 
statistically significant. 
.Table 9.11: Performance and non-linear relationship with largest shareholding 
εE)LOG(LISTAGβINDEPβDUMMYCEOβCASH/TAβ
VOLβ DEBTβPPE/TAβLOG(TA)βLAβLAβα  EPERFORMANC
10987
6543
2
210
++++++
++++++++=
  
Equation 9.5 
Ordinary least squares regression with company performance as the dependent variable using panel 
data White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected)  
 Panel A: without Fixed-Effects Panel B: with Fixed-Effects 
Dep. Var. TQ ROA MBV TQ   ROA MBV 
C  1.48 -13.40 -0.27 -0.97 -19.35 -13.99 
 [3.78]** [-1.77] [-0.08] [-0.75] [-1.45] [-4.30]** 
       LARGEST(LA) -0.05  0.34 -0.13  0.029  0.86 -0.03 
 [-10.55]** [1.98]* [-1.12] [2.93]** [3.16]** [-0.12] 
       (LARGEST)^2  0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 [6.99]** [-0.95] [1.38] [-2.24]* [-0.94] [-0.01] 
       INST_OWNP  0.01 -0.11  0.04 -0.00 -0.35  0.03 
 [8.44]** [-4.05]** [1.54] [-1.68] [-2.13]* [1.33] 
       LOG(TA) -0.24  8.88 -0.22  0.18  21.85  0.90 
 [-39.90]** [4.26]** [-0.33] [0.58] [6.11]** [1.07] 
       PPE/TA  0.29 -0.86 -0.53 -0.25 -2.52  1.17 
 [1.09] [-0.38] [-0.37] [-0.62] [-0.27] [0.50] 
       DEBT  0.28 -35.17  1.65  1.26 -92.75 -0.81 
 [3.53]** [-1.48] [0.24] [2.96]** [-8.07]** [-0.16] 
       VOL  0.89 -20.95  1.37  1.10  0.98  2.98 
 [4.47]** [-2.28]* [2.20]* [7.60]** [0.19] [3.30]** 
       CASH/TA  2.96 -27.41  2.71  3.23  19.11  7.22 
 [11.09]** [-1.90] [27.67]** [11.21]** [1.30] [2.47]* 
       DUMMYCEO -0.25  10.02  0.14 -0.30 -6.43  0.19 
 [-3.32]** [4.65]** [0.49] [-4.29]** [-1.63] [0.19] 
       INDEP -0.00 -0.39  0.01 -0.02 -0.29  0.07 
 [-3.01]** [-6.68]** [0.62] [-3.40]** [-2.79]** [1.40] 
       LOG(LISTAGE)  0.45  4.37  0.93  0.89 -12.83  3.41 
 [2.53]* [3.95]** [0.80] [34.18]** [-3.09]** [1.08] 
       Observations: 378 378 376 378 378 376 
R-squared: 0.34 0.26 0.02 0.75 0.87 0.10 
F-statistic: 16.84 11.51 0.55 5.23 11.23 0.20 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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9.9: Robustness Tests 
 
The relationship between ownership and company performance may be 
spurious because the ownership, as well as the performance variables, may be 
industry specific, as the empirical analysis did not use a control variable as a proxy 
for the industry type. As this study relies on a panel data set, a fixed-effects model is 
used that regards the differences between companies as parametric shifts of the 
regression function and controls for possible differences across companies. The 
robustness of the determinants of ownership is examined using different ownership 
measures and different measures of performance.  
 
A panel data set is used to allow for endogeneity issues. This sample does not 
show endogeneity issues when using the two stage least squares (2SLS) and three 
stage least squares (3SLS) regressions as the coefficients using the 2SLS and 3SLS 
were exactly the same as that of using ordinary least squares s regression. Therefore, 
this study uses only the ordinary least squares regressions to test the Hypotheses 1 to 
5. 
 
Equation 9.5 is re-run, but the ownership variable is a measure of the fraction 
of shares owned by the institutional shareholders and its square form. Table 9.12, 
shows the results of the hypothesis that the relationship between the company 
performance and institutional ownership is non-linear. With TQ as the dependent 
variable and the fixed-effects model, the direction of the estimated coefficients β1 
and β2 are in opposite directions, negative - positive, and statistically insignificant. 
When TQ is used as the dependent variable, the coefficients for institutional 
ownership and its square form are very close to zero. The control variables that show 
statistical significance at 5% level are LOG (TA), VOL and CASH/TA. With the 
inclusion of fixed-effects the coefficients sign change from negative to positive, but 
again statistically insignificant. The control variables that show statistical 
significance are DEBT, VOL, CASH/TA, INDEP and LOG(LISTAGE).The results 
imply that there is no association between TQ, as a performance measure and 
institutional ownership concentration. When fixed-effects are not included in the 
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regression, the LOG(TA), VOL, CASH/TA and LISTAGE control variables are 
statistically significant. When fixed-effects are included in the regression, the DEBT, 
VOL, CASH/TA, INDEP and LISTAGE control variables are statistically 
significant.  
 
For both the ROA without and with fixed-effects, the coefficients on the 
variables INST_OWNP and INST_OWNP2 have a positive and negative signs, 
respectively and both are statistically significant. Given the estimated values for the 
INST_OWNP and INST_OWNP
2
, the turning point of the relation between 
institutional ownership and TQ is 
 
TQ: Minimisation point = -β1/2β2 = 0.0134/(2*0.00014) = 48% 
The results suggest that as institutional ownership increases initially, the 
sample companies have a lower performance. When institutional ownership reaches 
around 48%, a positive association between institutional ownership and TQ emerges. 
This suggests that at higher levels of institutional ownership in the AIM companies 
supports the monitoring effects. 
 
The results, Table 9.12 (Panel B), when using ROA as the dependent 
variable, show that the direction of the coefficients for INST_OWNP (β1) and 
INST_OWNP
2
 (β2) change from negative to positive, respectively and statistically 
significant at 5% (see Table 9.12). The results are robust with the inclusion of fixed-
effects in the equation. The minimisation point is much higher for ROA than for TQ. 
 
ROA: Minimisation point = -β1/2β2 = 0.731394/ (2*0.007122) = 51% 
The results on the initial negative association between institutional ownership 
and company performance may explain that institutional shareholders do not 
contribute to the monitoring role, however as performance improves so does the 
institutional share ownership. The positive coefficient at higher levels suggests that 
institutional shareholders have a monitoring role at much higher levels. There is no 
theoretical basis to suggest at what particular ownership level this turning point 
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occurs. However, by assuming the complementary relationship between the director 
ownership and the institutional ownership, the results suggest a non-linear 
association between the institutional ownership and company performance. The 
turning point is between 48% and 52%, a turning point above the sample mean of 
43% for institutional shareholders suggests that the institutional shareholders in the 
AIM companies initially have a weak incentive to be active monitors of the 
companies they invest in. This is overcome when the institutional investors have 
sufficiently larger equity shareholdings. Without the fixed effect ROA regression, 
there is positive and statistically significant association with company size, 
DUMMY CEO and LOG (LISTAGE) control variables. In addition, the regression 
shows there is negative and statistically significant association with VOL and 
INDEP control variables. With the fixed-effects model, the regressions show that 
both DEBT and LOG (LISTAGE) have a negative coefficient and statistically 
significant, whereas DUMMYCEO has a negative coefficient, but shows no 
statistical significance.  
 
The results in Table 9.12 contrast McConnell and Servaes (1990), who find a 
significant and positive relationship with TQ, but is consistent with Cornett et al. 
(2007) who find a positive and significant relationship between performance 
measure, operating cash flow return, and institutional shareholdings. We can 
interpret this that at lower levels of institutional shareholdings the monitoring effect 
is not so strong and institutional shareholders can sell their shares, but at higher 
levels the institutional shareholders are more committed and associated with higher 
performance using the accounting measure of performance  and consistent with the 
notion that institutional ownership enhance monitoring. 
. 
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Table 9.12:Performance non-linear relationship with institutional shareholding 
 
=EPERFORMANC  
ε+E)LOG(LISTAG
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8
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2
β+INST_OWNP
1
β+
0
α
 
Ordinary least squares regression with company performance as the dependent variable using panel 
data. White cross-section standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected). 
 PANEL A  PANEL B  
Dep. Var. TQ TQ ROA ROA 
     C  1.02 -0.58 -0.83  5.55 
 [2.05]* [-0.60] [-0.11] [0.26] 
     
INST_OWNP  0.01 -0.01 -0.54 -0.73 
 [0.46] [-1.29] [-4.46]** [-3.75]** 
     
INST_OWNP
2
  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 [0.39] [1.29] [3.62]** [8.41]** 
     
LOG(TA) -0.24  0.16  9.07  20.15 
 [-3.01]** [0.56] [4.37]** [4.75]** 
     
PPE/TA  0.22 -0.37  0.68 -6.67 
 [0.65] [-0.97] [0.31] [-0.69] 
     
DEBT  0.24  1.19 -35.14 -95.35 
 [0.69] [3.27]** [-1.52] [-8.53]** 
     
VOL  0.99  1.08 -21.49  0.82 
 [3.12]** [7.03]** [-2.38]* [0.16] 
     
CASH/TA  2.77  3.11 -26.57  14.28 
 [5.78]** [11.16]** [-1.87] [1.12] 
     
DUMMYCEO -0.20 -0.12  8.03 -4.78 
 [-0.77] [-1.85] [3.58]** [-1.83] 
     
INDEP -0.00 -0.01 -0.42 -0.28 
 [-0.52] [-3.00]** [-5.80]** [-2.01]* 
     
LOG(LISTAGE)  0.41  0.89  5.08 -13.60 
 [2.13]* [61.57]** [4.57]** [-3.14]** 
     
Fixed -Effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations: 378 378 378 378 
R-squared: 0.31 0.75 0.26 0.86 
F-statistic: 16.39 5.28 12.62 11.23 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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9.10: Conclusion 
This chapter uses a sample of 131 companies listed on the AIM between 
2008 and 2010 and extends the UK based literature on the relationship between 
ownership holdings and company performance in several ways. The analysis begins 
by investigating the determinants of ownership. Hypothesis 1 states that the 
ownership shareholdings have a linear relationship to company performance. To 
summarise, Hypothesis 1 shows a negative relationship with CEO_OWNP and 
DIROWNP. As explained earlier, due to the complementary effects between director 
and institutional share ownership, the results show a positive association with 
institutional ownership and this is statistically significant. With LA and LA5, the 
direction of the coefficient is negative, but do not show any statistical significant 
relationship with TQ. With the inclusion of fixed-effects, the CEO _OWNP has a 
negative coefficient and is moderately significant. The LA5 shareholdings give a 
negative coefficient, but gives a weak statistically significance. 
 
Hypothesis 2, examines the relationship between company ownership and 
volatility. The results in Table 9.8 (Panel A) without firm fixed-effects show that 
coefficients of the variables volatility, and its square form, have a negative and 
positive sign, respectively. Both volatility and the square form are statistically 
significant with the CEO, director and institutional ownership shareholdings. 
Therefore, higher percentage of the ownership variable is associated with given 
increase in volatility. The results contrast the results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985, 
1165) who find a positive –negative suggesting ‘the increase in concentration of 
ownership associated with given increases in instability diminishes.’ With the 
inclusion of fixed-effects in the regression model, the statistical significance 
disappears. 
 
For Hypothesis 3, the results are mixed. For example, the results without 
fixed-effects show that the regression of TQ on ownership variable gives a negative 
coefficient with DIR_OWNP and positive with ROA, both are statically significant 
in both cases. Regression of TQ on INST_OWNP is positive and statistically 
significant. With fixed-effects, regression of ROA on director ownership shows a 
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positive coefficient and is statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 is not rejected, but 
the direction of the coefficient depends on the performance variable and the 
inclusion of fixed-effects. 
 
For Hypothesis 4, the variable DIR_OWNP, DIR_OWNP
2
 and DIR_OWNP
3
 
have the expected signs, positive-negative-positive but are not statistically significant 
when TQ is the dependent variable. One interpretation for the increase in TQ with 
increase in director ownership suggests the convergence of interest, while the decline 
relates to the convergence of entrenchment (see Morck et al. 1988, 312). Morck et 
al. show a positive association between TQ and high managerial ownership but has a 
weak statistical significance. With ROA as the dependent variable, the signs are 
opposite to that with TQ, negative-positive-negative, but the results are statistically 
significant with DIR_OWNP
2
 and DIR_OWNP
3
. This result contrasts the findings of 
Morck et al. (1988) Short and Keasey (1999), who show a positive-negative-positive 
for the coefficients on their measures of DIR_OWNP, DIR_OWNP
2
, and 
DIR_OWNP
3
 and all are statistically significant. Therefore, the results of Hypothesis 
4, cannot say that the cubic relationship between the performance of AIM companies 
and ownership is cubic, that is, increase in director ownership shifts from alignment, 
to entrenchment and to alignment. Hence, the present results on AIM companies 
cannot confirm that the convergence of interest effect dominates the entrenchment 
effect at high levels of ownership. 
 
For Hypothesis 5, when company performance is regressed on LA and LA
2
. 
With TQ, the results show that inclusion of fixed-effects, the coefficients for LA and 
LA
2
 have the expected signs, positive-negative sign, and the results are statistically 
significant, which confirms the quadratic relationship between company 
performance and the largest shareholder. The results suggest that the value of AIM 
companies rises as the largest ownership concentration increases. This clearly agrees 
with the theoretical reason that monitoring by the largest shareholder is provided and 
that beyond the turning point is negatively affected by the largest shareholder. Here, 
the concentration of the ownership structure allows the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. For ROA, the results show a positive coefficient for the largest 
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ownership and statistically significant for both inclusion and exclusion of fixed-
effects. However, at higher levels of concentration there is no association. 
 
Most researchers study on ownership performance relationship assumes that 
each form of ownership affects the company performance separately. However, the 
size of shareholdings by directors bears a complementary relationship to the size of 
shareholdings of the institutional shareholders. This prompts the question as to 
whether insider ownership, that is, directors affect the influence of institutional 
investors.  
 
This chapter provides evidence on the determinants of ownership structure 
for the AIM companies. In addition, it shows how different ownership shareholdings 
affect the performance of the AIM companies. The empirical evidence supports the 
monitoring and expropriation effects but is dependent on the performance measure 
and the type of ownership concentration. The results suggest that the convergence of 
interest and entrenchment effects on the company performance and director 
ownership is not evident in the AIM companies. Hence, to conclude that differences 
in corporate governance system for the AIM companies may be able to explain some 
of the differences. 
 
An assumption of the current analysis for the AIM companies is that 
causality runs from director ownership to company performance. However, it is 
difficult to ignore that ‗reverse causality‘ may be influencing the results. For 
example, the positive alignment between ROA and director ownership may suggest 
that the more successful companies provide their directors with more equity shares, 
or the directors are unwilling to sell their equity shares. In this case, the causality 
runs from performance to director ownership.  
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CHAPTER 10  EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
AND PERFORMANCE 
10.1: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of CEO pay for the 
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) for the period 2008 to 2010. In chapter 8, a composite corporate 
governance score showed no association with company performance. In Chapter 9, 
the results give a negative association between chief executive officer‘s (CEO) 
ownership holdings and Tobin‘s Q.  
 
Executive remuneration, including CEO pay, is well researched for the 
United States listed companies, and interest is now growing by researchers from 
other countries. For example, Australia (Schultz et al. 2013), Canada (Graham et al. 
2012), China (Conyon and He 2011), Greece (Drakos and Bekiris 2010), Italy 
(Barontini and Bozzi 2011), Japan (Nakazato et al. 2011), Korea (Kato et al. 2007), 
and Netherlands (Van Der Laan et al. 2010). The dominance of research into US 
companies reflects the difficulties in getting consistent data for other countries, 
mainly because of the variation in the manner of presentation of director 
remuneration data by individual companies. Earlier researchers have used 
remuneration measure such as cash salary plus bonus while the most recent research 
has been focusing on options granted or performance related pay (Main et al. 1996; 
Ozkan 2011).  
 
The seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of control 
and ownership suggests that agents (management) may not necessarily act to 
enhance shareholders‘ wealth, but may primarily act in a manner that serves their 
own self-interest. However, as directors own shares in their companies, the directors‘ 
interests should align with those of the shareholders. There is empirical evidence 
consistent with the Berle and Means position. For example, Baumol observes that 
executive salaries appear to be, ‘far more closely correlated with the scale of the 
operations of the company than with its profitability’ (Baumol 1967, 46; cited in 
Lewellen and Huntsman 1970, 710). However, the data on which Baumol‘s 
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statement depends on are nearly 50 years old, and the issue of how executive 
remuneration, particularly the CEO pay, is determined is by no means settled. This 
justifies further research, particularly relating to a hitherto underexplored set of 
companies. 
 
The research approach employed in this chapter uses an econometric method 
to investigate the relationship between the CEO pay and company performance. The 
research objective is to identify whether there is evidence to support a causal 
relationship between company performance and chief executive pay. This reflects 
the basic assumption that higher company performance will lead to higher CEO pay. 
However, it is likely that the extent of CEO ownership and director ownership of the 
company‘s shares will have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
corporate performance and CEO pay. One expects that CEOs with greater equity 
stake in the company are likely to be motivated by remuneration differently, from 
those with lower equity stake.  
 
For this chapter, the final sample consists of 197 non-financial AIM 
companies and 591company years over the period 2008 to 2010. This chapter 
considers the third and final research question, to identify the determinants of 
executive pay (including CEO remuneration). The analysis consists of ordinary least 
squares regression using panel data set. The variables for remuneration include chief 
executive remuneration (CEOPAY), highest paid director (HPD), aggregated total 
directors pay (PAYT) and the ratio of CEO PAY over total remuneration of all 
directors (CEOTR). The variables for company performance are Tobin‘s Q (TQ), 
and return on assets (ROA). The other governance variables include ownership 
shareholdings of CEO (CEO_OWNP), board of directors, (DIR_OWNP) and 
institutional investors (INST_OWNP). In addition, governance variables include 
dummy variables for FOUNDER and the presence of the duality role of the CEO/as 
the chairman roles (DUMMYCEO), and finally the board size (BSIZE). The control 
variables include logarithm of total assets (LOG (TA)), market capitalisation 
(MKVAL), cash and cash equivalent (CASH/TA), property plant and equipment 
(PPE/TA) and leverage (DEBT).  
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The results show that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the CEOPAY, HPD and PAYT regressions on TQ as a measure 
of performance. However, using ROA, as the performance measure, the coefficients 
are negative and statistically insignificant for all the variables except with HPD, but 
the coefficient value is negative and very low. However, inclusion of fixed-effects 
suggests that there be no association between executive pay and ROA. Consistently, 
the  regressions show that larger companies pay higher remuneration to their CEOs, 
have the higher HPD and higher PAYT, which is consistent with previous research 
on executive remuneration and performance (Conyon and Murphy 2000; Ozkan 
2007).  
 
The ratio of CEO pay to total remuneration, CEOTR, regression on TQ has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient with the inclusion of fixed-effects 
and the association disappears with non-fixed-effects. The regression of CEOTR on 
ROA gives a negative association and statistically significant without fixed-effects. 
However, inclusion of fixed-effects shows no association. 
 
The results of ownership as a governance variable on the right-hand side of 
the regression model are dependent on the ownership type. For example, the 
regression, without fixed-effects, between CEOPAY and CEO_OWNP has a 
negative coefficient and statistically significant. DIR_OWNP gives similar results. 
However, with the fixed-effects, for both CEO_OWNP and DIR_OWNP the 
direction reverses. With INST_OWNP, there is no association with CEOPAY. Using 
ROA as the performance variable the results are similar as above, except that the 
institutional shareholdings are now negative and statistically significant. 
 
The results also include some robustness tests. First, the market capitalisation 
as a proxy for company size gives a positive and statistically significant association 
with pay as the dependent variable. Second, using the logarithm of pay and 
logarithm of TQ, the results are positive and statistically significant. 
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The organisation of the rest of the chapter is as follows: section 10.2 outlines 
the institutional framework in the United Kingdom. Section 10.3 provides an 
overview of the literature on executive remuneration and Section 4 concentrates on 
the UK. Section 10.5 describes the hypothesis and section10.6 describes the 
remuneration, performance and other explanatory variables. Section10.7 provides 
information on data sources and description of data. Section 10.8 explains the 
empirical results. Section 10.9 considers the robustness and finally a conclusion in 
Section 10.10. 
 
10.2: Institutional Framework 
The corporate governance disclosure requirements in the UK for directors‘ 
remuneration have significantly improved since the publication of the Cadbury 
Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), and the Combined Codes (1998, 2003, 
2006, and 2008). The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that companies should 
establish remuneration committees, and since then the majority of the companies 
listed on LSE and AIM have established remuneration committees. The Greenbury 
Report (1995), advanced the Cadbury approach by extending the role and 
independence of the remuneration committee, thereby, preventing the executives to 
decide their pay packages themselves. The Hampel Report (1998) requires the UK 
companies to provide details on directors‘ remuneration similar to that in the US. 
Hampel (1998) stresses the need to pay non-executives fixed fees and recommends 
the barring of giving them incentive remuneration such as long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs). The Department of Trade and Industry (2002) now requires the disclosure 
in full details of the company‘s remuneration policy and for each director their 
remuneration package, together with explanations. The remuneration committee 
should be composed of independent non-executive directors, as recommended by the 
Higg‘s report 2003 (s13.8, p.61). The presence of independent non-executive 
directors increases the monitoring function of the committee in view of the potential 
conflict of interest. The remuneration committee‘s accountability is to the 
shareholders and the companies must put the remuneration report to shareholders for 
a vote at the annual general meeting. 
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In May 2003, the European Union Commission recommended that all listed 
companies in the European Union (EU) should report on individual director 
remuneration arrangements. By 2006, the following EU members had mandatory 
disclosure: Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. In addition, Norway introduced similar disclosure requirements, 
while Switzerland required disclosure for the highest paid executive only. There are 
differences in disclosure requirements between the UK and other countries: for 
example, the disclosure of the remuneration of the five most highly paid executives 
has been mandatory in Canada since 1993 (Sapp 2008, 714). Since 2006, the higher 
disclosure rules on remuneration arrangements for individual members of the board 
have aided the investigation of remuneration packages for the chief executive officer 
and other board directors in AIM companies. 
 
Given the dominance of research of US companies, interesting comparisons 
are likely to arise by examining UK companies. Both the UK and the US have 
similar regulatory systems due to the ‗Common Law‘ as compared to the ‗Civil Law‘ 
system in Europe; however, the UK market is distinct in that it has principle-based 
regulation rather than rule-based regulation as in the US. 
 
10.3: Literature Review 
Empirical researchers on CEO pay predominantly explain the theoretical 
context based on optimal contracting and the managerial power paradigms. Optimal 
contracting or arm‘s length contracting approach (Bebchuk and Fried 2004, 5) 
follows the traditional agency theory framework, which seeks to align the interests of 
the managers and the shareholders with the view to maximising shareholder value , 
(for example, Grossman and Hart 1983; Abowd and Kaplan 1999; Murphy 1999; 
Core et al. 2003). 
 
An alternative view concerning executive compensation is the managerial 
power approach, which assumes that the executives have significant power over the 
board of directors to influence their own pay and will use that power to extract rents 
from the company (Bebchuk and Fried 2004, 6). They favour the managerial power 
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hypothesis to explain that the CEOs have excess remuneration. The implications are 
that CEO is the influencing factor in the  pay setting process as the CEO has 
substantial control over the composition of the board of directors and the 
remuneration committee thus determining the CEO pay (Armstrong et al. 2012). 
Support for this hypothesis is found in that the CEO pay is disproportionate for 
companies with comparatively weak corporate governance characteristics such as 
weak boards, no dominant outside shareholder, and a manager who has a relatively 
large share ownership (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Studies have 
used a number of corporate governance factors that relate to CEO power: these 
factors include CEO tenure, CEO ownership, board size, CEO and Chairman duality, 
and board ownership (Veliyath et al. 1994). 
 
Researchers on CEO pay use the agency theory as the foundation of their 
theoretical framework, and there is general support that there is a positive 
relationship between executive remuneration and company performance (Lazarides 
et al. 2008). Earlier empirical works on the determinants of executive remuneration 
use only two predictors, company size and profitability. There is pervasive evidence 
to suggest that company size be a major determinant of CEO pay (Ciscel and Carroll 
1980; Murphy 1999).  Gabaix and Landier (2008, 49) use a simple equilibrium 
model find that company size, alone can almost fully explain the level of CEO pay. 
Several academic researchers find strong evidence for a positive association between 
an increase in the CEO pay and the company size, (for example, Roberts 1956; Cosh 
1975; Jensen  and Murphy 1990b; Hubbard and Palia 1995; Bliss and Rosen 2001; 
Gabaix and Landier 2008). Researchers observe the magnitude and the significance 
of the coefficients for company performance, as a higher coefficient for company 
performance suggests that executives will be motivated to work towards the 
improvement of the performance measures and align their interests with those of the 
shareholders. Roberts (1956) use data from large listed US companies and finds a 
stronger relationship between remuneration and sales compared to remuneration and 
profits. Similarly, McGuire et al. (1962) find that that executive remuneration has a 
higher correlation with measures of company size than with profits. McGuire et al. 
(1962) show that even after controlling for sales revenue, company profits show little 
or no correlation with executive remuneration. The above findings support Baumol 
  291 
 
(1967) argument that executives‘ pay support is increasing the size of the company. 
However, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970, 719) find sales to be irrelevant and infer 
‘there is greater incentive for management to shape its decision rules in a manner 
consistent with the shareholders’ interest than to seek the alternative goal of revenue 
maximisation’. Smyth et al. (1975); Ciscel and Carroll (1980, 509) contrast, 
Lewellen and Huntsman, that executive pay depends on both company size and 
profits whereas Meeks and Whittington (1975) finds that size is the main predictor of 
executive pay. 
 
In previous research, the pay variable has been the non-equity forms of pay 
such as salary and bonus, this is termed the cash remuneration. According to 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004, 8) much of the evidence suggests a weak association 
between the cash compensation and companies‘ industry-adjusted performance. 
 
There is empirical evidence to show a correlation between the level of 
directors‘ pay and other corporate governance variables, such as executive 
ownership (Cheng and Firth 2005) and institutional owners (Hartzell and Starks 
2003). 
 
Overall, the conclusions in the prior studies regarding the association of CEO 
pay and performance show that the sample selection, the country in question and the 
specific period influence the analysis. 
 
10.4: Evidence from the UK 
Studies of large UK companies show a positive relationship between 
directors‘ remuneration and the company‘s performance, for example, Gregg et al. 
(1993); Conyon (1997, 504). McKnight (1996, 563) finds performance and size are 
important determinants of executive remuneration and that the size variable explains 
48% of the variance in salary. Other research in the UK, such as Eichholtz et al. 
(2008), have found a weak association between executive cash remuneration and the 
pay-for-performance. However,Girma et al. (2007) conclude that the executive 
remuneration appears to be insensitive to performance and, in fact, Gregg et al. 
(2005) find little relationship between pay and performance. It was noted that  Ozkan 
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(2007, 2011); and Stathopoulos et al. (2005) both find an association between higher 
performing companies and executive remuneration, and both posit that the link 
between poorer performing companies and executive remuneration is weak. The 
primary analysis within these studies is whether company performance or size has 
been a determinant of pay. These studies have found a positive link between 
company size and remuneration; however, the relationship between performance and 
remuneration is mixed. 
 
The most common measure of pay in UK studies has been the cash 
remuneration (Gregg et al. 2005; Girma et al. 2007; Farmer et al. 2013) measured as 
the sum of base pay and annual bonus, the latter based on performance. CEOs also 
receive share options, which are rights to purchase shares at a pre-specified exercise 
price for a specific period, and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Another common 
measure is the total remuneration, which consists of the sum of the salary, annual 
bonus, share options granted and the LTIPs.  
 
Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) suggest that cash remuneration is a reliable 
proxy for total remuneration, but this research took place over 40 years ago, so the 
finding might not be valid today. In prior research, one of the reasons for excluding 
the long-term incentives was due to the difficulties in collecting consistent data and 
their value. However, since 2002 the UK listed companies have been required to 
disclose remuneration details in their annual reports. The remuneration disclosure 
has allowed researchers to improve their investigations and use different measures of 
pay. For example, McKnight and Tomkins (2004) uses salary, bonus and share 
options and argue that CEO or an executive through long tenure are likely to 
influence the pay setting process and design the remuneration scheme to meet their 
preferences. Ozkan (2007, 354) uses the following measures of pay: cash 
remuneration, total remuneration, LTIP awards and stock options.  
 
A variety of explanations for the differences in remuneration studies has been 
associated with researchers‘ use of different sets of data (both hand-collected and 
purchased), regulatory settings, econometric techniques, measurements and proxies 
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for the variables. The evidence from the empirical research shows strong support for 
sales and profit as the important determinants of CEO pay. Where researchers have 
found any evidence, they have shown statistically weak association between CEO 
pay and company performance (Gregg et al. 1993; Conyon et al. 1995). However, 
the variations in sensitivities found have been wide, suggesting that there are other 
influencing factors that the models are not capturing. McGuire et al. (1962); Cosh 
(1975); Meeks and Whittington (1975) find no evidence, or only a very weak 
relationship between executive remuneration and performance of the company.  
 
Several studies on executive remuneration in the UK , for example, Cosh 
(1975); Meeks and Whittington (1975); Gregg et al. (2005); Ozkan (2007) have 
shown that company size are a significant determinants of executive pay than 
measures of shareholder performance such as earnings per share and the accounting 
rate of return. The shareholder performance measures are less statistically significant 
in both cross-section and time series analysis than are company size measures. In 
instances, when the shareholder performance measures are significant they have a 
much smaller correlation coefficient. Cosh (1975, 89) compares both quoted and 
unquoted UK companies for the period 1968 to1971 and shows that company size as 
determinant of CEO remuneration alone explains 49% of the variance of the natural 
logarithm of CEO remuneration. Inclusion of profitability as an additional 
explanatory variable increases the variance slightly to 54%. He further shows that 
the results of the smaller companies were different from that of, the larger companies 
where size alone explains 19% of the variance and the inclusion of profitability 
increases the variance to 34%.  
 
Main et al. (1996) use both cash and equity-based remuneration for a small 
sample (60 UK companies) for the period 1983 to 1989. Although the sample size is 
relatively small, they show that the sensitivity of total remuneration including share 
options of the highest paid director (HPD) to company performance is low. Gregg et 
al. (2005) also find weak relationship between executive cash remuneration and 
company performance over the period 1994-2002.  
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Ozkan (2007) considers corporate governance mechanisms effects and level 
of CEO remuneration for 414 UK companies for the fiscal year 2003-2004. The 
Ozkan study shows that company performance does not have an influence on CEO 
remuneration. However, board structure and ownership shareholdings both explain 
significant amount of cross-sectional variation in total CEO remuneration. One 
major limitation of this analysis is the use of a single year data, fiscal year 2003-
2004. Although Cosh and Hughes (1997) show that financial institutional ownership 
shareholdings has no effect on the level of pay or the sensitivity of pay to 
performance, however the Ozkan study shows that institutional ownership has 
negative, but significant, impact on CEO remuneration. 
 
Doucouliagos et al. (2012) use an interesting method, meta-regression 
analysis, where they combine the results of 44 empirical studies of pay and 
performance relationships among UK companies. The Doucouliagos et al., study 
finds little association between CEO pay and corporate performance. Their measure 
of performance is ROA and shareholder return. 
 
Farmer et al. (2013) using data from 204 largest industrial UK companies, 
provide robust evidence consistent with the principal-agent theory that basic pay and 
annual bonus are determined relatively to the annual FTSE 350 performance.  
 
Table 10.1 summarises some of the UK research on remuneration and 
performance and shows there is some consensus within the empirical literature as to 
the association between executive remuneration, company size and company 
performance. There is some variation in the results due to the use of different 
samples. However, they are not very different in their sample selection as they use 
large UK companies. There are limitations to some of the prior work in UK such as 
using only the information of the HPD due to the disclosure regime, which allowed 
only the identification of the HPD and further some of these studies did not address 
endogeneity. 
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The evidence shows systematic association between executive pay and 
specific governance characteristics; however, the research on CEO pay has 
concentrated on large listed UK companies and, therefore, this identifies a gap to 
research CEO and executive pay on the smaller AIM companies. The following 
extract suggests that the level of executive remuneration is highly influenced by the 
CEOs in the AIM companies indicating that they are powerful in their decision-
making, an example of the managerial elites setting described as class hegemony in 
Chapter 3. ‘The chief executive of Gulf Keystone Petroleum defended his $22m 
(£14m) pay package on Monday, insisting it was justified by the company’s soaring 
share price’ (Gosden 2012). 
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Table 10.1: Summary of Remuneration Studies in the UK 
Author Sample Data Source Remuneration Performance Governance Others Method Conclusion 
Cosh (1975) 1600 large 
Manufacturing, 
distribution, 
construction, 
transport, and 
miscellaneous 
services sector; 
1969-1971 
Department of 
Trade and 
Industry 
HPD, logarithm of 
ay average pay over 
1969-1971 
Rate of return 
on net assets 
  Natural 
logarithm of 
net assets 
OLS Size is a major determinant of 
CEO compensation and the 
inclusion of profitability also 
affects compensation but not to 
the same extent. The results are 
not the same for smaller 
companies where both size and 
profitability is a strong 
determinant of compensation. 
Meeks and 
Whittington 
(1975)  
Manufacturing and 
Distribution 
sector; 1969-1971 
Published 
accounts 
HPD - salaries, fees 
and bonuses; 
average salary of 
directors  
Rate of return   Total assets;  
Sales  
 OLS Relationship between pay and 
size is positive and significant; 
but between pay and profitability 
not significant. 
Mcknight 
(1996) 
90 large 
companiesfor the 
periods of 1992, 
1993 and 1994 
Published 
accounts 
Percentage change in 
the sumof salary and 
percentage chagne in 
the sum of salary and 
annual bonus 
Percentage 
chagne in 
EPS, 
operating 
profits and 
sales turnover 
 Natural log of 
sales turnover 
and total 
assets in the 
year t-1 
OLS Changes in operating profits are 
weakly but significantly related to 
chagnes in annual bonuses. 
Changes in shareholder returns 
showed no relationship to 
changes in annual bonuses. 
Changes in executive salary, sales 
turnover and shareholder returns 
were not significantly associated 
with changes in EPS 
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Author Sample Data Source Remuneration Performance Governance Others Method Conclusion 
Conyon 
(1997) 
213 large UK 
companies 
between 1988 and 
1993 
Survey data for 
governance 
indicators and 
DataStream 
Salary plus bonus for 
HPD 
Shareholder 
return  
CEO and 
Chairman 
duality; 
remuneration 
committee 
Logarithm 
(sales); 
growth: 
change in 
logarithm 
(sales)  
 OLS Association between pay and 
performance is positive and 
significant at time,t and negative 
and insignificant when using t-1 
Cosh and 
Hughes 
(1997)  
64 UK Electrical 
Engineering 
sector;1989-1994 
Annual reports 
and financial 
press 
CEO (£) ROCE, Total 
shareholder 
return 
  TALCL,  
Sales, dummy 
variables, 
proportion of 
non-executive 
directors 
OLS  Pay levels aligned with company 
size and growth 
Conyon and 
Peck (1998) 
Financial Times 
top UK 100 
companies by 
market value 
Hemmington 
Scott Publishing 
Limited; 
DataStream 
International; 
annual reports 
HPD -  salary and 
bonus 
Total 
shareholder 
return 
NEDs; 
nominating 
committees; 
CEO duality; 
largest 
shareholder 
ownership  
  Panel data 
with fixed-
effects 
  
Conyon and 
Murphy 
(2000) 
510 UK and 1,666 
USA companies 
by market 
capitalisation 
UK - Annual 
reports and 
DataStream in; 
US -S&P‘s 
Compustat‘s 
ExecuComp 
 
Logarithm (salary 
and bonus);  
logarithm (total 
compensation); other 
cash pay, share 
options and LTIPs. 
Logarithm 
(shareholder 
value) 
 Share 
ownership 
Logarithm of 
sales 
 OLS Expected pay levels after 
controlling for company size and 
industry CEO pay levels are 
higher in the US than in the UK 
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Author Sample Data Source Remuneration Performance Governance Others Method Conclusion 
Buck et al. 
(2003),  
287 UK 
nonfinancial 
companies in 
FTSE 350 
Annual reports; 
shareholder 
circulars; 
telephone 
enquiries 
Logarithm of (salary 
+ annual bonus + 
benefits + pensions + 
change in options 
value + change in 
options value + 
change in equity 
value + dividend 
income + change in 
value of LTIPs). 
Total 
shareholder 
return 
Dummy for 
director who is 
CEO; dummy 
for Chairman 
and a dummy 
for dual role 
Chairman/CEO 
Sales,  
Industry 
dummies,  
R&D over 
total assets 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
LTIP is associated with higher 
absolute executive pay levels, but 
the performance-pay sensitivity is 
much lower  
Ozkan (2007) 414 large UK 
companies for the 
fiscal period 
2003/2004 
Annual reports; 
Hemscott and  
Data stream 
Cash compensation; 
Equity compensation 
and Total 
compensation 
Shareholder 
return; change 
in shareholder 
wealth; TQ  
Board size; 
NED, 
ownership: 
institutional, 4 
largest 
institutional, 
blockholder, 
CEO and 
directors 
Sales OLS - cross 
sectional 
regression 
Higher level of CEO 
compensation with larger boards 
and higher proportion of non-
executive directors; institutional 
and blockholder ownership is 
significant  
Dong and 
Ozkan (2008),  
Institutional 
investors and 
director pay: an 
empirical study of 
UK companies 
Hemscott and  
Data stream 
CEO cash pay; 
average pay of all 
executive directors, 
logarithm of CEO 
pay and logarithm of 
average cash pay of 
all directors 
TQ Ownership: 
institutional , 
CEO and  
director  
Logarithm of 
total assets, 
leverage, cash 
flow and 
dividend 
OLS - cross 
sectional 
regression 
Size and cash positively and 
significantly influence pay; CEO 
ownership, dividend and leverage 
has no significant impact on the 
level of CEO pay. 
Guest (2010),  1,880 UK 
companies for the 
period 1983-2002 
  Logarithm of the 
cash compensation 
Return 
measured as 
logarithm of 
buy and hold 
shares 
Logarithm of 
board size; 
proportion of 
NEDs 
Logarithm of 
sales 
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Author Sample Data Source Remuneration Performance Governance Others Method Conclusion 
Ozkan (2011)  390 non-financial 
companies FTSE 
All Share Index 
for the period 
1999 to 2005. 
Annual reports; 
Hemscott Guru, 
Data stream 
Total director 
remuneration as the 
sum of cash, value of 
stock options, and 
value of stock 
awards (or LTIPs)  
Shareholder 
Return; TQ 
Board size; 
Ownership 
includes 
executive 
director, 
institutional, 
largest four, 
blockholder 
NEDs; 
proportion of 
NEDs; number 
of blockholders; 
CEO age; CEO 
tenure 
Sales Panel data 
with fixed 
year and 
fixed 
industry 
effects 
 CEO pay is higher with the 
following: company is larger, 
larger board size, higher 
proportion of NEDs. Institutional 
and blockholder ownership has a 
negative but significant impact on 
CEO pay level. TQ does not have 
significant impact on the level of 
CEO cash and total remuneration. 
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Pay performance sensitivity and elasticity 
Researchers have used two approaches to model the relationship between 
performance and pay. In the first approach, pay is treated as a linear function of 
performance: 
 
Equation 10.1 
ititit μ+)nceβ(Performa+α=Pay                                                            (1) 
 
In Equation 10.1, the coefficient, β, is interpreted as the sensitivity of an 
executive‘s pay to the company‘s performance, or its pay performance sensitivity for 
company ‗i‘ in year ‗t.' Empirical work that has examined this relationship of CEO 
pay and company performance has found the coefficient to be positive and 
significant (Garen 1994, 1176). In prior studies, researchers commonly used the pay 
of the company‘s highest paid director or aggregate board remuneration because 
there was no requirement under UK company law to disclose separate information 
(see Conyon et al. 1995, 708). In formulating their statistical models, researchers 
have chosen between current and lagged values, absolute values in monetary terms, 
logarithms and change in values for the relevant variables. The commonly used 
measure of remuneration is the aggregate of salary and bonus, (for example, Jensen 
and Murphy 1990; Conyon and Gregg 1994; Conyon 1997). 
 
The measurement of performance for comparative purposes has been 
problematic, so researchers have used both market based performance measures such 
as shareholder return and accounting based company performance returns such as an 
accounting rate of return or earnings per share. Researchers have used shareholder 
return contemporaneously with the remuneration variable (Conyon 1997, 500), and 
others have used shareholder return as a lagged variable, (for example, Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Gregg et al. 1993; Conyon and Gregg 1994). One reason for using the 
lagged shareholder return is to minimise the causality issue. 
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As noted above, some researchers have formulated the relationship between 
pay and performance using logarithms: 
 
Equation 10.2 
it
μ+
it
mance)βLn(Perfor+α=
it
Ln(Pay)                                                                            (2) 
 
For example, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) in Equation 10.2 have used 
logarithms (ln) and the estimated ‗β‘ coefficient as the elasticity of pay with respect 
to performance. Whereas Equation 10.1 reflects the sensitivity of pay to 
performance, Equation 10.2 reflects the elasticity of pay relative to performance. The 
model implied by Equation 10.2 is more realistic, as in practice we would not expect 
a linear relationship between performance and pay implied by Equation10.1.  
 
An in-depth review of the academic literature suggests that a direct 
relationship between CEO pay and company performance is complicated and 
difficult to establish. The consensus is that an assortment of moderators influences 
the relationship between pay and performance. Although the corporate governance 
structures of the UK and US are similar, there are significant differences. For 
example, the UK corporate governance is strongly influenced by the Cadbury Report 
(1992) recommendations such as separate individuals commonly hold the CEO and 
Chairman roles. Since 2002, the UK shareholders have voted annually on executive 
remuneration packages, although there is no evidence that say-on-pay proposals 
change the level or growth of CEO pay (for example, Ferri and Maber 2013). The 
result of this voting system is often unsatisfactory to executives, and though the vote 
is non-binding, companies abide by them. For example, shareholders of Royal Dutch 
Shell PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, and Provident Financial PLC have voted 
against management remuneration plans. 
 
Cheffins and Thomas (2001) suggest that the existence of structural 
differences between the UK and the US allow CEO remuneration to be researched in 
the context of legal, political, business culture and regulatory systems. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, both the UK and the US governance systems are market-based and 
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characterised as having diffused share ownership and liquid markets. This is in 
contrast to other countries where concentrated share ownership is the dominant form, 
and the market is relatively illiquid (Porta et al. 1997, 1137-1138). Therefore, in 
countries where ownership is widely dispersed, one should observe a strong 
correlation between executive pay and company performance as a way to reduce 
agency costs. One would expect that the dominant and individualistic nature of the 
US style managers as exemplified by their preference of huge remuneration 
packages to converge to other countries. This higher remuneration is associated 
mainly with the equity-based incentives. One question that arises is whether this 
form of incentive-based pay can cascade down to the UK directors. However, 
evidence suggests otherwise, and the US CEOs have higher pays and equity based 
incentives compared to the CEOs in the UK. The main difference is due to the higher 
share option practices in the US than in UK. Conyon and Murphy (2000, 667) 
suggest that the culture is one of the several factors that can account for the deviation 
between the UK and the US pay levels. 
 
The institutional shareholders and their representative groups, for example, 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) and the Pension Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) have been 
influential in providing non-statutory policy guidelines for the UK companies. For 
example, the ABI guidelines require the UK companies to limit the issue of share 
options to four times the cash remuneration (Conyon and Murphy 2000; Conyon and 
Sadler 2001). 
 
The above discussion suggests that corporate governance in the UK have 
been subject to considerable reforms on executive remuneration since the Cadbury 
1992 report, but the question remains whether there is any association between the 
directors‘ pay and their companies‘ performance. The diversity of the empirical 
results, a significant increase in directors‘ remuneration and shareholders‘ rights has 
contributed to a large amount of scholarly literature on executive remuneration. 
However, one critique of executive remuneration to date is a lack of study involving 
small companies. In addition, agency theory and managerial theory are developed 
mainly within the US context (Boyd et al. 2012). Researchers interested in 
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understanding the determinants of CEO remuneration focus on the sensitivity of the 
CEO remuneration to company performance (see Equation 10.1) in large listed 
companies. As the natures of principal-agent conflicts are different between large 
and smaller sized companies, the determinants of the large companies may not 
necessarily be the same as that of the smaller, younger and growth companies. To 
date very few studies have exclusively provided evidence of such companies (see 
Barnes et al. 2006, 19). 
 
10.5: Hypothesis Development  
The hypothesis for Chapter 10 consists of two parts: the first part explores the 
impact of performance, governance variables and company specific variables on 
executive remuneration. The second part examines the level of remuneration and the 
level of ownership concentration. 
 
The primary focus is on the relationship between the CEO compensation and 
company performance although other factors are included in the model as control 
variables. The first hypothesis is that the board of directors rewards the CEO of the 
company for high company performance because this will maximise company value, 
and hence shareholder value. This hypothesis is a direct application of the principal-
agent theory. Consistent with prior literature (for example, Doucouliagos et al. 2012)  
the expectation is that CEO pay to show a positive correlation with performance. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis in support of the agency argument that CEO pay will 
be associated to company performance. For robustness, alternative measures of 
executive remuneration are HPD and PAYT. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between executive remuneration 
and company performance measured as TQ. 
Tosi et al. (2000) through a meta-analysis review of the literature on CEO 
pay find that company size accounts for more than 40 percent of the variability in 
pay. Therefore, the second hypothesis that the executive remuneration will be 
influenced by the company size. 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between executive remuneration 
and company size.  
Previous research, for example, Bebchuk et al. (2011); (Hu et al. 2013), use 
the ratio of CEO pay to the total remuneration of the top five executives within the 
top management team and call this ratio CEO Pay slice (CPS). The entrenchment 
hypothesis suggests that powerful CEOs find it easier to expropriate shareholder 
wealth reflecting agency problems and reduce company value and performance 
(Bebchuk et al. 2011). The Bebchuk et al. study find that there is a negative 
correlation between CEOTR and TQ. This may also raise problems of causation. 
This is because the correlation between CEOTR and TQ may reflect the tendency of 
lower valued companies to use high CEOTR in their pay practices rather than 
CEOTR and the factors it reflects bringing about a decrease in company value. They 
also find that CEOTR positively correlated to ROA. They explain that the CEO‘s 
compensation being more sensitive to performance than that of the other members of 
the board. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the ratio of CEO pay to 
the total remuneration of the directors (CEOTR) to company performance 
measured by TQ or ROA. 
Agency theorists suggest a number of indirect ways to mitigate agency costs, 
and in turn lead to higher CEO pay. The means to reduce the agency costs are, for 
example, use of smaller boards (Yermack 1996) greater board independence, or CEO 
to hold ownership shares (McConnell and Servaes 1990). The more shares owned by 
the CEO; the greater would be the ability of the CEO to decide their own level of 
remuneration. Similarly, the more shares owned by the board of directors 
collectively, the abler the board is to resist pressure from outside shareholders to 
restrain the pay level of the CEO. This leads to the fourth, fifth and sixth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between CEOPAY and CEO share 
ownership. 
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Similarly, the more shares owned by the board of directors collectively, the 
abler the board is to resist pressure from outside shareholders to restrain the pay level 
of the CEO. This leads to the fifth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between CEOPAY and directors’ 
ownership. 
According to Hartzell and Starks (2003) institutional shareholders serve a 
monitoring role in the principal-agent relationship and, therefore, there is a negative 
relationship between the level of remuneration and the institutional shareholder 
ownership level. 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between CEOPAY and 
institutional ownership. 
 
10.6: Variables 
Dependent Variables - Remuneration 
For each company in the sample, four measures of directors‘ remuneration 
are used: Total CEO Pay (CEOPAY), pay of the highest paid director (HPD)68, total 
remuneration of the whole board (PAYT) and the ratio of total CEO pay over total 
directors‘ remuneration (CEOTR).  
 
CEO Remuneration (CEO PAY) 
The total annual remuneration includes CEO‘s salary, bonus, other 
remuneration, the total value of stock options granted and director fees if reported. 
Figure 10.3 shows that large differences in pay levels are attributable to the granting 
of stock options. Due to the small number of AIM companies using options, options 
as a separate variable, were not used. Agarwal (1981); Finkelstein and Boyd (1998); 
                                                 
68 ‗the highest paid director‘ means the director to whom is attributable the greatest part of the total 
of the aggregates p. 118; section 10 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/410/pdfs/uksi_20080410_en.pdf; accessed 6 January 2012 
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Tosi et al. (2000) show that the cash remuneration can be a proxy for total CEO pay 
and, therefore, there does not seem to be an issue in using CEO pay with different 
alternatives. Hence, as per Tosi et al. (2000, 307) if all the components of total pay 
were not available, total cash pay measured as salary plus bonus or the cash salary 
was used. Researchers often assume that the CEO remuneration as a proxy for senior 
executive remuneration within the company. However, Henderson and Fredrickson 
(2001) rebut this and suggest that there is variation among the executive pay of the 
senior board members. Henderson and Fredrickson use the tournament theory to 
suggest that the differences in pay exist as a means to both motivate and mitigate 
agency problems. 
 
Highest paid director (HPD)  
Several researchers use the HPD as the dependent variable as this is both 
efficient and convenient (for example,  Lewellen and Huntsman 1970, 714; Conyon 
and Peck 1998). 
 
Total pay for all directors (PAYT)  
Similarly, to Ozkan (2007) PAYT is a measure of total pay for all directors 
on the board.  
 
Total remuneration of the CEO over the total director remuneration (CEOTR) 
CEOTR is the ratio of the total remuneration of the CEO over the total 
directors‘ remuneration. Bebchuk et al. (2011) use a similar ratio. Their definition is 
the percentage of the CEO total remuneration to the top five executives‘ total 
remuneration. The size of the AIM companies does not always justify the presence 
of five executive directors and hence the denominator for this thesis includes total 
remuneration of all directors of the company. 
 
Performance Variables 
Table 10.1 provides examples of different performance variables from 
previous remuneration studies. The rationale for including profits measure is that it is 
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an incentive that aligns the interest of the shareholders and the management in a 
principal-agent relationship. 
 
Company performance and company size are the two most common 
predictors of executive pay (Tosi et al. 2000, 307). Following Mehran (1995), 
company performance measure includes a market measure, Tobin‘s Q (TQ) and an 
accounting measure, return on assets (ROA). The inclusion of ROA is seen to be 
important as researchers argue that accounting measure, ROA, is critical in 
determining executive remuneration (Antle and Smith 1986, 7). As per Chung and 
Pruitt (1996, 1140) it is hypothesised that a positive correlation between executive 
remuneration and TQ should be observed. 
 
Control Variables 
The research on determinants of CEO pay and performance are strongly 
affected by the choice of the explanatory variables, which have varied from as low as 
two to more than twenty and the pay elements considered (Devers et al. 2007, 1021). 
The control variables that are company specific for this chapter include company 
size, cash holdings, leverage and capital expenditure scaled over total assets. Chapter 
7 provides more details on these control variables and the definitions are shown in 
Table 10.2. 
 
Corporate Governance Variables 
CEO ownership 
One of the ways of mitigating agency problems in a corporation is for the 
CEO to own shares in the company (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004) argue that the executive compensation practices may not be in the 
interests of the shareholders because they are the product of managerial power. It is 
assumed that CEOs with higher share ownership will have greater power and thereby 
use it to benefit themselves in terms of higher remuneration. Research using US 
companies show mixed results and Holderness et al. (1999) has shown that higher 
CEO ownership has a negative influence on CEO remuneration. 
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Director ownership 
Director ownership is the sum of all directors‘ shareholdings. The UK law 
has avoided making a distinction between insiders and outsiders, and, therefore, both 
the insider and outsider directors have equal liability. Hence, the UK‘s definition of a 
director can be either an executive (insider) or a non-executive director (outsider).  
 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional shareholding is the sum of all ownership holdings greater than 
3% disclosed by institutional investors, such as pension funds. Hartzell and Starks 
(2003, 2352); Ozkan (2007) find institutional shareholders ownership level to have a 
negative relation to the level of executive remuneration.  
 
Board size 
Board size as a governance variable is preferred to independence. Since the 
board decides the level of executive remuneration, board independence particularly 
on the remuneration committee may be a factor in determining executive 
remuneration. The presence of independent directors is to reduce the managers‘ 
power over executive pay. However, for the AIM companies, the non-executive 
directors (NEDs) independence as characterised by the Higg‘s report is problematic 
since the independence of the NEDs may be questionable. This arises because the 
CEO may be an influencing factor in the selection of the NEDs, particularly when 
the CEO and the NED either know each other socially or have a business 
relationship. Additionally, where the non- executive directors themselves are 
executive directors of other listed companies, they will opt for higher remuneration 
levels (see Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). 
 
Since the Higg‘s report, there has been a substantial change in the companies 
having a balanced board. Franks et al. (2001) argue that the non-executive directors‘ 
role is advisory rather than monitoring. In this context, the proportion of the non-
executive directors will have no impact on the CEO remuneration. Empirical 
research on the relationship between board structural relationship and the level of 
executive pay is mixed. Gregory-Smith (2012) concludes that after controlling for 
the determinants of CEO pay and company fixed-effects their study fails to find any 
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evidence that increase in independent non-executive directors reduces CEO pay. In 
contrast, Capezio et al. (2011) finds a positive and significant relationship. However, 
for reasons mentioned above, independence as a variable was not used in the 
regression analysis. 
 
Founder 
Since, the companies in the sample are small and young; they are most likely 
to be run by the company‘s founder. The problems with a founder board member are 
that they will use their power to remain as the CEO or executive chair for several 
reasons such as securing the role for their heirs or attain disproportionate 
remuneration and perquisites. Alternatively, founder member may be willing to 
accept lower cash remuneration because they can gain from their share ownership or 
they want to hold on to the company they started. Anderson and Reeb (2003) use 500 
S&P companies and find that companies run by founding families are more valuable 
and perform better than other companies. Therefore, the presence of the founder on 
the board will have a positive relationship with executive remuneration. I use 
dummy variables for a founder, equal to one if the founder is a paid executive, and 
zero otherwise. In this study, no difference was made whether the founder was a 
CEO or a member of the board. 
 
CEO/Chair duality role  
As per previous discussion, if a company‘s CEO holds the dual position of 
the company‘s executive chair, this may raise governance concerns in respect of a 
joint CEO-chair. The CEO power will enable him/her to demand higher 
remuneration for the dual role. The duality variable is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the roles of the CEO and the Chairman are separate and zero otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
Gabaix and Landier (2008, 65) consider three different proxies for company 
size: natural logarithm of market value measured as debt plus equity, earnings before 
interest and tax and sales revenue. Farmer et al. (2013, 92) use logarithm of sales 
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revenue lagged by one year. Consistent with Chapters 8 and 9, for this chapter the 
natural logarithm of total assets is a proxy for company size. 
 
The other control variables include cash and cash equivalents over total 
assets, total liability over total assets and capital expenditure over total assets. All of 
these variables previously discussed in Chapter 7 and summarised in Table 10.2 
 
Table 10.2: Description of dependent and independent variables  
Variable Units Definition 
Remuneration Variables 
 CEOPAY  £,000 Chief Executive officer‘s total cash pay, bonus, options and others 
HPD  £,000 Highest paid director‘s total cash pay  
PAYT £,000 Total remuneration of all directors 
CEOTR Percentage Percentage of Chief Executive officer‘s total cash pay over total 
director cash pay 
OtherVariables 
TQ   Tobin‘s Q measured as ratio of [total assets plus market value of 
equity minus the shareholders‘ equity] over the total assets  
ROA Percentage Return on Assets 
MKVAL £, Million Market Capitalisation 
CEO_OWNP Percentage The percentage of equity ownership owned by CEO 
DIR_OWNP  Percentage The percentage of equity ownership owned by directors  
INST_OWNP  Percentage The percentage of institutional ownership greater than 3%  
SIZE   Natural logarithm of total assets  
CASH/TA  Percentage Ratio of total cash and cash equivalents over total assets as 
percentage 
DEBT  Percentage Ratio of total long and short term liabilities over total assets as 
percentage 
PPE/TA Percentage The ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets as 
percentage 
BSIZE  Number of executive and non-executive members 
DUMMYCEO  Dummy variable: if CEO/ chairman roles are separate is 1, 
otherwise 0 
FOUNDER  Dummy variable: if a founder member of the board receives pay, 
then measured as 1, otherwise 0 
 
10.7: Data  
As a starting point, the sample is constructed by determining the ownership 
data available for the period 2006 to 2010. A list of 627 companies was provided to 
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S&P Capital IQ, who then downloaded the remuneration data for 615 companies. 
From this list, companies were deleted for the following reasons: lack of data on 
CEO or managing director remuneration (93); lack of computation of Tobin‘s Q 
value (106); lack of ownership data (7); negative shareholders‘ equity (30) and no 
data for debt, cash and cash equivalent and property, plant and equipment (182). The 
final data set consists of 197 companies. Non-UK currencies were converted to Great 
British pounds (GBP) using the year-end exchange rates for respective years. The 
S&P Capital IQ provided the exchange rates.  
 
A manual check was conducted with a sample of 58 companies using the 
companies‘ annual reports to crosscheck the figures from the S&P Capital IQ. 
Annual reports were available from the company‘s website, Google & Northcote. 
The annual reports were searched for the following keywords: remuneration, 
compensation and salary. Data was available either in the notes to the accounts or the 
remuneration report. Where CEOs are not identifiable from the S&P Capital IQ data, 
the annual reports were used to verify CEOs. Terminology such as managing 
director (MD) is used if the CEO was not available. However, CEO/MD is not 
substituted for an executive chair, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or the Chief 
Operating Officer (COO). Where companies showed several CEOs or MDs, the 
company‘s group figures are used 
 
Any missing data for the CEO remuneration and financial data are checked 
against the annual reports. However, it was not always possible to get the data for the 
following reasons: the size of the companies did not justify a separate CEO, the CEO 
had resigned; and an Executive Chairman, the CFO or the COO carried out the 
responsibilities of the CEO. (Future research should extend the variable to include 
other key directors). 
 
 In particular, in the US the prominence of the CFO is growing, and his/her 
role is comparable to that of the CEO, (Zorn 2004). In addition, CEO-CFO role is 
further strengthened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requirement for the US 
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listed company‘s CEO and CFO personally certify on the reliability of the financial 
statements. 
 
10.8: Empirical Results 
The executive remuneration packages contain the following components: 
cash salary, annual bonus, other remuneration, director fees, stock options granted 
and restricted stock options (not shown in the analysis, as there were only very few 
companies providing restricted stock options). Figure 10.1 shows the average 
directors‘ remuneration type over the period 2008 to 2010 from 615 AIM companies. 
Since the number of companies varies each year, the average values over the number 
of companies disclosing the amounts are shown. This figure shows that the majority 
of the companies have higher payments of the cash salary, followed by the bonus. 
The figure 10.1 clearly indicates that the number of companies providing 
bonus element of remuneration has increased over the three years, in contrast to the 
salary, other remuneration and director fees, which have remained almost stagnant. 
 
Figure 10.1: Average Values for the Remuneration Structure  
Total 615 companies, for the period 2008-2010  
 
Figure 10.2 shows the actual number of companies disclosing the different 
components of remuneration structure 
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Figure 10.2: Number of Companies Disclosing Different Remuneration Types  
Total 615 companies, for the period 2008-2010  
 
AIM companies have increased the amount of options granted to their 
directors and the average amount of options granted increased by 262.4% from £1.24 
million to £4.88 million. The maximum value of total options granted in 2006 was 
£40.98 million and increased to £104.54 million in 2010. However, the total number 
of companies granting options is very low (see figure 10.3). Other empirical research 
shows growth in equity remuneration for board directors. For example, Farrell et al. 
(2008) show that there is a shift to from cash only remuneration to equity 
remuneration for data set from Fortune 500 companies from 1998 to 2004. 
 
Figure 10.3: Comparison of Cash Remuneration (Salary and Bonus) and 
Options granted  
615 companies for the period 2006-2010 
 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 10.3, Panels A and B, shows the descriptive statistics for non-
winsorised and winsorised variables, respectively. The mean value of CEO pay is 
£0.382 million, median value and largest CEO pay being £0.245 million and 
£19.16million, respectively. For the highest paid director, the mean value is £0.438 
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million and median and largest being £0.278 million and £19.16million, respectively. 
The mean value of TQ is 1.5, which is lower than both Dong and Ozkan (2008)‘s 
1.68 and Ozkan (2011)‘s 1.78. Similarly, the median value of 1.1 is lower than Dong 
and Ozkan‘s 1.28. The mean and median of CEOTR are similar at 37.38% and 
37.28%, respectively. However, the mean is higher than Bebchuk et al. (2011) who 
have a mean of 35.7%. CEO Pay ranged from a low of £0.01 million to a high of 
£19.16 million whereas the HPD amount ranged from a low of £0.028 million to 
high of £19.16 million. Market capitalisation has a mean value of £59.9 million and 
a median of £18.3 million. Ozkan (2011) has a mean market capitalisation of £1,824 
million, clearly indicating the difference in the size of the companies in both studies. 
With all variables, except the DUMMYCEO, the mean is considerably larger than 
the median, showing that the distribution has a right-skewness. The univariate 
statistics show, when comparing the maximum values and the mean values, the 
presence of outliers. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the data set shows a large 
spread between the mean and the median values also indicating likely outliers hence 
the data are winsorised at 1% and 99%.This mitigates some of the potential biases of 
very large and very small remuneration packages. 
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Table 10.3: Descriptive Statistics  
197 AIM companies and 591 company-years, with no missing data, for the period 2008 to 2010.  
 
Units  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Variable  Panel A: non winsorised 
 
Panel B: winsorised at 1% and 99% 
CEOPAY £ 000s 381.59 245.00 19,156.52 11.17 881.23  347.68 245.00 3,192.29 15.82 377.74 
HPD £ 000s 438.54 277.71 19,156.52 28.07 895.16  413.34 277.71 4,463.56 71.00 478.98 
CEOTR % 37.38 37.28 82.73 0.71 14.95  37.36 37.28 77.46 1.23 14.88 
PAYT £ 000s 1,068.59 736.73 31,456.02 118.81 1,606.21  1,024.04 736.73 8,125.37 165.33 1,006.29 
OPTIONS £000s 220.79 0.00 12,852.68 0.00 858.07  207.82 0.00 6,452.70 0.00 708.60 
TQ  1.50 1.11 12.65 0.19 1.19  1.50 1.11 7.64 0.43 1.13 
ROA % -4.83 1.75 54.24 -218.85 24.91  -4.49 1.75 33.59 -102.33 22.06 
AVROA % -6.30 0.81 43.04 -157.82 23.63  -6.30 0.81 26.72 -121.58 23.04 
MKVAL £ million 59.85 18.30 4,242.95 0.77 219.88  49.60 18.30 728.79 1.31 100.64 
TA £ million 73.38 30.17 3,871.23 1.46 205.18  62.50 30.17 471.69 1.57 88.88 
CASHTA % 20.83 14.23 95.54 -40.48 21.24  20.89 14.23 89.80 -0.30 20.98 
DEBT % 42.44 40.88 181.41 0.81 23.65  42.28 40.88 113.09 1.96 22.96 
PPETA % 17.54 6.32 98.72 0.02 23.01  17.51 6.32 93.34 0.05 22.92 
CEOOWN % 6.74 1.45 58.39 0.00 11.22  6.69 1.45 52.06 0.00 11.02 
DIROWN % 17.58 10.91 86.07 0.01 17.65  17.50 10.91 68.63 0.07 17.41 
INSTOWN % 35.25 33.49 98.46 0.00 21.42  35.16 33.49 85.50 0.00 21.21 
FOUNDER Binary 0.21 0 1 0 0.41  0.21 0 1 0 0.41 
BSIZE  7.04 7 19 3 2.1  7.03 7 13 3.38 2.02 
DUMMYCEO Binary 0.66 1 1 0 0.47  0.66 1 1 0 0.47 
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Table 10.4: Correlation Matrix 
197 AIM companies and 591 company-years, with no missing data over the period from 2008 to 2010. All variables winsorised at 1% and 99%. 
                     
C
E
O
P
A
Y
 
H
P
D
 
C
E
O
T
R
 
P
A
Y
T
 
O
P
T
IO
N
S
 
T
Q
 
R
O
A
 
A
V
R
O
A
 
M
K
V
A
L
 
T
A
 
C
A
S
H
T
A
 
D
E
B
T
 
P
P
E
/T
A
 
C
E
O
O
W
N
 
D
IR
O
W
N
 
IN
S
T
O
W
N
 
F
O
U
N
D
E
R
 
B
S
IZ
E
 
D
U
M
M
Y
C
E
O
 
CEOPAY  1.00                   
HPD  0.98 1.00                  
CEOTR  0.21 0.11 1.00                 
PAYT  0.90 0.96 -0.07 1.00                
OPTIONS  0.77 0.84 -0.02 0.87 1.00               
TQ  0.16 0.17 -0.06 0.20 0.22 1.00              
ROA  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.05 1.00             
AVROA  -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 0.71 1.00            
MKVAL  0.40 0.44 -0.08 0.48 0.43 0.16 0.07 0.06 1.00           
TA  0.15 0.19 -0.06 0.24 0.19 -0.07 0.08 0.10 0.82 1.00          
CASHTA  0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.15 0.35 -0.12 -0.21 0.07 -0.06 1.00         
DEBT  -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 0.01 0.08 -0.14 0.03 -0.32 1.00        
PPE/TA  -0.05 -0.04 -0.15 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.32 0.03 1.00       
CEOOWN  -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.16 0.06 1.00      
DIROWN  -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.13 0.20 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.22 -0.01 0.56 1.00     
INSTOWN  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.25 -0.46 1.00    
FOUNDER  0.14 0.15 -0.05 0.18 0.18 0.16 -0.11 -0.15 0.13 0.11 0.18 -0.07 -0.10 0.02 0.08 -0.07 1.00   
BSIZE  0.08 0.11 -0.31 0.20 0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.11 0.16 0.17 0.11 -0.06 -0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.11 0.07 1.00  
DUMMYCEO  0.09 -0.00 0.55 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 -0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.15 1.00 
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Executive remuneration, company performance and ownership holdings 
This section focuses to explain the level of executive remuneration, company 
performance and ownership shareholdings. The definition of each variable is shown 
in Table 10.2. The following models are used: 
Model 1 
ε+BSIZE8β+FOUNDER7β+DUMMYCEO6β+PPE/TA5β+
+DEBT4β+CASH/TA3β+LOG(ta)2β+TQ1β+0α=CEOPAY
              (1) 
 Model 2 
ε+BSIZE8β+FOUNDER7β+DUMMYCEO6β+
+PPE/TA5β+DEBT4β+CASH/TA3β+LOG(TA)2β+TQ1β+0α  =      HPD
 (2) 
Model 3 
ε+BSIZEβ+FOUNDERβ+DUMMYCEOβ+
+PPE/TAβ+DEBTβ+CASH/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α=PAYT
876
543210
 (3) 
Model 4 
ε+BSIZEβ+FOUNDERβ+DUMMYCEOβ+
+PPE/TAβ+DEBTβ+CASH/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α= CEOTR
876
543210
  (4)  
Model 5 
ε+CEO_OW NPβ+BSIZEβ+FOUNDERβ+DUMMYCEOβ+
+PPE/TAβ+DEBTβ+CASH/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α=CEOPAY
9876
543210
  (5) 
Model 6 
ε+DIR_OW NPβ+BSIZEβ+FOUNDERβ+DUMMYCEOβ+
+PPE/TAβ+DEBTβ+CASH/TAβ+LOG(TA)β+TQβ+α=CEOPAY
9876
543210
  (6) 
Model 7 
εINST_OW NP++β
BSIZE+FOUNDER+βDUMMYCEO+β+β
PPE/TA+DEBT+βCASH/TA+βLOG(TA)+βTQ+β+βCEOPAY=α
9
876
543210
  (7) 
Model 8 
ε+INST_OW NP10β+
+CEO_OW NP9β+BSIZE8β+FOUNDER7β+DUMMYCEO6β+
+PPE/TA5β+DEBT4β+CASH/TA3β+LOG(TA)2β+TQ1β+0α=CEOPAY
 (8) 
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Model 9 
ε+INST_OW NP10β+
+DIR_OW NP9β+BSIZE8β+FOUNDER7β+DUMMYCEO6β+
+PPE/TA5β+DEBT4β+CASH/TA3β+LOG(TA)2β+TQ1β+0α=CEOPAY
  (9) 
Tables 10.5 and 10.6 show the results of different variants of remuneration 
regressed against TQ, control variables and governance variables, without and with 
company fixed-effects, respectively.  
With fixed-effects, all the coefficients are lower except with the founder and 
R-squared is above 70%.  
 
Executive Remuneration (CEOPAY, HPD, and PAYT) regression on performance, 
TQ and ROA 
Table 10.5 shows the relationship between CEOPAY, HPD and PAYT, as the 
dependent variables, and TQ is positive and statistically significant. The positive 
coefficient are in line with the hypothesised sign and the existing literature (see 
Dong and Ozkan 2008, 25; Sapp 2008, 729). However, Ozkan (2011, 271, 272) find 
that the TQ has a negative coefficient and statistically insignificant impact on the 
levels of CEO cash, and total remuneration, but she does find a positive coefficient 
and statistically significant result using shareholder return variable as the company 
performance measure. Ozkan (2011) results contrast the findings of Ozkan (2007) 
that show that shareholder return has a positive coefficient but statistically 
insignificant influence on CEO cash pay, and total remuneration. However, Ozkan 
(2007, 358-360) show a positive coefficient and significant impact of TQ with CEO 
cash pay, equity based pay and total remuneration.  
 
Table 10.6 shows that the coefficients for the levels of CEOPAY, HPD and 
PAYT are negative and statistically insignificant with ROA as the explanatory 
variable. This is counter intuitive as it means that the companies with lower ROA 
pay their executives higher salaries than those with higher ROA. This suggests that 
the CEO pay estimation is dependent on the measure of company performance 
variable, and firms with higher growth opportunities pay their executives higher 
compensation. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is consistent with TQ but not the accounting 
measure of performance, ROA. Interestingly, Sapp (2008, 729) finds a significant 
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negative relationship with compensation and ROA. Therefore, the association 
between remuneration and performance may be context related, since Sapp (2008) 
uses a sample of the large listed Canadian companies. 
 
Remuneration and company characteristics 
The results show that the association between executive remuneration and 
company size is positive and statistically significant. This confirms the univariate 
analysis that the company size has a positive impact on executive pay. This suggests 
that the executive directors have higher pay levels for larger companies. The results 
are consistent with fixed-effects. The company size has a higher impact on pay, 
compared to TQ since the absolute coefficients for the company size; LOG (TA), is 
greater than that of TQ in Models 1 to 4. The significant and positive association 
between executive compensation and company size is consistent with previous 
studies (Conyon and Murphy 2000; Ozkan 2007, 361; Guest 2010). Table 10.7 
shows that the company size explains between 11%, 12% and 20% of the variation 
in the regressions using CEOPAY, HPD and PAYT, respectively, but only 3% for 
CEOTR. 
 
The regression results in Table 10.5 show that the level of executive 
remuneration is positive with an increase in cash holdings, CASH/TA, but is 
statistically insignificant except for PAYT when it is weakly significant. The results 
are consistent with fixed-effects. Table 10.6, the association between the dependent 
variables, CEOPAT, HPD and PAYT, and CASH/TA is positive and statistically 
significant with and without fixed-effects. 
 
Table 10.5, with DEBT, the results are mixed. The coefficient is positive with 
CEOPAY and statistically significant. Bebchuk et al. (2011) explain the positive 
association that when debt is high, the CEO might need more remuneration With 
HPD and PAYT, the coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant. Adding 
fixed-effects, Panel B, all the coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant. 
The CEO may have greater power to secure higher remuneration as results are 
different with HPD and PAYT.  
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Table 10.5, Panel A, the association of executive remuneration with PPE/TA 
is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the executive management 
prefer to maintain their level of remuneration with less investment in property, plant 
and equipment. However, with fixed effect Panel B, the coefficient for CEOPAY 
changes to positive and is statistically insignificant. HPD and PAYT coefficient 
remains negative but is statistically insignificant. With ROA, Table 10.6, the results 
are similar. 
 
Remuneration and governance variables 
Results show that DUMMYCEO impact on remuneration is mixed. Using 
fixed-effects, it is significant with all definitions of executive remuneration. One 
explanation could be that the additional cost of having the two roles of the CEO and 
chairman separate does not decrease CEO pay, and this is obvious when compared to 
CEOTR used as the dependent variable. Therefore, if the chairman provides weak or 
no monitoring of the CEO PAY, then is there any reason to keep the two roles 
separate? 
 
With the FOUNDER, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
in Table10.5 Panel A. With the fixed-effects, the coefficients are larger and remain 
statistically significant. This result is consistent for ROA in Table 10.6 Panel A. 
With fixed-effects, the coefficients are lower, and CEOPAY is no longer significant. 
This suggests that the Founder as a CEO or member of the board have relatively 
higher say on the remuneration of the directors. 
 
The results in Table 10.5 the relationship between executive remuneration 
and board size is mixed. The results show a positive and weak statistically 
significant, at 10%, relationship with CEOPAY and HPD, but moderately significant 
with PAYT. This result is similar to that by Ozkan (2007); Guest (2010). With fixed-
effects, the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant with CEO and HPD, 
but statistically significant with PAYT. With ROA, the results are similar without 
fixed-effects, but no longer statistically significant with fixed-effects. The 
assumption is that firms with large board size would show a higher proportion of 
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non-executive directors. The results show that large boards offer higher 
remuneration to CEOs, HPD or the board. The results suggest that the CEO is more 
powerful and able to obtain higher remuneration due to poor disciplinary function of 
the non-executive directors. Thus, the results suggest that larger boards are less 
effective in monitoring and more susceptible to influence of CEO power (see Ozkan, 
2007). 
 
The relationship between CEOTR and TQ 
This section discusses the empirical results for AIM companies concerning 
the relationship between CEOTR and firm performance, TQ and ROA. The 
regressions include some of the standard controls used by Bebchuk et al. (2011). 
Their measure of TQ is the ratio of the market to book value of the company. 
 
With CEOTR, Table 10.5 Panel A, the coefficient with TQ is positive and 
statistically insignificant, but with the inclusion of fixed-effects, the coefficient 
direction changes to negative and is statistically significant. Panel A results show 
that CEOTR is negative and statistically significant association with LOG (TA), 
PPE/TA and BSIZE, but positive and statistically significant association with DEBT 
and DUMMYCEO. With CASH/TA and FOUNDER, there is no relationship. Table 
10.5 Panel B with fixed effect, the coefficient with TQ is negative and statistically 
significant. The results show that CEOTR is positively associated with LOG (TA), 
PPE/TA and DUMMYCEO. CEOTR shows no relationship with CASH/TA, DEBT, 
FOUNDER and BSIZE. 
 
Table 10.6 Panel A, the regression of CEOTR on ROA gives a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. The results show a negative and statistically 
significant association between CEOTR with LOG (TA), PPE/TA and BSIZE. The 
results show association between CEOTR with DEBT and DUMMYCEO is positive 
and statistically significant. With DEBT and FOUNDER, there is no relationship. 
Table 10.6 Panel B with fixed effect, the coefficient with ROA is positive and 
statistically insignificant. This contrasts the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2012) who 
find a positive correlation between CEOTR and performance. The results show that 
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CEOTR is positively associated with LOG (TA), PPE/TA and the DUMMYCEO. 
With the remaining control variables, there is no association.  
 
Using the DUMMYCEO control variable equal to one if the CEO and 
Chairman roles are not combined. The regression with the DUMMYCEO, as an 
explanatory variable, shows that when the CEO roles and the Chairman roles are 
separate, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Other results show 
that show the combination of the two roles has higher CEO remuneration include 
Core et al. (1999); Conyon and Murphy (2000); Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
.  
Inclusion of board size, the coefficient of the board size is negative with both 
TQ and ROA as the main explanatory variable. The board size variable is not 
statistically significant when fixed-effects are included. The larger board size 
indicates that there are more non-executive directors thus monitoring the CEO PAY 
or the board pay is high. 
  
Inclusion of DEBT, the coefficient is positive with both TQ and ROA, 
however the statistical significance is observed when firm fixed-effects are not 
included. The inclusion of fixed-effects, the coefficient on performance is negative 
and statistically insignificant. 
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Table 10.5: OLS Regressions of Executive Remuneration on TQ 
εBSIZEβFOUNDERβDUMMYCEOβ
PPE/TAβDEBTβCASH/TAβLOG(TA)βTQβαPay
876
543210


 
Winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; White cross-section 
 Panel A: Without Fixed-effects Panel B With Fixed-effects 
Model 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var: CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR 
         
         C -478.20 -451.15 -1115.26  39.74 -288.35 -309.89 -543.47  28.37 
 [-5.23]** [-3.38]** [-4.80]** [25.30]** [-2.76]** [-5.12]** [-12.19]** [6.06]** 
         
TQ  93.26  118.32  258.21  0.16  87.93  121.21  244.16 -0.13 
 [8.06]** [7.78]** [12.29]** [0.80] [7.22]** [9.85]** [19.03]** [-6.47]** 
         
LOG(TA)  127.05  167.86  405.69 -0.55  112.38  151.19  270.18  2.04 
 [9.95]** [9.18]** [12.60]** [-3.97]** [3.66]** [3.49]** [2.63]** [8.94]** 
         
CASHTA  0.51  0.97  2.55 -0.00  0.03  1.62  7.55 -0.01 
 [1.10] [1.54] [2.33]* [-0.04] [0.07] [1.31] [4.13]** [-0.57] 
         
DEBT  0.96 -0.05 -0.37  0.03 -1.15 -1.74 -1.72 -0.02 
 [2.52]* [-0.09] [-0.48] [40.90]** [-1.51] [-1.23] [-0.43] [-0.77] 
         
PPE/TA -1.27 -1.60 -3.17 -0.06  0.89 -1.31 -2.77  0.08 
 [-4.78]** [-4.96]** [-2.87]** [-8.08]** [1.44] [-0.83] [-0.54] [2.76]** 
         
DUMMYCEO  167.62  28.89 -157.12  15.92  39.36 -89.70 -189.88  8.71 
 [5.23]** [1.19] [-4.86]** [18.35]** [12.58]** [-6.41]** [-3.92]** [7.47]** 
         
FOUNDER  130.16  179.30  379.88 -0.36  206.84  383.87  571.25  0.05 
 [11.44]** [4.83]** [4.37]** [-0.94] [3.01]** [9.45]** [5.60]** [0.01] 
         
BSIZE  12.93  10.71  61.00 -1.61  12.69  10.65  37.36 -0.53 
 [2.20]* [1.98]* [6.37]** [-7.65]** [0.88] [1.44] [2.07]* [-1.71] 
         
         Observations: 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 
R-squared: 0.27 0.26 0.38 0.37 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.87 
F-statistic: 26.32 24.96 44.12 43.28 5.64 4.36 5.19 12.31 
         
         
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  
  324 
 
Table 10.6: OLS Regressions of Executive Remuneration on ROA  
εBSIZEβFOUNDERβDUMMYCEOβ
PPE/TAβDEBTβCASH/TAβLOG(TA)βROAβαPAY
876
543210


 
Winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; White cross-section 
 
 Panel A: Without Fixed-effects Panel B With Fixed-effects 
Models 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var: CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR 
         
         C -330.14 -263.67 -702.51  39.91 -211.51 -233.33 -403.63  28.48 
 [-4.92]** [-2.77]** [-4.07]** [30.03]** [-1.65] [-2.18]* [-2.93]** [5.17]** 
         ROA -1.16 -1.70 -1.41 -0.05 -0.45 -1.46 -3.37  0.01 
 [-1.96] [-1.98]* [-0.64] [-2.96]** [-0.49] [-1.12] [-1.49] [0.26] 
         LOG(TA)  114.37  152.97  361.22 -0.32  119.83  171.05  314.90  1.96 
 [9.03]** [9.57]** [12.72]** [-5.40]** [3.39]** [3.62]** [2.82]** [3.66]** 
         CASHTA  1.76  2.53  6.18 -0.00  1.40  3.65  11.70 -0.01 
 [2.82]** [3.07]** [3.90]** [-0.17] [5.30]** [3.49]** [9.64]** [-0.59] 
         DEBT  0.84 -0.21 -0.69  0.02 -0.24 -0.84 -0.07 -0.02 
 [3.09]** [-0.54] [-0.88] [17.76]** [-0.45] [-0.90] [-0.02] [-1.12] 
         PPETA -1.41 -1.81 -3.33 -0.06  0.10 -2.30 -4.72  0.08 
 [-6.49]** [-7.01]** [-3.51]** [-14.46]** [0.34] [-1.55] [-0.95] [2.40]* 
         DUMMYCEO  147.09  2.62 -212.18  15.84  26.82 -106.81 -224.26  8.73 
 [4.76]** [0.12] [-6.35]** [18.19]** [3.05]** [-17.01]** [-9.09]** [7.46]** 
         FOUNDER  148.10  200.97  438.02 -0.56  54.59  176.00  153.50  0.25 
 [6.78]** [3.82]** [3.67]** [-1.15] [1.09] [2.99]** [1.28] [0.06] 
         BSIZE  15.84  13.95  72.66 -1.70  14.70  13.82  43.94 -0.54 
 [2.53]* [2.42]* [8.35]** [-7.34]** [1.04] [1.91] [2.48]* [-1.66] 
         
         Observations: 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 
R-squared: 0.21 0.20 0.31 0.38 0.73 0.68 0.72 0.87 
F-statistic: 19.01 17.99 32.81 44.20 5.21 4.03 4.81 12.31 
         
         
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 10.7: Regression of executive remuneration and company size 
Winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; 591 observations. White cross-section; 
Without Fixed-effects 
Dep. Var: CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR 
     
     C  15.90 -22.52 -133.47  43.73 
 [0.53] [-0.53] [-1.26] [35.93]** 
LOG(TA)  98.36  129.22  343.16 -1.89 
 [8.20]** [7.47]** [11.68]** [-10.53]** 
     
     R-squared: 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.03 
F-statistic: 72.49 78.52 136.33 15.77 
     
     t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively  
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Remuneration and ownership variables 
Table 10.8 Panel A, without fixed-effects, shows the regression results of 
CEOPAY on the level of CEO ownership, director ownership and institutional 
ownership. With increasing CEO ownership (Model 5), the coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. The direction and the statistical significance remain with 
the inclusion of the institutional ownership (Model 8) in the regression, but the value 
of the coefficient is lower. For the Models 5 and 8 with fixed-effects, Panel B, 
CEO_OWNP is not statistically significant.  
 
With director ownership (Model 6), the regression shows a negative 
coefficient and statistically significant, and with the inclusion of institutional 
ownership (Model 9), the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. With 
the fixed-effects, the coefficient becomes positives in both models and remains 
statistically significant.  
 
In Models 8 and 9, CEOPAY shows no statistical association with 
institutional ownership. This finding is consistent with that of Dong and Ozkan 
(2008, 25). The findings are in line with Cosh and Hughes (1997) who use a dummy 
variable for institutional investors and find that the coefficient is insignificant and 
hence has no impact on the level of CEO PAY. However, Ozkan (2007); (2011) find 
that there is a negative and significant relationship between CEO pay measures, cash 
and total remuneration, and the level of institutional shareholder ownership. Ozkan‘s 
sample consists of large UK companies, and institutional shareholders maybe 
showing more attention to the larger companies and less to the smaller companies on 
AIM. Ozkan (2011) using CEO pay-performance sensitivity of option grants for 
large UK non-financial companies finds a positive and significant influence for 
institutional ownership. The variation in the results, in Table 10.8 and those by 
Ozkan, suggests that the size of the company and the remuneration measure matter. 
Overall, the beta coefficients of the explanatory variables TQ, LOG (TA), 
DUMMYCEO and FOUNDER are positive and statistically significant, indicating 
their critical importance as determinants of executive remuneration. DEBT is 
positive and statistically significant in Panel A and not in Panel B. PPE/TA is 
negative and statistical significant in Panel A without fixed-effects. 
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Table 10.8: OLS Regressions of Remuneration, TQ and Ownership  
Dependent Variable : CEOPAY: All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; 591 observations . OLS regressions include White cross-section  
Model 5 6 7 8 9 5 6 7 8 9 
 Panel A: without fixed-effects Panel B: with fixed-effects 
C -459.91 -452.25 -495.41 -467.17 -471.16 -290.71 -363.14 -246.19 -243.93 -318.16 
 [-5.27]** [-4.77]** [-5.39]** [-5.41]** [-4.96]** [-3.29]** [-3.18]** [-2.08]* [-2.37]* [-2.60]** 
TQ  93.06  91.41  92.93  92.95  91.72  87.97  87.42  86.92  86.88  86.52 
 [8.41]** [7.99]** [8.28]** [8.53]** [7.94]** [7.35]** [7.15]** [6.45]** [6.56]** [6.47]** 
LOG(TA)  129.02  124.23  124.11  127.83  123.08  112.63  120.60  114.99  114.78  122.35 
 [9.71]** [9.37]** [8.62]** [8.46]** [8.62]** [3.70]** [3.57]** [3.49]** [3.56]** [3.49]** 
CASH/TA  0.54  0.50  0.49  0.53  0.48  0.04  0.15 -0.04 -0.05  0.07 
 [1.18] [1.08] [0.97] [1.09] [0.99] [0.07] [0.30] [-0.12] [-0.12] [0.17] 
DEBT  1.27  1.16  0.99  1.27  1.12 -1.16 -1.19 -1.23 -1.23 -1.26 
 [3.09]** [3.18]** [2.54]* [3.05]** [2.99]** [-1.50] [-1.44] [-1.27] [-1.28] [-1.26] 
PPE/TA -1.19 -1.26 -1.23 -1.17 -1.23  0.89  0.71  0.78  0.78  0.63 
 [-4.49]** [-4.86]** [-4.32]** [-4.21]** [-4.40]** [1.42] [1.08] [1.12] [1.11] [0.88] 
DUMMYCEO  168.36  164.16  166.44  167.88  164.37  39.35  40.22  36.10  36.10  37.14 
 [5.72]** [5.05]** [4.93]** [5.46]** [4.97]** [12.31]** [7.94]** [94.68]** [82.32]** [19.25]** 
FOUNDER  135.63  135.27  133.27  136.60  135.87  207.28  195.37  211.76  211.37  200.83 
 [12.08]** [13.30]** [13.13]** [12.67]** [13.96]** [2.90]** [3.08]** [2.78]** [2.68]** [2.86]** 
BSIZE  10.92  12.75  12.45  10.81  12.48  12.73  12.08  14.32  14.29  13.63 
 [1.72] [2.15]* [2.12]* [1.73] [2.15]* [0.89] [0.84] [1.05] [1.06] [1.01] 
CEO_OWNP -4.08  -3.92  0.21  -0.19 
 [-7.14]**  [-4.71]** [0.15]  [-0.12] 
DIR_OWNP -1.10  -0.79  3.22   2.96 
  [-7.91]**  [-2.63]** [3.23]**  [4.03]** 
INST_OWNP   0.85  0.32  0.56  -1.51 -1.51 -1.39 
   [1.69] [0.58] [0.96]  [-1.68] [-1.66] [-1.76] 
R-squared: 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
F-statistic: 25.01 23.63 23.61 22.50 21.31 5.59 5.63 5.63 5.59 5.62 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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The next section repeats Model 5 to 9 using ROA as the performance 
measure. Table 10.9 Panel A shows that the regressing the CEO remuneration gives 
a negative coefficient for CEOPAY on CEO_OWNP and is statistically significant,  
and the results remain consistent with Model 8 with the inclusion of institutional 
ownership holdings. However, the t-statistics is much lower. With the fixed-effects, 
the CEO_OWNP is no longer statistically significant. The negative coefficient 
suggest with the CEO_OWNP indicates that the CEOPAY reduces with increase in 
the CEO shareholdings. One can explain that the CEO is not concerned with the cash 
element of the remuneration package and other perquisites may be more significant 
to them. 
 
Table 10.9 Panel A shows that the coefficient for total director ownership 
holdings is negative and statistically significant. With the inclusion of the fixed-
effects, Panel B, the coefficient with DIR_OWNP becomes positive and is still 
statistically significant. This indicates that the directors as a group are influential in 
deciding their pay package.  
 
Table 10.9 Panel A, Model 7 – the coefficient with institutional shareholding 
is positive and statistically insignificant. With the inclusion of fixed-effects, the 
coefficient for institutional shareholdings becomes negative and statistically 
significant (as predicted in hypothesis 6). The results suggest that institutional 
investors in AIM companies play a complementary role on the CEO or director 
ownership holdings and provide a substitute -monitoring role for CEOPAY 
.  
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Table 10.9: OLS regressions of CEO remuneration, ROA and ownership  
Dependent Variable : CEOPAY: All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; 591 observations . OLS regressions include White cross-section 
 Panel A: Without Fixed-effects Panel B: With Fixed-effects 
Model 5 6 7 8 9 5 6 7 8 9 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
C -312.51 -299.77 -349.51 -322.45 -316.82 -205.90 -295.09 -166.52 -154.97 -245.92 
 [-4.97]** [-4.40]** [-5.14]** [-5.14]** [-4.67]** [-1.86] [-2.04]* [-1.19] [-1.29] [-1.59] 
ROA -0.95 -0.93 -1.15 -0.96 -0.97 -0.45 -0.48 -0.56 -0.57 -0.58 
 [-1.58] [-1.54] [-1.97]* [-1.56] [-1.47] [-0.49] [-0.54] [-0.65] [-0.66] [-0.68] 
LOG(TA)  115.19  109.97  111.19  113.67  109.11  119.26  129.20  124.17  123.14  132.43 
 [8.79]** [8.66]** [7.67]** [7.49]** [7.90]** [3.39]** [3.36]** [3.32]** [3.34]** [3.34]** 
CASH/TA  1.81  1.73  1.73  1.79  1.72  1.39  1.52  1.31  1.30  1.42 
 [2.87]** [2.78]** [2.58]* [2.69]** [2.63]** [5.35]** [4.34]** [6.61]** [7.31]** [5.00]** 
DEBT  1.14  1.10  0.86  1.13  1.06 -0.23 -0.31 -0.40 -0.38 -0.45 
 [3.81]** [3.88]** [2.98]** [3.71]** [3.74]** [-0.41] [-0.50] [-0.54] [-0.50] [-0.57] 
PPE/TA -1.30 -1.37 -1.36 -1.28 -1.35  0.11 -0.09 -0.00  0.01 -0.16 
 [-5.94]** [-6.46]** [-5.65]** [-5.42]** [-5.82]** [0.37] [-0.25] [-0.00] [0.08] [-0.94] 
DUMMYCEO  148.06  143.30  145.88  147.44  143.41  26.88  27.85  23.13  23.19  24.32 
 [5.18]** [4.60]** [4.45]** [4.90]** [4.53]** [2.98]** [3.29]** [2.24]* [2.20]* [2.60]** 
FOUNDER  154.33  155.25  151.44  155.54  155.62  53.67  43.11  62.80  61.14  51.76 
 [7.17]** [7.45]** [7.45]** [7.54]** [7.61]** [1.06] [0.86] [1.25] [1.18] [1.10] 
BSIZE  14.32  15.93  15.31  14.16  15.62  14.61  14.03  16.66  16.52  15.92 
 [2.16]* [2.57]* [2.47]* [2.18]* [2.62]** [1.04] [1.00] [1.24] [1.23] [1.19] 
CEO_OWNP -3.93  -3.71 -0.53  -1.03 
 [-6.14]**  [-3.98]** [-0.30]  [-0.56] 
DIR_OWNP -1.44  -1.14  3.52   3.21 
  [-33.53]**  [-2.56]* [3.81]**  [4.26]** 
INST_OWNP   0.92  0.43  0.51  -1.79 -1.82 -1.67 
   [1.63] [0.68] [0.72]  [-2.80]** [-2.83]** [-3.08]** 
R-squared: 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 
F-statistic: 18.17 17.27 17.13 16.37 15.57 5.17 5.20 5.21 5.17 5.20 
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10.9: Robustness 
In the next section, Models 1 to 4 are repeated using the market 
capitalisation, MKVAL, as an alternative measure of the company size. The results 
show that the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for all measure of 
executive remuneration. 
 
Table 10.10: OLS Regressions of Remuneration and MKVAL  
All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; 591 observations. OLS 
regressions include White cross-section  
 MKVAL is used as a measure of company size 
With Fixed-effects  
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var: CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR 
     
C -144.32 -64.04 -159.95 30.75 
 [-1.50] [-1.01] [-0.62] [8.12]** 
LOG(MKVAL) 110.64 137.57 272.19 1.26 
 [15.24]** [9.06]** [7.52]** [9.05]** 
CASH/TA 0.58 2.41 9.31 -0.03 
 [1.94] [2.41]* [6.25]** [-1.33] 
DEBT -0.22 -0.42 1.05 -0.03 
 [-0.22] [-0.26] [0.24] [-1.19] 
PPETA 1.62 -0.65 -1.04 0.08 
 [4.07]** [-0.43] [-0.20] [2.96]** 
DUMMYCEO 29.48 -102.91 -218.42 8.80 
 [13.95]** [-7.78]** [-5.01]** [7.64]** 
FOUNDER 173.44 313.87 439.61 1.41 
 [3.51]** [9.25]** [6.10]** [0.31] 
CEOOWN 0.43 -0.75 -2.36 0.15 
 [0.35] [-0.24] [-0.31] [2.51]* 
     
BSIZE 10.44 7.88 31.79 -0.56 
 [0.80] [1.37] [2.05]* [-1.87] 
     
     
R-squared: 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.87 
F-statistic: 5.54 4.22 5.04 12.37 
     
    
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The second robustness uses the logarithm of the dependent variable, pay and 
the explanatory variable, performance (see Equation 10.2). This logarithm procedure 
mitigates heteroskedasticity resulting from extreme skewness. Table 10.11 (PANEL 
A) shows the results of the regression of the LOG (PAY) on LOG (TQ). The 
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coefficient is positive and statistically significant with all four measures of pay. The 
R-squared is higher than in regressions that did not use the logarithm form for pay 
and performance. Gabaix and Landier (2008) measure the elasticity by regressing the 
natural logarithm of total pay of the CEO to the logarithm of the market 
capitalisation. Their data contains the top 1,000 companies of the ExecuComp data 
for the period 1992 to 2004 and find that the coefficient is 0.37 without fixed-effects 
and reduces to 0.26 with company fixed effect. They use the market capitalisation as 
a measure of company size. Table 10.1, Panel A, shows that the coefficient of the 
regression of the logarithm of CEOPAY on logarithm of TQ gives a positive 
coefficient of 0.4 without fixed-effects in the regression. With the inclusion of fixed-
effects, Panel B shows that the coefficient reduces to 0.24. These results are in line 
with that of Gabaix and Landier (2008). 
 
Table 10.11 Panel B shows that the regression of logarithm CEOPAY, HPD 
and PAYT on logarithm of TQ has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
but with CEOTR the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. 
. 
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Table 10.11: OLS Regressions Using Logarithms of Pay and Performance 
Dependent Variable: CEOPAY: All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99%; Cross-sections included 197; 591 observations. OLS regressions include White cross-section  
 Panel A: Without Fixed-effects Panel B: With Fixed-effects 
Model 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var:Natural logarithm CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR CEOPAY HPD PAYT CEOTR 
         
C  4.05  4.43  5.02  3.63  4.49  4.85  5.84  3.24 
 [51.96]** [32.56]** [53.37]** [292.79]** [28.27]** [46.36]** [65.86]** [47.00]** 
LOG(TQ)  0.40  0.38  0.37  0.04  0.24  0.21  0.23  0.03 
 [13.65]** [7.77]** [12.40]** [4.53]** [5.93]** [3.89]** [4.70]** [1.86] 
LOG(TA)  0.31  0.34  0.34 -0.03  0.25  0.25  0.19  0.07 
 [25.56]** [22.19]** [26.34]** [-11.92]** [10.34]** [5.34]** [3.57]** [2.15]* 
CASH/TA -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 
 [-2.67]** [1.84] [-0.26] [-2.58]* [-1.71] [4.34]** [4.26]** [-4.08]** 
DEBT  0.00 -0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 [2.78]** [-0.42] [0.49] [6.75]** [-3.21]** [-1.43] [-1.27] [-0.99] 
PPE/TA -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 
 [-12.69]** [-10.81]** [-11.04]** [-12.14]** [2.25]* [-0.89] [-0.85] [1.55] 
DUMMYCEO  0.39 -0.05 -0.18  0.57  0.10 -0.21 -0.20  0.30 
 [8.37]** [-2.13]* [-10.38]** [16.65]** [7.66]** [-6.01]** [-5.79]** [6.30]** 
FOUNDER  0.17  0.19  0.22 -0.03  0.31  0.38  0.22  0.10 
 [8.21]** [4.55]** [8.52]** [-0.94] [1.93] [7.12]** [4.07]** [0.70] 
BSIZE  0.02  0.02  0.07 -0.06  0.02  0.02  0.04 -0.02 
 [2.17]* [8.94]** [31.57]** [-8.44]** [1.41] [4.29]** [4.67]** [-2.20]* 
         
Observations: 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 
R-squared: 0.37 0.40 0.54 0.39 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.84 
F-statistic: 43.02 48.99 86.25 46.71 10.00 7.92 10.37 9.68 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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10.10: Conclusion 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the determinants of executive 
remuneration and analyses the impact of company performance, measured as TQ or 
ROA, (see Mehran 1995, 170) and ownership structure on executive remuneration. 
Executive remuneration measures are CEOPAY, HPD, PAYT and CEOTR. The 
impact of ownership structure on CEO pay is examined using CEO ownership, total 
director ownership and institutional ownership. The control variables are company 
size, debt, cash holdings, board size, founder and dummy variable for the separate 
roles of the CEO and the chairman. 
 
The ordinary least squares method includes fixed-effects to allow for the 
unobserved heterogeneity across companies. The main findings, based on a sample 
of 197 AIM companies, were that company size has a dominant effect in determining 
the level of executive remuneration. The result for a relationship between the pay 
and company size is consistent with the results of previous studies (Conyon and 
Murphy 2000; Lee and Chen 2011; Ozkan 2011). One explanation is that larger 
companies need higher quality directors and need higher pay levels to attract them.  
 
The results confirm the first hypothesis that the relationship between the 
executive pay level and company performance measure of TQ is positive and 
significant. Using an accounting measure, ROA, the results show no association 
between the executive pay and the ROA. 
 
The results confirm the second hypothesis that the relationship between the 
level of executive pay and company size is positive and statistically significant with 
measures of managerial pay and robust with different measures of company size, 
(MKVAL). 
 
The results confirm the third hypothesis regarding the pay distribution in top 
executive, that is, that the relationship between executive remuneration measured as 
the ratio of CEO pay to the total remuneration of the directors (CEOTR) is 
negatively related to TQ and moderately significant. However, as per hypothesis 1, it 
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is not robust to different measures of company performance. This finding contrasts 
that of Bebchuk et al. (2011) who find that using ROA is positive and significant. 
However, the differences may be due to the sample type, number of observations and 
the explanatory variables. 
 
The results do not support the fourth hypothesis since CEOPAY has a 
negative coefficient (the expected direction was positive) and is statistically 
significant without fixed-effects. The results show that with the inclusion of fixed-
effects CEO_OWNP has a positive coefficient but no longer statistically significant. 
With the ownership as the governance variable, the direction of the coefficients does 
not change with the inclusion of different measures of performance in the 
regressions. The findings suggest that the inclusion of a governance variable may 
serve to reduce the agency problems between managers and the company. In this 
case, the increase in CEO_OWNP correlates to a decrease in CEOPAY. Yet 
remuneration can enhance agency costs if it is not monitored (Jensen et al. 2004).  
 
The fifth hypothesis cannot be confirmed, since the results show that when 
fixed-effects are ignored the direction of the coefficient on DIR_OWNP is negative 
and statistically significant. With the inclusion of the fixed-effects, the direction of 
the coefficient reverses and remains statistically significant. 
 
 The results support the sixth hypothesis since CEOPAY has a negative 
relationship to institutional ownership when the fixed-effects are included in the 
regressions. According to Hartzell and Starks (2003) institutional shareholders serve 
a monitoring role in the principal-agent relationship and hence there is a negative 
relationship between the level of remuneration and the institutional shareholder 
ownership level. The results are not statistically significant with TQ, but statistically 
significant with ROA with the fixed-effects. 
 
The findings on company performance, TQ and ROA as proxies for 
performance, suggest that the performance measure has an impact on CEOPAY. The 
implications of CEO pay are that company size matters. This final chapter provides 
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empirical evidence on the determinants of the executive remuneration levels for a 
sample of 197 AIM companies for the period 2008 to 2010. The results indicate that 
ownership type influence the level of CEO compensation and the findings suggest 
that company size matters since larger firms consistently give higher pay levels.  
 
This final chapter provides empirical evidence on the determinants of the 
executive remuneration levels for a sample of 197 AIM companies for the period 
2008 to 2010. The results indicate that ownership type influence the level of CEO 
compensation and the findings suggest that company size matters since larger firms 
consistently give higher pay levels.  
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CHAPTER 11  CONCLUSIONS 
11.1:  Introduction 
There is a paucity of academic studies on the potential impact that the 
adoption of good corporate governance practices may have on company value in 
smaller, growth companies that are quoted on an exchange. This study is important 
because it contributes to filling this gap in our knowledge. Unlike companies seeking 
admission to the main London Stock Exchange market, the companies admitted to 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) are not subject to the UK Listing 
Authority‘s listing rules and face lower regulation. AIM companies are not required 
to follow the recommendations of the UK‘s Corporate Governance Code (2012), 
although, in practice most companies adopt the minimum requirements, following 
the guidance provided by the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA). The QCA 
recommendation contributes highly to better transparency, while at the same time 
reflecting the flexibility of the application of the ‗comply or explain‘ concept. AIM 
constitutes a mix of companies, where the larger companies generally follow the 
UK‘s Corporate Governance Code recommendations, whereas the smaller 
companies barely adhere to the minimum requirements of the QCA guidelines. 
Researching these companies is important because there is evidence that the market 
rewards those companies that adopt good corporate governance practices. 
 
11.2:  Research Questions Answered 
Theoretical questions: 
Taking the previous literature in the field of corporate governance as a 
starting point, can the theoretical approach of agency theory developed mainly in the 
context of large companies, be extended to smaller quoted companies. In particular, 
do we observe in smaller companies quoted on AIM the diffused ownership 
structure, which is, assumed to underlie agency theory as typified in an Anglo-Saxon 
context? 
 
The theoretical prediction that the presence of higher investor protection in 
common law countries, for example, UK, leads to greater ownership dispersion is 
ambiguous (Porta et al. 1999). Because the AIM companies typically exhibit block 
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holdings in their ownership and governance structure, the simplicity of agency 
theory, as shown in Figure 3.1, does not capture the actual structures of AIM 
companies. The research provides support for the wider agency model based on 
controlling or dominant shareholder. 
 
Empirical questions: 
First, does overall corporate governance disclosure show association with 
higher company performance, that is, results from, or with individual attributes of 
corporate governance? 
 
Prior research has used different data sources for the construction of 
corporate governance measure or index. These sources include surveys, 
questionnaires, and third party generated indices. The construction of the corporate 
governance index follows the themes developed by Bruno and Claessens (2007) and 
the guidelines provided by the Combined Code 2008 and the Quoted Companies 
Alliance guidelines (QCA). The results show a nomination committee exists in a 
minority of the AIM companies, however, the duality of the chief executive officer 
(CEO)/chair and the presence of audit and remuneration committees are observed as 
more common features among AIM companies. The results show that the corporate 
governance, measured using a corporate governance score based on company 
governance disclosures, is not associated (in terms of a statistically significant 
relationship) with company performance measured as TQ, ROA and MBV. The 
results also show that corporate governance attributes is not explained well by other 
company specific control variables such as size, growth, and the ratio of capital 
expenditure over sales. Regression of the sub-indices on the company performance, 
the results show that there is no association with any of the sub-indices and TQ, 
except the remuneration sub-index, REM1, shows a weak association with ROA. 
 
Second, what are the determinants of ownership structure for the AIM 
companies? How do different ownership structures affect company performance? 
Theory suggests that executive ownership helps align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders and that large block holders can prevent 
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expropriation by the management. The implication is that concentrated ownership is 
associated with higher company performance. To investigate this, it is first necessary 
to study the factors that determine ownership structures. Various measures of 
ownership were used, and the endogeneity problem (that ownership might be 
dependent on company performance) was addressed by including performance 
measures as explanatory variables. The results suggest that ownership is dependent 
on company size – companies with higher total assets and higher capital intensity, 
tend to have smaller block shareholdings. 
 
Examining the relationship between ownership and company performance, 
the empirical results confirm that there is managerial entrenchment at higher levels 
of ownership. The findings of this study are consistent with the finding of Short and 
Keasey (1999) that managerial ownership has a non-linear relationship with 
performance that implies managerial alignment at lower levels of managerial 
ownership, managerial entrenchment at moderate levels of managerial ownership, 
and alignment again at higher levels of managerial ownership. However, the results 
vary depending on how ownership of the company is defined and measured. I do not 
find conclusive evidence that corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that 
are consistent with improved company performance. 
 
Third, what are the determinants of Chief Executive Officer‘s (CEO) pay for 
companies on the AIM? 
 
The results show that company performance (measured as TQ), control 
variables such as company size and the presence of the founder on the board of 
directors are positively and statistically significant to executive pay. Separation of 
the Chairman and CEO roles has a significant impact on executive pay, but the 
direction of the relationship varies depending on which measure of the executive 
remuneration is used. However, the results are not robust with ROA as a measure of 
company performance.  
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11.3: Research Limitations 
The first limitation is that this thesis focuses on the arguably narrow 
theoretical view that the agency problem exists between the management and the 
shareholders and often between the single agent, the CEO and the shareholders as the 
principal. Corporate governance has been discussed in the research literature using 
different theories (described in Chapter 3). Although, AIM companies are not 
dispersed compared to the large companies on the main market and hence there will 
be less of the traditional agency problems. However, under the more concentrated 
ownership, or presence of large shareholders there is likely that the expropriation 
problem shifts to the large shareholders. The potential clash of objectives includes 
that between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders. Academic authors 
have debated whether companies should be run solely in the interests of shareholders 
or whether the interests of other stakeholders, that is, any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the organisation‘s objectives (Freeman 1984). Therefore, 
the other legitimate stakeholders should also be considered. The institutional 
regulation, advocates the supremacy of the shareholder interest should be 
maintained, but faintly touches legitimately on the other stakeholders. 
 
The second limitation is the method used in this study, which is 
predominantly a quantitative study of published data. Therefore, this study largely 
ignores any nuances specific to individual companies or the actors within the 
companies. Although qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews would 
involve a smaller sample size compared to the quantitative method used in this 
thesis, they may ultimately disclose more about the effectiveness of the decision-
making strategies of the key players in the companies. 
 
The third limitation is the method for analysing the empirical data, which has 
mainly used the ordinary least squares regression approach (OLS). Recent 
developments in corporate governance research use other models besides the OLS. 
These include the two stage least squares (2SLS) and three stage least squares 
(3SLS) regression analyses, which are utilised in order to address the issues of 
endogeneity. The econometric analysis used both 2SLS and 3SLS in Chapters 9 and 
10, but the results did not find any substantial differences in the coefficient values in 
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comparison with the results of the OLS. Using a larger sample and focusing on the 
larger companies on the AIM may lead to different results. For example, Farag et al. 
(2014, 10-12) using 271 AIM companies do find a significant relationship between 
corporate governance attributes and accounting performance measure, return on 
assets, but do not find any relationship between venture capitalist ownership and 
both financial performance and corporate governance. 
 
The fourth limitation is the sample size issue particularly affected the 
findings in Chapter 8, as the data had to be manually collected. Hence, the results 
reported in Chapter 8 uses a smaller sample size compared to the other two empirical 
chapters, and compared to other researchers whose sample sizes are much larger. 
The small sample size in Chapter 8 came about due to delisting from the AIM or 
corporate data were missing. The results did not show any relationship between the 
corporate governance and company performance, and this may be due to the bias in 
the selection of the sample as the later chapters with larger sample size did have a 
relationship. In addition, the small sample size may reduce the statistical power of 
tests. 
 
11.4: Contributions 
From the above, this thesis draws out three broad potential contributions. The 
first of these is that this work contributes to the existing work on corporate 
governance by filling the gap between the larger main market and the second tier 
stock exchange, within a common law legal system (discussed in Chapter 5). The 
contextualised and detailed account of corporate governance in the UK and the AIM 
companies should be of interest to academics concerned about the potential of 
corporate governance research and its practical implications within second tier 
markets, such as AIM, as it is characterised by different regulatory requirements 
compared with the London Stock Exchange‘s main market. A feature of the AIM is 
the use of nominated advisers in their monitoring capacity is an important factor for 
the AIM companies. This should also be of interest to those who consider that 
corporate governance practices may be converging but are still largely dependent on 
the national attributes, as well as idiosyncrasies of individual companies and their 
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management. I have used the development of governance theories, development of 
the corporate governance codes in the UK and the factors that contribute to 
ownership concentration to help understand the gap between the main market and the 
AIM. The research findings highlight that the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis of 
dispersed ownership may not be generalisable to the smaller quoted companies. The 
problems of corporate governance involving an agent remain but have now shifted to 
include the blockholders and the minority shareholders as the principal-agent 
relationship.  
 
The second contribution in this thesis adds to the series of empirical research 
that have examined disclosure with best practice provisions of the corporate 
governance code at country level, and it adds to this knowledge by providing 
evidence using AIM companies and by evaluating the relationship between 
ownership structure and company performance.  
 
The third contribution in this thesis adds to the body of research that looks 
into executive remuneration. This thesis adds to this knowledge, first, by considering 
the determinants of the chief executive remuneration and, second, by offering more 
evidence on the relationship between the executive remuneration and company 
performance for the AIM companies. 
 
11.5: Further Work 
There are potentially four areas for future work. The AIM has been 
successfully in existence since 1995. As the regressions in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 show 
that there are missing variables, this suggests that there is need for further research to 
augment the  explanations by investigating whether managerial attributes such as 
age, tenure and education can affect company performance. Therefore, future work 
might involve longitudinal studies of whether individual managers affect corporate 
behaviour and performance. 
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There is a large amount of literature that argues that the industry is an 
important determinant of governance outcomes (see Chancharat et al. 2012, 145). 
Given that a large part of AIM consists of mining and oil and gas companies, this 
suggests a second line for future research, which would determine the extent to 
which industry determines governance structures, and indirectly the performance of 
AIM companies. 
 
The study of AIM, in this thesis, is a single case study of governance, 
ownership and performance of companies on the second tier stock exchange. New 
second tier markets have been appearing in other countries, and a third line of future 
research may involve both exploratory studies of these new markets and comparative 
investigations to determine the extent to which findings relating to AIM can be 
generalised more widely to other second tier markets. 
 
The London Stock Exchange and the government have emphasised the soft 
touch regulation and use of self-regulation. The ownership and control structures in 
large companies have been extensively analysed by several authors such as Hart 
(1995). This analysis assumes that a corporation‘s control exists centrally via a 
unitary board system in the UK. However, the issues of related parties due to their 
influence/control may organise governance structures, which may lead to 
expropriation of corporation assets due to managerial power. Therefore, the policy 
makers may want to recommend stricter adoption of the country‘s corporate 
governance codes for the second tier exchanges, compared to the current less rigid 
rules and, thereby, protect the minority shareholders. Therefore, there is a need to 
revisit the existing work from the regulation perspective. 
 
11.6: Conclusions 
This chapter began with identifying a gap in the corporate governance 
literature. It then answered the research questions, on the theoretical aspects as to 
whether agency theory can be extended to smaller quoted companies. It then 
answered three empirical questions relating to the following: first, whether overall 
corporate governance disclosure is associated with higher company performance, 
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that is, results from, or with individual attributes of corporate governance. Second, 
the determinants of ownership structure, and, third, the determinants of CEO pay. 
The thesis contributes to the understanding of the gap between theoretical corporate 
governance and corporate governance in practice, and each of the three empirical 
chapters document previously untold behaviour of smaller listed companies, which 
may contribute to corporate governance literature in general. This thesis contributes 
to the use of agency theory in the field of corporate governance in smaller listed 
companies, new regulatory recommendations requiring a shift from the current 
flexible adoption of corporate governance practices and the reduced regulatory 
requirements compared to the LSE main market. The thesis was concluded with a 
discussion on four potential areas for future research: additional research to include 
management attributes, industry influence, empirical case studies into the gap 
between corporate governance practices within the main market and the second tier 
market in different countries, and, finally, revisit the existing work from the 
regulation perspective.
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1:  List of official AIM Nominated Advisers (Nomads) 
Nominated Advisers (Nomads) Nominated Advisers (Nomads) 
Allenby Capital Limited Libertas Capital Corporate Finance Limited 
Altium Capital Limited Liberum Capital Limited 
Arden Partners plc Macquarie Capital (Europe) Limited 
Beaumont Cornish Limited Merrill Lynch International 
Cairn Financial Advisers LLP Nomura Code Securities Limited 
Canaccord Genuity Hawkpoint Partners Limited Northland Capital Partners Limited  
Canaccord Genuity Limited Nplus1 Singer Advisory LLP 
Cantor Fitzgerald Europe  Numis Securities Limited 
Cenkos Securities Plc Oriel Securities Limited 
Charles Stanley Securities Panmure Gordon (UK) Limited 
Citigroup Global Markets Limited Peel Hunt LLP 
Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
Daniel Stewart & Company plc RBC Europe Limited 
Davy Corporate Finance RFC Ambrian Group trading as RFC Ambrian 
Deloitte Corporate Finance Sanlam Securities UK Limited  
Deutsche Bank AG Seymour Pierce Limited (in administration) 
Execution Noble & Company Ltd Shore Capital & Corporate Limited 
FinnCap Ltd Smith & Williamson Corporate Finance Limited 
Fox-Davies Capital Ltd SP Angel Corporate Finance LLP  
Goldman Sachs International SPARK Advisory Partners Limited  
Grant Thornton UK LLP Strand Hanson Limited 
HSBC Bank plc UBS Limited 
Investec Bank Plc W.H. Ireland Limited 
J. P. Morgan Securities Plc Westhouse Securities Limited 
Jefferies International Limited  ZAI Corporate Finance Limited 
 Zeus Capital Limited 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
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APPENDIX 2:  List of 56 companies used in Chapter 8 
Company Name Company Name Company Name 
ACM Shipping Group ADL Advanced Medical Solution 
Albermarle & Bond Alkane Energy Alternative Networks 
Antrim Energy Inc Belgravium Technologies Capital Pub Co 
Catalytic Solutions Inc CBG Group China Biodiesel Intl Hldg Co Ltd 
CSS Stellar Plc Dart Group Plc Dawnay Day Treveria 
Energiser Investments Plc Fieldbury Plc Finders Resources 
Finsbury Food Group Plc Fulcrum Pharma GW Pharmaceuticals 
Imagelinx Plc Intercede Group Lancashire Hldgs 
Latham(James) Leyshon Resources LPA Group 
Majestic Wines  Plc Motivcom Newmark Security 
Personal Group Hldgs Pittards Plexus Hldgs 
RAB Capital Real Estate Investors RWS Hldgs 
Sefton Resources Inc Simigon Ltd Slimma 
Sopheon Sovereign Reversions Strategic Thought Group 
Synchronica Plc Tanzanite One Thirdforce 
Tottenham Hotspur Plc Touch Group Trading Emissions 
West China Cement Ltd Wynnstay Group Xploite Plc 
YM Biosciences Inc Young & Co's Brewery Zenergy Power Plc 
Zoo Digital Group Plc Zytronic 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
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APPENDIX 3: List of 131 companies used in Chapter 9 
Company Name Company Name Company Name Company Name 
2 Ergo Group Abbey Plc Abcam Accsys Technologies 
ACM Shipping Group 
Plc 
Advanced Medical 
Solutions Group 
Akers Biosciences Inc All Leisure Group Plc 
Alternative Networks Amiad Filtration 
Systems 
Amino Technologies Andor Technology 
Asian Citrus Hldgs ASOS plc Augean Avanti Communications 
Group Plc 
Avocet Mining - 
Replaced European 
Goldfields 
Billing Services Group Blinkx Plc Cape Plc 
Caretech Hldgs Plc Ceres Power Hldgs Character Group China Shoto 
Churchill China Cohort Colefax Group Colliers Cre 
Concurrent 
Technologies 
CPL Resources Cropper(James) Cryo-Save Group Nv 
CVS Group Plc Dart Group Plc Datatec Desire Petroleum 
Discovery Metals Ltd DM Plc Education Development 
Intl 
Eros International 
Firestone Diamonds First Property Group Forte Energy Nl Fyffes 
Goals Soccer Centres Green Dragon Gas Ltd Group NBT GTL Resources 
Gulf Keystone 
Petroleum 
Gw Pharmaceuticals Hamworthy Plc Hargreaves Services 
Healthcare Locums Plc Helius Energy Plc Highland Gold Mining Hotel Corp(The) 
Hutchison China 
Meditech 
Huveaux Plc    (Dods) Ideal Shopping Direct Immunodiagnostic 
Systems Hldgs 
Immupharma International Greetings Iomart Group IQE Plc 
James Halstead Kalahari Minerals Kbc Advanced 
Technologies 
Latham(James) 
Lidco Group Lombard Medical 
Technologies 
M&C Saatchi M.P.Evans Group 
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Company Name Company Name Company Name Company Name 
Majestic Wine Plc Maple Energy Plc May Gurney Integrated 
Services 
Medusa Mining Ld 
Modern Water Plc Monitise Plc Mulberry Group N.W.F Group 
Nature Group Plc Netplay TV Plc Nichols Origin Enterprises Plc 
Oxford Advanced 
Surfaces Gr Plc 
Park Plaza Hotels Ltd Peel Hotels Petra Diamonds 
Phorm Inc Pittards Plant Health Care Platinum Australia Ltd 
Playtech Ltd Plexus Hldgs Portmeirion Group Powerflute OYJ 
Prezzo Provexis Proximagen 
Neuroscience 
Rcg Hldgs Ltd 
Rotala Rurelec Scapa Group Plc Silverdell Plc 
Sinclair(William)Hldgs Skywest Airlines Ltd Snacktime Plc Software Radio 
Technology 
Sqs Software Quality 
Systems Ag 
Sterling Energy Straight Plc Sutton Harbour Hldgs 
Swallowfield Tanfield Group Telford Homes The Stanley Gibbons 
Group Plc 
Thorpe(F.W.) Toluna Total Produce Plc Tottenham Hotspur Plc 
Toumaz Hldgs Ld Vertu Motors Plc Vinaland Walker Greenbank 
Wynnstay Group Yougov Young & Co's Brewery Zenergy Power Plc 
Zetar Plc Velosi Ltd (available for 2008 
and 2009) 
System C Healthcare (available 
for 2008 and 2009) 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
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APPENDIX 4:  List of 197 companies used in Chapter 10 
Company Name Company Name Company Name Company Name 
21st Century Technology 
plc. 
Abcam Plc ACM Shipping Group 
plc 
Acta SpA 
Active Risk Group PLC Advanced Medical 
Solutions Group plc 
Advanced Power 
Components plc 
ADVFN plc 
Agriterra Limited Akers Biosciences Inc. Alliance Pharma plc Allocate Software plc. 
Alternative Networks Plc Altitude Group plc Amino Technologies 
plc 
Amphion Innovations 
plc 
Andor Technology plc ANGLE Plc Anglo Asian Mining 
PLC 
ANT Plc. 
AorTech International plc Arden Partners Plc. Arian Silver 
Corporation 
Armour Group plc 
Artisan UK plc ASBISc Enterprises 
Plc 
Asia Digital Holdings 
plc 
Asian Citrus Holdings 
Ltd 
ATH Resources plc Augean plc Avesco Group plc Biome Technologies 
plc 
Bond International 
Software plc 
Brady plc Byotrol plc Camco International 
Limited 
CareCapital Group Plc Caretech Holdings 
PLC 
Cello Group Plc Celtic plc 
Chamberlin plc China Shoto Plc City of London 
Investment Group PLC 
Clover Corp. Ltd. 
Coolabi PLC CPL Resources plc Crimson Tide Plc Dart Group plc 
Datatec Ltd. DCD Media plc Deltex Medical Group 
plc 
Desire Petroleum plc 
Driver Group, PLC Ebiquity plc Eckoh Plc Education Development 
International plc 
EnCore Oil Plc e-pay Asia Limited eServGlobal Ltd. Eurogold Ltd. 
Falkland Islands 
Holdings plc 
Faroe Petroleum plc Fiske Plc. Forte Energy NL 
Fyffes plc GB Group plc GCM Resources Plc Gippsland Ltd. 
Global Energy 
Development plc 
Goals Soccer Centres 
plc 
Gooch & Housego plc Group NBT plc 
Gulf Keystone Petroleum 
Ltd. 
GW Pharmaceuticals 
plc 
Hargreaves Services Plc Hasgrove PLC 
Havelock Europa plc Hutchison China 
MediTech Ltd. 
Hydro International plc Hydrogen Group PLC 
Ideal Shopping Direct Plc IDOX plc ILX Group plc Imagelinx plc 
Immedia Group PLC Imperial Innovations InterBulk Group plc Intercede Group plc 
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Company Name Company Name Company Name Company Name 
Interior Services Group 
plc 
Iomart Group plc IS Solutions plc Jacques Vert plc 
James Cropper plc Jelf Group Just Car Clinics Group 
Plc 
KBC Advanced 
Technologies plc 
LiDCO Group plc Lighthouse Group plc Livermore Investments 
Group 
Lok'n Store Group plc 
LPA Group plc M&C Saatchi plc Manganese Bronze 
Holdings plc 
Mariana Resources Ltd. 
Matchtech Group plc Mattioli Woods plc Mediwatch plc Metalrax Group plc 
Metrodome Group plc Mid-States plc Morson Group plc MTI Wireless Edge 
Ltd. 
Murgitroyd Group plc Mwana Africa PLC Nationwide Accident 
Repair Services plc 
NetPlay TV plc 
Next Fifteen 
Communications Group 
plc 
Nichols plc Norman Broadbent Plc Northbridge Industrial 
Services PLC 
Numis Corporation plc OMG plc OOH Media Group Ltd. Patsystems plc 
Peel Hotels plc Penna Consulting plc Pennant International 
Group plc 
Petra Diamonds Ltd. 
PetroLatina Energy Plc Pilat Media Global plc PipeHawk plc Plant Health Care 
Playtech Limited PLUS Markets Group 
plc 
Portmeirion Group plc Prezzo plc 
Printing.com plc Provexis plc Proximagen Group plc Rambler Metals & 
Mining PLC 
Razor Risk Technologies 
Limited. 
Red24 plc Regal Petroleum plc Regency Mines Plc 
Regenersis plc Renew Holdings Plc Rockhopper 
Exploration plc 
Rotala PLC 
RTC Group plc Sarantel Group PLC Scapa Group plc SciSys plc 
Serabi Mining Plc ServicePower 
Technologies plc 
SimiGon Ltd. Software Radio 
Technology plc 
Solid State plc Sound Oil Plc ST Barbara Ltd. Staffline Group plc 
StatPro Group plc Sterling Energy plc Straight plc Summit Corporation plc 
Surgical Innovations 
Group plc 
Sutton Harbour 
Holdings plc 
Swallowfield plc Sylvania Resources Ltd. 
Symphony 
Environmental 
Technologies Plc 
Synairgen Synchronica PLC Taihua Plc 
Tanfield Group plc Tangent 
Communications PLC 
Telford Homes plc Telit Communications 
PLC 
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Company Name Company Name Company Name Company Name 
The 600 Group PLC The Stanley Gibbons 
Group plc 
Tikit Group plc Timeweave plc 
Tricorn Group plc Tristel Plc UBC Media Group plc Ukrproduct Group Ltd. 
Ultrasis plc United Carpets Group 
PLC 
Universe Group plc Volvere plc 
Walcom Group Ltd Walker Greenbank plc Webis Holdings Plc Workplace Systems 
International plc 
Young & Co's Brewery 
plc 
Zenergy Power PLC Zetar Plc Zoo Digital Group plc 
Zytronic plc    
Source: London Stock Exchange 
 
